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Abstract
This thesis examines the history of wind power in Australia from the late 1970s to the early
2000s, informed by the body of theory k n o w n as the Social Shaping of Technology (SST).
Until recently, wind power played a negligible role in power generation apart from for
remote area power supplies. Following the introduction of two renewable energy support
mechanisms in the late 1990s, Australia experienced the beginnings of a 'wind rush'.

It is argued that the treatment of wind power should be explained using a synthesis of a
contextual historical approach and an interpretive approach.

The contextual approach focuses on the structure of and changes to the Australian
electricity sector, and the evolution of environment policy. It highlights the importance of
plentiful, cheap electricity supplies for Australia's economy. M u c h of Australia has
abundant fossil fuel and hydro resources, and wind power was regarded as too expensive to
be a viable alternative. Exceptions included windy remote areas, where wind power could
supplant diesel fuel, and for a time some state grids, w h e n future supply of conventional
fuels looked uncertain. During the 1990s, the greenhouse effect became a public policy
issue, in effect redefining the meaning of wind power as a greenhouse gas-free energy
source. F r o m the mid 1990s, the electricity sector was restructured: the electricity utilities
were disaggregated, corporatised and in some cases privatised; and a National Electricity
Market w a s introduced. Falling electricity prices initially m a d e it more difficult for wind
power to compete with electricity from conventional fuels. F r o m the late 1990s, green
power schemes and a Mandatory Renewable Energy Target were introduced, providing a
n e w market for wind power and other forms of renewable energy. The thesis shows h o w
attempts to introduce wind power facilities were influenced by these contextual features.

However, this does not enable adequate explanation of attitudes towards wind power, or
debates over h o w wind power should be deployed. Thus the contextual analysis is
integrated with an analysis of h o w different actors have interpreted wind power during the
period under examination. The thesis explores two themes that have emerged from analysis
of the positions taken by protagonists: the interpretation of wind power as an environmental
technology, drawing on literature in Environmental Sociology; and the interpretation of the
technical capability of wind power in the electricity grid, drawing on literature in the Social
Construction of Technology.

xiv
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Thefirstinterpretative theme deals with the construction and evolution of the idea of an
environmental technology. In the 1970s and early 1980s, m a n y environmentalists depicted
wind power as an 'alternative technology', a holistic notion incorporating visions of
sociopolitical change. These visions have changed over time, as wind power has
increasingly come to be regarded by governments, business and sections of the environment
movement as potentially offering n e w business opportunities. Renewable energy support
mechanisms introduced as part of greenhouse policies have accelerated this trend. Yet, as
the number of planned wind power installations has increased, a movement opposed to the
development of wind farms in scenic areas has also grown. This opposition has highlighted
the tension between local and global environmental protection.

The second interpretative theme deals with the technical capability of wind power in the
electricity grid. Unlike most conventional energy sources, which are predictable,
controllable and centralised, wind power is intermittent, relatively unpredictable and
diffuse. Electricity supply and use patterns, and practices in the electricity industry have
evolved around the characteristics of conventional energy sources. There have been debates
about h o w wind power's technical characteristics impact on wind power's value to the grid
and h o w it should be deployed. This thesis draws on the concept of interpretative flexibility,
which has been used to illustrate h o w negotiations over the technical meaning of a n e w
technology shape its design and usage patterns. At the time of writing, no clear consensus
has emerged.

The thesis demonstrates that no simple explanatory framework can deal with the complexity
of the history of wind power in Australia. It argues that a contextual historical approach can
be integrated with interpretive approaches to provide a more comprehensive account of the
fortunes of this n e w technology. While the thesis does not directly address the policy
question of h o w greater usage of wind power could be advanced, it concludes by asking
what would have had to be different in order for wind power to have been more widely
adopted, and what lessons wind power advocates can draw from this study.
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Chapter 1: General Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Over the past few decades, calls for more environmentally benign production and
consumption patterns have become more widespread. The belief that this can be achieved
through

replacing

conventional

technologies

with

more

environmentally

benign

technologies has also become commonplace. Today, not only environmentalists but also
sections of business, government and the public hold these views, and s o m e see such
technologies as a major growth area of the future. Yet the replacement of conventional
technologies with more environmentally benign alternatives is still the exception rather than
the rule. M y intention in this thesis is to explore h o w w e can explain usage patterns of more
environmentally benign technologies, drawing on the body of theories and concepts k n o w n
as the 'social shaping of technology'.

Although different labels have been used to describe technologies that are valued for having
reduced environmental impact compared with conventional technologies, for the purposes
of analysis they can be grouped together as a category, which I call 'environmental
technologies'.1 Examples are manufacturing processes and/or products that require less
usage of resources or hazardous materials than those that they are intended to replace,
processes/products whose by-products are less hazardous, and processes/products that rely
on renewable rather than depleting resources. 'Environmental technology' is thus an
analyst's category; yet, m a n y would recognise this category under labels including 'clean',
'alternative', 'green', 'pollution-free' and 'environmentally-friendly'. S o m e commentators
also differentiate between 'end-of-pipe' and 'clean' technologies: respectively, those that
clean up environmental problems after they have been created, and those that do not create
the environmental problems caused by the technologies they replace.2 Although I recognise
that the division between the two is not always clear-cut,3 the category as I construct it does
not include those usually regarded as end-of-pipe.

There is no consensus about what constitutes an environmental technology, and in some

Of course, such technologies also have social and cultural aspects.
Anthony Clayton, Graham Spinardi and Robin Williams, Policies for Cleaner Technology: A New
Agenda for Government and Industry, Earthscan, London, 1999.
ibid.
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instances there is clear contention. For example, the 'green car', championed by the
automotive industry, represents to s o m e environmentalists a travesty of the idea; similarly
nuclear power is sometimes touted as a greenhouse-friendly energy source, yet it is a longstanding target of the environment movement. Aside from such controversial examples, I
argue that the label 'environmental technology' is intended to evoke an image of
desirability—it is a normative label. M y further aim is to deconstruct the label, to ask what
meanings different sections of society ascribe to it, h o w and w h y these meanings have
developed and changed over time, and h o w differing conceptions have shaped usage
patterns of technologies labelled as such.

Many analysts of what I am calling environmental technology investigate how the
innovation of environmental technologies can be fostered, or the usage of existing
environmental technologies advanced.4 The aim here is not to address these policy concerns
directly, but to inquire into usage patterns. H o w , w h y and by w h o m are environmental
technologies adopted or rejected? T o what extent is the marginal status of environmental
technologies inevitable?5 If, as theorists of the social shaping of technology affirm, w e
should

reject determinist views

of technological

change

and

instead

emphasise

contingency—that things could have been different, that w e have choices about our
technological future—why is one path chosen and not another?6

Exploring these questions requires substantial empirical investigation. In this thesis, I focus
on explaining usage patterns of wind power, a technology that is widely, though not
universally, regarded as an environmentally benign alternative to conventional electricity
generation technologies. W i n d p o w e r — t h e direct harnessing of wind energy for electricity
generation using a wind turbine 7 —has been used to achieve a variety of goals, but it is its
purported capability to contribute to various environmental objectives that has principally

6

7

See for example, Paul Weaver, Leo Jansen, Geert van Grootveld, Egbert van Spiegel and Philip
Vergragt, Sustainable Technology Development, Greenleaf, Sheffield, 2000; Remco Hoogma, Rene
Kemp, Johan Schot and Bernhard Truffer, Experimenting for Sustainable Transport - The Approach
ofStrategic Niche Management, Spon Press, London, 2002.
See also Offe on social-structurally, accidentally, and systematically excluded events. Claus Offe,
"Structural problems of the capitalist state", in K. von Beyme (ed.), German Political Studies 1, Sage[
London, 1974.
Stewart Russell, "Writing energy history: explaining the neglect of C H P / D H in Britain", British
Journal of the History of Science, Vol. 26, 1993, pp. 33-54; Donald MacKenzie, Knowing Machines:
Essays on Technical Change, M I T Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1996, chapter 2.
The terms wind generator and aerogenerator are also used.
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motivated its supporters. M y focus is on the recent history of wind power in Australia.

This thesis can claim originality in several ways. First, applying 'social shaping of
technology' theory to an analysis of the history of wind power in Australia comprises an
original contribution. Second, the thesis includes thefirstsubstantial history of wind power
in Australia, a history informed by the theoretical framework adopted. Third, other accounts
of the Australian institutional context for wind p o w e r — t h e electricity sector and renewable
energy policy—have been limited and insufficient for explaining the treatment of wind
power. T h e thesis also includes a comprehensive history of this institutional context.

1.2 Case Study: Wind Power in Australia
H o w useful is a study of wind power in explaining usage patterns of environmental
technologies? In other words, h o w typical is wind power of environmental technologies?
W i n d power has some features that need to be considered w h e n drawing more general
conclusions. First, in the main it is not a consumer technology: few people buy a wind
power system for their o w n use.8 T h e role of wind power is in electricity supply, a service
until recently provided primarily by the state; hence the influence of industry and
consumers in the adoption of wind power had been limited mainly to indirect means. 9
However, this has changed since the mid 1990s, as the Australian electricity supply industry
has been liberalised, and consumers have been given some choice over electricity
generation options. Second, since interest in environmentally benign technologies took off
in the early 1970s, wind machines have been regarded by m a n y as almost the archetype of
the category 'environmental technology'. This has m u c h to do with their distinctive and
simple shapes; m a n y publications about environmental technologies feature the image of a
wind turbine or windmill.10 Thus, most people would readily associate wind power with the
category 'environmental technology' and this association is a relatively long-lived one. This
is in contrast to the status of newer and more obscure environmental technologies (such as

8

In later chapters I discuss briefly the use of small-scale wind power in remote area power su
individual properties.
9
Increasing the uptake of more environmentally benign consumer technologies may present other
difficulties. See the discussion about barriers to sustainable transport, including cultural and
psychological factors, in Rene Kemp, Johan Schot and Remco Hoogma, "Regime shifts to
sustainability through processes of niche formation: the approach of strategic niche management",
Technology Analysis and Strategic Management, Vol. 10, No. 2,1998, pp. 175-195.
10
See for example the case of David Dickson, Alternative Technology and the Politics of Technical
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manufacturing processes). Third, wind power projects are both supported and opposed on
environmental grounds. W i n d power can be depicted as sitting at the intersection of global
and local environmental issues.11 Environmentalists concerned about global environmental
issues, particularly climate change, typically support wind power as an energy source that
does not emit greenhouse gases. Those concerned with local environmental issues m a y
oppose wind power for degrading the visual amenity of the countryside or because they can
kill birds. Such opponents have been remarkably successful at stopping wind power
developments in some countries.

Wind power is currently one of the world's fastest growing energy technologies. The
modern era of wind system innovation began after the 1970s oil shocks, and wind power is
n o w acknowledged by m a n y in the electricity industry as a mature and reliable technology.
Yet in Australia it plays a negligible role in electricity generation: until the late 1990s, there
were only a few grid-connected wind systems. After two mechanisms to encourage greater
use of renewable electricity were introduced in the late 1990s, the number of wind
installations being planned or under construction grew significantly.13

How is this very low usage of wind power in Australia usually explained? Commonly,
energy analysts, particularly in the electricity industry, have maintained that so little use is
m a d e of wind power in Australia because it is too expensive and because its undesirable
technical characteristics (particularly its intermittency) limit its value to the grid. While not
denying the significance of cost as a barrier, nor wind's intermittency as limiting the
penetration of wind power in an electricity system, I regard such an explanation as
problematic for several reasons. First, it takes the meaning of wind power's characteristics
as given, as unequivocal. Second, it begs the question of what is the basis of energy
decision-making

in the electricity industry. Third, it disregards the sociotechnical

characteristics of the existing electricity system. W i n d power does not form the basis of a
n e w electricity system, but has tofitinto an existing one, and could well be disadvantaged
because of some incompatibility with current arrangements.

Change, Fontana/Collins, London, 1974.
David Elliott, Energy, Society and Environment, Routledge, London, 1997.
For example, in the period 1999 to 2001 the annual growth rate in worldwide operating wind was
over 35%. Based onfiguresobtained from Wind Power Monthly.
These mechanisms are green power and a mandatory renewable energy target. They are discussed in
chapters 6, 7 and 8. The growth in Australia's wind capacity under these mechanisms is discussed in
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A s described in this thesis, advocates of wind power, particularly environmentalists, have at
times challenged these conventional explanations: they have presented alternative
assessments of the cost and technical capability of wind power; they have argued that
decision-making in the electricity industry has often been premised on the quest for growth
and continued exploitation of local fossil fuel and hydro resources rather than least-cost
considerations; and they have proposed alternative configurations of electricity systems that
would be more compatible with the characteristics of wind power. Their explanation for the
neglect of wind power has thus focused on institutional barriers that disadvantage wind
power and other renewables, relative to conventional forms of power generation.14
Advocates of wind power have often singled out the electricity utilities for criticism,
accusing them of favouring conventional fuels and thus being biased against wind power.
Entrenched practices in the electricity industry; the utilities' preference for large, centralised
power stations; their commitment to growth; their virtual monopoly position in electricity
supply; their predominantly supply-side focus: all have been considered obstacles to the
deployment of wind power.

Examining institutional barriers has been one of the approaches used by sociologists of
technology and evolutionary economists w h e n explaining the success or failure of other
n e w technologies.15 These analysts have argued that the technological characteristics and
economics of n e w technologies are not sufficient explanations for the treatment of a n e w
technology. Rarely are n e w technologies cheaper at the outset than those they are intended
to displace. Often n e w technologies are not initially regarded as technically superior;
similarly, m a n y inventions that would probably have met a popular need do not reach the
marketplace.16 For example, in her study of the rivalry between the domestic gas and
electric refrigerators, Ruth Schwartz C o w a n argued that the electric refrigerator succeeded

14

15
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chapter 8.
Andrew Blakers, T o m Crawford, Mark Diesendorf, Geoff Hill and Hugh Outhred, The Role of Wind
Energy in Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Opportunities and Benefits for the Australian Wind
Energy Industry, Department of the Arts, Sport, the Environment, Tourism and Territories, Canberra,
1991; Gavin Gilchrist, The Big Switch: Clean Energy for the Twenty-first Century, Allen & Unwin,
St. Leonards, N S W , 1994; Australian Cogeneration Association, Removing Impediments to
Cogeneration and Renewable Generation in the National Electricity Market, Melbourne, June 2000.
For example Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman (eds), The Social Shaping of Technology, Open
University Press, Milton Keynes, 1985; Hoogma et al, 2002, op. cit.
Ruth Schwartz Cowan, " H o w the refrigerator got its hum", in MacKenzie and Wajcman (eds), 1985,
op. cit.; MacKenzie, 1996, op. cit.
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not because of technical superiority, but because the institutions backing it c o m m a n d e d
m u c h greater financial and technical resources, enabling the manufacturers of electric
refrigerators to quickly corner the market.17 Donald MacKenzie (following Brian Arthur
and Paul David) pointed out that technologies that are adopted early benefit from the
experience gained in their use and the resources devoted to improving them, thus gaining a
significant lead over rivals. "Technologies m a y be best because they have triumphed, rather
than triumphing because they are best".18 This process, called 'lock-in', m a y lead to rival
technologies being locked out.19

Environmental technologies may well differ from many other new technologies in some
respects. For example, it is often claimed that damage to the environment or amelioration of
damage is inadequately priced in the market. Hence, the main driver for the deployment of
environmental technologies has usually been government regulation.

The form that this

regulation takes m a y have a significant influence on the type of environmental technology
that prevails.21

1.3 The Social Shaping of Wind Power
So, how do I approach this analysis? My intention is to test how insights from the social
shaping of technology (SST) can be applied to explaining usage patterns of wind power in
Australia.22 Although a "broad church",23 S S T perspectives focus on h o w social structures
and social processes shape the development and use (or non-use) of a technology. A n S S T
explanation for the history of wind power would start not from the characteristics of wind
power technology, but from an analysis of the social context such as decision-making

17
18

22

Cowan, 1985, op. cit.
MacKenzie, 1996, op. cit., p. 7.
Brian Arthur, "Competing technologies, increasing returns, and lock-in by historical events",
Economic Journal, Vol. 99, 1989, pp. 116-131.
Rene K e m p , "An economic analysis of cleaner technology: theory and evidence", in Kurt Fischer and
Johan Schot (eds), Environmental Strategies for Industry: International Perspectives on Research
Needs and Policy Implications, Island Press, Washington D C , 1993.
For example. K e m p et al noted that Californian zero-emission vehicle regulation has led to electric
cars being favoured at the expense of hybrid-electric cars. K e m p , Schot and H o o g m a , 1998, op. cit.
MacKenzie and Wajcman (eds), 1985, op. cit.; Robin Williams and David Edge, "The social shaping
of technology", Research Policy, Vol. 25, 1996, pp. 865-899; Stewart Russell and Robin Williams,
"Social shaping of technology:frameworks,findings and implications for policy", in K. H. Sorensen
and R. Williams (eds), Shaping Technology, Guiding Policy: Concepts, Spaces and Tools, Edward
Elgar, Cheltenham, 2002.
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processes about electricity supply. The approach of examining institutional barriers to wind
power, cited above, is thus compatible with SST.

The social context in which decisions are made (or not made) about using wind power can
be analysed at different levels. I argue that this analysis needs to start at a broad level—the
political economy of the Australia energy sector. In recent years, the structure of the
Australian energy sector has been radically transformed. W h a t is the significance of these
changes and h o w have they affected the treatment of wind power? I argue that it is also
necessary to analyse the actions of social actors as they attempt to shape the development of
the electricity system, while situating their actions within the broader framework of the
structure of the energy sector. Situating actors helps us not only to interpret these actions
but also to understand h o w some actors are better placed to impose their objectives, while
others are quite marginal.

But this captures only part of the story. Above I suggested that attention be paid to the
differing meanings that social actors ascribe to the category of 'environmental technology',
particularly as it is a normative label, and that this m a y help us to better understand
whether, h o w and w h y these technologies are used. M a n y environmental technologies are
also n e w technologies; thus, m u c h discourse on environmental technologies relates to their
expected performance. For example, m a n y actors in this account of wind power in Australia
had virtually no experience with the technology for m u c h of the period under study. Thus in
examining differing meanings of wind power, I a m often referring to the differing
expectations that these actors have of wind power.

Being new technologies, the ways in which environmental technologies are used and
assessed have often not stabilised. A s such, debates m a y be evident about h o w well such
technologies work (or their efficacy). For example, I show that the electricity utilities'
assessments of the technical capability of wind power and its value to the grid have at times
been strongly contested by wind power advocates. (Since these assessments were often
from a position of little experience, they should be regarded as expectations of technical
capability and value.) Thus, in exploring the differing meanings or expectations of wind
power, w e should also attend to the technical content of claims m a d e about wind power by

Williams and Edge, 1996, op. cit.
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the various social actors. H o w then do negotiations a m o n g actors over these assessments o
wind power influence its treatment? H o w can these assessments be related to the socia
interests of the actors? H o w have these assessments and the criteria by which wind power is
assessed changed in response to broader shifts in the economy, the structure of the energy
sector and the environment agenda?

The idea that a given technology may have different meanings has been used by
sociologists of technology w h e n accounting for the development path of technologies.
While it is often recognised that the sociopolitical meanings of a technology m a y differ,
sociologists of technology call attention to h o w negotiations over differing technical
meanings can shape a technology's development path.24 S o m e have used the term
'interpretative flexibility' to describe h o w different meanings of the technical content can
lead to different interpretations of whether or h o w well a technology works.

Attention to actors' different meanings of wind power provides an interesting dimension to
an analysis of usage patterns of wind power. But h o w can it be integrated with a contextual
approach outlined above? Does it m a k e any difference to an explanation for the history of
wind power in Australia? A s described in this thesis, decision-making about electricity
generation options has remained in the hands of a few. Most advocates of wind power had
little influence over this process. Should w e then expect their different interpretations of
wind power to be of little or no consequence to the treatment of wind power?

1.4 Research Approach
M y principal questions for this research are as follows. W h a t is an appropriate framework
for analysing the usage patterns of wind power in Australia, and h o w well does this
framework explain the treatment of wind power? There already exists a significant body of
theory concerned with the social shaping of technology, s o m e of which can readily be
applied to an analysis of the usage patterns of n e w technologies. I hope to draw together

24

25

See also Michael Mulkay, "Knowledge and utility: implications for the sociology of knowledge",
Social Studies of Science, Vol. 9, 1979, pp. 63-80, fh. 40.
Wiebe E. Bijker, Of Bicycles, Bakelites, and Bulbs: Towards a Theory of Sociotechnical Change,
M I T Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1995; Trevor Pinch, "The social construction of technology: a
review", in Robert Fox (ed.), Technological Change: Methods and Themes in the History of
Technology, Harwood, Amsterdam, 1996.
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approaches that are most relevant to this case study. In particular, I wish to show that both
contextual and constructivist approaches are important parts of this framework. There are
also other disciplines, such as environmental sociology, that offer an interpretation of usage
patterns of environmental technologies such as wind power: h o w can these be combined
with insights from the social shaping of technology? M y purpose is not to compare h o w
well each approach taken separately explains the usage patterns of wind power in Australia,
but rather to attempt to draw these approaches into a useful framework. In particular, it
seems likely that constructivist approaches m a k e for a richer interpretation of the history of
wind power. But, h o w do they add to an explanation of the treatment of wind power?

My analysis is pitched at an intermediate level of analysis. I do not examine how macro
theories—such as those of the capitalist state, technological society, energy economics,
global environmental politics and so o n — c a n be incorporated into this analysis. However, I
a m concerned with understanding the nature of the Australian state, the roles of technology
policy and energy policy in the Australian economy, and Australia's response to global
environmental politics, insofar as these relate to the treatment of wind power. I do not
undertake a micro analysis of the detail of a particular wind power episode; however, I do
study particular episodes in the history of wind power. In choosing an intermediate level of
analysis and linking this to macro and micro analyses, I hope to both incorporate broader
sociopolitical and economic changes along with findings from a detailed study of a
marginal technology.

On a more personal note, I undertook this study because of my political commitment to
environmentally sustainable and globally equitable energy usage patterns. O n e of m y main
aims is to further our understanding of h o w w e might m o v e towards a more sustainable
energy future, and h o w obstacles to the adoption of environmental energy technologies
might be overcome.

The thesis draws mainly on documentary evidence supplemented by some interviews and
informal communication with key players. These have been used not only to construct this
history of wind power in Australia, but also to ascertain the differing meanings ascribed to
wind power. While contemporary meanings can be elicited in interviews, this study is also
concerned with h o w meanings have changed over time. Since actors' recall can be
unreliable, documentation has proved more useful. Interviews and informal communication
have been used mainly to verify and expand on documentary evidence, or tofillin gaps.
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The amount of documentation on wind power and on the electricity industry is significant.
Since the 1980s, there have been m a n y reports written by or about the electricity industry,
providing insight into their planning and decision-making processes. There have been
several inquiries into the electricity industry and particular projects (including wind power
projects), and the submissions to and findings of these inquiries are publicly available. T h e
electricity industry and renewable energy agencies have reported most of their wind power
investigations or projects, and a number of their studies have been published. W i n d power
advocates have also been prolific, with some having undertaken their o w n detailed wind
power studies, often as part of their remonstrations against the negative attitude of the
electricity industry towards wind power.

Gaining access to internal documentation or even interview material about the electricity
utilities or wind power projects has, however, been difficult. I have found the electricity
utilities to be quite secretive. Furthermore, at the time that this study was undertaken, the
electricity utilities had been corporatised and in some cases privatised, making access to
information even more difficult. Private wind power companies have also been unwilling to
divulge information, deeming m u c h of it commercially sensitive. O n m a n y occasions I have
had to rely on secondary source material, such as newspaper and magazine articles and
other reports of events by both insiders and outsiders. Documentary evidence does, of
course, have limitations. In particular, documents have been written for other purposes.
Piecing together the history of wind power and eliciting the author's perspectives on wind
power requires some interpretation.

1.5 Overview of Thesis
The remainder of the thesis is arranged as follows.

In chapter 2 I review a number of approaches to the social shaping of technology that are of
relevance to the case study. Ifirstreview contextual approaches that relate to electricity
systems, energy technologies, environmental technologies and alternative technologies. I
then review the Social Construction of Technology approach, which focuses particularly on
the interpretative flexibility of technologies. Problems with the approach, including its
epistemological relativism and its seemingly political agnosticism are explored.

The next six chapters are divided into two chronological parts: chapters 3, 4 and 5 deal with
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the period up to 1988, while chapters 6, 7 and 8 deal with the period post-1988. The year
1988 was w h e n the 'greenhouse effect' became a public policy issue, leading to a n e w surge
of interest in wind power. B y choosing such a dividing date, I do not suggest that there were
abrupt changes in the circumstances for wind power; the shifts were in the main gradual.

In the first chapter of each part (chapters 3 and 6), I examine the evolution of
environmentalism and changing ideas about what constitutes an environmental technology,
focusing on renewable energy technologies. In the 1970s, renewable energy technologies
were seen by m a n y environmentalists as 'alternative technologies', a holistic notion
incorporating a vision of sociopolitical change. Renewable energy technologies were also
depicted as alternatives to depleting fossil fuels and nuclear power. B y the late 1980s, the
notion of wind power as an environmental technology began to consolidate around its
ability to generate electricity without emitting greenhouse gases. The view among
environmentalists and policy makers that environmental technologies could become a
growth industry, creating jobs and export opportunities, grew throughout the 1980s and
1990s. Growing too was opposition to wind power developments on aesthetic grounds.

I begin chapters 4 and 7 with an analysis of the political economy of the Australian energy
sector, describing the key institutions affecting the treatment of renewable energy technologies, and renewable energy policies at state and federal level. I focus in particular on the
main institution affecting the treatment of wind power, the electricity supply industry, as it
isfirstreformed and then restructured, and analyse the effect of this on wind power.

In chapters 5 and 8,1 recount the history of wind power in Australia. I also examine debates
about the technical efficacy of wind power and its value to the grid, and show h o w these
debates have evolved with external changes. I show h o w the positions of protagonists have
shifted somewhat toward each other, though there is little evidence of a consensus.

Chapter 9 comprises discussion and conclusions. I examine what have been the most
significant factors in shaping the treatment of wind power, and reflect on the adequacy of
the theoretical framework employed here to explain this history of wind power. I conclude
by asking what could have been different, and to what extent has the marginal status of
wind power been inevitable.
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Chapter 2: Social Shaping of Technology Approaches
2.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to explore elements of a framework for explaining the history of
wind power technology in Australia. I employ a 'social shaping of technology' (SST)
approach; that is, I start with the social structures and processes that shape the development
and use of a technology. I argue the need to draw on both structure-oriented and actororiented perspectives; that is, I argue that this framework needs to incorporate both an
analysis of the structure of the energy sector, and an analysis of h o w actors interpret the
technology and h o w these interpretations guide their actions. This framework should
contribute to explaining use patterns of wind power, including lack of use and m o d e s of use.

Analysts employing a SST approach have typically studied the social processes behind
technological innovation, usually focusing on the shaping of a particular artefact or a
technological system.1 This study focuses on explaining the usage patterns of wind power
technology rather than the micro-shaping of the basic design of wind technology. O f course,
design and use cannot be neatly separated into two phases: the selection environment feeds
back into design. A n example is that manufacturers are redesigning wind turbines to
minimise adverse effects on w e a k electricity grids.

Two issues need clarification. First, in explaining usage patterns of wind power, what
'technology' is the focus? Second, since wind power is little used in Australia, what
historical episodes should be studied and h o w should they be analysed? H o w do w e avoid
methodological problems arising from the study of non-uses of a technology, in effect, nonevents? I deal with these in turn.

First, the shaping of what technology is to be studied? I deal primarily not with the shaping
of wind energy artefacts, but with the shaping—or rather, reshaping—of electricity
generation systems (grid-connected and stand-alone) with regard to the use or non-use of
wind power. It m a y be argued that analysing the determinants of choice between generating

1

See for example Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman (eds), The Social Shaping of Technology,
Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1985; Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes and Trevor Pinch
(eds), The Social Construction of Technological Systems, M I T Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1987;
Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society 1990-1930, John Hopkins
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technologies A and B is a trivial example of social shaping.2 But this overlooks the
ramifications on electricity system operations; for example, wind power is very unlike
conventional generators in terms of variability, controllability and distribution. I also argue
that the scope of this analysis should be m u c h broader than just electricity generation:
decision-making affecting the adoption of wind power needs to be analysed from the
perspective of h o w electricity systems as a whole operate and what broader social role they
play. A n d while this account is not about the shaping of wind turbines (which has taken
place mostly outside Australia), the technology design process is relevant, as it has
influenced attitudes to wind power in Australia. Furthermore, the requirements of users are
fed back to wind system manufacturers, and occasionally Australian users of wind systems,
mostly electricity utilities, have shaped wind power technology to suit local conditions.

Second, will an historical account of wind power's treatment help to explain its limited
usage? If so, what episodes should be studied? Occasionally S S T literature deals with 'paths
not taken'; for example, a few analysts have studied the shaping of 'failed' technologies.3
Yet classifying wind power technology as either failed or successful is problematic. While
m a n y expect the deployment of wind power technology to increase greatly over the next
few decades, this expectation is premised on assumptions about h o w today's dominant
environmental concerns will be accommodated by industrial society.4 It is premature to call
wind power technology successful.

Neither is wind power a 'path not taken'. Wind power may be rarely used in Australia, but
it has long been on the energy policy agenda. W i n d power enjoys popular support and m a n y
have long advocated its greater use, although until recently most electricity utilities have
shown only token interest. So wind power is not a non-issue. Yet, it is insufficient to study
only episodes w h e n wind power projects were proposed. It is also necessary to understand

University Press, Baltimore, 1983.
Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman, "Other areas of study", in MacKenzie and Wajcman (eds),
1985, op. cit.
See "Symposium on Failed Innovations" in Social Studies of Science, Vol. 22, 1992. For examples of
more even handed treatment of successful and failed rival technologies, see Trevor J. Pinch and
Wiebe E. Bijker, "The social construction of facts and artefacts: or how the sociology of science and
the sociology of technology might benefit each other", Social Studies of Science, Vol. 14, 1984, pp.
399^141; Ruth Schwartz Cowan, " H o w the refrigerator got its hum", in MacKenzie and Wajcman
(eds), 1985, op. cit.; Mikael Hard and Andrew Jamison, "Alternative cars: the contrasting stories of
steam and diesel automotive engines", Technology in Society, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1997, pp. 145-160.
See chapter 6.
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w h y the utilities usually dismissed wind power. T o address the latter, I examine both the
history of the Australian electricity utilities to understand their value system and its
influence on various groups' stance towards wind power, and the history of Australian
energy policy to understand w h y governments have not fostered significant use of wind
power. S o m e theoretical perspectives m a y also offer insight into this problem. H o w a
marginalised concern gets or fails to get on the policy agenda is a familiar problem in the
political science and public policy literatures. The theory of nondecision-making, discussed
in section 2.2.2, m a y be particularly useful.

How should the social structures and processes shaping the usage or neglect of wind power
be studied? H o w might social structures hinder usage of wind power? W e can study actions
of relevant individuals, groups and organisations, their perspectives on wind power and
negotiations a m o n g them, as they try to reshape electricity systems. W e can also provide a
context for these actions, perspectives and negotiations, by locating actors within a broader
structural framework, and relating their perspective on wind power and their effectiveness
in achieving their goals to their location within this broader structural framework. S o m e
groups do not participate in the shaping process; their exclusion is an outcome of
arrangements in the energy sector, and thus is better analysed within a structural account.

The social processes shaping the treatment of wind power can also be studied at different
levels, differentiated by h o w the technical content, and more generally, the meaning of the
technology is treated. At the first level the technical content can be treated as
unproblematic; thus one can study h o w various social groups influence whether and h o w
wind power is used. But such an approach would tell only part of the story. Indeed, m a n y
protagonists in the wind power debate have not treated the technical content as
unproblematic: the technical capability of wind power in an electricity system has been
hotly debated, and positions on this question have shifted over time. So the second level of
analysis includes h o w protagonists' negotiations over technical content influence the
treatment of wind power in electricity systems. The third level—regarded as the most
controversial—is similar to the second, except that the technical content is regarded as
socially negotiated and context-dependent. This third level refers to a branch of S S T k n o w n
as social constructivism. S o m e analysts have used the qualifier 'mild', and 'radical' (or
'strong') social constructivism to differentiate between the first and third levels
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respectively.5 Trevor Pinch (following S i s m o n d o ) described the distinction:
In its mild form, social constructivism is simply equated with science and technology
having social components: the science and technology w e get has in some sense been
influenced or shaped by such social components ... The radical version of social
constructivism is concerned to show h o w social processes influence the very content of
technology—what it means for a technology to be deemed as working, for example. This
version ... claims that the meaning of the technology, including facts about its working ...
are themselves social constructs.6
Unfortunately, this quote implies that S S T equates to social constructivism. I reserve the
term social constructivism to describe w h a t Pinch calls radical social constructivism.

In this thesis I a m studying social processes principally at the second o f the three levels
outlined above. W h i l e I e m p l o y the Social Construction o f T e c h n o l o g y ( S C O T ) approach, a
form o f radical social constructivism,71 find s o m e o f its tenets problematic, particularly its
reliance o n epistemological relativism. I a m sceptical about the claim that w e cannot obtain
k n o w l e d g e o f the 'real' technical content o f artefacts, but a c k n o w l e d g e that for analytical
purposes it m a y

be useful to treat this as such. H e r e I a m

differentiating b e t w e e n

epistemological and methodological relativism, a n d opting for the latter.8 O f course there
are m a n y technical matters concerning the usage o f w i n d p o w e r about w h i c h there are n o
disagreements. It w o u l d be possible to subject such uncontested k n o w l e d g e to a social
constructivist analysis; however, this w o u l d produce a different type o f thesis than this one. 9

7

Sergio Sismondo, "Some social constructions", Social Studies ofScience, Vol. 23,1993, pp. 515-553.
Trevor Pinch, "The social construction of technology: a review", in Robert Fox (ed.), Technological
Change: Methods and Themes in the History of Technology, Harwood, Amsterdam, 1996, pp. 19-20.
Social constructivist analyses of technology form a subset of social shaping of technology
approaches. Robin Williams and David Edge, "The social shaping of technology", Research Policy,
Vol. 25,1996, pp. 865-899.
ibid.
I a m assuming that one can employ methodological relativism without adhering to epistemological
relativism; yet this m a y be a problematic assumption. Hans Radder, "Normative reflexions on
constructivist approaches to science and technology", Social Studies of Science, Vol. 22, 1992, pp
141-173. Radder noted:
[L]ogicalfy, methodological relativism does not entail epistemological ... relativism ... Adding
epistemological relativism to the purely methodological position seems indeed natural and
desirable:first,because it offers argumentative support to the methodology, which goes beyond
pointing out its mere 'fruitfulness' in claiming that it is adequate and in principle able to produce
complete explanations of the phenomena under study; and second, because, if methodological
relativism is to have a wider significant than just for the empirical study of science and
technology itself, it will have to be at least epistemologically underpinned, (pp. 155-156.)
It is undoubtedly easier to subject technical (or scientific) controversies to a social constructivist
analysis rather than to do this for non-controversial matters, as alternative positions have already been
constructed by the participants. However, controversies are just the tip of the iceberg.
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M y concern here is with episodes w h e n the technical content was contested.

So what is meant by technical content? Here I mean the question of how well wind power
'works' in an electricity system or its 'efficacy', including discursive elements used to
categorise and assess forms of power generation, such as intermittency, diffuseness,
reliability,firmnessand security of supply. T o illustrate, consider some of the consequences
of harnessing wind for power generation. The electricity industry categorises wind as an
intermittent energy source, because wind speeds and hence the power output of a wind
turbine are fluctuating, and are at a given instant unpredictable. In an electricity system with
no storage capacity, power demand and supply are matched at every instant, and a higher
price is put on supply available during periods of high demand. Operators of wind systems
cannot guarantee power output w h e n it is needed. Moreover, the seasonal and annual power
output of a given wind turbine varies significantly (and this variation m a y be exacerbated
by climate change), making it difficult for operators to estimate future output and thus
income. Because of wind turbines'fluctuatingpower output, electricity network operators
are concerned that wind turbines m a y affect quality of supply or place more onerous
operating requirements on other system components. W i n d energy is a diffuse source, thus
wind systems need to be physically decentralised to at least some extent. Individual wind
turbines have a small output compared with most utility-owned generating plant. They can
be installed and commissioned quickly, compared with conventional plant. Because of their
requirement for strong winds, wind turbines are best located in windy locations; but such
windy locations do not necessarily coincide with established electricity networks or loads.

These are some of the issues affecting the efficacy of wind power in an electricity system.
They are explored in more detail in later chapters. I a m not focusing on h o w these attributes
affect the feasibility of wind power. Rather, I a m studying h o w different actors, employing
arguments about wind power's attributes, disagree on the efficacy of wind power and
consequently its value and h o w and whether it should be deployed. I also ask whether and
h o w such and whether such disagreements shape usage patterns of wind power.

How is it that actors disagree about the efficacy of wind power? Disagreements may occur
because wind systems are relatively new; hence initially there will be m a n y unknowns. 10

Wind systems are new in the sense that the use of large grid-connected turbines is relatively recent.
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H o w well wind power works depends on local conditions, local experience and local
knowledge; thus operators of wind turbines undergo a learning process. W i n d systems have
developed rapidly since the early 1970s, with the cost and performance improving in a
manner that was not well foreseen. Furthermore, actors have changed their assessment of
wind power based on information disseminated by wind turbine manufacturers and wind
power users in other countries. S o m e actors have been hesitant about translating overseas
experience to Australia, citing differing electricity network characteristics, in particular
Australia's relatively w e a k rural grids.

There have been other contentious issues unrelated to the maturity of wind power
technology and operator experience. There have been disagreements over the firmness of an
intermittent energy source, over financial parameters and criteria used to determine the
value of wind power, over the consequences of decentralising generation, over the benefits
of diversifying energy sources, over the value of renewable energy sources to long-term
security of electricity supply, over the reliability of wind turbines, over the cost of errors in
demand forecasting and over the feasibility of using demand-side measures to cope with
wind power's intermittency. There have been disagreements over whether to internalise the
social and environmental costs and benefits (or externalities) of power generation; that is,
there have been disagreements over the location of the system boundary within which wind
power's efficacy should be evaluated. Advocates of wind power typically draw the
boundary wider than just the internal operation of the electricity system, while
governments, which use the electricity industry to achieve broader social and economic
goals, also draw a wide but different boundary. A n d there have been disagreements over
what value should be assigned to these externalities."

Furthermore, the criteria by which various parties judge wind power's efficacy have shifted
over time, not only because of the maturation of wind turbines or their o w n experiences
with wind power, but also in response to broad contextual changes. Shifts in the
environment agenda and the restructuring of the Australian electricity industry have also
been significant. Interestingly, some analysts have claimed that the restructured electricity
industry represents a 'level playing field', where the true worth of renewable energy

11

See for example Olav Hohmeyer, "Renewables and the full cost of energy", Energy Policy, Vol. 20
No. 4, 1992, pp. 365-375; Nick Eyre, "External costs: what do they mean for energy policy?"'
Energy Policy, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1997, pp. 85-95.
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technologies (RETs) will finally be recognised.12

Learning curves, disagreements among concerned parties, and shifting criteria for efficacy
m a y m a k e for an interesting story; but w e can also ask h o w negotiations over these differing
perspectives and shifts in perspectives shape this account of wind power. Yet w e should not
overestimate the degree to which assessments of wind power's efficacy influence its usage
in specific instances. For example, an electricity utility m a y initiate a wind power project
principally as a public relations exercise, yet produce a more favourable technical and
economic assessment to justify this decision. Without insider access, it is difficult to
identify the rationale for specific projects.

In focusing on the efficacy of an 'environmental' electricity generator such as wind power
technology, I do not suggest that the efficacies of conventional electricity generators are
uncontested.13 N o r a m

I assuming that the decisions to adopt these conventional

technologies were based solely on 'rational' technical and economic assessment methods,
as is usually portrayed by the electricity industry. W h a t I a m suggesting is that existing
electricity systems have been built around established generating technologies, and that
electricity supply and usage patterns, quality of supply standards and performance
expectations have been shaped by the characteristics of these technologies. N e w
technologies such as wind turbines are required tofitinto an existing system, which w a s not
designed around their characteristics. H o w then do the characteristics of the existing system
affect h o w the efficacy of wind power is judged?

A further question is whether it is even possible to draw a boundary around the 'technical':
for example, quality of supply standards were once socially negotiated; supply outages are
deemed unacceptable because of their social ramifications; wind systems' technical
capability for producing pollution-free power is valued because of social concerns about the
environment. If such a boundary is drawn, can the efficacy of wind power be determined
within the boundary, but outside the boundary it is a matter of negotiation? O r is it better to
assert that technical content is sociotechnical?

There are other criteria for judging the efficacy of a technology that relate to the symbolic

12
13

See chapter 7.
See section 5.5.2.
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value of a technology. A n example is Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch's study of the
efficacy of the Patriot anti-missile missile used during the 1991 Gulf W a r . T h e Patriot w a s
intended to combat Iraqi Scud missiles; yet it appears that Patriots destroyed very few if any
Scuds. T h e 'success' of the Patriot lay in its symbolic value, principally in keeping Israel
out of the war and holding the anti-Iraq alliance together.14

For wind power, the symbolic value is often of great importance. Indeed, the wind turbine is
the symbol of green values par excellence. Electricity utilities publicise their wind power
activities by emblazoning images of wind turbines across their magazines, annual reports
and

advertising

material. People

living

near

wind

farms

often

become

more

environmentally conscious as a result. S o m e politicians seek to gain political mileage
through advocating wind power. Indeed, the high visibility of wind systems, coupled with
the publicity that they attract, helps to disguise that wind contributes only a tiny fraction of
power to the grid.

This symbolic role of wind power leads back to questions raised in chapter 1: What is
meant by the label 'environmental technology'? H o w

has the label 'environmental

technology' been socially constructed, and h o w has wind power c o m e to be seen as an
environmental technology? 15 1 examine these questions in chapters 3 and 6.

In the remainder of this chapter, I ask how SST approaches can provide a theoretical
framework for this study. Ifirstexamine approaches which m a y help us to understand h o w
sociotechnical context shapes the treatment of wind power. I then describe the Social
Construction of Technology approach, which I use as a framework for examining h o w
negotiations over differing meanings of wind power shape usage patterns. O f course, both
contextual and constructivist approaches have their critics. In particular, contextual
approaches that focus on structures are criticised for overlooking, or being too pessimistic

14

Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch, "A clean kill?: the role of Patriot in the Gulf War", in The Golem at
Large, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998.
Although it is useful to regard the category 'environmental technology' as socially constructed, I am
not agnostic about the existence of environmental problems and the capacity of certain technologies
to alleviate some of these. Such criticisms have been made of those studying the social construction
of environmental problems. See Kate Burningham and Geoff Cooper, "Being constructive: social
constructionism and the environment", Sociology, M a y 1999, Vol. 33 No. 2, pp. 297-316. O n the
other hand, I recognise that some interest groups may frame environmental problems in such a way
that favours a 'solution' that they are promoting. For example, wind farm developers depict climate
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about, the possibility of change and for being determinist, while constructivist approaches
m a y give insufficient attention to h o w structures hinder change and h o w stability is
maintained. In this study I a m concerned with explaining h o w and w h y change does or does
not occur. Thus, m y aim is not to treat contextual and constructivist approaches as rival
methods for explaining usage patterns of w i n d power; rather, I consider that each has its
strengths, and seek w a y s of integrating them.

2.2 Contextual Approaches
2.2.1 Introduction
In this section, I review contextual approaches that can contribute to a framework for
explaining the history of wind p o w e r in Australia. I review approaches used by those w h o
have analysed energy systems or barriers to alternative technologies as well as insights from
the public policy literature.

One analyst who has analysed the usage patterns of an alternative electricity generating
technology is Stewart Russell. In his study of the U K ' s failure to m a k e significant use of
combined heat and p o w e r ( C H P ) and district heating ( D H ) , Russell argued:
[A]n explanation of the neglect of C H P / D H requires ... a historical and structural analysis
of its context: the energy sector and its broader social and economic role. The little activity
on C H P / D H that can be traced must be situated in the organizational and technical
development of the key institutions—the electricity industry and central and local
government—and developing relations between them. These characteristics and relations
must in turn be linked to the specific character of the British economy and state.16
Russell highlighted the need to identify the interests associated with the institutional
arrangements—the groups which benefit economically, politically or professionally.
[P]ast and present arrangements correspond to and support certain economic and political
interests in the sector and beyond. That conflicts of interest in the sector are often
channelled through technical debates does not mean that facts determine policies; rather it
underlines the need to understand h o w competing knowledge claims are constructed and

change from greenhouse gas emissions as more pressing than preserving landscape values.
Stewart Russell, "Writing energy history: explaining the neglect of C H P / D H in Britain", British
Journal of the History of Science, Vol. 26, pp. 33-54, 1993, at p. 27. C H P (called 'cogeneration' in
Australia) is the production of both heat and power, typically by using the waste heat from power
generation for low temperature heating requirements. In cold climates, the waste heat is commonly
used for district heating, that is, the provision of heat to nearby buildings.
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deployed, and how they come to be aligned to institutional interests—how policies may
determine the facts. The inadequacies of government policies and actions in the sector are
likewise derived from its location and character, and the inherent limitations on state
intervention, rather than simply, or even significantly, from incompetence and mistakes ...
The view developed here ... implies that certain courses of action and technological options
may be more or less systematically excluded or actively resisted because of the challenges
they represent to established interests within the sector and beyond.17

Russell has raised some interesting themes for this thesis, in particular the need to start not
from the attributes of the technology, but from the characteristics and role of key
institutions, such as the electricity industry and federal and state governments. I suggest too
that w e need to examine not only the institutions which seemingly had the p o w e r to
implement alternative technologies, but also the less powerful groups w h o were supporting
the alternative technologies. Could they effect change and if so, h o w ?

Following Russell, I argue that the stance of the main players towards wind power needs to
be analysed with reference to their social and economic role. H o w w a s the electricity
industry's attitude towards wind power shaped by the structural role of the industry? In
chapters 4 and 7, I start with an overview of Australia's political economy, examining the
role played by the energy sector. I then analyse the history and structure of the electricity
sector, asking what forces have shaped the sector.

I also describe the groups advocating wind power, and in chapters 5 and 8, explore how
they sought to effect change. Is it sufficient to explain their ability, or inability, to intervene
in favour of wind power in terms of their structural location; or should w e also evaluate the
effectiveness of strategies adopted by these groups? T o focus merely on the latter would be
to embrace a pluralist model of political power: the idea that public policy is shaped by the
various pressure groups which lobby governments, and that the outcome reflects the success
of strategies used. While I reject the pluralist model, I accept that a structural explanation is
inadequate if it fails to acknowledge that structures can change. Such changes usually occur
in small steps, perhaps as a result of strategies by seemingly w e a k groups. This is explored
further in section 2.2.6.

ibid., pp. 49-50.
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I also agree with Russell that the analyst should be sceptical about conventional
explanations that technical characteristics determine the choice of technology. Rather than
accepting the appeal to disembodied technical facts, w e should interpret 'facts', or rather
'technical knowledge claims', by analysing the actors and institutions which deploy t h e m —
not only the electricity industry, but also advocates of wind power. In this thesis I describe
h o w different groups interpret and evaluate wind power. I examine h o w such interpretations
and evaluations are shaped by wider discourses about environmental technologies and by
institutional interests.

2.2.2 Nondecision-malting
This study attempts to explain the neglect of a technology that opinion polls suggest is
widely supported outside the electricity industry. (I acknowledge too the need to examine
the basis for this support, and the w a y in which claims of widespread support are deployed
by proponents of the technology. This is discussed further in section 6.6.) A b o v e I asked
h o w one is to analyse episodes w h e n wind power is not considered—in effect 'non-events'.
Political scientists have long explored mechanisms by which certain issues are kept off the
political agenda. Bachrach and Baratz use the term 'nondecision-making' to describe h o w
particular groups, usually the elite, exercise power by preventing demands and grievances
from even entering the political arena. Within a political system, institutional procedures
and practices m a y operate systematically to benefit certain groups at the expense of others.18
Thus in analysing w h y wind power is so seldom considered, w e should examine h o w
electricity planning issues are framed such that this option remains marginal, and in whose
interests the electricity sector operates.

But first, what is the warrant for assuming that an unmet public demand exists for increased
use of wind power? The public's attitude m a y be difficult to gauge, since there have been
no long-term Australian surveys on public opinion about wind power. The public m a y not
distinguish between forms of renewable energy, perhaps expressing support for 'solar
energy', formerly the umbrella term. Support for renewable energy has fluctuated over the

Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, Power and Poverty, Oxford University Press, N e w York, 1970.
See also Steven Lukes, Power: a Radical View, MacMillan, London, 1978; Christopher H a m and
Michael Hill, The Policy Process in the Modern Capitalist State, 2nd ed., Harvester Wheatsheaf,
N e w York, 1993; Brian Martin and Pam Scott, "Automatic vehicle identification: a test of theories of
technology", Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1992, pp. 484-505.
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last three decades: support peaked in the late 1970s in response to 'limits to growth' and
anti-nuclear concerns; declined in the mid 1980s; and grew1 from the late 1980s in response
to concerns about climate change. Surveys on Australians' attitudes towards renewable
energy have shown that most support increased use of renewable energy, but far fewer are
willing to pay extra for it.19 Recent surveys on attitudes to wind power in other countries
indicate a very high level of support, and limited polling conducted in Australia shows
similar results.20 A n d Australian governments and electricity utilities certainly act as though
wind power were popular, seeking publicity for even token wind power proposals.

So what are the mechanisms by which public support is not translated into action? One clear
w a y is by portraying electricity decision-making as free from political influence. T h u s the
electricity utilities were initially established or nationalised as statutory authorities at arm's
length from government, and directed to meet industry's and the community's need for
cheap, safe, reliable and secure supplies of electricity. Decision-making about generating
technologies w a s portrayed as a purely technical and economic issue, the responsibility of
technical experts. This view w a s prevalent in the era before public interest in renewable
energy took off. It could not be sustained from the 1970s, as commentators claimed that
governments

were

using the electricity industry to meet political objectives, as

environmentalists and other critics increasingly exposed the technocratic ideology in the
industry and sought greater public control, and as governments sought m o r e accountability
from the utilities. F r o m the mid 1990s, electricity utilities were corporatised and in s o m e
cases privatised, removing them further from government control, with decision-making
driven primarily by commercial imperatives.

19

20

Roy Morgan Research Centre Pty Ltd, Survey on Power, Conducted for the State Electricity
Commission of Victoria, October 1982; Laurence O. P. Knight, "Soft versus hard: an Australian
study of an ideological basis to attitudes towards energy use and supply", The Canadian Geographer,
Vol. 34, No. 1, 1990, pp. 63-76; Caroline Le Couteur, "Australian views on renewable energy", Solar
'97, Australian and N e w Zealand Solar Energy Society Conference, Canberra, 1-3 December 1997.
For example, a 1994 survey of 1000 N e w Zealanders found that 8 9 % agreed that N e w Zealand
should make greater use of wind power. M R L Research Group, Attitudes Towards Wind Generation
of Electricity: Research Summary, Wellington, June 1994. For U S and U K examples, see American
Wind Energy Association, "Wind power scores well in G M P public opinion survey", 1996, Accessed
2 October 1999, <http://www.awea.org/faq/surveys/survey6.html>; British Wind Energy Association,
A Summary of Research Conducted into Attitudes to Wind Power from 1990-1996, 1996, Accessed
14 December 2002, <http://www.bwea.com/ref/survey.html>. Surveys carried out by the wind energy
industry and by independent bodies both recorded high support. A n Australian example is Auspoll,
Report to Pacific Hydro Limited: Portland Wind Energy Project - Quantitative Research, February
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Another form of nondecision-making is evident where demands are met by a token or
symbolic response. F r o m the late 1970s, most governments in Australia released energy
policies that included statements of support for renewable energy, and provided funds for
small wind projects. This w a s repeated in the late 1980s, after the greenhouse effect became
a public policy issue. F r o m the late 1990s, with the emergence of green power schemes
(whereby customers could pay a premium on their power bill for an equivalent amount of
electricity to be sourced from R E T s ) and full retail contestability (whereby all customers
can choose their electricity retailer), a n e w form of nondecision-making became apparent.
The use of renewable energy could be portrayed as a matter for consumer choice rather than
public policy: electricity customers could choose to buy electricity from renewable energy
sources or choose the 'greenest' electricity retailer.

2.2.3 Factors Assisting or Hindering New Environmental Technologies
There are a number of reasons w h y n e w technologies are at a disadvantage compared with
the established technologies that they are intended to replace.21 Established technologies are
well known, while decision-makers m a y k n o w little about n e w technologies and their
performance. Often n e w technologies are more expensive than established technologies
particularly because the market for them is small, and established technologies have
benefited from increasing returns over time.22 Players pushing n e w technologies are often
initially w e a k and perhaps disunited, have w e a k networks, and exercise little influence over
policy-makers. In chapters 4 and 7, I describe h o w renewable energy advocates have
attempted to overcome these handicaps by forming over time increasingly effective forms
of association.

The fate of a new technology can also be strongly influenced by events outside the direct
control of the technology's backers. Such external events can profoundly influence h o w
actors line up to back or oppose the n e w technology, and can change the criteria by which

2002. See section 6.6 for an interpretation of this high level of support.
See also Anna Johnson and Staffan Jacobsson, "Inducement and blocking mechanisms in the
development of a new industry: the case of renewable energy technology in Sweden", in Rod
Coombs, Ken Green, Albert Richards and Vivien Walsh (eds), Technology and the Market: Demand,
Users and Innovation, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2001.
Brian Arthur, "Competing technologies, increasing returns, and lock-in by historical events",
Economic Journal, Vol. 99, 1989, pp. 116-131.
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the n e w technology is assessed, thereby strengthening or weakening its chances.

For

example, a number of external events have had an adverse effect on h o w fossil fuel and
nuclear generating plant are regarded, and a consequent positive impact on the case tor
wind power. These include the birth of the modern environment m o v e m e n t from the late
1960s, the 1970s oil shocks, the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident, rising
concerns about greenhouse gas emissions from about 1988, mounting pressure on countries
to curtail emissions following the 1997 Kyoto climate change conference, and various
economic downturns, which reduced electricity demand growth thereby making investment
in n e w power stations a more risky proposition.

Other events have shifted the balance of forces in Australia's electricity industry, the most
prominent example being the 1990s restructuring of the electricity industry. Even from the
late 1970s, demands for increased political accountability of statutory authorities had
weakened the traditional players. The impacts of these changes on the history of wind
power are examined in chapters 4 and 7. S o m e events have weakened the case for wind
power, compared with fossil fuel plant. For example, Australia's exchange rate has
experienced a downward trend over the past two decades, making imported capitalintensive plant such as wind turbines more expensive. Increased availability of natural gas
in Australia from the late 1980s has m a d e gas an increasingly attractive option, possibly at
the expense of renewable energy technologies.

Some actors have shifted their position in response to these external events, leading to
changing alliances. For example, in the climate change debate, the natural gas industry has
distanced itself from the other fossil fuel industries in order to appear 'greener'. The
Australian Cogeneration Association24 has renamed itself the Australian Ecogeneration
Association, widening its brief to include the renewable energy industry. Traditional fossil
fuel businesses are also increasingly moving into the renewable energy industry,
recognising that it offers n e w business opportunities.25 The environment m o v e m e n t has also
shifted its attitude towards industry and its quest for growth, from hostility in the 1970s to a
more cooperative position in the 1990s. This is described in chapters 3 and 6.

Peter Karnoe, pers. comm., June 2000.
Cogeneration usually relies on natural gas.
A n example is BP moving into the photovoltaics industry. In Australia, a number of electricity
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Government policy measures can also influence the treatment of n e w environmental
technologies. Such measures m a y be introduced specifically to encourage (or to hinder) the
diffusion of these technologies. Examples include research, development and demonstration
( R D & D ) funding; programs to support commercialisation; environmental regulation; taxes
or subsidies; provision of venture capital; and stimulation of demand through government
purchase policy.26 Sometimes, environmental technologies m a y

be the unintended

beneficiary or victim of other policy measures. Examples of the latter are subsidies for
diesel use in remote areas, and rural electrification schemes. Such measures disadvantage
renewable energy remote area power supplies.

2.2.4 Sociotechnical Systems
Technological change in power generation usually entails more that just substitution of one
type of hardware for another. Electricity generators do not function in isolation; they are
part of a system. T h o m a s Hughes, w h o analysed the development and growth of electricity
systems, used the term technological system—or better, sociotechnical system—to convey
the idea that an electricity system comprises not only physical components such as
generators, transmission lines, transformers and motors, but also components labelled
'social', such as organisations, technical standards and electrical engineering education.27
Social components under the system manager's control, Hughes argued, are not the social
context of the technical components, but part of the system—hence the term soc/otechnical
system. Hughes called factors outside the system manager's control 'the environment'; over
time some become incorporated into the system.28 A n example is fuel supply: to reduce
dependence on outsider suppliers, utilities m a y acquire their o w n coal mines. This has
occurred in s o m e Australian states.

In describing the history of sociotechnical systems, Hughes employed the concept
'technological momentum', located between technological determinism, the view that
technical forces drive social change, and social determinism, the view that social forces

utilities have become keen supporters of wind power. This is described in chapter 8.
Johnson and Jacobsson, "Inducement and blocking mechanisms", 2001, op. cit.
Hughes, 1983, op. cit.; Thomas P. Hughes, "The evolution of large technological systems", in Bijker,
Hughes and Pinch (eds), 1987, op. cit.; Thomas P. Hughes, "From deterministic dynamos to
seamless-web systems", in Hedy E. Sladovich (ed.), Engineering as a Social Enterprise, National
Academy Press, Washington D C , 1991.
Hughes, 1987, op. cit.
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drive technical change. 29 Mature sociotechnical systems m a y appear to be autonomous,
because they have gained significant m o m e n t u m .
Technological systems, even after prolonged growth and consolidation, do not become
autonomous; they acquire momentum. They have a mass of technical and organizational
components; they possess direction, or goals; and they display a rate of growth suggesting
velocity ... The large mass of a technological system arises especially from the organisation
and people committed by various interests to the system. Manufacturing corporations,
public and private utilities, industrial and government research laboratories, investment and
banking houses, sections of technical and scientific societies, departments in educational
institutions, and regulatory bodies add greatly to the momentum of m o d e m electric light and
power systems. Inventors, engineers, scientists, managers, owners, investors,financiers,civil
servants, and politicians often have vested interests in the growth and durability of a system.
31

A n existing system, thus reinforced, greatly hinders the development of n e w systems.

Why then does the transformation of sociotechnical systems occur, what does it entail, and
what choices are available to actors pursuing their o w n interests, including the creation of
spaces for n e w technologies?

Consider the 1990s transformation of the Australian electricity sector. A common view
a m o n g electricity industry analysts w a s that the sector needed restructuring because the
utilities were no longer performing their functions effectively: they had b e c o m e selfserving, and subject to the w h i m s of politicians and pressure from trade unions. 32 T h o m a s
H u g h e s sought a broader explanation for system transformation: he thought the m o s t likely
cause w a s "a confluence of contingency, catastrophe and conversion".33 A contingency, "an
overpowering change in environmental circumstances", m a y cause a change in direction.34
T h e 1973-74 oil shock is an obvious example; it did not kill off large energy-based

30

32

33

Thomas P. Hughes, "Technological momentum", in Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx (eds), Does
Technology Drive History: The Dilemma of Technological Determinism, M I T Press, Cambridge
(Mass.), 1994.
Hughes, 1987, op. cit., pp. 76-77.
Thomas P. Hughes, American Genesis: A Century of Invention and Technological Enthusiasm 18701970, Viking, N e w York, 1989.
See for example Robert R. Booth, Warring Tribes: The Story of Power Development in Australia,
Bardak, Perth, 2000. The question of why systems change has been addressed by a number of writers.
For drivers of change in the U S electricity sector, see Richard Hirsh, Technology and Transformation
in the American Electric Utility Industry, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK), 1989.
Hughes, 1989, op. cit., pp. 470-71.
ibid., p. 462. By 'environment' he refers to that which is outside the system.
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systems, but certainly altered their course.35 A system catastrophe, through its effect on
public perceptions, m a y have a similar effect. Catastrophic failures of nuclear p o w e r plants,
for example, were instrumental in the decline of nuclear power. A n example of conversion,
"a change in belief, attitudes and intentions", is the growth of the environment m o v e m e n t
and its challenge to the profligate use of energy.36

Yet to ask why systems change is to presume that stability is the norm. Jane Summerton
questioned this:
[P]eriods of stability in technical systems and networks are typically only provisional.
Systems and networks are dynamic entities; they can seldom—if ever—be 'blackboxed'
(closed) for good.37
Summerton also noted that although system change m a y appear to be driven by internal
problems—as conventional explanations m a y s u g g e s t — w e should consider h o w various
actors perceive such 'problems' and whether they have the ability to carry out change. A s
described in chapter 4, several groups outside of the electricity industry—including
environmentalists, renewable energy advocates, self-generators, industrialists, neoliberal
commentators, public officials and governments—had long regarded the structure of the
Australian electricity industry as problematic, but for differing reasons. S o m e had the
ability to effect change during the 1980s, chiefly by increasing the utilities' accountability
to government. T h e 1990s restructuring w a s m u c h m o r e extensive, involving what
Summerton called "territorial expansion and interconnection of similar systems across
political borders", and "the reorganizing of previously monopoly systems into n e w
configurations based on principles of competition and open access".38 In Australia, this
restructuring w a s difficult because it involved significant changes to the environment,
including the reshaping of federal-state political relations and the changing of competition
law.39 It also entailed the establishment of national bodies to enable state-based electricity
systems to be transformed into a national one. 40 A s the electricity utilities had seldom acted
cooperatively in the past, this w a s no m e a n feat.41

36
37

38
39
40
41

ibid., p. 466.
Jane Summerton, "Introductory essay: the systems approach to technological change", in Jane
Summerton (ed.), Changing Large Technical Systems, Westview Press, Boulder (Colo.), 1994, p. 5.
ibid., pp. 5-6. Such changes have also occurred in systems other than electricity networks.
See chapter 7.
See also ibid. This is described in chapter 7.
Booth, 2000, op. cit. A n exception was the cooperative arrangement for systems operation between
Victoria and N S W .
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A pertinent question for this thesis is what opportunities arise for n e w actors w h e n systems
change. I return to examine this in chapter 9.

2.2.5 The Compatibility of New Technologies with Existing Systems
For a n e w technology to succeed, h o w compatible must it be with the existing system? A n d
because the advent of n e w technologies m a y coincide with system transformation, h o w are
these n e w technologies implicated in system change? 42 W a s wind power formerly neglected
because it w a s incompatible with the centralised electricity system, and what role is wind
power n o w playing in breaking d o w n the centralised system?

A useful distinction proposed by Hughes is that between radical and conservative
inventions. Radical inventions, if successful, lead to n e w systems; conservative inventions
improve yet preserve existing systems. Those conceiving of radical inventions are usually
outsiders.
Because radical inventions do not contribute to the growth of existing technological
systems, which are presided over by, systematically linked to, and financially supported by
larger entities, organizations rarely nurture a radical invention.43

Is wind power a conservative or radical invention? During the 1970s there were several
different models of wind power put forward. M a n y government-funded research programs
were aimed at developing giant multi-megawatt machines—these were not successful—
while alternative technology advocates favoured small and medium-sized wind turbines, as
did m a n y n e w manufacturers of wind turbines. W i n d turbines could be used for remote area
power supplies, or turbines could be connected to the grid, either singly or in wind farms.
W i n d turbines could be owned by individuals, cooperatives, private companies or electricity
utilities.

Richard Hirsh and Adam Serchuk, in their analysis of wind power use in the US, argued
that wind power was primarily a conservative invention. Giant wind turbines were
compatible with the dominant model of increasingly larger generating units and the

Alexandra von Meier, "Integrating supple technologies into utility power systems: possibilitie
reconfiguration", in Summerton (ed.), Changing Large Technical Systems, 1994, op. cit.
43
Hughes, 1987, op. cit, p. 56.
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expectation of continued high demand growth rates. The wind farm, a model which
flourished in California, seemed less conservative since wind farms were mostly o w n e d by
independent entrepreneurs causing a significant loss of control for the utilities. Interestingly,
since the 1992 passage of an Act permitting utility-owned wind farms, utilities have m o v e d
into this area, regaining control.44 Hirsh and Serchuk maintained that the wind farm w a s still
a conservative invention, because it did not affect h o w electricity w a s used. T h e truly
radical form w a s the small wind turbine powering an individual household or community,
because this m a y have required significant changes to electricity usage patterns, and thus
lifestyles.45

Matthias Heymann, in his analysis of the history of wind power in three countries,
disagreed. H e suggested that wind p o w e r m a y be incompatible with centralised electricity
systems. W i n d machines had their heyday in the period before the rise of centralised
electricity systems:
[T]he 'formation phase' of electric power systems coincided with the phase of decline of
windmills and wind turbines. In thefirstdecades of the 20th century the number of
windmills and wind turbines fell rapidly from their historical climax in the late 19th century
to insignificance. Central electricity supply based on big power plants became so strong—
and so strong a paradigm—that there weren't even many disputes over decaying windmills
and rusty wind turbines left behind. Although the wind was considered a very cheap energy
source, small, decentralized, user-owned wind turbines did notfitto (sic) the characteristics
and the momentum of electric power systems based on big, utility-owned power plants.
Energy generation by wind turbines was irregular, unpredictable, and small; and wind
turbines could not generate alternating current electricity, which became the basis of power
system expansion and defined technical standards of electricity use.46

The 1990s renaissance of wind power occurred, Heymann argued, when the paradigm of
centralised p o w e r stations w a s starting to break d o w n . Reasons for this breakdown included
technological stasis,47 the oil shocks, the stalling of economic growth, and the burgeoning
environment and anti-nuclear movements. 4 8 With increasing pressure for electricity
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Richard Hirsh and A d a m Serchuk, "Momentum shifts in the American electric utility system: catastrophic change—or no change at all?", Technology and Culture, Vol. 37, No. 2, 1996, pp. 280-311.
ibid.
Matthias Heymann, " A fight of systems? Wind power and electric power systems in Denmark,
Germany, and the USA", Centaurus, Vol. 41, 1999, pp. 112-136 at p. 115.
Hirsh, 1989, op. cit.
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deregulation, utilities w e r e forced to allow access to small private generators. Electricity
systems, H e y m a n n argued, are n o w m o v i n g towards hybridisation:
[A]n integration or combination of different, even contradictory structural element into
power supply, such as a combination of big and small, central and decentralized
technologies, a combination of utility-owned and private-owned power plant capacities, and
a combination of production-side oriented and demand-side oriented policies. While the
real effect of hybridization hitherto remains limited, its tendency, nevertheless, is notable
and likely to continue.49
H e y m a n n rejected H u g h e s ' distinction between radical and conservative inventions, n o t m g
that rather than systems changing as a result of radical inventions, systems m a y change in
small incremental steps.50 This point is taken u p in section 2.2.6.

In the early 1980s, many renewable energy advocates would probably have agreed with
H e y m a n n . T h e y depicted the centralised electricity utilities as a major obstacle to w i n d
power, arguing that the electricity industry had to be restructured. For example, Australian
academic, electricity industry analyst and w i n d p o w e r advocate H u g h Outhred thought that
restructuring w o u l d reduce the influence of the old guard, and allow insiders interested in
sustainable energy to flourish.51 Writing in 1983, U S renewable energy analysts Daniel
D e u d n e y and Christopher Flavin advocated the break u p of m o n o p o l y utilities:
N o institution is more important to the fate of renewable energy—or more in need of
redirection—than the electric utility ... In serious need of reform are pricing, financing,
competitive access, and structure. More specifically, the price consumers pay for electricity
must more accurately reflect the social costs of producing electricity; utilities must help
finance energy efficiency and renewable energy; nonutility power producers must be
encouraged to operate; and today's giant utilities must be restructured into a greater number
of smaller, more workable entities ... The ... most difficult utility reform needed is a
reversal of the seemingly inexorable trend toward centralization that has prevailed since the
1920s ... With the advent of new opportunities for conservation and small-scale renewable
energy technologies, the optimum size of utilities is no longer 'extra large' ... Since
centralized organizations rarely break up of their o w n accord, governments will have to
promote or force this diffusion of power.52

50

ibid., p. 131. Others talk of a changing energy paradigm. Elliott suggests that the emerging paradigm
may be based on diffuse, renewable sources using small-scale, decentralised generation technologies
in a liberalised market creating small, local environmental impacts. David Elliott, "Renewable energy
and sustainable futures", Futures, Vol. 32, 2000, pp. 261-274.
Heymann, 1999, op. cit.
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In the 1990s, influenced by neoliberal thinking, the Australian government (along with
m a n y others) restructured the electricity industry along similar lines to those described by
Deudney and Flavin, claiming that this would provide n e w opportunities for renewables.
H o w renewables have fared under this n e w industry structure is explored in chapters 7 and
8. Restructuring has accelerated the process of hybridisation; however, as described in
chapter 4, m o v e s toward hybridisation were evident during the 1980s, w h e n s o m e utilities
c a m e under pressure to allow private generators access to the grid.

While his notion of hybridisation is useful, I am not fully convinced by Heymann's
argument. There m a y well be a temporal link between the rise and decline of the centralised
electricity system, and the decline and rise of wind power respectively. Yet, while wind
power plants must to s o m e extent be physically decentralised, they can certainly be
centrally o w n e d and operated. T h e history of Australian electricity utilities prior to
restructuring has shown not so m u c h a reluctance to utilise n e w generating technologies as a
reluctance to allow private generation. T h e utilities have been more concerned with
maintaining control over electricity generation; if wind power were to be used, it would be
on the utility's terms. This concurs with Hirsh and Serchuk's observation of U S utilities
moving into wind power once legislative barriers were lifted. It m a y therefore be more
fruitful to ask under what circumstances the electricity utilities were willing to experiment
with wind power. This is explored in chapters 5 and 8.

What problems are faced by those wishing to introduce wind power into an existing
electricity system? T h o m a s Baumgartner and T o m Burns analysed cases where alternative
energy technologies have been introduced. They suggested a framework for analysing h o w
compatible a n e w technology is with the existing sociotechnical system.
The introduction and use of a new technology involves establishing socio-technical
systems, or reshaping already existing ones. Such systems are the frames within which
social agents will produce, distribute, and use the technology. The method of compatibility
analysis considers in what concrete ways the introduction and use of a new technology will
interact with the infrastructures and conditions in production, distribution and use settings.53
They divided the compatibility analysis into four elements:
•

Technology

and

material infrastructure. W h a t complementary technologies are

Company, New York, 1983, p. 283,288.
53
Thomas Baumgartner and T o m R. Burns, Transitions to Alternative Energy Systems: Entrepreneurs,
New Technologies and Social Change, Westview Press, Boulder, 1984, p. 12.
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required; and are they available and appropriate? H o w d o climatic and geographic
factors affect the use of the n e w technology? H o w appropriate are existing transport and
communications systems, and maintenance and repair systems?
•

Cultural infrastructure. H o w do the "cognitive frames and values in a given culture
affect h o w the n e w technology is perceived? 54

•

Organisational and social infrastructure. H o w d o established organisational patterns
affect the production and usage of the n e w technology? Could those with vested
interests in the established system hinder the development of the n e w technology? W h a t
opportunities and influence do proponents of the n e w technology have to bring about
the required restructuring of the existing sociotechnical system?

•

External support structures and institutions. H o w do external conditions such as
"educational and research services, advisory organizations, information networks and
training institutions" affect the success or failure of the n e w technology? A r e political
and legal support and government infrastructure sufficiently developed to assist in
bringing about the necessary changes for the n e w technology? 55

In chapter 9, I use this framework to identify w a y s in which wind p o w e r m a y be
incompatible with the current system.

Baumgartner and Burns also stressed the importance of entrepreneurs and change agents,
w h o push for the introduction of the n e w technology.
[T]he establishment and development of an alternative energy system will require actors
with social power, knowledge and motivation to bring about the necessary changes in
material, cultural, and social organizational conditions.56
They suggested that the success or failure of change agents depends on factors such as:
• their collective knowledge and learning capabilities, the ability of key actors to develop
designs or models of new energy [production, distribution, and use] systems and to get
them to function effectively, or at least to identify what concrete problems have to be
solved to achieve effective functioning.
•

their awareness of the need, and their readiness to try, to restructure existing laws,
institutions, policies and other relevant regulation.

• their ability to mobilize social power in order to bring about economic and sociopolitical changes, in part to deal with any agents or groups opposed to the introduction

54
55
56

This point has similarities with the Social Construction of Technology described in section 2.3.
/_>«/., pp. 12-14.
ibid., p. 15.
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and development of the new technologies.

Baumgartner and Burns noted that the change agents pushing renewable energy will
probably be w e a k initially, and there will be a number of groups supporting the existing
energy industries, including workers and communities w h o depend on these industries for
their livelihood. For renewable energy advocates, gaining the support of key players,
particularly governments, is critical:
Typically, the ultimate success of new energy technologies will depend on the position
taken by large corporations, utility companies, the construction industry, powerful labor
unions, and key government agencies. Historically, governments have played strategic roles
in reducing the technical and market uncertainties and in spreading the risks involved in
alternative technology developments.58

In Australia, there have been many groups, aside from the utilities, supporting the existing
electricity generating technologies: the fossil fuel industries; equipment suppliers; power
station construction companies; unions; workers in the industry; communities located near
power plants; and electricity consumers expecting existing arrangements to keep them
supplied with cheap electricity. In chapter 9, I examine whether any of the groups
supporting wind powerfittedthe role of change agent.

Apart from new technologies having a weak support base compared with existing
technologies, newcomers face another hurdle in unseating these entrenched technologies.
Faced with competition, those with an interest in existing technologies have an incentive to
improve their products.59 So while R E T s are seemingly advantaged by m o v e s to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, proponents of fossil fuels are n o w offering 'clean coal' and highefficiency combined-cycle gas turbines. A n d while R E T s have advantages in times of
uncertain load growth due to theirflexibilityand modularity, so too does natural gas plant.

In a similar vein to Baumgartner and Burns, Mikael Hard and Andrew Jamison analysed
h o w established technologies are embedded within social structures, and thus what
alternative technologies must overcome. Their aim w a s "to break d o w n the 'defining

ibid., p. 17.
ibid., p. 21.
Ren6 Kemp, Johan Schot, Remco Hoogma, "Regime shifts to sustainability through processes of
niche formation: the approach of strategic niche management", Technology Analysis and Strategic
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power' of stabilized technologies into three kinds of reinforcing structures: symbolic,
organizational, and behavioral", described as follows:
•

Symbolic structures refer to the values that are associated with technologies—the
visions, expectations, and desires—at both the individual and collective levels ...
Alternative technologies often succeed or fail largely on the basis of the symbols or
visions which are associated with them.

•

Organizational structures refer to the social systems that support the dominant
technologies and from where attacks on alternatives are often launched ...

•

[B]ehavioral structures [are] the habits and routines that are found in everyday life, the
personal expectations that users have of their technical artifacts, the patterns of
domestication that must be dealt with by any successful innovation.

What then does it take for an alternative technology to successfully challenge an established
technology? H a r d and Jamison suggested:
A n alternative technology seldom succeeds if it poses an alternative at all three levels. Indeed
our contention is that a too-ambitious alternative is less likely to succeed than a conservative
one ... Alternative technologies must not merely provide alternative values or expectations.
They must, even more crucially, generate sufficiently strong institutional support, and they
must not be seen to challenge accepted standards of (socio-technical) behavior.61

Hard and Jamison's case study was on alternative cars, i.e. consumer goods, while wind
turbines are usually producer goods. T h u s these reinforcing structures should be analysed
from the perspective of the electricity utilities. I return to this in chapter 9.

Technology assessment techniques may also be biased against a new technology, as they
m a y incorporate values associated with existing technologies. Financial analyst S h i m o n
A w e r b u c h opposed the use of traditional valuation tools in assessing R E T s . H e argued that
tools based o n the discounted cash flow m e t h o d might be inappropriate for assessing n e w
technologies such as R E T s , or comparing R E T s with existing energy technologies. R E T s
differ from most fossil fuel-based generators in that they are capital intensive with very l o w
operating costs. Fossil fuel-based generators, however, usually have l o w capital costs and
high variable costs.62 Because of the discounting effect o n the capital recovery costs, the
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Management, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1998, pp. 175-195.
Hard and Jamison, 1997, op. cit., p. 147-8.
ibid., p. 148, 158.
This is not the case for brown coal plant, as used in Victoria.
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revenue requirements of capital-intensive technologies and thus the calculated cost per
energy unit are very sensitive to the discount rate used, while those of fuel-intensive, lowcapital technologies are quite insensitive. A t high discount rates, capital-intensive
technologies will therefore appear far m o r e costly than they do at low discount rates.63 A s
described in chapter 5, the choice of discount rate for wind plant w a s contentious.

Instead of using the same discount rate to evaluate different generating options, it makes
more sense, A w e r b u c h argued, to use different discount rates according to the level of risk.
Financial investors do not use the same discount rate for high-risk and low-risk options;
indeed, they recognise that incorporating low risk investments with a low expected yield
into a financial investment portfolio is a sound investment strategy, as it reduces the total
risk of the portfolio. A w e r b u c h argued that the cost-risk trade-off from incorporating
renewable energy technologies should be analysed in similar terms. R E T s have a lower risk
than do traditional generating technologies; hence, the inclusion of R E T s in an electricity
generation portfolio reduces the total level of risk, and they should therefore be assessed
using a lower discount rate.64

There are several reasons why RETs are less risky options for an electricity utility than are
conventional generating technologies. Because the costs of R E T s are largely fixed and are
independent of m o v e m e n t s in fossil fuel prices, they represent a very low financial risk.65
R E T s tend to be modular and flexible; that is, they can be constructed in a range of sizes
and brought on line very quickly. They therefore reduce the uncertainty involved with
energy planning and the risk of under- or overcapacity.66 R E T s will not be subject to a
future carbon tax nor will they require emission-control retrofits in the future. Yet, the risk
of added future costs are usually not incorporated into the valuation of fossil-fuel options.67

Shimon Awerbuch, "The role of risk and discount rates in utility integrated-resource planning", 1992,
Accessed 15 December 2002, <http://www.fortunecity.con^usiness/finance/983/docs/roleofrisk.doc>;
Shimon Awerbuch, "Measuring the costs of photovoltaics in an electric utility planning framework",
1993, Accessed 15 December 2002, <http://www.fortimecity.con^usiness/finance/983/docs/
measurin.doO.
Awerbuch, 1992, op. cit.; Shimon Awerbuch, "Getting it right: the real cost impacts of a renewables
portfolio standard", Public Utilities Fortnightly, Vol. 138, No, 4,2000, pp. 44-55.
Awerbuch, 1992, op. cit.
von Meier, 1994, op. cit.
Shimon Awerbuch, " W e do not have the measurement concepts necessary to correctly implement
IRP: a synthesis and research agenda", 1993, Accessed 1 January 2001, <http://www.crest.org/
renewables/awerbuch/mesurmnt/mesurmnt.pdf>.
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O f course, s o m e conventional generating options are also capital-intensive witn

ow

operating costs, and thus represent a low risk in terms of future fuel price fluctuatrons.
Hydro power, a conventional form of renewable energy is one; b r o w n coal-fired plan
another. (Brown coal is cheap to mine and has a very low opportunity cost.) H o w e v e r , apart
from small-scale hydro, these two types of plant do not offer the benefits of modularity and
flexibility that the n e w renewables do; furthermore, b r o w n coal-fired stations are heavy
emitters of greenhouse gases, and thus are m o r e risky, as they are likely to be affected by
future environmental regulations.

Awerbuch also pointed to the difficulties in valuing a new technology, as its benefits are
unlikely to be fully k n o w n in advance. T h e benefits of n e w technologies m a y not be
recognised, because it is usually assumed that they willfitinto an existing system. Yet they
m a y allow a system to be reorganised in w a y s perhaps not predicted.
N e w technologies generally possess a bundle of attributes which differentiate them from
the previous vintage technology. For example, it was discovered that the special attributes
of new manufacturing process technologies included capabilities not previously understood
or measured such as their effect on product throughput and quality, their different financial
risk characteristics and their ability to help make the manufacturing process highly flexible
and responsive to changing market requirements. Before these measures were conceived,
the benefits of new process technologies were not precisely understood and their valuations
generally indicated that they were not cost effective as compared to previous vintage
technologies.68

New technologies may allow electricity systems to be reconfigured in a number of ways.
Alexandra von Meier coined the term 'supple technologies' to describe electricity
generation, load management and network control technologies which are modular,
dispersed and flexible. The use of such technologies can allow reconfiguration of the
physical electricity network, of system control, of system planning, of ownership and
regulation, and of management and culture.69 This is in keeping with the H e y m a n n ' s notion
of hybridisation of electricity networks discussed earlier in this section.

69

Shimon Awerbuch, "The problem of valuing new energy technologies", Energy Policy, Vol. 24, No.
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The view that R E T s enable system reconfiguration and thus should not be assessed in a
similar manner to conventional generating technologies is being increasingly advanced by
advocates of renewable energy. They are in effect challenging traditional assessments of the
efficacy of renewable energy. In section 2.3, I examine h o w such contrary views can be
analysed. Butfirst,I examine an alternative w a y that such advocates can create a space for
the n e w technology, and h o w small changes m a y over time lead to large shifts in
sociotechnical systems.

2.2.6 Technological Regimes and Technological Niches
A s described in the following chapters, advocates of wind power and other R E T s have used
a number of strategies to increase the usage of these technologies. They have attempted to
win decision-makers over to a more favourable evaluation of wind p o w e r — a s noted earlier,
different groups evaluate wind power in quite different ways. They have taken advantage of
occasions w h e n the organisational structure of electricity systems was influxto further their
aim. They have also attempted to change the institutional setting for renewable energy.
Because advocates of renewable energy were usually weak actors, they could seldom effect
significant change in the institutional setting. (Occasions w h e n they successfully influenced
government policy are examined in later chapters.) Often the most promising strategy was
to create a protected space for renewable energy—a niche.70 A n obvious example of a niche
for wind power is remote area power supplies.

The creation of a niche, a space where the technology can be temporarily shielded from
normal market forces and allowed to mature, can be useful—perhaps essential—for the
successful innovation of any n e w technology. Here I examine its potential role in fostering
environmental technologies.

Can weaker actors create a niche, or is this the role of government agencies in seeking to
foster innovation? Until recently, the main group pushing environmental technologies was
the environment movement, often motivated by opposition to a particular dominant

Hugo Verheul and Philip J. Vergragt, "Social experiments in the development of environmental technology: a bottom-up perspective", Technology Analysis and Strategic Management, Vol. 27, No. 3,
1995, pp. 315-326; Kemp, Schot and Hoogma, 1998, op. cit.; Rene Kemp, Arie Rip and Johan Schot,
"Constructing transition paths through the management of niches", in Raghu Garud and Peter Karnoe
(eds), Path Dependence and Creation, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah (New Jersey), 2000.
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technology and the desire to demonstrate the viability of an environmentally benign
alternative. For example, m a n y early advocates of renewable energy were motivated by
opposition to nuclear power. Environmentalists also use different criteria than do other
actors to evaluate technology, placing m u c h m o r e emphasis on social and environmental
impacts and outcomes than on technical or economic performance.71 Recently, interest in
environmental technologies has b e c o m e more c o m m o n : as environmental regulations are
tightened, corporations and government have begun to regard environmental technologies
as offering n e w business opportunities. B y the 1990s there were a range of actors seeking to
foster the innovation and diffusion of environmental technologies.

Because of the important role traditionally played by environmentalists, we need to look
beyond the role of large actors such as corporations, large institutions and government
agencies in creating niches for n e w environmental technologies. H u g o Verheul and Philip
Vergragt studied the role of citizens and environment groups in the innovation of
environmental technologies—they termed these "social experiments". S o m e of these
initiatives later b e c o m e successful, often because they were taken over by existing corporate
interests.72 O n e example that they cited w a s the establishment of wind turbine cooperatives
in the Netherlands, which used loans from their m e m b e r s to invest in wind turbines. These
were established in the main by people opposed to nuclear power w h o wanted to
demonstrate the viability of alternative generating technologies. B y demonstrating that wind
power could be a profitable investment, the cooperatives also helped to spur a private
market for wind turbines, particularly a m o n g farmers seeking n e w sources of income. 73

Verheul and Vergragt noted that niches were valuable for allowing the technology to
mature, for providing the selection environment the opportunity to adapt:74
The creation of a niche is necessary because the development of a new technology is not a
momentary event, but requires a series of learning processes in which the technology and
its social and physical environment are mutually adapted. That implies that it is very
difficult for new technologies to compete with older technologies that are already
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As described in chapters 3 and 6, ideas about what constitutes desirable social and environmental
outcomes have shifted over time.
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embedded in the selection environment.75
Similarly, K e m p et al emphasised the time needed for learning:
Apart from demonstrating the viability of a new technology and providingfinancialmeans
for further development, niches helped to build a constituency behind a new technology,
and to set in motion interactive learning processes and institutional adaptations—in
management, organization and the institutional context—that are all-important for the wider
diffusion and development of the new technology.76
T h e success of the Danish wind turbine program in the 1970s and 1980s, compared with the
U S experience can be seen as a case of successful niche management. 7 7

Successful formation of a niche may lead to the transformation of a technological regime.
For renewable energy advocates, this would be a shift from a regime based on fossil fuels as
the main energy source to a m o r e sustainable one. 78 T h e concept of technological regime
was

introduced by evolutionary economists as a m e a n s of analysing barriers to

technological change. It is intended to go beyond the concept of a technological p a r a d i g m —
the idea that, in a given technological field, problem definitions, problem-solving
procedures and assumed trajectories of progress tend to be confined within a given
framework. 79 T h e concept of technological regime is conceived m o r e broadly to include not
only these cognitive aspects, but also the selection environment and the interplay between
these two. 80 K e m p described it as:
[T]he overall complex of scientific knowledge, engineering practices, production process
technologies, product characteristics, skills and procedures, institutions and infrastructures
which make up the totality of a technology. The basic idea behind a technological regime is
that the ways in which technological change will and can develop are both structured and
constrained: constrained by the available methods and techniques, by the consensus of
engineering ideas about how to approach problems, by the organisational and institutional
context, by patterns of infrastructures and consumer demand.81

Of course, new technologies must originate in existing regimes, and their success may well
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be linked to structural problems within the existing regime.82 A n example is the problem of
climate change to the fossil fuel regime. K e m p et al noted that over time as the n e w
technology benefits from learning and institutional adaptation, and m a y eventually b e c o m e
a force of its own. 8 3

An example of a regime shift that appears to be occurring in the electricity industry, in
Australia and elsewhere, is the shift from steam turbine generators to gas turbine generators.
Jorge Islas has traced the history of this shift, highlighting the importance of early niches
and the learning that occurs via these niche applications. Initially suitable niches for gas
turbines were mainly the low load factor applications of peak supply and standby supply. In
these niches, the technical and economic characteristics of the gas turbine, such as low
capital cost and rapid start-up, placed it at an advantage compared with the steam turbine.
Its success here led to increasing returns to adoption, and thus increased industrial learning
about the technology. S o m e gas turbine manufacturers recognised that there were
opportunities to extend the role of the gas turbine, and R & D programs were instigated to
improve its performance and extend its capabilities. O n e successful development w a s a
hybrid of the gas turbine and steam turbine, k n o w n as the combined-cycle gas turbine
( C C G T ) . Initially the gas turbine w a s used as an auxiliary to the steam turbine; later the gas
turbine became the dominant component. 84

The question of how to manage a niche successfully in order to effect a technological
regime shift is an important one for guiding renewable energy policy but is of less concern
in this study.85 W h a t is of interest is that a mechanism such as niche creation m a y lead over
time to structural change. Thus while structural analyses highlight barriers to change and
are pessimistic about the prospect of large-scale change, theories of niche m a n a g e m e n t and
regime shifts show that small changes and the associated learning and network-building can
eventually lead to a regime shift.
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2.3 The Social Construction of Technology
2.3.1 Introduction
A s noted above, environmentalists can play an important role in the innovation and
diffusion of environmental technologies, such as through niche creation, because they often
disagree with conventional interpretations and evaluations of these technologies. H u g o
Verheul and Philip Vergragt noted:
The niche is created and protected by a network of actors which share a c o m m o n problem
definition in relation to the innovation ... [They] make a different evaluation of
technological options than, for example, industrial actors, primarily because the
environmental aspects are more important for them.86
H o w can the observation that environmental technologies have differing meanings for
different groups be incorporated into an explanation for the history of wind p o w e r ?

One SST approach has incorporated analysis of different meanings of a new technology into
an explanation of the technology's development path and usage patterns. This is the Social
Construction of Technology ( S C O T ) approach,firstoutlined by Trevor Pinch and W i e b e
Bijker, and developed further by Bijker and others.87 First I present an overview of S C O T ,
and then examine s o m e criticisms of this approach.

Central to SCOT are that the 'working' of a technology be taken as contingent rather than
intrinsic, and that 'successful' and 'failed' technologies be examined symmetrically.
[F]or a theory of technology, 'working' should be the explanandum, not the explanans. The
'working' of a machine is not an intrinsic property of the artifact, explaining its success;
rather it shouldfigureas a result of the machine's success. Thus, the success or failure of an
artifact are to be explained symmetrically, by the same conceptual framework. A n
asymmetrical explanation might, for example, explain the commercial success of an artifact
that w e n o w consider to be working by referring to that 'working', while the failure of that
same artifact in another context might be explained by pointing at social factors. In a
symmetrical explanation, 'working' and 'nonworking' will not figure as causes for a

Verheul and. Vergragt, 1995, op. cit., p. 322.
Pinch and. Bijker, 1984, op. cit. A n important precursor to this study was an article by Mulkay which
refers to the possibility of subjecting the technical meanings of technologies to sociological analysis.
Michael Mulkay, "Knowledge and utility: implications for the sociology of knowledge", Social
Studies of Science, Vol. 9, 1979, pp. 63-80. The S C O T approach was elaborated on in Wiebe E.
Bijker, Of Bicycles, Bakelites, and Bulbs: Towards a Theory of Sociotechnical Change, M I T .Press,
Cambridge (Mass.), 1995. See also Pinch, 1996, op. cit.
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machine's success or failure. The claim is not that 'working' is merely in the eye of t e
•

88

beholder, but that it is an achievement rather than a given.
Several concepts used by the SCOT approach are of relevance here: 'interpretative
flexibility'; technological frames'; 'relevant social groups'; and 'closure'.

The concept 'interpretative flexibility' was borrowed from earlier studies of the social
construction of scientific knowledge in the Empirical P r o g r a m m e of Relativism ( E P O R ) .
There it referred to the idea that experimental results could be interpreted in m o r e than one
way. 8 9 E P O R researchers found that interpretativeflexibilityw a s best revealed during a
scientific controversy, because then opposing scientists were often articulating differing
views over scientific findings.90 E P O R researchers also investigated the social mechanisms
that limit interpretative flexibility allowing the controversy to end, to reach closure.
Scientists negotiating the interpretation of experimental data e m p l o y — b y necessity—tactics
that would be regarded as 'non-scientific'.92 H e n c e "nature alone does not provide a
determinant outcome to scientific debate".93 These non-scientific tactics, which are shaped
by the scientists' social interests, will be rendered invisible once closure is achieved, with
the outcome then considered 'scientific knowledge'

94

Pinch and Bijker suggested that, in employing the concept of interpretativeflexibilityin the
social construction of technology, the development of an artefact is analogous to a scientific
controversy. In S C O T , interpretative flexibility refers to h o w different groups ascribe
different meanings to the artefact. Because the meaning of the artefact has interpretative
flexibility, different development paths are put forward; to understand w h y one path
succeeds requires a social explanation. Pinch and Bijker illustrated this with the
development of the bicycle. During the long development process, a n u m b e r of problems

88
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90
91
92

Bijker, Of Bicycles, Bakelites, and Bulbs, 1995, op. cit., pp. 14-15.
H.M. Collins, "Stages in the empirical programme of relativism", Social Studies of Science, Vol. 11,
1981, pp. 3-10; H.M. Collins, Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice,
Sage, London, 1985.
Pinch and Bijker, 1984, op. cit., p. 410.
Collins, 1981, op. cit., p. 4; Pinch and Bijker, 1984, op. cit., p. 409.
Collins, 1985, pp. 142-145.
Trevor J. Pinch and Wiebe E. Bijker, "The social construction of facts and artefacts: or h o w the
sociology of science and the sociology of technology might benefit each other", in Wiebe E. Bijker,
Thomas P. Hughes and Trevor Pinch (eds), The Social Construction of Technological Systems, M I T
Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1987, p. 40. (This is a modified version of Pinch and Bijker, 1984, op. cit.)
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and solutions were presented at particular times. A problem w a s said to exist w h e n any
participating group believed it so, and for each problem, several (not necessarily technological) solutions were possible. Groups interested in the artefact, called 'relevant social
groups',were divided according to the meaning they attributed to the artefact. M e m b e r s of a
relevant social group thus shared the same meaning. These different meanings referred not
only to social meaning, but also to the technical content of the artefact. In their case study,
Pinch and Bijker described the different models of bicycle produced in the period before the
design stabilised, including models considered at the time to be serious rivals but n o w
regarded as failures. O n e example w a s the model n o w called the penny-farthing: for s o m e
groups it w a s a successful 'sporting' machine, while others deemed it unsafe. A range of
solutions w a s offered for the problems presented, leading to n e w models, and so on.95

Bijker introduced the concept of 'technological frame' to describe the arena which
structures interactions within a group and through which the meaning of an artefact is
ascribed. T h e concept is somewhat analogous to Kuhn's 'paradigm'96 but it applies to all
relevant social groups, not just engineers, and it is used more broadly to include not only
cognitive but also social and material elements.97 It includes "goals, key problems, problemsolving strategies (heuristics), requirements to be met by problem solutions, current
theories, tacit knowledge, testing procedures, and design methods and criteria".98 M a n y
elements of a technological frame, as Bijker described it, are more applicable to the process
of innovation rather than the diffusion of a technology. Such a concept, however, is useful
in understanding h o w groups m a k e different assumptions of the purpose of a given
technology and thus of appropriate uses and usage patterns of the technology. Baumgartner
and Burns' idea of cultural infrastructure, described in section 2.2.5, is a similar concept to
technological frame but more applicable to understanding usage patterns. I employ the
concept of cultural infrastructure in chapter 9.

Bijker noted that a given actor may be a member of several relevant social groups and thus
m a y be involved with different technological frames. Their interactions cannot therefore be

Collins, 1985, pp. 142-145.
Pinch and Bijker, 1984, op. cit. In a latter book, Bijker further describes the development process. See
Bijker, Of Bicycles, Bakelites, and Bulbs, 1995, op. cit.
Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed., Chicago University Press,
Chicago, 1970.
Bijker, Of Bicycles, Bakelites, and Bulbs, 1995, op. cit.
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completely structured by the technological frame. H e introduced the concept of degree o
•P

inclusion in a technological frame. Thus in the case of wind power, an advocate o

* A

win

power m a y also be an electrical engineer, or even w o r k for an electricity utility an
have partially acquired the technological frame of the latter. Their assumptions about win
power will probably differ from wind power advocates w h o are, say, m e m
environment groups.

'Closure'—again drawn from EPOR studies, where it referred to the emergence of
consensus—occurred w h e n the relevant social groups believed that the problems arising
previously had been solved.
Closure in technology involves the stabilization of an artefact and the 'disappearance' of
problems. To close a technological 'controversy' the problems need not be solved in the
common sense of that word. The key point is whether the relevant social groups see the
problem as being solved.99

In this thesis, I ask how the meaning of wind power, beliefs about how well it works, and
the meaning of its representation as an environmental technology vary for different groups,
1 r\r\

and h o w these evolve over time. Whether closure is ever achieved is another matter.
Certainly some meanings have stabilised over time: a m o n g most groups, wind p o w e r is n o w
considered in terms of the contribution it can m a k e to reducing carbon dioxide emissions.
But the controversy over h o w wind power should be valued in an electricity system is by no
means closed.

Studying closure mechanisms, however, begs the question of whether controversies over
wind power can be closed. Here I draw an analogy with Susan Leigh Star's observation
that, for marginalised groups, some seemingly standardised technological systems m a y
never be stable.101 Similarly, alternative technologies such as wind power are expected to fit
into a system designed around and benefiting conventional generating technologies. Perhaps
Star's argument can be applied more generally to suggest that closure is an illusion or only
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100

101

ibid, p. 123.
Pinch and Bijker, 1984, op. cit., pp. 426-427.
I use 'closure' and 'stabilisation' synonymously. Bijker differentiates between the two. Bijker, Of
Bicycles, Bakelites, and Bulbs, 1995, op. cit.
Susan Leigh Star, "Power, technology and the phenomenology of conventions: on being allergic to
onions", in John Law (ed.), A Sociology ofMonsters: Essays on Power, Technology and Domination,
Routledge, London, 1991.
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temporary, for it is only through ignoring (or silencing) the perspectives of marginalised
groups that controversies appear to be closed.102 Until the use of wind systems is seen as
normal—if this ever occurs—advocates of wind systems m a y continue to take issue with
official assessments of wind power.

Yet, Star's example does not help us to understand what strategies marginalised groups (or
advocates of alternative technologies) have adopted to effect change: her allergy has not
changed options offered by restaurants; while other more vocal marginalised groups have
been more effective. For example, disabled groups have been relatively successful in
changing the design of buildings to enable access. W h a t successful strategies, then, have
advocates of environmental technology adopted to effect change?

2.3.2 How to be 'Symmetrical'?
A s described in the previous section, S C O T requires a symmetrical analysis: technologies
deemed 'successful', 'failed', or anywhere else along the spectrum should be studied using
the same analytical tools. This approach is also called methodological relativism. W h a t
would a symmetrical analysis m e a n for this study?

This case study of wind power is not about the history of rival technologies, nor is it about
competing wind systems designs in the period before one design became dominant.103 In
this study, I take symmetry to m e a n that the claims m a d e by relevant social groups about
the properties of wind power should be examined using the same analytical tools. The
analyst should not evaluate the epistemological status of these claims, thus avoiding
statements about the 'true' properties of wind power. Such statements cannot therefore be
employed to explain w h y wind power plays only a marginal role. Yet, I have concerns
about this approach: I question whether w e can be symmetrical without slipping into
epistemological

relativism

(that

is, whether

methodological

relativism

implies

epistemological relativism104); and I show that (in this study, at least) the analyst m a y be
making implicit judgments about the properties of wind power w h e n deciding which are the
relevant social groups. This latter point is discussed below.

See section 2.2.2.
The latter would of course be similar to Pinch and Bijker's study of the development of the bicycle.
Radder, 1992, op. cit.
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Though not the main focus, rival technologies are part of the story too. For just as the
efficacy of wind power can be problematised, so too can the efficacy of conventional
generating plant. S o m e advocates of wind power argued that conventional generating plant
did not 'work' as well as the electricity utilities claimed: they were inflexible (for example,
they were very large and their construction required a long lead time), environmentally
damaging, and subject to (sometimes frequent) mechanical breakdown, the consequences of
which were not fully taken into account by the electricity utilities w h e n comparing their
performance with that of wind power. S o m e renewable energy and energy efficiency
advocates went further than this arguing that energy supply and use patterns were an
outcome of past practices in the electricity supply industry and its reliance on large,
centralised electricity plant. They were, in effect, arguing that the criteria for judging h o w
well electricity systems work are historically contingent.

There is a further aspect to symmetry that I wish to explore, which concerns the role of the
analyst. I suggest that the analyst should be reflexive about her/his o w n political and
cognitive position for the purposes of examining h o w this could affect the analysis. H o w
m y membership of several knowledge communities—in particular, engineering—affects
h o w I select and depict relevant social groups is discussed in section 2.3.5. Butfirst,I ask:
W h a t is the significance of m y political position for this study?

Briefly, my political position is as follows. I agree with many of the demands often made in
conjunction with calls for increased use of renewable energy, particularly m o v e s towards
sustainable and globally equitable energy usage patterns, including a large reduction in
energy demand in the industrialised countries through greater energy efficiency and
restructuring of energy-intensive practices. I consider that the possibility of climate change
makes the shift away from fossil fuels an urgent matter. I support increased use of wind
power, though not all proposed wind power developments, and I surmise that not all wind
power proponents are driven by environmental concerns. Because of this political position,
m y position on h o w energy options should be assessed includes advocacy of the
internalisation of the social and environmental costs of energy supply, a greater priority for
demand-side options in electricity planning, and increased decentralisation of power
generation within a national grid to reduce energy loss and enhance security. I suspect that
traditional forms of assessment of electricity options are biased in favour of conventional
power generators and large electricity users, and—since I maintain that all forms of
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assessment e m b o d y normative assumptions—advocate the use of assessment methods that
are predicated on the need for environmental sustainability. Furthermore, I undertake this
study with political objectives: I hope to aid the fortunes of environmentally sustainable
energy technologies by showing that the assessment of these could be otherwise. M o r e
generally, I argue against conventional analyses of energy choices, which depict these as
merely technical or economic matters, and attempt to s h o w h o w energy decision-making
processes can be subjected to social and political analysis.

Some have argued that a symmetrical analysis requires the analyst to avoid taking sides
politically as well as epistemologically. C a n methodological relativism be compatible with
commitment to a political position? M o r e fundamentally, what are the normative
implications of m y study? 105

Here I am entering a debate which has simmered in Science and Technology Studies circles
(and other disciplines106) for m a n y years. I raise it here because, by examining this debate, I
can m o r e clearly explicate m y justification for this study. I do not review this debate
thoroughly, but rather elicit s o m e observations of relevance.107 The debate rages on m a n y
fronts; here I survey two, each of which will shed different light on the question. These are
charges against and defence of the S C O T approach, and a debate conducted within science
studies on whether symmetry is inherently radical.

2.3.3 The SCOT Approach and Political Commitment
Although not addressed in Pinch and Bijker's original programmatic paper, the implications
of S C O T for politics is developed in later work. 1 0 8 1 start by considering the contribution of

For a review, see Martyn Hammersley, Taking Sides in Social Research: Essays on Partisanship and
Bias, Routledge, London, 2000.
In particular, I do not engage with arguments that having a political commitment entails treating
technologies as though they have objective effects, thus requiring a realist position. I do not wish to
reject realism outright. See Keith Grint and Steve Woolgar, "On some failures of nerve in
constructivist and feminist analyses of technology", Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 20,
No. 3, 1995, pp. 286-310; Rosalind Gill, "Power, social transformation, and the new determinism: a
comment on Grint and Woolgar, Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1996, pp.
347-353; Steve Woolgar and Keith Grint, "A further decisive refutation of the assumption that
political action depends on the 'truth' and a suggestion that w e need to go beyond this level of debate:
a reply to Rosalind Gill", Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1996, pp. 354-357.
The main references are: Stewart Russell, "The social construction of artefacts: a response to Pinch
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t w o critics of S C O T : Stewart Russell and L a n g d o n Winner. Both argued that using
methodological relativism w a s probably incompatible with having a political c o m m i t m e n t
to 'better' technologies, and opted for political commitment. 1 0 9

Russell advised that methodological relativism should be used with m u c h caution:
I can accept the usefulness of [methodological] relativism as a limited heuristic device ...
[But] it is easy to slip from relativism as a method into relativism as a position on
conflicting viewpoints ... [Arguments about technical performance blend into arguments
about objectives, economics, effects, risks, benefits and other dimensions of their
desirability. If w e accept that arguments over technological options are socially constructed,
then it follows that a relativist approach with respect to them leads us into relativism with
respect to social interests—in other words, political neutrality.110
H e advocated not a symmetrical but a partisan approach:
[We need to start] from a political commitment to demonstrating the possibility of alternative
technologies for alternative goals, and to opening up the process of technological
development to sections of society denied access to it... It is no coincidence that some of the
most valuable and analytically satisfying critiques of technologies and their justifications have
come from movements opposing them and putting forward alternatives.111

W i n n e r w a s also sceptical about the value of relativism, arguing that S C O T does not

and Bijker", Social Studies of Science, Vol. 16, 1986, pp. 331^46; Trevor Pinch and Wiebe Bijker,
"Science, relativism and the new sociology of technology: reply to Russell", Social Studies of
Science, Vol. 16, 1986, pp. 347-360; Langdon Winner, "Upon opening the black box andfindingit
empty: social constructivism and the philosophy of technology", Science, Technology and Human
Values, Vol. 18, No. 3, 1993, pp. 362-378; Wiebe Bijker, " D o not despair: there is life after
constructivism", Science, Technology and Human Values, Vol. 18, N o . 1, 1993, pp. 113-138; Bijker,
Of Bicycles, Bakelites, and Bulbs, 1995, op. cit.; Pinch, 1996, op. cit.; Eduardo Aibar, "Technological
frames in a town planning controversy: w h y w e do not have to drop constructivism to avoid political
abstinence", in C. Mitcham (ed.), Research in Philosophy and Technology: Social and Philosophical
Constructions of Technology, Vol. 15, JAI Press, Greenwich (Conn.), 1995; Eduardo Aibar, "The
evaluative relevance of social studies of technology", Philosophy and Technology, Vol. 1, Nos. 3-4,
1996, Accessed 4 August 1999, <http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/ejournals/SPT>; Wiebe Bijker and Eduardo
Aibar, "Dutch, dikes and democracy: an argument against democratic, flexible, good and bad
technologies", Proceedings of the Third European Congress on Technology Assessment,
Copenhagen, 4-7 November 1992, pp. 538-557; Mark Elam, "Anti anticonstructivism or laying the
fears of a Langdon Winner to rest", Science, Technology and Human Values, Vol. 19, N o . 1, 1994,
pp. 101-106; Langdon Winner, "Reply to Mark Elam", Science, Technology and Human Values, Vol.
19, N o . 1, 1994, pp. 107-109; Hans K. Klein and Daniel Lee Kleinman, "The social construction of
technology: structural considerations", Science, Technology and Human Values, Vol. 27, N o . 1,2002
pp. 28-52.
110
111

Both Russell and Winner offer other criticisms of the S C O T approach. S o m e are discussed later.
Russell, 1986, op. cit., pp. 332-333.
ibid., p. 333.
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contribute to an analysis of a technology's political implications. H e chided S C O T for:
[I]ts lack of and, indeed, apparent disdain for anything resembling an evaluative stance or
any particular moral or political principles that might help people judge the possibilities that
technologies present ... Unlike the previous generations of critical social thinkers, social
constructivism provides no solid, systematic standpoint or core of moral concerns from
which to criticize or oppose any particular patterns of technical development. Neither does
it show any desire to move beyond elaborate descriptions, interpretations, and explanation
to discuss what ought to be done.112
Like Russell, Winner admitted a role for limited relativism, acknowledging that it m a y be
sensible for an analyst to temporarily suspend political judgment of a technology, but
considered that strict adherence to relativism precluded the analyst from taking a stand on
larger political questions about technology.113

It is appropriate here to reflect on Russell's claim that the most valuable critiques come
from those putting forward alternatives. Note that Pinch and Bijker argued that the S C O T
approach is intended to focus attention on alternative technologies, since it requires the
analyst to examine symmetrically successful and failed (or alternative) technologies;114 but
this differs from Russell's c o m m e n t s about the value of advocacy

of alternative

technologies. In chapter 3,1 review the contribution of advocates of alternative technology
of the 1970s and early 1980s. They were supporters of renewable energy technologies, and
their arguments for renewable energy were firmly tied in with a critique of conventional
electricity systems, in particular nuclear power. This led s o m e advocates of alternative
technology to research or build renewable energy systems to demonstrate alternatives to
nuclear power. Russell is correct to acknowledge the value of their contributions, insofar as
they helped to put renewable energy on the political and technological agenda. Moreover,
there are limits to the value of an unengaged analysis for furthering a political cause:
exposing the subtle w a y s in which established systems operate to ensure dominant
technologies and institutions maintain their position probably requires that they be provoked
through challenge by an alternative. But does this require that the analyst be the one
challenging orthodoxy, or can it be equally valuable in furthering a political position to
undertake a symmetrical study of the orthodoxy and their challengers? Indeed, an analyst
w h o is engaged in promoting an alternative technology m a y be blind to the subtleties of

112

Winner, 1993, op. cit., pp. 371, 374.
ibid.
114
Pinch and Bijker, 1986, op. cit., pp. 352-353.
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those challenging the alternative, and m a y fail to deconstruct the w a y s in w h i c h advocates
of the alternative technology represent the alternative in order to garner support. For
example, w i n d p o w e r advocates m a y fall into the trap of categorising those opposing the
siting of w i n d farms in scenic locations as supporters of the status quo, and fail to analyse
rhetorical strategies and representations of w i n d p o w e r used b y w i n d farm developers.

Later defences of SCOT suggest that the choice is not as bleak as both Russell and Winner
contend. In later w o r k , W i e b e Bijker argued that social constructivism can aid political
action b y furthering the democratisation of technology:
[Technological d]eterminism inhibits the development of democratic controls on
technology because it suggests that all interventions are futile ... [I]f w e do not foster
constructivist views of sociotechnical development, stressing the possibilities and
constraints of change and choice in technology, a large part of the public is bound to turn
their backs on the possibility of participatory decisionmaking, with the result that
technology will really slip out of control.116
Problematising the technical content of artifacts plays a vital role in democratisation:
Without an understanding of the interpretative flexibility of sociotechnical ensembles, the
analysis of technology and society is bound to reproduce only the stabilized meanings of
technical artifacts and will miss many opportunities for intervention. But interpretative
flexibility needs to be demonstrated in a rigorous way that goes beyond the simple level of
observation that 'technology is human-made and therefore subject to m a n y societal
influences'.117

Bijker also employed a version of the 'methodological relativism may help the underdog'
argument, which I explore further in the next section:
The deconstructive capacity of recent work can be effectively used to show interpretative
flexibility, to suggest alternative technological choices, to debunk the sociotechnical
ensembles constructed by the powerful.118
H e also acknowledged that the less powerful might not benefit, since powerful groups can
also d r a w o n social constructivist strategies.119

115

118
119

See chapter 6.
Bijker, Of Bicycles, Bakelites, and Bulbs, 1995, op. cit., p. 281. Unfortunately, this quote seems to
equate S C O T with SST. In fact, all S S T approaches are opposed to technological determinism.
ibid, p. 281. See also Wiebe E. Bijker, "Democratization of technology, w h o are the experts?", The
World Series on Culture and Technology, 1995, Accessed 18 August 1999, <http://www.
desk.nl/~acsi/WS/speakers/bijker2.htrn>.
Bijker, 1993, op. cit., p. 130.
Bijker, Of Bicycles, Bakelites, and Bulbs, 1995, op. cit, p. 289.
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M o r e fundamentally, constructivists challenge the idea of political commitment as
conventionally understood, and tend to exhibit a libertarian streak.120 In response to
Winner's argument that "social constructivism provides n o solid, systematic standpoint or
core of moral concerns from which to criticize or oppose any particular patterns of technical
development", 121 Eduardo Aibar doubted that such a "privileged theoretical position" exists,
while Trevor Pinch pointed to "the futility of trying to change the world

by

pronouncements". 122 Constructivists eschew traditional structural approaches in social
theory (though s o m e are n o w m o r e willing to incorporate structure in their analyses).123
They are thus opposed to the assumption that stable social interests direct technological
change, regarding technology and society as contingent and emergent.

Aibar, a SCOT analyst, suggested that critics of constructivism might be yearning for a
previous era, w h e n great hopes were placed in the revolutionary potential of the working
class, and later n e w social movements. H e argued that the current sociopolitical crisis—a
crisis of both the institutions of political representation and "emancipatory political
discourse"—requires a n e w kind of political response. H e described four typical, yet (as he
argued) problematic, responses to this crisis: persistence with the strategies of the past;
concentration on ethics rather than political concerns; celebration of pluralism and
relativism (the postmodern approach); and a desperate hope that democratic institutions can
be strengthened sufficiently through greater public participation. T h e constructivist
approach, he argued, represents a fifth, and m o r e fruitful response, since it avoids both
technological and social reductionist assumptions:
Once w e develop social constructivism until w e reach its more radical implications, w e are
also forced to reconsider pur former image of the social: "society itself has to be rethought
from top to bottom" ... The problem is not that of choosing between a politically suspicious
will to turn STS into another respectful 'scientific' discipline and a commitment to produce
'committed' studies. The serious problem is that of finding out what 'commitment' might
mean once w e drop our m o d e m assumptions about technology and society—once w e take up
the challenge to analyze the co-production of technology and society, once w e acknowledge

Elam, 1994, op. cit. I use 'constructivist' rather than 'social constructivist' deliberately. Here
constructivism comprises a range of approaches including S C O T . Wiebe. E. Bijker and John L a w
(eds), Shaping Technology / Building Society, M I T Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1992.
Winner, 1993, op. cit., p. 374.
Aibar, 1996, op. cit.; Pinch, 1996, op. cit.
See criticisms of SCOT'S agency-centred approach in Klein and Kleinman, 2002, op. cit.
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both the end of the technocratic paradise and the present crisis of political discourse.124

Here I take issue with Aibar. I acknowledge that political strategies need to be continually
rejuvenated in keeping with current political circumstances, but the constructivist approach,
with its questioning of the value of conventional political action, bears the hallmark of a
political retreat. For example, Aibar seems sceptical about the potential of social
movements for achieving social and political change, yet I suspect he has written off too
soon the environment movement. 1 2 5 Emancipatory political discourse m a y not be in crisis,
but rather manifest in a n e w form.

2.3.4 The Neutrality versus Commitment Debate
A b o v e I referred to the suggestion that methodological relativism can undermine the
position of more powerful groups, thus aiding the 'underdog'. Such thinking could motivate
a partisan study of wind power. B y symmetrically presenting assessments of wind power
undertaken by both the electricity industry and wind power advocates, and by seeking social
explanations for each group's assessment of wind power's efficacy and for technological
choice in the electricity industry, a partisan analyst m a y undermine the dominant position of
the electricity utilities and fossil fuel interests.

This idea seems plausible. But what is the warrant for assuming that a symmetrical analysis
would help the underdog? Is a symmetrical analysis possible if one is partisan? A n d since
wind power is supported by disparate interests, w h o then is the underdog?

To explore this, I draw on a debate of the politics of the sociology of scientific knowledge
(SSK). 1 2 6 Provoking this debate w a s a 1990 paper by P a m Scott, Evelleen Richards and
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Aibar, 1995, op. cit., p. 15. The quote is from Bruno Latour.
Some SST theorists do study the environment movement. See, for example Steven Yearley, The
Green Case: a Sociology of Environmental Issues, Arguments, and Politics, Harper Collins, London,
1991; Alan Irwin, Citizen Science: a Study of People, Expertise, and Sustainable Development,
Routledge, London, 1995.
SSK is the science studies equivalent to SCOT. Some of the key articles are: Pam Scott, Evelleen
Richards and Brian Martin, "Captives of controversy: the myth of the neutral social researcher in
contemporary scientific controversies", Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 15, No. 4 1990
pp. 474-94; H.M. Collins, "Captives and victims: comment on Scott, Richards, and Martin", Science,
Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1991, pp. 249-251; Brian Martin, Evelleen Richards
and Pam Scott, "Who's a captive? Who's a victim? Response to Collins' method talk", Science
Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1991, pp. 252-255; Evelleen Richards and Malcolm
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Brian Martin. Scott et al noted that, while studying scientific controversies, their attempts to
be neutral social researchers had not been successful—their work had been drawn into the
debate. They had been captured by the side with less scientific credibility, leading them to
conclude:
[A]n epistemologically symmetrical analysis of a controversy is almost always more useful
to the side with less scientific credibility or cognitive authority. In other words,
epistemological symmetry often leads to social asymmetry or nonneutrality. The side with
few scientifically or socially credentialed resources is more likely to attempt to enroll the
researcher, whereas the better-credentialed side views an epistemologically symmetrical
analysis as threatening to its cognitive and social authority, and it is more likely to react to
the analyst with hostility or suspicion.127
T h e idea that analysts can be neutral, they argued, is a myth; and symmetry m a y well be
intrinsically radical. In later work, Martin opted to actively intervene as a partisan in
controversies, taking the side of the underdog.128

Others rebutted this, pointing to how SSK insights may be used in the service of powerful
groups to undermine the arguments of less powerful groups. Such cases, often found in the
courtroom or other forums for public disputes, are typically where weaker groups rely on
scientific claims to challenge more powerful groups. SSK allows such scientific claims to
be deconstructed.129 Because of this, some environmentalists, who are in many cases reliant
on scientific claims, are hostile to social constructivism.130

Scott et al probably have a more valid point in their observation that the analyst is likely to
receive a cooler reception from the dominant side. This resonates with my experiences—the

Ashmore, "More sauce please! The politics of SSK: neutrality, commitment and beyond", Social
Studies of Science, Vol. 26, No. 2, 1996, pp. 219-228; H. M . Collins, "In praise of futile gestures:
how scientific is the sociology of scientific knowledge?", Social Studies of Science, Vol. 26, No. 2,
1996, pp. 229-44; Malcolm Ashmore, "Ending up on the wrong side: must the two forms of
radicalism always be at war?", Social Studies of Science, Vol. 26, No. 2, 1996, pp. 305-22; Evelleen
Richards, "(Un)Boxing the monster", Social Studies of Science, Vol. 26, No. 2, 1996, pp. 323-56;
Dick Pels, "The politics of symmetry", Social Studies of Science, Vol. 26, No. 2, 1996, pp. 277-304;
Sheila Jasanoff, "Beyond epistemology: relativism and engagement in the politics of science", Social
Studies of Science, Vol. 26, No. 2, 1996, pp. 393-418; Brian Martin, "Sticking a needle into science:
the case of polio vaccines and the origin of AIDS", Social Studies of Science, Vol. 26, No. 2, 1996,
pp. 245-276; Brian Wynne, "SSK's identity parade: signing-up, off-and-on", Social Studies of
Science, Vol. 26, No. 2,1996, pp. 357-91.
Scott, Richards and Martin, 1990, op. cit., p. 490.
Martin, 1996, op. cit.
Jasanoff, 1996, op. cit.
See for example Burningham and Cooper, 1999, op. cit.
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electricity utilities were in the main unwilling to offer information not already in the publrc
d o m a i n — a n d this has shaped the form that this study has taken. O n the other hand, I have
also found some local protests groups opposing wind farm developments to be very
secretive and unwilling to speak to people w h o do not share their views. But I have not
encountered such secrecy a m o n g those wind farm opponents w h o have expertise in
planning or another relevantfield;thus I suspect that this secrecy is bound up with the
question of expertise. This is discussed further in section 2.3.5.

What are the implications of 'taking the side of the underdog' for this study? Scott et al
argued that neutral analyses aid the sides with less cognitive credibility. In examples that
they cited this was the weaker side. But is this generally the case? Certainly the wind energy
industry is the underdog with respect to the coal industry in terms of size, resources and
political influence. But seen in terms of the global climate change agenda, with the resultant
preference for energy technologies that do not emit carbon dioxide, the wind energy
industry probably has more cognitive credibility. W i n d power, along with most renewables,
is touted as a significant growth industry, while the coal industry regularly has to defend
itself against accusations that it is a major polluter. I suspect that most environmentalists,
and some of the general public, believe the claims of the renewable energy industry about
the efficacy of renewables, and believe that the dominant energy industries are using their
political clout to impede the growth of renewables. If I treat claims of the dominant energy
industries and renewable energy industries symmetrically, then it m a y do more to
undermine the claims of the renewable energy industry.

Here I am referring to how renewable energy is viewed in the eyes of the public—for we
must distinguish between public views of renewables and views within the energy policy
community. In the latter, renewables have had very little credibility. In Australian policy
circles, m u c h lip service has been paid to renewables over the years, but only occasionally
have they been given serious consideration, and this has been primarily for economic
reasons rather than their environmental benefits. In chapters 4 and 7, I explore the
formulation of renewable energy policy in Australia and the effect of renewable energy and
environmental lobbies on policy.

131

See also case of the tobacco industry, which is the 'overdog' with respect to social power, but, since
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Scott et al, it seems, equated a symmetrical analysis with a neutral analysis. I maintain that
it is important to differentiate between these, and also avoid the assumption that the
analyst's political position necessarily corresponds with that of any of the protagonists.
Earlier I outlined m y political position, which includes (cautious) support for wind power,
and support for energy assessment methods predicated on the need for environmental
sustainability. I also hold a 'meta-level' position, one that I hope to further through this
study: I argue that sustainable energy advocates need to expose the social and political
factors shaping energy decision-making and energy preferences. M y support for the latter
ranks higher than m y support for wind power. Yet it is m o r e likely that I would be
portrayed by others as a supporter of wind p o w e r — a n d perhaps a traitor if m y analysis
undermines s o m e of the wind lobby's claims.

Evelleen Richards, whose study of the controversy over an alternative cancer treatment
(large doses of Vitamin C ) led to her being portrayed as an alternative medicine supporter,
highlighted the problem faced by an analyst of an alternative technology w h o wants to be
seen as a sociologist of an alternative technology rather than an advocate:
I have a good deal of sympathy with the struggles of alternative medicine and its
practitioners and adherents to gain a fairer hearing in the forums dominated by conventional
medicine and ... I have personally intervened in an attempt to achieve more symmetrical
treatment of Pauling's claims about vitamin C ... But such sympathy or intervention should
not be confused with the advocacy of alternative claims ... If, however, 'alternativists' want
to deploy m y work in their struggle to achieve a better hearing for their claims, I cannot
have too many problems with this. After all, what I am advocating is more democratic
participation in treatment evaluation and regulation.133
In other words, Richards' political position pertains to the method used to assess different
medical treatments, rather than a particular medical treatment per se.

One problem is that controversies are often portrayed as two-sided. As Richards noted:
The two-sided model analytically replicates the power relations of domination with its easy
assumption of 'for' and 'against', or 'overdogs' and 'underdogs'. It precludes other
positions and possibilities, other interests that an analyst may, should she wish, identify
with and commit herself to (or, indeed, be captured by).134

Richards, 1996, op. cit.; Trevor Pinch, "Generations of SSK", Social Studies off Science, Vol. 23,
1993, pp. 363-373.
Richards, 1996, op. cit., pp. 343-344.
ibid, p. 342.

Andrea Bunting. The Social Shaping of Wind Power in Australia

58

Yet describing the protagonists in this study is no easy matter. For example, the
environment movement is divided on the issue of whether wind power is an environmental
technology, and thus should be treated as multiple movements. Communities living close to
wind power developments are also divided: some members m a y oppose such developments
on environmental grounds; some m a y have an economic interest in the development; s o m e
may

value the greater local self-reliance it affords; some

may

become

more

environmentally aware as a result of the experience. Fossil fuel interests, which have
traditionally been sceptical about wind power, are moving into the wind energy industry.
Electricity utilities have changed their opinion of wind power for a range of reasons,
including political pressure, the introduction of green power schemes, and the expectation
of full retail contestability. S o m e are n o w actively involved in developing wind farms. A
few businesses that m a y otherwise oppose internal isation of environmental costs are
recognising the value of clean technology, and hence m a y support stronger environmental
regulation.

It is preferable not to view protagonists in terms of 'sides', but rather, in terms of groups
being engaged in various alliances at times and places w h e n some of their interests, goals
and context align. For example, environmentalists concerned about climate change, and the
wind power industry are, in effect, allies in their support for wind power. Yet they are
pursuing quite different interests in relation to their broader political agendas. Most
environmentalists advocate a shift towards a sustainable energy futures requiring a mix of
demand- and supply-side options, while the wind energy industry is principally motivated
by commercial imperatives and m a y see other sustainable energy industries as 'the
competition' in the scrabble for the scarce sustainable energy dollar.135

But neither these groups nor the interests that they pursue should be regarded as stable or
given.136 For example, the group that I identify as the 'electricity utilities' has changed its
identity over time. A s its identity has changed, and as circumstances have changed, so too
have the interests that this group pursues. This is described further in chapter 7.

The latter sentiment is undoubtedly curbed by the formation of umbrella bodies for sustainable
energy industries.
Wynne, 1996, op. cit.
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2.3.5 Relevant Social G r o u p s
I n o w examine h o w the analyst m a y select and depict 'relevant social groups' ( R S G s ) . I
briefly review s o m e criticisms of h o w S C O T analysts have used this concept, and discuss
implications for this study.

But first, what do SCOT theorists say about how one identifies RSGs? Bijker suggested that
the analystfirstidentifies obvious actors, and then notes which other actors they refer to. B y
'following the actors', the analyst should be able to describe and delineate the R S G s in
m o r e detail. A t various times, actors m a y identify n e w R S G s and forget about others.
T h u s Bijker w a s concerned with identifying groups that are relevant for the actors at a given
time. H e argued that it is not appropriate for analysts to impose their o w n categories.138

Stewart Russell described a number of problems arising from this:
First, it is easy to omit groups, either because they had no voice in the process, or because
they were indifferent to the specific options on offer, positions which none the less need
explaining. Second, it is easy to lapse into over-aggregation; the public statements of [an
organization] no doubt mask significant internal divisions. Third, the stated objectives or
rationale of an organization may bear no simple correspondence to its interests or to the
effective function which it performs in interaction with other groups in a structured social
context. Fourth,... it is possible for certain sections of society to secure their interests, or to
have them secured, without participating directly in conflict.139
Russell also criticised S C O T ' S conception of social structure and h o w R S G s are depicted
structurally:
Far beyond just 'identification' and 'description', groups need locating in a structured and
historical context... It is this structural location that largely determines their relationship to
[the] technoloigy.140

In a similar vein, Mikael Hard argued that the SCOT approach outlined by Pinch and Bijker
"lacks a discussion of power, stratification, and hierarchy", and thus fails to deal adequately
with social conflict. S C O T ' S depiction of closure as the outcome of a consensus a m o n g
R S G s is problematic; there are other possible closure mechanisms, including the use of

Bijker, Of Bicycles, Bakelites, and Bulbs, 1995, op. cit., pp. 46-48.
ibid., p. 49.
Russell, 1986, op. cit., p. 335. Similarly, Winner suggested that some groups might have been
"suppressed or deliberately excluded". Winner, 1993, op. cit., pp. 369-370.
Russell, 1986, op. cit., pp. 334-335. Similar remarks are made by Winner, 1993, op. cit., pp. 370-371.
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force.141 A n d , as noted in section 2.3.1, 'closure' m a y be illusionary.

I now turn to specific issues pertaining to the use of the concept RSGs in this thesis.

Regarding the issue of over-aggregation raised by Russell, I acknowledge that it is
problematic to assume that organisations such as the electricity utilities or the corporatised
or privatised electricity companies were homogeneous. Attitudes to and agendas tor
renewable energy varied within organisations and groups, although it might be difficult tor
an outsider to discern these differences. Electricity utilities, in particular, were renowned for
not sharing information with the public, and there were very few public forums where an
electricity utility expressed a range of views. Anecdotal evidence suggests that a renewable
energy group within an electricity utility might not have been taken seriously by those
involved with the 'real' work of the business. (In recent years, semi-autonomous business
units have been formed within electricity companies, meaning that this m a y be less of a
concern.) Yet because renewable energy is popular, published documents and public
pronouncements from these utilities m a y well have presented an overly favourable account
of the dominant attitude to renewables and the relative importance of renewable energy
activities within the organisation. H u g h Outhred, Australian engineering academic and wind
power advocate w h o has worked closely with the ESI for m a n y years, observed that there
were a number of people working for the utilities w h o supported more sustainable forms of
electricity supply, but these 'saplings' were in the main s w a m p e d by the dominant culture.
H e favoured restructuring, since it would shake up the old guard, and provide a space for
the saplings to grow and to manoeuvre for change.142 Within an organisation, differing
meanings ascribed to wind power can also relate to job function. For example, in her study
of technological innovation in electric power distribution companies, Alexandra von Meier
showed that 'engineers' and 'operators' evaluate a n e w technology quite differently. She
relates this to the values of each group, which are shaped by different cognitive
representations of the technology corresponding to different work contexts.143

Similarly, the stance of governments towards renewable energy is unlikely to be
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Mikael Hard, "Beyond harmony and consensus: a social conflict approach to technology", Science,
Technology and Human Values, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1993, pp. 408-432, at p. 415.
Hugh Outhred, pers. comm.
Alexandra von Meier, "Occupational cultures as a challenge to technological innovation", IEEE
Transactions on Engineering Management, Vol. 46, No. 1, 1999, pp. 101-114.

Chapter 2: Social Shaping of Technology Approaches

homogenous.

Different

government

departments—for

example, the

61

environment

department and the energy department—might be pursuing different agendas on renewable
energy. Within one department, there m a y be a range of agendas for renewable energy.
M u c h of the time, governments placed their energy agencies within the department
responsible for mineral resources, making it difficult for officers within these departments
w h o wished to promote a view of energy as something other than a resource to be exploited.

The problem raised by Russell of the 'missing social groups' suggests that it is politically
inappropriate to include only those groups which are visible to other groups. But it m a y also
be analytically inappropriate. I argue that w e should not consider R S G s as only an actors'
category, and that analysts will need to incorporate their o w n categorisation along with the
actors'. This relates to differences within social theory: S C O T draws upon action-oriented
approaches, which avoid structural categories imposed by the analyst. Action-oriented
approaches have obvious benefits; in particular, they enable a far richer account and m a y
better account for change. But since their use m a y lead to unacceptable omissions and an
inadequate explanatory framework, as described by Russell, I hold that they are insufficient
in themselves.

In imposing my categorisation of RSGs, I find it useful to analyse RSGs in terms of, first,
their access to decision-making processes and thus their opportunity to influence the course
of events (such as h o w wind power was perceived), and second, their degree and type of
expertise. Here I need a brief detour into the sociology of science. The concept of R S G s , as
used by the S C O T approach, has been drawn from the sociology of science. It is a
translation of the E P O R concept of core set, though S C O T appears to use the concept of
R S G s in a looser w a y than E P O R uses core set, and S C O T is less specific about h o w it
accounts for expertise and influence in decision-making processes. In the sociology of
science, the core set designates the (relatively small) group of scientists—allies and
opponents, perhaps encompassing a range of expertise—engaged in a particular scientific
controversy.144 They are "the group w h o contest and produce n e w knowledge of the natural
world".145 The core set will be surrounded by 'on-lookers', those w h o follow but are not

Collins, 1985, op. cit; Trevor Pinch, "The sociology of the scientific community", in R.C. Olby, G.N.
Cantor, J.R.R. Christie and M.J.S. Hodge (eds), Companion to the History of Modem Science,
Routledge, London, 1990.
ibid.,p.9\.
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active in the controversy.146 M e m b e r s of the core set engage in negotiation over the
interpretation of experimental data, and to them is revealed,fleetingly,the contingency of
knowledge.

In considering how the idea of a core set relates to the use of RSGs in this study, I raise two
questions. First, do m e m b e r s of a core set unproblematically recognise each other as
experts?147 If not, treating the core set as an actors' category becomes problematic. Second,
do all m e m b e r s of a core set have s o m e (not necessarily equal) ability to influence the
outcome of the controversy? I do not attempt to answer these questions for scientific
controversies, other than to note that scientific controversies m a y range from the balanced
to the very one-sided. In cases where scientists challenge orthodoxy, are considered as
cranks or charlatans by their orthodox opponents, have little access to financial resources,
and are prevented from publishing in the scientific literature, the answers to one or both of
these questions is most likely 'No'. 148 In a study of the treatment of an alternative
technology w e should be prepared for a similar answer.

Thus, I argue that in this type of study the analyst should not omit groups merely because
they had little access to or were disadvantaged in decision-making processes, and thus had
little or no influence. I do not intend to reproduce the general types of findings of public
forums and inquiries, where dominant groups are far better placed to impose their views,
and knowledge claims put forward by marginal groups can easily be excluded.149 O n the
other hand it is not feasible to include all of the groups which did not actively seek to
influence the course of events, and it is problematic for the analyst to assume that she, or
another person or group, can speak for them. T h e most obvious 'missing social g r o u p ' —
aside from future generations, w h o will undoubtedly be affected by energy decisions m a d e
today—is the general public. (And of course it is highly problematic to treat the public as a
single group.) M e m b e r s of the public typically are in favour of renewable energy, are
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concerned about environmental issues, are relatively ignorant about electricity supply
systems, are reluctant to pay m o r e than a trivial amount for sustainable energy, and are
unwilling to modify their high-energy lifestyles to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. W h o is
to speak for this paradoxical beast?150 There are m a n y structural reasons for w h y the general
public hold such views, which relate to h o w energy supply is organised in our society.151
But to speak for these groups suggests that w e can ascertain their objective interests, a
problematic proposition indeed.15

Apart from acknowledging the existence of these 'missing social groups', their paradoxical
views and the structural reasons for both their views and their exclusion from energy
decision-making, I do not intend in this thesis to focus on these groups. M y main interest is
in analysing the position of groups which sought influence on decisions about wind power,
whether or not they were influential.

For much of its history, the electricity utilities were able to undertake electricity planning,
including the assessment of different generation options, with little if any input from other
groups. Recently, other groups, including those favouring renewables, have sought more
influence. T h e y have challenged the electricity utilities' assessments of renewable energy in
public forums, lobbied governments and energy agencies, proposed their o w n renewable
energy projects and m a d e use of occasional openings in the electricity planning process. For
example, at times the utilities' planning processes were the subject of inquiries, which
provided critics with the opportunity to present alternative assessments of generation
options, including occasionally wind power.

The second way that we can differentiate RSGs is in terms of their degree and type of
expertise. Here, I argue, the analyst needs to m a k e a technical judgment about w h o to
include, because not all groups necessarily agree on what constitutes expertise.

The Australian Consumers Association does occasionally comment on renewable energy issues, such
as the choice of green power products.
Jesse S. Tatum, Energy Possibilities: Rethinking Alternatives and the Choice-Making Process, State
University of N e w York Press, Albany, 1995; Andrea Bunting and Stewart Russell, "What sustains
unsustainability? Examining context, explaining obstacles, devising strategies for renewables", Solar
'97, Australian and N e w Zealand Solar Energy Society Conference, Canberra, December 1-3, 1997.
Lukes, 1978, op. cit; Stewart Russell, "Interests and the shaping of technology: an unresolved debate
reappears", Science and Technology Analysis Research Programme, University of Wollongong,
Working Paper No. 4, April 1991.
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If R S G s is to be treated as an actors' category, then w e should probably expect that
participants recognise each other's expertise. Yet this is problematic. For example, there are
m a n y w h o try to influence h o w wind power is assessed; not all are recognised by o
participants to be experts. O n e group, the electricity utilities, have been loath to
acknowledge other participants' claims to expertise, c o m m o n l y arguing that the utilities
k n o w best because they are charged with keeping the electricity system functioning. (Of
course, within the electricity utilities, those responsible for network operation might have
different views to those responsible for power generation.) Equally one could argue that,
since the utilities have had little or no experience with wind power, they cannot be experts.
There are m a n y different issues pertaining to the efficacy of wind power; it is unlikely that
any participants' expertise extends across all aspects. W i n d p o w e r is a subject which
attracts m u c h interest, particularly amongst environmentalists; thus there is likely to be a
continuum rather than a clear-cut boundary between professional expertise and lay interest.

Recognition of expertise is very much bound up with the issue of credibility. In recent
times, the electricity utilities have c o m e under increasing fire: they have been labelled as
self-serving bureaucracies; they have incurred the wrath of environmentalists over s o m e of
their power station proposals and their neglect of demand-side management; and they have
m a d e substantial forecasting errors leaving s o m e states saddled with enormous debts.
Consequently, the credibility of the electricity industry, in relation to their ability to assess
generation options, has been eroded—at least in the eyes of s o m e environmentalists,
economists, public officials and commentators. 154 (The erosion of the utilities' credibility is
undoubtedly a significant reason behind the restructuring of the industry: " W h e r e expertise
is challenged, institutions falter, and flux and chaos threaten".155) O n the other hand,
environmentalists and the renewable energy industry have had limited credibility in policy
and electricity industry circles, though n o w their influence is perhaps increasing. In both
cases w e can attribute this credibility deficit to conflicting value systems. In the former case
it can also be attributed to the utilities becoming out of step with changing circumstances,
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such as declining d e m a n d growth rates, rising environmental concerns and technological
stasis;156 in the latter case to the renewable energy industry's lack of track record.

Must analysts then impose their own view of expertise? Only to some extent, I believe.
While participants m a y disagree on important aspects—such as the primacy of economic or
sustainability criteria—they agree on m u c h more. A vast amount of technical knowledge is
taken as given. Technical claims considered wildly fanciful are thus excluded on the basis
of this shared knowledge. 157

But how do we delimit this shared knowledge, and how then do we evaluate a challenge to
orthodox thinking? A pertinent example concerns the 1970s work of A m o r y Lovins.158 H e
challenged the orthodox position that high energy growth rates were essential to ensure
economic growth. A t the time, his views were considered wildly fanciful; today m a n y are
c o m m o n l y accepted.159 Because Lovins c a m e to be regarded as successful in the area of
energy conservation, his knowledge claims are usually taken seriously. Yet this thesis is
equally concerned with the 'unsuccessful', those whose ideas are not adopted, and whose
knowledge claims are not taken seriously at the time. For example, h o w do w e evaluate the
claim often m a d e by renewable energy advocates that had renewables received adequate
R & D funding (comparable to, say, nuclear power), these technologies would be more
mature and cheaper today?

It therefore seems likely that the analyst must make some judgment about which claims she
deems valid and which she does not. A n example concerns the claims m a d e by some groups
opposing wind farm developments, claims that I believe vary widely in validity. S o m e , I
have surmised, are based on little or anecdotal evidence.160 Other claims, for example that

Hirsh, 1989, op. cit.
Staudenmaier made a similar point in his review of constructivist approaches. John Staudenmaier,
"Problematic stimulation: historians and sociologists constructing technology studies", in C. Mitcham
(ed.), Research in Philosophy and Technology, Vol. 15: Social and Philosophical Constructions of
Technology, JAI Press, Greenwich, (Conn.), 1995.
Amory B. Lovins, Soft Energy Paths: Towards a Durable Peace, Friends of the Earth, San Francisco,
and Ballinger, Cambridge (Mass.), 1977.
In 1998 Lovins wrote: "Total U S energy use is now slightly below the level suggested in m y 1976
'soft energy path' graph ... widely criticized at the time as wildly optimistic". Amory B. Lovins,
"Energy lessons learned and to be learned: verities that will astonish some and delight the rest",
Whole Earth, Winter 1998, p. 31.
For example, Geoff Collins, an Australian wind farm developer who has attended a number of protest
meetings, has reported on claims made by opponents of wind turbines contributing to some illnesses
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increasing energy efficiency is a more cost-effective w a y of reducing greenhouse gas
emissions than building wind farms, seem to be more valid, albeit a little short-sighte .

I believe that it is unacceptable for the analyst to implicitly make judgments about the
validity of different claims while claiming to employ methodological relativism. T h u s only
a w e a k methodological relativism m a y be possible.161 It is probable that these judgments
will be shaped by the analyst's o w n biases, which in m y case are coloured by

my

engineering training. A n d of course a similar remark can be m a d e about the groups that
a m studying: there is no expectation that any group can be 'objective'.

What then are the groups which have expertise in electricity systems and/or renewable
energy systems? Prior to the 1970s, in m u c h of Australia, the electricity supply industry had
a virtual monopoly on expertise about the electricity sector, because there w a s little outside
interest and the utilities controlled most of the information.162 There w a s little renewable
energy expertise: a small number of researchers studied solar heating systems, and a few
companies supplied wind systems for remote users. But over the past few decades the locus
of energy expertise has broadened considerably. With the rise of the environment,
alternative technology and anti-nuclear movements, and, in the w a k e of the 1970s oil
shocks, with heightened interest in energy matters including m u c h greater funding for
renewable energy research and development, a n e w generation of energy experts w a s
spawned. 163 S o m e joined renewable energy associations, with the aim of sharing and
disseminating information, and lobbying governments. State governments instituted n e w
energy departments or agencies, some of which developed expertise in renewable energy
systems.

The

renewable

energy

industry—manufacturers,

suppliers,

developers,

consultants, etc—has grown significantly in the last few decades and is n o w a major body
of expertise. M o r e recently, with the rise of the global environment agenda and the
restructuring of the electricity utilities, m a n y individuals, groups and organisations have a
professional interest in energy supply and use, and n e w types of expertise (e.g. in energy
marketing) are emerging.

161
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(asidefromrecognised effects such as illnesses caused by shadow flicker from wind turbines). Geoff
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Staudenmaier, 1995, op. cit. noted: "Where the trouble begins, I think, is when the urge to find
universal epistemological laws of technology leads to a rhetoric of inflated claims", p. 98.
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O f course, w e would expect a significant disparity in expertise a m o n g those w h o profess an
interest in renewable energy. For example, environmentalists, w h o frequently m a k e
arguments for renewable energy, m a y well be m o r e knowledgeable about the technologies
that they oppose—such

as nuclear p o w e r — t h a n those that they support. Those with

expertise in other energy technologies sometimes m a k e negative pronouncements about the
efficacy of renewable energy.164 M a r k Diesendorf (former president of the Australasian
W i n d Energy Association) m a d e an interesting observation about h o w s o m e might gain
expertise in renewables:
It seems to m e that nuclear power proponents, who are usually trained as nuclear
technologists or scientists, and whose public credibility generally rests on specialised
expertise in these areas, face a dilemma. To promote nuclear power, some of them must try
to criticise renewable sources of electricity ... H o w are these narrow experts to extend their
expertise, or at least the public image of it, to renewables? Unfortunately, this has been
achieved in some countries by governments which handed over R & D in renewable energy
and much energy policy-making to former nuclear energy researchers and administrators,
respectively. Furthermore, where wind and solar energy associations seek high status with
governments, they have sometimes appointed as office-bearers senior engineers or administrators from electricity utilities and corporations, which tend to be strongly pronuclear.165

2.3.6 The Adequacy of SCOT as an Explanatory Framework
C a n S C O T contribute to an explanatory account for usage patterns of wind power, or does it
provide just a richer description? If it can be explanatory, what kind of explanatory
framework does it lead to? In their defence of constructivist approaches such as S C O T ,
John L a w and W i e b e Bijker claimed that, by emphasising contingency, constructivist
approaches avoid a priori explanatory frameworks and thus avoid social determinism—the
idea that our technologies are simply an outcome and reflection of social relations. This,
they regarded as a problem with structural accounts. They were critical of structural
accounts which view institutions and actors' interests as static and stable: the institutions
and actors' interests which m a k e up the explanatory framework m a y well change as the

Gavin Gilchrist, The Big Switch: Clean Energy for the Twenty-first Century, Allen & Unwin, St.
Leonards, N S W , 1994; Daniel M . Berman and John T. O'Connor, Who Owns the Sun?: People,
Politics, and the Struggle for a Solar Economy, Chelsea Green, White River Junction (Verm.), 1996.
Mark Diesendorf, Letter in The Ecologist, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1984. Diesendorf noted that the latter was
not the case for A u s W E A .
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action unfolds. Indeed, existing institutions, and hence the institutional barriers to n e w
technologies, should be recognised as merely the successful outcome of past actions.

Thus the restructuring of existing institutions involves undoing the efforts of previous
system-builders and confronting interests built into those existing institutions by past
successful action. A s these institutions are restructured, w e can observe n e w institutional
barriers to wind power being erected, whether intentionally or not. For example, as the
Australian electricity supply industry has been restructured, powerful groups (generally
large existing players) have had considerable success in ensuring that they are advantaged
by the n e w arrangements compared with newer players.

Yet, does the SCOT approach adequately deal with the difficulties in overcoming
institutional barriers to n e w technologies, particularly w h e n there is a significant disparity in
power between different actors? This question is problematic, since the S C O T approach
recasts the question of institutional barriers. Analysing the institutional barriers to a n e w
technology does not necessitate recognition of the interpretative flexibility of the
technology. B y focusing on institutional barriers, w e are likely to accept the interpretation
of the technology favoured by its advocates and overlook alternative interpretations. Indeed,
the idea that the fate of a n e w technology can be explained by recourse to institutional
barriers is in effect the mirror image of the traditional explanation—that the fate of a n e w
technology can be explained by its intrinsic technical and economic characteristics.

On the other hand, if we accept that the meaning of a technology is interpretively flexible,
then what were regarded as institutional barriers are revealed to be outcomes of choices.
The focus then shifts from the 'institutions' and 'barriers' to the strategies of actors. It is
possible to do this without foregoing a solid structural analysis, by recognising that
institutions have c o m e to be seen as legitimate, and that this legitimacy needs to be
maintained. What, then, are the strategies used to legitimate institutions, and to maintain or
undermine this legitimacy?

Some of the actors in this account of wind power in Australia suggest that the latter is a
worthwhile approach: they have offered alternative interpretations of the meaning of wind
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John Law and Wiebe E. Bijker, "Postscript: technology, stability and social theory", in Bijke
Law (eds), 1992, op. cit.
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power; they have devised strategies to m a k e alternative interpretations publicly k n o w n ; they
have revealed the contingency of institutional barriers; and they have devised strategies to
undermine the legitimacy of existing institutions. In this thesis, I recount their strategies, but
also describe the social, political and economic context in which they operated.

2.4 Framework for Analysis
M y intention in this thesis is to combine both contextual and interpretative approaches to
explain the treatment of wind power in Australia. Here I summarise the main features of the
framework that I adopt in this thesis.167

The institutional structures that provide the context for wind power activity exhibit both
stability and change. These structures place constraints on what outcomes are likely. Yet
they also need to be seen as products of successful strategies by earlier actors, and
institutional change as an outcome of strategies by more recent actors. Periods of
institutional change m a y offer opportunities for intervention by n e w actors promoting n e w
technologies. B y observing periods of change, w e m a y also better identify in whose
interests these institutions operate. However, actors' interests are also changing.

The interpretative approaches focus on contested knowledge claims, not to determine which
interpretations were justified, but to analyse h o w negotiations over the interpretation of
wind power shapes whether and h o w it is deployed. W e can also show h o w the structural
location of actors (which m a y itself be changing during this account) shapes h o w their
knowledge claims influence decision-making.

The requirements for an explanatory framework are more fully described in section 9.2.

I am drawing on a listfromBijker, Of Bicycles, Bakelites, and Bulbs, 1995, op. cit. This is described
in further detail in section 9.2.
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Chapter 3: The Idea of an Environmental Technology
"What's all this about revolution? I came here to talk about windmills ".'

3.1 Introduction
In chapter one I suggested that w e explore the differing technical and social meanings
ascribed to technologies that I have categorised as 'environmental technologies'.2 H o w have
these meanings and associated expectations evolved and shaped usage patterns of such
technologies? I illustrate this with reference to a technology widely (though not universally)
regarded as environmentally benign—wind power technology.

The label of environmental technology suggests alleviation of some environmental
problems. W h a t then is the relationship between various groups' use or advocacy of wind
power and their conception of environmental problems? T o what extent are environmental
concerns driving the use or advocacy of wind power a m o n g different groups? Is consensus
a m o n g these groups, or another form of closure, emerging?

Since the early 1970s, wind power has been widely regarded as an environmental
technology, and remains popular because of this image. A s such, advocacy of wind power is
usually linked with concerns about environmental degradation. Yet the dominant
environmental issues associated with wind power have changed significantly, ranging from
resource depletion, to air, water and thermal pollution, to wilderness loss from hydropower,
to nuclear power, to acidification, to climate change. Opponents of wind power also claim
to be protecting the environment. W i n d power supporters—developers, manufacturers,
users, etc.—would not necessarily be regarded as environmentalists by the mainstream
environment movement. 3 Governments and electricity utilities portray support for wind
power as evidence of their green credentials, yet have often been driven by rising fuel prices
and public relations than the desire to reduce environmental impacts of electricity supply.
A s governments offer incentives for wind power, more businesses m o v e into the wind
power industry, viewing environmental betterment as offering n e w business opportunities.

Anonymous comment at an early alternative technology meeting, cited in Peter Harper, "What future
for alternative technology?", in Horace Herring (ed.), Alternative Technology, Vol. 1, Smoothie
Publications, Brighton (UK), 1974, (n.p.).
For stylistic reasons, I do not henceforth place environmental technology within quotation marks.
However, it is to be understood that this is constructed as an analyst's category.
Of course, the term 'environmentalist' is contested.
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Ideas about the role of technology in solving environmental problems, and the relationship
between technological systems and social arrangements have also evolved. M a n y early
environmentalists called for deindustrialisation and a shift towards smaller and simpler
technologies, which could be owned and operated by householders or communities, which
could be installed, maintained and perhaps built by the practical layperson, and which
enabled greater self-reliance. (This is discussed in section 3.3.) W i n d power, they believed,
was such a technology. Yet today's wind machines are large, sophisticated, and typically
owned and operated by the electricity utilities. M a n y environmentalists n o w see further
industrialisation as the key to environmental improvement, and some in the corporate world
are promoting greater use of environmental technologies to advance corporate goals rather
than just environmental goals.

Once mainly associated with the counterculture, environmental technologies are now being
more widely deployed and are expected to become a major growth industry. So w h y this
shift? Have governments, corporations and the public finally accepted the warnings about
an impending environmental crisis? Are environmental technologies n o w sufficiently
mature to compete with conventional but more environmentally damaging technologies? Is
this shift because m a n y m o d e m environmental technologies require little lifestyle changes
by citizens, compared with earlier environmental technologies? Or is it because the use of
environmental technologies is seen as compatible with commercial imperatives, with m a n y
environmental technologies n o w produced, sold and therefore promoted by medium-sized
and large businesses?

How then can this account of the history of wind power be linked to changing ideas about
what constitutes an environmental technology? T o examine this, I start by exploring h o w
environmentalism and the environment agenda have been transformed over the past few
decades. This chapter covers the period until 1988; chapter 6 covers the period post-1988.
The selection of the year 1988 as the divider for the two main parts of this thesis is
pertinent, for in 1988, concerns about the use of fossil fuels contributing to climate change
moved from scientific discourse to the public policy agenda.

I follow this with a study of the alternative technology movement, one of the first groups to
promote renewable energy technologies as environmental technologies—though generally
they did not use this term. The alternative technology movement was itself small; its
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importance lies in its wider influence on popular views of environmental technologies. I
examine

the

movement's

differing

particularly renewable energy, and

interpretations
show

how

of environmental

technologies,

these shaped the uses for which

environmental technologies were deemed appropriate. I show h o w the ideals of the
alternative technology m o v e m e n t started to unravel as other groups, some of w h o were
pursuing quite different agendas, started to show interest in renewable energy.

3.2 Environmentalism
3.2.1 The Phases of Environmentalism
Since the mid 1960s rise of the modern environment movement, environmentalism has
transformed significantly. A n d r e w Jamison identified six phases: awakening (pre-1968),
age

of

ecology

(1969-74),

politicisation

(1975-79),

differentiation

(1980-86),

internationalisation (1987-93), and integration (1994-present).4

Jamison's categorisation deals with broad trends mainly in developed countries, not
specifically Australia. Australian environmentalists have often followed overseas trends,
particularly the anti-nuclear debate, but have also focused on local issues. While the
movements in Europe have campaigned against nuclear power and polluting industries, the
Australian environment m o v e m e n t has focused mainly on wilderness and forestry
preservation, and opposition to uranium mining.5 The Australian campaigns have been in
response to the type of projects (mainly mines, d a m s and logging) proposed by local
resource-based industries.6 Yet, the Australian environment m o v e m e n t is not unified, nor do
campaign issues of larger environment groups always correspond with the concerns of most
environmentally aware citizens. The Australian public tends to be more concerned about

Andrew Jamison, "The shaping of the global agenda: the role of non-governmental organisations", in
Scott Lash, Bronislaw Szerszynski and Brian Wynne (eds.), Risk, Environment and Modernity:
Towards a New Ecology, S A G E Publications, London, 1996; Andrew Jamison, "Introduction: issues
and concepts", in Andrew Jamison (ed.), Public Engagement and Science and Technology Policy
Options (PESTO) Final Report, Center for Social Science Research on the Environment, Aarhus
University, Denmark, 1999, Accessed 5 October 1999, <http://www.au.dk/~cesamat/>; Andrew
Jamison, The Making of Green Knowledge, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001.
Drew Hutton and Libby Connors, A History of the Australian Environment Movement, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge (UK), 1999; P.R. Hay and M.G. Haward, "Comparative green politics:
beyond the European context?", Political Studies, Vol. 36, 1988, pp. 433^148.
Jonathan West, "Goals, strategy and structure: how the environment movement organised for victory in
the 1980s", in Ian Marsh (ed.), The Environmental Challenge, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1991.
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pollution and other urban issues than about wilderness and forestry preservation.7 Pollution
and resource usage issues, including energy supply and use, have often been taken up by
local ad hoc environment groups.8 With these qualifications in mind, I briefly describe
Jamison'sfirstfour phases, and in the next section examine h o w applicable they were in
Australia, focusing on attitudes towards renewable energy during each phase.

The period prior to 1968 is described by Jamison as one in which public education was
emphasised. A n e w environmental consciousness, m u c h broader than the earlier nature
conservation movement, w a s emerging. It had an ecological perspective, conceiving of
nature and society as interrelated rather than separate and opposed. Through influential
works such as Rachel Carson's Silent Spring and efforts of n e w environment activists,
attention w a s drawn to the deleterious consequences of scientific and technological
innovations. It w a s a sentiment that accorded with contemporaneous general critiques of
modern technology and technological society by authors such as Marcuse, Ellul and
Mumford. These critiques, coupled with the counterculture m o v e m e n t , meant that
"environmentalism became a broad m o v e m e n t of social and political opposition".

The second phase, 1969 to 1974, Jamison described as one of "institution building". The
environment m o v e m e n t established a collective identity, articulating a m o r e positive
environmental program, including the promotion of 'alternative' technologies, such as
renewable energy technologies.10 Environmental education programs flourished; m a n y
governments established environment departments or agencies, and passed legislation to
protect the environment; and the United Nations convened a major conference on the
environment (at Stockholm in 1972), and established an environment agency.11

7

10

Jan Pakulski, Bruce Tranter and Stephen Crook, "The dynamics of environmental issues in Australia:
concerns, clusters and carriers", Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 2, 1998, pp.
235-252.
Hutton and Connors, 1999, op. cit.
Jamison, 1996, op. cit., p. 228.
ibid.
Key environmental texts of this period were Edward Goldsmith, Robert Allen, Michael Allaby, John
Davoll and Sam Lawrence, A Blueprint for Survival, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth (UK), 1972;
Donella Meadows, Dennis Meadows, Jorgen Randers and William Behrens, The Limits to Growth,
Universe Books, N e w York, 1972. For a contemporaneous overview of the environment movement at
this time see David L. Sills, "The environmental movement and its critics", Human Ecology, Vol. 3,
No. 1, 1975, pp. 1-41. For a review of government environmental measures in many countries see
Martin Janicke, "Conditions for environmental policy success: an international comparison", The
Environmentalist, Vol. 12. No. 1, 1992, pp. 47-58.
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Thefirstoil shock ushered in the third phase of environmentalism, which continued until
about 1980: " W h a t had been a concern with the quality of life and with controlling pollution
w a s transformed into a massive concern with energy".12 This, Jamison noted, had two main
effects: environmentalism had more influence on governments' agendas; and environment
organisations transformed into bureaucracies. Consequently, the environment m o v e m e n t
developed political strategies and attracted more politically conscious members. The
m o v e m e n t also became more professional, spawning experts in areas such as energy
planning and policy, and alternative energy technologies.13

Some earlier environmentalists had advocated use of renewable energy, but following the
oil shock this became a key tenet of the environment movement. Renewable energy
resources promised to alleviate some of the dominant environmental concerns: they offered
pollution-free power, and were non-depleting—the oil shock had heightened fears of
resource scarcity raised in the earlier period.14 S o m e environmentalists and scientists were
warning of climate change from the burning of fossil fuels and urging a shift to renewable
energy resources,15 but this became a policy issue only in the late 1980s. The oil shock saw
m a n y governments, particularly in Europe, plan for increased use of nuclear power. 16 The
anti-nuclear m o v e m e n t grew quickly, urging development of renewable energy as an
alternative to nuclear power. S o m e nuclear power opponents were keen to demonstrate the
viability of renewable energy, swelling the ranks of the alternative technology movement. 1 7
Policy makers looked to renewable energy for other reasons. While some were influenced
by pressures from an environmentally conscious public, most thought that renewable energy
could enhance security of energy supplies.

12
13

14
15

16
17

Jamison, 1996, op. cit., p. 230.
ibid.; Andrew Jamison, "How can w e educate green engineers?", EASST Review, Vol. 16, No. 2,
1997.
Meadows et al, 1972, op. cit.
Australian examples include Sylvia J. Mainwaring, "Carbon dioxide—catalyst for climate change",
Habitat, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1974, pp. 20-23; Barry Hunt, "Carbon dioxide in the atmosphere: a threat to
our future?", Habitat, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1980, pp. 22-26.
For an overview of nuclear controversies see O E C D , Technology on Trial, O E C D , Paris, 1979.
The Danish case is described in Ulrik Jorgensen and Peter Karnoe, "The Danish wind-turbine story:
technical solutions to political visions?", in Arie Rip, Thomas, J. Misa and Johan Schot (eds),
Managing Technology in Society: The Approach of Constructive Technology Assessment, Pinter,
London, 1995.
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T h e fourth phase from 1980 to 1986, Jamison noted, s a w the emergence of professional
environmentalism. Commercial activities developed in areas such as environmenta
technologies and environmental impact assessment.18 Environmentalists entered parliaments
or influenced the policies of existing parties. T h e environment m o v e m e n t c a m e to be
•

19 T

dominated by professional lobby groups, w h o began to target international bodies.

Less

favourable to environmentalism and environmental technology policy w a s the ideological
shift in Western governments a w a y from social and environmental concerns towards
neoliberalism.20 T h e environment m o v e m e n t started to lose its radical edge during this
period, focusing less on social change and m o r e on the scientific and technical aspects of
environmental improvement. Maarten Hajer described this:
The environmentalists of the 1980s were less radical, more practical, and were much more
policy-oriented. The movement's emphases were no longer on alternatives for society, it
started to focus on presenting practical alternatives within society instead. Technology was
no longer the focus of critique but increasingly came to be seen as the discourse of
solutions. A new type of knowledge became relevant. Activists should no longer be
qualified to discuss the crisis-ridden nature of the capitalist system on a reasonably wellinformed level, now they were valued for various sorts of expertise (such as scientific or
engineering know-how, or media, management, or marketing skills) ... [I]n the 1980s the
environmental movement took up the role of counter-expert, illuminating alternative
solutions to what were increasingly seen again as environmental problems (thus bracketing
deeper institutional causes).21

3.2.2 Environmentalism in Australia
D o these phases apply to Australia, and h o w did attitudes to renewable energy evolve?

Australia was slow to embrace the new environmental consciousness; the interests of the
conservation

movement

were

still narrow. 22

T h e first nation-wide

conservation

organisation, the Australian Conservation Foundation ( A C F ) , w a s established in 1965; yet it
w a s a conservative organisation dominated by m e m b e r s of the establishment.23 During the

18
19
20

22
23

Jamison, 2001, op. cit.
Jamison, 1996, op. cit.
Jamison, 1999, op. cit.
Maarten A. Hajer, The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization and the
Policy Process, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995, pp. 93-94.
Hutton and Connors, 1999, op. cit.
ibid.
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Many

small

environment groups were brought under the umbrella of coordinating councils in all states,
and in major cities Environment Centres were established to provide community education
and resources for the movement. 2 5 In 1973 the A C F w a s taken over by environmentalists of
a m o r e activist persuasion.26 T h e environmental consequences of electricity projects
aroused concern: the N e w p o r t P o w e r Station dispute (in Victoria), and efforts to prevent the
Hydro-Electric Commission of Tasmania flooding Lake Pedder began during this phase.27
Australian environmentalists still showed little interest in renewable energy.

In Australia the third phase was somewhat delayed; but the 1979 oil shock certainly
galvanised governments and policy makers. Australian governments instituted a number of
renewable energy investigations and research programs, the principal motive being to
reduce dependence on imported oil.28 Australian environmentalists saw renewable energy as
a m e a n s of averting resource depletion, but m o r e so as an alternative to nuclear power.
While overseas activists campaigned against local nuclear power plant proposals, there
were no public plans to build nuclear power plants in Australia following the axing of the
proposed Jervis B a y nuclear project in 1972. 30 However, Australia is rich in uranium; hence
Australian anti-nuclear groups concentrated their efforts on stopping uranium mining.31 T h e
Australian electricity supply industry (ESI) did not escape environmentalists' campaigns:
protests continued against the Newport power station and the Tasmanian hydroelectric
proposals. In Tasmania, the environmentalists' defeat over the flooding of Lake Pedder w a s
followed by a successful campaign to stop the Gordon-below-Franklin dam.

J. Andrew Lothian, "Attitudes of Australians towards the environment: 1975 to 1994", Australian
Journal of Environmental Management, Vol. 1, September 1994, pp. 78-99.
West, 1991, op. cit.; Hutton and Connors, 1999, op. cit.
ibid.
For details of both disputes see Stephen Rosenthal and Peter Russ, The Politics of Power: Inside
Australia's Electric Utilities, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1988, chapter 10.
See section 4.5.
See for example Barbara James, "Energy strategy alternatives to nuclear power", Habitat, Vol. 4, No.
5, 1977, pp. 13-21; R.L. Phillips, "Uranium, fuel for thought: an overview of some of the issues in
nuclear power generation", The Institution of Engineers, Australia, General Engineering
Transactions, Vol. GE3, 1979, pp. 32-40. Australian early wind power advocates who were
interviewed for this thesis mentioned nuclear power specifically.
Some nuclear opponents feared that electricity utilities had future plans for nuclear power stations.
See Barbara Hutton, "Nuclear power in Australia", Chain Reaction, Vol. 4, No. 4,1979, pp. 9-13.
Hutton and Connors, 1999, op. cit.; Greg Adamson, Stop Uranium Mining! Australia's Decade of
Protest 1975-85, Resistance Books, Chippendale ( N S W ) , 1999.
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Jamison described h o w the environment m o v e m e n t started to produce energy experts during
this period. In Australia, through involvement in the anti-nuclear m o v e m e n t and in disputes
with the electricity industry, the environment m o v e m e n t developed expertise in energy
planning, policy and technologies. S o m e scientists, engineers and other professionals were
also environmentalists, extending their influence through writing and active involvement.
For example, the Society for Social Responsibility in Science published Energy and People,
covering issues ranging from energy technologies to energy use, pricing, policy, institutions
and politics.32 M a n y scientists and engineers, including wind power advocates, campaigned
against the Gordon-below-Franklin proposal.33 In Victoria, the C o m m u n i t y Energy Network
and the Conservation of Urban Energy Group undertook research and education into energy
issues.34 They also undertook a comprehensive examination of energy supply and use in
Australia, focusing particularly on the opportunities for energy conservation in Victoria.

Jamison's fourth phase saw the increased influence of environmentalists in parliament.
Australia w a s ahead of its time: the United Tasmania Group w a s formed in 1972 during the
Lake Pedder dispute.36 In the 1980s, green independents were progressively elected to the
Tasmanian Parliament.37 In Victoria, environmentalists had s o m e influence in the A L P
government elected in 1982—this is described in chapter 4. During the 1980s, however,
government support for renewable energy research and development declined and the
environment movement's and the general public's enthusiasm for renewable energy
waned. 38 A s described in later chapters, this decline w a s suddenly reversed in the late
1980s, the time w h e n the greenhouse effect became a widespread concern.
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Mark Diesendorf (ed.), Energy and People: Social Implications of Different Energy Futures, Society
for Social Responsibility in Science (A.C.T.), Canberra, 1979.
See section 5.5.5.
Les Dalton and Alan Pears, "Energy policy: plugging in the public", Habitat, Vol. 8, No. 5, 1980, pp.
18-19.
Deborah White, Philip Sutton, Alan Pears, Chris Mardon, John Dick and Maurie Crow, Seeds for
Change: Creatively Confronting the Energy Crisis, Patchwork Press, North Melbourne, 1978.
Pamela Walker, "The United Tasmania Group: an analysis of the world'sfirstgreen party", in Peter
Hay, Robyn Eckersley and Geoff Holloway (eds), Environmental Politics in Australia and New
Zealand, Board of Environmental Studies, University of Tasmania, 1989.
Hutton and Connors, 1999, op. cit.
See for example Lee's comments on this declining interest. Trevor Lee, "The renewable energy
community: where to from here?", Solar Progress, Vol. 14, No. 3, 1993, p. 3.
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3.3 Alternative Technology
3.3.1 Introduction
The alternative technology (AT) movement had its heyday in the 1970s, though remnants
still exist today.39 While A T w a s part of the environment m o v e m e n t , it w a s also rooted in
other tenets of the counterculture. Alternative technologies were regarded as more than just
environmentally benign technologies. S o m e advocates of A T used them to achieve greater
self-reliance. S o m e valued the do-it-yourself capability. S o m e saw them as amenable to
community control and public participation. A c o m m o n thread w a s that alternative technologies were regarded as an integral part of a better w a y of life—however this w a s conceived.
Energy supply and use patterns in Western societies, particularly over-reliance on fossil
fuels and use of nuclear power, were a major concern for m a n y in the A T movement. 4 0
Electricity systems based on these sources were regarded as not only environmentally
detrimental, but also socially detrimental, because they were very large, centralised, capitalintensive, and the domain of technical specialists. Advocates of A T advocated use of
smaller-scale, decentralised renewable energy sources and greater energy conservation.

To understand this broad view of what constituted an alternative technology, we need to
consider the environment movement's beliefs. Eyerman and Jamison emphasised that
environmentalists were not just political actors, but also creators of knowledge. They
categorised the ideas and conceptions of the environment m o v e m e n t into three dimensions

Key references are as follows: Godfrey Boyle and Peter Harper (eds), Radical Technology,
Wildwood House, London, 1976; Robin Clarke, "The pressing need for alternative technology",
Impact of Science on Society, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1973, pp. 257-271; David Dickson, Alternative
Technology and the Politics of Technical Change, Fontana/Collins, London, 1974; Peter Harper, "In
search of allies for the soft technologies", Impact of Science on Society, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1973, pp.
287-305; Horace Herring (ed.), Alternative Technology, Vol. 1, Smoothie Publications, Brighton
(UK), 1974; Andrew MacKillop, Why Soft Technology? Alternative Solutions to the Energy Crisis,
Methuen, London, 1975; Carroll Pursell, "The rise and fall of the appropriate technology movement
in the United States, 1965-1985", Technology and Culture, Vol. 34, No. 3, 1993, pp. 629-637;
Witold Rybszynski, Paper Heroes: A Review of Appropriate Technology, Prism Press, Dorchester
(UK), 1980; Kelvin W . Willoughhy, Technology Choice: A Critique of the Appropriate Technology
Movement, Westview Press, Boulder (USA), 1990; Langdon Winner, The Whale and the Reactor,
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1986, chapter 4; Langdon Winner, "The political philosophy
of alternative technology: historical roots and present prospects", Technology in Society, Vol. 1,
1979, pp. 75-86. For a history of influences on environmentalism and A T see Jamison, 2001, op. cit.
Not all advocates of A T were anti-nuclear; indeed some members of the Australian group
Appropriate Technology and Community Environment (APACE) objected to the group's anti-nuclear
stance. See A P A C E Newsletter, No. 21, 1984. A P A C E was principally concerned with appropriate
technology in third world countries.
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of'knowledge interests': cosmological, technological and organisational.
The cosmological dimension referred to the basic assumptions or beliefs derived from
systems ecology, which all environmental activists took more or less for granted. The
technological dimension referred to the specific topics of environmental protest, as well as
the alternative techniques that have been developed in, for example, renewable energy and
biodynamic agriculture. The organizational dimension referred to the anti-elitism that
environmentalism shares with most of the other new social movements, an ambition to
deprofessionalize expertise and develop new, more democratic forms of knowledge
production.41

The AT movement thus went beyond the technological dimension, the attempt to create
n e w forms of technology to replace those considered environmentally damaging. This w a s
intertwined with the other dimensions. T h e ideas of systems ecology were extended into a
theory of social ecology: thus environmentalists acted to achieve a m o r e ecological society,
to create a w a y of life more in harmony with nature.42 T h e organisational dimension
included the critique of elitism and the established order, and the quest for knowledge to
serve the people.43

Individual advocates of AT placed different emphases on these three dimensions;
furthermore, within each dimension, ideas differed about what w a s appropriate. In
particular, ideas differed about what constituted a good society and what role technology
played in this. T o explore this, I provide a brief overview of the A T m o v e m e n t and its
supporters, focusing on their attitudes towards renewable energy.44 I attempt to glean from
the A T literature h o w advocates of A T portrayed the relationship between technology and
society, and what they understood the benefits of renewable energy to be. I s h o w h o w the
social and political visions associated with A T started to diminish as a range of other groups
began to endorse renewable energy. Did this then lead to a convergence of the meaning of
alternative technology?

41
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Ron Eyerman and Andrew Jamison, Social Movements: A Cognitive Approach, Polity Press
Cambridge (UK), 1991, p. 66.
ibid.
ibid.
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For a comprehensive review of the A T movement see Willoughby, 1990, op. cit. For criticisms, see
Samuel C. Florman, "Small is dubious", in William B. Thompson (ed.), Controlling Technology:
Contemporary Issues, Prometheus Books, Buffalo (NY), 1991; Rybszynski, 1980, op. cit.; Harper,
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3.3.2 T h e Origins a n d Beliefs of the Alternative T e c h n o l o g y M o v e m e n t
The idea of developing alternative technologies gained popularity in the 1960s through
efforts to assist the development of poor countries, m a n y of which had recently gained their
independence. 45 Fritz Schumacher argued that developing countries needed 'intermediate
technology', later called 'appropriate technology'.46
[A]n intermediate technology would be immensely more productive than the indigenous
technology ... but it would also be immensely cheaper than the sophisticated, highly
capital-intensive technology of m o d e m industry ... [It would]fitmuch more smoothly into
the relatively unsophisticated environment in which it is to be utilised. The equipment
would be fairly simple and therefore understandable, suitable for maintenance and repair on
the spot.47
T h e idea that such technologies might also be 'appropriate' in the First World spread during
the 1970s. T h e term 'alternative technology' is often used to describe such technologies and
the associated m o v e m e n t in First W o r l d countries.48

T h e Third World appropriate technologists, particularly Fritz Schumacher, were an
important influence on the A T m o v e m e n t : Schumacher's 1973 book Small is Beautiful w a s
a bestseller and gave the m o v e m e n t one of its main slogans.49 S o m e advocates of A T were
m o r e radical than Schumacher, with those influenced by M a r x i s m judging Schumacher to
be naive about h o w capitalism functioned and h o w it shaped the values of a society, the
organisation of w o r k and the forms of technology.50 There were other influences on A T ,
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Rybszynski, 1980, op. cit.; Willoughby, 1990, op. cit.
Schumacher had long been concerned about resource depletion and in the 1950s had predicted the
coming of an energy crisis. Geoffrey Kirk (ed.), Schumacher on Energy, Abacus, London, 1983. See
also Willoughby, 1990, op. cit. Similar concerns about an impending oil shortage were also expressed
by M . King Hubbert, a U.S. geologist, in the 1950s.
E. F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful: A Study of Economics as if People Mattered, Blond & Briggs,
London, 1973, p. 167-168. This was drawn from a paper published in 1965.
In Australia, the term 'appropriate technology' is used mainly in reference to developing countries or
regions. Willoughby treats alternative technology and appropriate technology as separate but
overlapping categories. Willoughby, 1990, op. cit. In the U K , the term 'alternative technology' was
used synonymously with 'radical technology' by the group associated with the magazine
Undercurrents. In the 1970s, there were many variants, including soft technology, radical technology,
participatory technology, Utopian technology. In Australia, the term 'soft technology' was used as the
former title of the Alternative Technology Association's magazine. 'Soft technology' was originally
coined by alternative technology pioneer Robin Clarke, but was later used by Amory Lovins in a
different sense to describe energy technologies only.
Schumacher, 1973, op. cit. M u c h of the book was a collection of Schumacher's essays and lectures
from the previous decade.
Eric Entemann, Fred Gordon, Kathy Greeley, Ray Valdes and Peter Ward, "Alternative technology:
possibilities and limitations", in Godfrey Boyle, David Elliott and Robin Roy (eds), The Politics of
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some interrelated, including the countercultural movement, the anarcho-utopian tradition,
critiques of industrial society by Lewis M u m f o r d , Jacques Ellul, Herbert Marcuse, and the
critical science of Barry C o m m o n e r and others.52 F r o m the early 1970s, environmentalism
became an important influence on A T .

AT was not only a protest movement, but also an attempt to articulate a positive program
for change. B y the early 1970s, the environmentalism's d o o m s d a y scenario w a s slowly
transforming into a search for n e w directions.53 Earlier critiques of industrial society had
painted a gloomy picture. So too did the environment m o v e m e n t , with its focus on resource
depletion, exponential economic growth, and rising population levels. It suggested that,
unless prompt action w a s taken to create a sustainable society, the industrial world w o u l d
face collapse. S o m e in the environment m o v e m e n t were almost anti-technology, believing
that m o d e m science and technology could not solve the environmental crisis, since it w a s
these institutions, deeply instilled with the ideology of controlling nature, that were to
blame. 54 Advocates of A T were m o r e optimistic. They were critical of m o d e r n science and
technology, yet believed that technology w a s not inherently repressive, and could be
harnessed to create a less oppressive, m o r e participatory society.55 Godfrey Boyle and Peter
Harper stated: " w e can control technology, but if w e don't it will control us". 56 Recently,
John A n d r e w s recalled h o w he w a s inspired by the idea:
That it was possible to design technologies that served very different goals, that technology
doesn't necessarily harm the environment, [that] you can develop technologies that enhance
people and their growth ... I was quite interested in that as a way of using technology to
serve human goals, rather than the technological juggernaut running over people.57
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Technology, Longman and The Open University Press, London, 1977; David Chidakel, "Small is
beautiful as a book and as a bum steer", Science for the People, Vol. 7, No. 4, 1975, pp. 17-19.
See for example Murray Bookchin, "Towards a liberatory technology", in Post-Scarcity Anarchism,
Wildwood House, London, 1974. This essay wasfirstpublished in 1965.
See discussion in Willoughby, 1990, op. cit.; Godfrey Boyle and Peter Harper, "General
introduction", in Boyle and Harper (eds), 1976, op. cit.; Pursell, 1993, op. cit., Rybszynski, 1980, op.
cit.; Horace Herring, "What is alternative technology?", in Herring (ed.), 1974, op. cit.
Robin Clarke, "Technology for an alternative society", New Scientist, 11 January 1973, pp. 66-68.
Stephen Cotgrove, Catastrophe or Cornucopia: The Environment, Politics and the Future, Wiley,
Chichester, 1982; Stephen Cotgrove, "Technology, rationality and domination", Social Studies of
Science, Vol. 5, 1975, pp. 55-78.
ibid.
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Godfrey Boyle and Peter Harper, "General introduction", in Boyle and Harper (eds), 1976, op. cit.
John Andrews, Interview, 15 August 2000. Andrews was an early advocate of wind power. H e edited
Chain Reaction, the Friends of the Earth magazine, and later worked on the Victorian wind study. H e
also undertook a major study on the creation of'solar jobs' in Victoria. (See chapter 4.)
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Efforts to create less oppressive and m o r e participatory forms of social organisation were
c o m m o n in the n e w social m o v e m e n t s of the 1960s and 1970s; yet this had a m u c h longer
history, notably within the anarchist tradition.58 Also with a long history w a s the desire to
create m o r e democratic technologies,59 a quest revived in the 1960s. Lewis M u m f o r d
explicitly m a d e the case for maintaining and furthering democratic technologies. In a 1964
essay, M u m f o r d distinguished between authoritarian and democratic technologies, a view
that would later resonate with the A T m o v e m e n t .
[F]rom late neolithic times in the Near East, right down to our own day, two technologies
have recurrently existed side by side: one authoritarian, the other democratic, the first
system-centred, immensely powerful, but inherently unstable, the other man-centred,
relatively weak, but resourceful and durable. If I am right, w e are n o w rapidly approaching
a point at which, unless w e radically alter our present course, our surviving democratic
technics will be completely suppressed or supplanted.60
M u m f o r d argued that society has been duped by the apparent material benefits of
authoritarian technics; yet ultimately authoritarian technics would exert such control that
democracy would not survive. H e called for a revival of democratic technics:
[T]he small scale method of production, resting mainly on human skill and animal energy
but always, even when employing machines, remaining under the active direction of the
craftsmen or the farmer, each group developing its own gifts, through appropriate arts and
social ceremonies, as well as making discreet use of the gifts of nature.61

Since the AT movement was intent on creating new forms of social organisation along with
using alternative technologies, m a n y embraced alternative lifestyles. F r o m the late 1960s, in
Australia and elsewhere, a stream of people sought escape from the oppression of industrial
society, s o m e going 'back to the land' and/or experimenting with alternative forms of social
organisation.62 Although m a n y alternative lifestylers sought an ecologically sound life,
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Winner, 1979, op. cit.
Carroll Pursell, "The American ideal of a democratic technology", in William B Thompson (ed.),
Controlling Technology: Contemporary Issues, Prometheus Books, Buffalo (NY), 1991; Mulford Q.
Sibley, "Utopian thought and technology", American Journal of Political Sciences, Vol. 17,1973, pp.
255-281.
Lewis Mumford, "Authoritarian and democratic technics", Technology and Culture, Vol. 5, No. 1,
1964, pp.1-8.
ibid.
For an overview of ideas about alternative lifestyles in Australia see Margaret Smith and David
Crossley (eds), The Way Out: Radical Alternatives in Australia, Lansdowne Press, Melbourne, 1975;
Peter Cock, Alternative Australia, Quartet Books, Melbourne, 1979.
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m a n y early participants were driven by the desire to quit the rat race and to create an
alternative personal environment. T h e ecological consciousness often c a m e later, as the
environment m o v e m e n t grew. 63 T h e quest for self-reliance w a s a significant driver. Jacob
and Brinkerhoff noted: "Alternative technology combines the back-to-the-landers' concern
with ecological integrity and individual self-reliance".

Some alternative communities developed demonstration centres, which were intended to
s h o w that alternative technologies were preferable to the high technologies of industrial
society.65 T w o

well-publicised centres in the U K

were Biotechnic Research

and

Development, established by Janine Clarke and Robin Clarke with others,66 and an
alternative community associated with the journal The Ecologist.67 M e m b e r s of the latter
were attempting to put into practice ideas published in A Blueprint for Survival, an
influential environmental book of the period, in which they outline a 100-year plan for the
establishment of self-reliant communities. 68 Australian advocates of A T from Appropriate
Technology for C o m m u n i t y and Environment ( A P A C E ) were also keen to develop an A T
demonstration centre, but government funding w a s denied.

An alternative technology was considered as having desirable aspects beyond just the
environmental. S o m e advocates of A T produced lists of characteristics to distinguish
alternative

technologies

from

contemporary

advanced

technologies.

Commonly

emphasised criteria were that alternative technologies should have low environmental
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Peter Cock, "Some of the alternatives", Habitat, Vol. 3, No. 6, 1976, pp. 2-11.
Jeffrey C. Jacob and Merlin B. Brinkerhoff, "Alternative technology and part-time, semi-subsistence
agriculture: a survey from the back-to-the-land movement", Rural Sociology, Vol. 51, No. 1, 1986,
pp. 43-59, at p. 45.
John P. Milton, "Communities that seek peace with nature", The Futurist, December 1974, pp. 264269.
Janine Clarke and Robin Clarke, "The Biotechnic Research Community", Futures, June 1972, pp.
168-173; Milton, 1974, op. cit. This community was disbanded a few years later. Robin Clarke,
Technological Self-Sufficiency, Faber, London, 1976.
Milton, 1974, op. cit.
Goldsmith et al, 1972, op. cit. For an analysis of the role of A Blueprint for Survival in the early
environment movement, see Hajer, 1995, op. cit.
Plans for the centre are described in Robyn Williams, Science Show, Vol. 2, No. 9, A B C Radio,
Broadcast on 4 October 1980. See also William Wallace Walker (ed.), Energy Options, Energy
Options Group, Kelso (NSW), 1979.
See for example the list in Clarke and Clarke, 1972, op. cit. Problems with this approach have been
highlighted by others. David Dickson, 1974, op. cit., Thomas Simon, "Appropriate technology and
inappropriate politics", in William B Thompson (ed.), Controlling Technology: Contemporary Issues,
Prometheus Books, Buffalo (NY), 1991; Harper, 1974, op. cit.; Rybszynski, 1980, op. cit.

impact, be

labour

intensive, be

non-alienating

and

non-exploitative, and

foster

decentralisation and self-reliance.71 Next I discuss h o w these criteria were thought to apply
to renewable energy, and describe h o w the connection between renewable energy and these
criteria changed over time. A s noted above, different advocates of A T did not give these
criteria equal weight. For example, U K advocate and analyst of A T Peter Harper, writing in
the mid 1970s, pointed to a division in the movement.
[T]hrough all the jumble of goals and assumptions of people tinkering with technological
alternatives there are two main blocs:
- those that think the system is bound for physical collapse;
- those that think the system is evil.
Of course there's no reason why you can't think both ... But basically, there are those who
worry about environment and resources, and those who worry about alienation and
exploitation?2

Environmental impact
Alternative technologies were to have low environmental impact and m a k e minimal use of
non-renewable resources. Yet, what constitutes low environmental impact depends on h o w
one perceives environmental problems and the risks associated with these. Since all
technologies have s o m e detrimental impacts, this will inevitably entail trade-offs.

Since the 1973-74 oil shock, energy supply and usage patterns have been a central concern
for environmentalists, although

beliefs about what

are the main

energy-related

environmental problems have shifted. In the 1970s, resource depletion, air pollution,
thermal pollution, and nuclear power were the main concerns; later acid rain became a
significant environmental issue, particularly in Europe; more recently concerns about global
warming have dominated. In s o m e countries (including Australia) large-scale hydropower
proposals have at times provoked fervent environmental protests.73

Renewable energy has been considered an environmentally benign remedy for many of
these energy-related environmental problems. Recently, s o m e analysts have begun to draw
attention to environmentally
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damaging

aspects of renewable energy technologies,

Simon, 1991, op. cit. These criteria should be regarded as interrelated.
Harper, 1974, op. cit. (n.p.). Elliott and Elliott make a similar point. David Elliott and Ruth Elliott,
The Control of Technology, Wykeham Publications, London, 1976.
Because it is regarded as a conventional generation technology, I am not including large-scale hydro
in the category of renewable energy.
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sometimes without consideration of the trade-offs between the benefits and detriments of
renewable energy compared with conventional energy sources. For example T h e Cato
Institute, a right-wing U S think tank, noted:
[E]very major renewable energy source has drawn criticism from leading environmental
groups: hydro for river habitat destruction, wind for avian mortality, solar for desert
overdevelopment, biomass for air emissions, and geothermal for depletion and toxic
discharges.74
T h e attribution of environmental problems to wind power—principally bird strike, noise,
loss of visual amenity and land use requirements—is described in chapter 6.

The AT movement believed that small-scale renewable energy technologies would be less
environmentally damaging than large-scale energy systems. Large-scale systems were
unnecessary, m a n y argued, since energy use in the First World could be severely curtailed
while still allowing citizens a high quality of life.75 This premise w a s heresy in the early
1970s, but is m o r e accepted today. Whether the energy needs of m o d e r n society, albeit
curtailed, could be met by small-scale systems is another matter.76 Indeed compared with
large-scale systems, s o m e small-scale systems are wasteful of resources. Advocates of A T
also tended to favour autonomy from the electricity grid (since they desired self-reliance—
see below); yet small, stand-alone, renewable energy systems require battery storage and
are thus m o r e resource intensive than grid-connected systems. A few advocates of A T were
aware of these problems. Writing in 1974, Peter Harper noted s o m e of these concerns, and
also foreshadowed s o m e of the environmental problems later associated with w i n d power:
[C]osts of most services tend to increase with decreasing scale, reaching their highest point
at the village scale, beloved of many A T freaks, and dropping slightly for the single
dwelling where no distribution system is required ... Replace a 20 Meggawatt (sic) coalburning power stations with 1000 x 20 Kilowatt windmills, or 20000 x 1 k W mills. Is it any
environmental improvement? They would look like pylons with knobs on, need
transmission lines anyway to carry the electricity generated, and would make a fearful noise
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Robert L. Bradley Jr, Renewable Energy: Not Cheap, Not "Green", The Cato Institute, Cato Policy
Analysis No. 280, 1997, Accessed 3 October 1999, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-280.html>.
See for example Godfrey Boyle, Living on the Sun: Harnessing Renewable Energy for an Equitable
Society, Calder and Boyars, London, 1975.
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... As far as resources are concerned, a large number of small windmills will need far more
copper for windings and wiring.77

Labour-Intensity
Another c o m m o n attribute of alternative technologies w a s labour intensity: they were said
to reduce the need for capital and alleviate unemployment. These had been important
motives for the appropriate technology m o v e m e n t in Third World countries;78 but after
structural unemployment emerged in the First World in the mid 1970s, it became an issue
there too. Writing in 1978, Hazel Henderson noted:
N e w citizen movements in overdeveloped countries are now coalescing around ecological
awareness and focus on the need for more labor-intensive, appropriate technologies, which
can increase human autonomy and productivity with modest capital inputs. Such
technologies geared toward full employment and decentralized production which can
increase the incomes and welfare of rural and poor people are now increasingly relevant to
the poorer citizens of over-developed countries.79
Willoughby noted that s o m e A T programs have been aimed at communities and groups
suffering from poverty and unemployment. 8 0 A s described later, m a n y Australian renewable
energy advocates have linked their use to employment generation.

Freedom from alienation and exploitation
T h e idea that technologies should not alienate and exploit workers w a s emphasised by
radical A T advocates, m a n y drawing on Karl Marx's writings on the alienation and exploitation of workers under capitalism. A call for technologies that were non-alienating and nonexploitative w a s also evident in the writings of Murray Bookchin and Lewis Mumford. 8 1 In
the A T m o v e m e n t , this theme w a s emphasised by s o m e associated with the U K publication
Undercurrents, and influential author, journalist and analyst of A T , David Dickson:
[U]topian technology would ideally provide the means by which [the individual] could
fulfil and experience his full human potential. It would ... [remain] directly under the
individual's control, and [link] him with, rather than [separate] him from, fellow members
of the community, and the natural environment ... [It would stress] the close relationship
between the individual, the tools with which he works, and the object that he produces ... It

Harper, 1974, op. cit. (n.p.)
Schumacher, 1973, op. cit.
Hazel Henderson, Creating Alternative Futures: The End of Economics, Perigee, N e w York, 1978, p.
365.
Willoughby, 1990, op. cit.
Bookchin, 1974, op. cit.; Mumford, 1964, op. cit.
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would attempt to ensure that the machine remained an appendage to man, rather than the
other way round.82

The elimination of exploitation was partly a matter of how work was organised. Advocates
of A T favoured small-scale production units and community control of technology, best
achieved, they thought, in decentralised communities. 83 It w a s a theme that accorded with
the quest for alternative lifestyles. A n d r e w MacKillop noted:
[Decentralization of soft technology complements the desire that is gradually emerging in
the West for a new kind of working life. Craft workshops, coastalfishingand isolated
organic farming communities are three examples of the ways of life that many formerly
urban people are now choosing.84

The AT movement soon turned to devising alternative methods of production in
conventional workplaces. A n important catalyst w a s an initiative by workers at the U K
company, Lucas Aerospace. In 1975, facing a rationalisation of the c o m p a n y and a
recession, workers challenged management's prerogative to determine what w a s produced.
Drawing on their o w n ideas, the workers formulated a Corporate Plan to produce socially
useful products, including products for disabled people, medical technologies, and
renewable energy technologies.85 Their plan w a s an attempt to address s o m e of the
contradictions of m o d e m industrial society, including its failure to meet h u m a n needs, and
its failure to fully use the skills and creativity of m a n y people.

Aside from regarding the manufacture of renewable energy technologies as being perhaps
less exploitative of workers, s o m e advocates of A T thought that renewable energy resources
were by their very nature less exploitative. Godfrey Boyle (editor of Undercurrents) argued
that the characteristics of now-renewable energy resources—they can be o w n e d , and require
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Dickson, 1974, op. cit., p. 105.
ibid.
MacKillop, 1975, op. cit.
Dave Elliott, "What is to be made?", Undercurrents, No. 13,1975, pp. 17-19; Hilary Wainwright and
David Elliott, The Lucas Plan: A New Trade Unionism in the Making?, Allison & Busby, London,
1982; Mike Cooley, Architect or Bee? The Human Price of Technology, Hogarth Press, London, 1987.
ibid The idea of harnessing people's skills and creativity was also a theme of the appropriate
technology movement in developing countries. Schumacher also advocated humanised work. E. F.
Schumacher, Good Work, Cape, London, 1979. The Lucas Plan also inspired other attempts to
humanise work. See Richard Badham, Machine Metaphors and Conspicuous Production: the
Human-Centred Systems Movement and the Re-enchantment of Technology, Working Paper, Science
and Technology Analysis Research Programme, University of Wollongong, 1991. Thus the legacy of
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large amounts of capital and technical k n o w l e d g e — " m a k e them eminently suitable for
exploitation b y ruling oligarchies in the furtherance of the o w n interests".87 Renewable
energy sources are different:
They are accessible in almost every part of nearly every country to persons possessing a
minimum of capital and technical knowledge. A n d they are non-exploitative not only in the
sense that they cannot be 'used up', but also in the sense that they are distributed in fairly
low concentrations everywhere, so that it is difficult to accumulate inordinate amounts in
one place—a fact which is a decided disincentive to the entrepreneurially-minded.88

Ideas about renewable energy started to change following the 1973-74 oil shock. Policy
makers c a m e to regard renewable energy as a possible solution to the so-called 'energy
crisis'. Governments started to fund renewable energy R D & D , and corporate interests
m o v e d in. T h e idea that alternative technologies were intrinsically non-exploitative b e c a m e
difficult to sustain. In 1976, David Elliott and Ruth Elliott noted:
[S]ome alternative technologists are becoming increasingly disturbed at the growing
interest among Government and business groups in the potential of alternative technology
as a means of easing the energy problems facing advanced industrialized societies. Rather
than seeing such developments as encouraging signs of 'conversion' they fear that 'the
system' will appropriate only the techniques of alternative technology and not its radical
values. Divorced from these values such techniques could become as exploitative as any
existing technology.89

Decentralisation and Self-Reliance
M a n y advocates of A T called for technological and political decentralisation: technologies
should be physically decentralised, and production, control and decision-making should
also be decentralised.90 T h e criterion of fostering decentralisation and self-reliance is thus
connected with the criterion of being non-alienating and non-exploitative. A d v o c a c y of
decentralisation usually also encompassed the quest for greater self-reliance.91

The high value placed on decentralisation is no doubt linked to the movement's roots in

the A T movement went beyond development of environmental technologies.
Boyle, 1975, op. cit., p. 14.
ibid., p. 16.
Elliott and Elliott, 1976, op. cit., p. 228,fii.f. See also S a m Love, "The new look of the future", The
Futurist, April 1977, pp. 78-80.
For a critical examination of the concept of decentralisation see Winner, 1986, op. cit.
The term 'self-sufficiency' is used more often, but as Willoughby noted, it implies absolute
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anarchism and the critique of industrial society based on large, centralised technological
systems. M o r e generally, the theme of decentralisation runs through s o m e of the early
environment literature. Here w e can point to the influence of anarchist and pioneering
environmentalist Murray Bookchin. In his 1963 book Our Synthetic Environment,

one of

thefirstbooks of the modern era of environmentalism, he noted:
The m o d e m city has reached its limits, Megalopolitan life is breaking down—psychically,
economically, and biologically. Millions of people have acknowledged this breakdown by
'voting with their feet'; they have picked up their belongings and left ... The reconciliation
of man with the natural world is no longer merely desirable; it has become a necessity ...
The average American is making an attempt, however confusedly, to reduce his
environment to a human scale. H e is trying to re-create a world that he can cope with as an
individual, a world that he correctly identifies with the freedom, gentler rhythms, and
quietude of rural surroundings.92

Bookchin also appears to have been the first to make the connection between
decentralisation and the use of renewable energy sources to conserve fossil fuels and reduce
the need for nuclear power. 93 This theme w a s developed in Bookchin's 1965 essay
"Towards a Liberatory Technology", an important influence on the A T

movement.

Bookchin regarded renewable energy sources as desirable because they are diffuse. Arguing
for "the need to m a k e man's dependence upon the natural world a visible and living part of
his culture", Bookchin envisaged a society where each community satisfies where possible
its o w n requirements for food, energy, water and materials using local resources rationally
and ecologically.95

The case for decentralisation is also spelled out in A Blueprint for Survival.
Decentralisation, the authors maintained, would create stable societies through the full
participation of citizens in decision-making, enable industry and agriculture to be geared
towards meeting people's needs, enhance the growth of the individual, and increase self-
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Chapter 3: The Idea of an Environmental Technology

91

reliance thus reducing the burden on ecosystems.

Many in the AT movement regarded political institutions and technological institutions as
interrelated, "that centralized technologies contribute to political centralization"?1 Thus
decentralisation w a s about m o r e than just worker or community control; the size and
complexity of technological institutions had to be reduced, and production decentralised.
David Dickson noted:
The type of society usually envisaged by Utopian technologists is a highly decentralized one
made up primarily of small, relatively autonomous and self-sustaining communities. These
would be based on non-alienating forms of production and each enjoying a high degree of
economic and political independence from a central decision-making body. Each community would as far as possible be responsible for producing its own food and energy.98

What did decentralisation of energy production and use mean in practice.to advocates of
A T ? There w a s general agreement that renewables should be used as an energy source,
since renewable energy is a diffuse source and is widely available. For manufacture of
renewable energy equipment, s o m e favoured use of local labour and resources, although the
latter m a y have been impractical.99 Although solar and wind energy technologies can be
physically centralised to s o m e extent, they lend themselves to decentralised use. But in what
sense? Renewable electricity generators can be physically decentralised while connected to
a grid system, or they can be autonomous. M a n y advocates of A T favoured the use of
autonomous power generation units.100 Decentralisation—independence from the electricity
grid (and the electricity utility)—was thus a means towards greater self-reliance. O f course,
s o m e were moving to rural areas where grid electricity w a s not available. But the idea of
having decentralised, grid-connected renewable energy systems would start to gain
currency. S o m e advocates of A T and environmentalists favoured these systems not because
they fostered individual or community self-reliance, but because they seemed to offer a
practical solution to the problems caused by the electricity industry's traditional planning
practices. This idea is explored in chapter 5.

Goldsmith et al, 1972, op. cit.
Ian G. Barbour, Technology, Environment and Human Values, Praeger, N e w York, 1980, p. 300.
(Italics in original). See also Dickson, 1974, op. cit.
ibid., pp. 138-139.
Murray Bookchin even envisaged that communities might be able to extract trace and diluted
materials from the earth. Bookchin, 1974, op. cit.
See Boyle and Harper (eds), 1976, op. cit.
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3.3.3 T h e Alternative Technology M o v e m e n t in Australia
In Australia, interest in alternative technology started to g r o w during the m i d 1970s. A
group called Appropriate Technology and C o m m u n i t y Environment, or A P A C E , w a s
established in 1976. M e m b e r s of A P A C E were followers of Schumacher's ideas, and their
main focus w a s appropriate technology for Third World countries. T h e main group
interested in alternative technology for the First World w a s the Alternative Technology C o operative ( A T C ) , later called the Alternative Technology Association ( A T A ) . T h e A T A w a s
predominantly Victorian-based, though it has n o w expanded interstate. Stephen Ingrouille,
w h o founded the A T C in 1976 and soon after established a retail outlet for alternative
technologies, recalled that he w a s motivated by the oil shocks, the nuclear p o w e r debate,
and the desire to demonstrate alternatives to nuclear power. T h e self-reliance m o v e m e n t
w a s another important driver:
That was about the time of the oil crisis, and it just seemed to m e ... that there needed to be
answers, and the answer to m e was solar energy ... It was also the time of the movement
against uranium mining, and a lot of opposition to nuclear power—they were talking about
bringing nuclear power into Australia at that stage, and I was involved with Friends of the
Earth ... Someone came to m e and said what w e need to do is be seen to be doing
something not just anti-uranium but something positive, and would I start an organisation.
W e called a meeting to see if people would be interested in working on what was then
called alternative technology.101

The overriding focus of the ATC/ATA was the hardware. Much of its publications focused
on the alternative technologies themselves; very little w a s written about energy policy or
politics—though this started to change in the later 1980s. 102 Advocates of A T were very
optimistic about the prospects for renewable energy, barely anticipating the institutional and
economic barriers they would face. Ingrouille reflected:
W e were moving a little away from the anti-uranium; that wasn't our emphasis. Our
emphasis was: if you're serious about not going down the nuclear path and if we're serious
about having clean energy sources, then what w e need to be starting to do now is develop
solar. At that stage we couldn't see any reason why you wouldn't ... There was a lot of
naivete there; w e didn't expect that w e were up against some formidable forces like the
electricity associations and the gas people, who all had massive vested interests in selling
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Stephen Ingrouille, Interview, 22 November 2000.
The ATA's main publication was Soft Technology.
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more gas and more electrical appliances and so forth. W e were only ever a few hundred
people w h o were pushing this, but w e certainly caught the public's imagination ... W e were
quite keen on the idea of decentralised power systems and people taking control of their
own energy production as well as consumption ... producing] the energy where you
needed it. That was an underlying idea that w e had—not only would you do that but you'd
have much more control of that, more responsibility for it. And photovoltaic panels—in
1978 they were $10 per peak watt and w e were being told that by 1985 they would come
down to 50c per peak watt. So w e actually believed that. W e thought—and that's what w e
were telling people—with mass production, very soon you'd be able to put these on your
roof to generate your own power.103

They were also very optimistic about the prospects for small-scale wind power, which they
thought could be used by those in the burgeoning self-reliance movement.
In those days there were still a lot of old Dunlites on farms that had just been deserted, and
w e were literally climbing up towers and pulling them down and renovating them and
reselling them ... There was quite a strong self-sufficiency movement; people were trying
to go back [to the country] and live a less complex life, and so that was the market... O f
course there were reasons why, when state electrification went through, why everyone was
so keen to jump on the grid system and abandon their wind generators: wind generators are
problematic, they break down, they need servicing, they might be 60ftup towers, they're
noisy. There were all sorts of problems with wind generators that w e were very naive about.
The technology wasn't quite there.104

3.3.4 T h e Dilution of the Alternative T e c h n o l o g y Ideal
B y the later 1970s, the holistic notion of an alternative technology started to break up.
Following the 1973-74 oil shock, energy c a m e to be seen as a major environmental and
public policy issue, and renewable energy technologies became the most prominent of
alternative technologies. N e w players began promoting renewable energy technologies.
Governments and policy makers hoped that development of renewable energy might
enhance security of energy supply, acting as a hedge against future energy price rises. In the
main, they were not driven by environmental concerns. Anti-nuclear activists advocated
renewable energy as an environmentally benign alternative to nuclear power, and s o m e
sought to demonstrate its viability. Their large numbers swelled the ranks of alternative
technology advocates, but diluted the original concerns of the A T m o v e m e n t . Anti-nuclear

Stephen Ingrouille, Interview, 22 November 2000.
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activists seemed more intent on showing that there were safe alternatives to nuclear power,
rather than pursuing the holistic alternative technology ideal.

Also in the mid 1970s, new funding opportunities became available for renewable energy
R D & D , and the number of individuals, groups and organisations with an interest in
renewable energy skyrocketed. M a n y did not share the A T movement's outlook; they were
interested in the development of the technology and perhaps the environmental benefits, but
not the radical social changes.105 A n d there w a s m o n e y to be m a d e and careers to be
furthered. Undoubtedly most organisations and m a n y individuals with an entrepreneurial
bent were interested in the funding and commercial opportunities, yet probably happy to be
associated with the renewables' popular image. There were others w h o believed in the
ideals of the A T m o v e m e n t yet still had to earn a living, m a n y using these opportunities to
start small businesses in the renewable energy field.106 S o m e proponents of renewable
energy, however, were proposing systems that were completely antithetical to the A T ideal.
Their focus w a s on the supply side only; they proposed large, centralised electricitygenerators, compatible with the existing electricity network and existing socio-political
structures.107 In Australia, the m o n e y available for renewable energy R D & D w a s relatively
small; yet m a n y took advantage of these n e w opportunities. This is described in chapter 4.

The criterion of labour intensity evolved into a concern about job creation: a renewable
energy industry w a s sprouting and unemployment w a s rising, so increased use of renewable
energy with equipment supplied by local manufacturers w a s promoted as a m e a n s of
creating local jobs. This w a s evident in Australia: for example, the push for 'solar jobs' in
Victoria is described in the next chapter.

ibid. Dunlite was an Australian brand of small wind turbines used in rural areas.
See Winner's criticisms of the movement in Winner, 1986, op. cit., chapter 4.
Reece compared the two groups in the U S A , the entrepreneurial types and the advocates of A T , both
of which pursued small business opportunities in renewable energy. Ray Reece, The Sun Betrayed: A
Report on the Corporate Seizure of U.S. Solar Energy Development, South End Press, Boston, 1979.
See for example Michael Kenward, "Here comes the sun", New Scientist, 12 July 1973, pp. 71-72;
Tim Johnston, "The sunshine spreaders", New Scientist, 10 M a y 1973, pp. 337-339; John Noble
Wilford, "Energy crisis: in quest of new sources", New York Times, 18 April 1973, pp' 1, 21. Some
proposals were quite fantastic: for example Glaser's proposal for huge solar power stations in orbit
which would beam energy back to earth. Peter Glaser, "The case for solar energy", in Meredith W .
Hiring and Roy J. Crooks (eds), Energy and Humanity, Peter Peregrinus, Stevenage (UK), 1974*
Some of the U S proposals are described in Reece, 1979, op. cit. For a thorough review of the status of
renewable energy technologies and proposals for development prior to the 1973 oil shock see Wilson
Clark, Energy for Survival: The Alternative to Extinction, Anchor Books, Garden City (NY), 1974
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T h e link between use of renewable energy and freedom from alienation and exploitation
gradually b e c a m e m o r e tenuous. In Australia, s o m e renewable energy advocates were
promoting worker control in the late 1970s. For example, one early supporter of wind
power, Alan Parker, described h o w he thought the wind energy industry should be
organised: he w a s opposed to the do-it-yourself approach favoured by m a n y advocates of
A T , instead highlighting the importance of craft skills in industry.
Most Australians are in favour of developing renewable energy sources, and many also
want to see their introduction promoting more decentralisation of political and economic
power. To achieve these ends I believe it is necessary to create a solar and wind engineering
industry in Australia, but an industry which is self-managed by the workers involved in it,
and one whose production is geared not to maximising profits but to meeting
democratically determined social goals. Without such an industrial base the desired
technical change either will not take place, or will be imposed from outside in a perveted
(sic) form by multinational companies.108
B y the 1980s, few were making this link—though as noted above the quest for humanised
w o r k continued.109 There were fewer people promoting A T

as an integral part of

constructing better forms of work, social and political organisation.

As described below, the quest for decentralisation and self-reliance lived on for some, but
since most Australians lived in cities and would most likely continue to do so,
decentralisation could have only limited appeal. M a n y advocates of renewable energy were
starting to turn a w a y from this idea, and investigating the possibility for large-scale use of
renewables. For example, John A n d r e w s , an Australian anti-nuclear activist w h o had been
influenced by the A T m o v e m e n t and the early environmental texts Limits to Growth

and

Blueprint for Survival,110 argued that small-scale wind systems were suitable only in rural
areas. City dwellers were best served by a large n u m b e r of multi-megawatt turbines located
in windy areas remote from large population centres.
There is, I think, a lingering belief in some people in the alternative technology movement
that, with reduced demand, city people could get their electricity from small, friendly,
locally built, controlled and sited wind generators, one per house, one per block, or even
one per sky scraper. However desirable this may be politically, there are unfortunately

Alan Parker, "Wind power industry", Chain Reaction, Vol. 3, No, 3,1977, pp. 22-23.
There has recently been a revival of the quest for more democratic technologies. See Richard Sclove,
Democracy and Technology, Guildford Press, N e w York, 1995.
John Andrews, Interview, 15 August 2000.
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cogent technical factors militating against this form of deployment of wind devices.111
Large w i n d systems, he suggested, w e r e compatible with greater political and e c o n o m i c
decentralisation, but could not b y themselves promote it. Recently, A n d r e w s recalled:
[By the mid 1970s] I was starting to question some of the idealistic aspects of alternative
technology with the small-scale self-sufficiency. It was put up as a complete, alternative
model of a society and an economy, that w e could all have self-sufficiency in food and
energy and other produce at quite a small scale, and I was questioning the practicality of
that. So I started to be more interested in some of the ways of getting renewable energy into
the mainstream system.112

Other writings from the late 1970s reflected almost a tension between those calling for
large-scale use of renewable energy and those advocating decentralised, small-scale use of
renewables. For example, the 1979 Australian Energy

Options Conference, w h i c h brought

together people critical of government energy policy and interested in alternative energy
sources, noted in its conclusions:
It was felt that on a small scale wind power was of importance to isolated communities for
generating electricity and pumping water. But on a national scale w e should be looking to
building very large windmills throughout Australia to generate power to feed in to the
national grids. This wind power could provide much of the base load that is currently being
supplied by the non-renewable fossil fuels.113
Yet later it stated:
Who would be privileged to live under rural autonomy with wind generated electricity,
radiant collectors and vinyl biogas digesters, and who must live in cities to provide the othes
[sic] with steel, plastics, precision bearings, wind generator coils or grow crystals? It was
felt that there would be migration from the cities to a self-sufficient rural life especially by
those w h o saw no employment possibilities in the cities.114

The quest for decentralised use of renewable energy coupled with an alternative lifestyle
lives o n in the h o m e p o w e r m o v e m e n t — h o m e o w n e r s w h o generate their electricity, often
because they are remote from the grid. M a n y rely o n renewables, mainly photovoltaic
systems, and in s o m e instances micro hydro and small w i n d turbines.115 In a study of the U S

1

"' John Andrews, "Wind power for Australia", Chain Reaction, Vol. 3, N o , 3, 1977, pp. 24-31
John Andrews, Interview, 15 August 2000.
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Energy Options '79 Conference, "Submission from Energy Options '79", in Walker (ed.), 1979, op
cit., p. 45. Note that this conflicts with the electricity utilities' conception of base load. They would
regard base load as being supplied by generators with roughly constant output.
ibid., p. 46. Emphasis in original.
Tatum discusses the U S home power movement. Jesse S. Tatum, Energy Possibilities: Rethinking
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h o m e p o w e r m o v e m e n t , Jesse T a t u m showed that in the late 1980s the ideals of
decentralisation and self-reliance were still alive and well:
Participants in the home power movement almost uniformly have a clear desire to live
differently. In some cases they appear to have made their choices based on inchoate or
relatively unexamined drives, in others, on clearly articulated social and philosophical
positions they developed over many years. In either case, there is clear and recurring
evidence of a desire to reshape the human relationships of community and traditional
definitions of work roles and a desire to redefine relationships with the natural world.116

Such sentiments were found in Australia. In the late 1970s Stephen Ingrouille established a
retail outlet to sell energy and agricultural equipment and supplies to those seeking an
alternative, self-reliant lifestyle. In 1979, Ingrouille, along with similar Australian retailers
formed the Appropriate Technology Retailers Association. A T R A is still in existence and is
n o w a m u c h larger association. Other m e m b e r s of the A T A , and the Australasian W i n d
Energy Association ( A u s W E A 1 1 7 ) also provided information and advice to those wishing to
use small-scale, decentralised renewable energy systems.

Australian users of renewable energy in remote areas during the 1970s and early 1980s
probably shared the view described by Tatum, particularly since for a time the taxation
system discriminated against renewable energy.118 A 1987 Victorian survey of owners of
renewable remote area p o w e r supplies ( R A P S ) systems indicated that owners were
concerned mostly with independence from the electricity utility and the desire to use
renewable energy.119 Recently m a n y m o r e remote households have installed renewable
R A P S systems; mostly using photovoltaics.120 In 1987, the N S W government introduced a
R e m o t e Area P o w e r Assistance S c h e m e to provide financial assistance to those wishing to

Alternatives and the Choice-Making Process, State University of N e w York Press, Albany, 1995.
ibid., p. 92. Tatum's interviews were carried out in 1989.
See section 4.6.6.
See section 4.5.2. Wind power had been used before this in Australia. Earlier in the twentieth century,
wind power was used for remote power supplies in Australia and elsewhere, but these were replaced
by diesel generators or made redundant by rural electrification. The driver for the use of renewable
energy then was quite different. Robert W . Righter, Wind Energy in America: A History, University
of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1996. For a look at old Australian wind generators see Tony Stevenson,
"Wind Power in Australia", in Mick Harris and Alan Hutchinson (eds), Alternative Technology
Australia, Alternative Technology Association, Collingwood (Vic), 1983.
T. B. Tregaskis, "The Victorian study on stand alone power supply systems (SAPS)", Solar & Wind
Technology, Vol. 7, No. 1,1990, pp. 49-54.
There are of course instances where it may be cheaper to use renewable systems within the grid area,
especially for low demand applications such as lighting where no electricity connection exists.
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install renewable energy systems; and four years later a similar scheme w a s introduced in
Victoria.121 Today, owners of renewable R A P S systems m a y have no environmental interest
at all, their motivation being primarily economic. 1

3.3.5 Revolution or Reform
T h e dilution of the A T ideal signified the adoption of a m o r e reformist approach by the
movement. M a n y in the early A T m o v e m e n t had preached revolution: they were trying to
create a better society. But before long the m o v e m e n t started seeking w a y s to use
alternative technology within existing society. A s Maarten Hajer noted, environmentalists
argued "that the resolution of m a n y environmental problems w a s well within the reach of a
reformist environmental strategy".

One who best exemplifies this transition was Amory Lovins, author of Soft Energy Paths, a
highly influential book about renewable energy and energy conservation from the 1970s.
Lovins, a nuclear energy opponent, w a s associated with Friends of the Earth in the U K . Soft
Energy Paths spoke some of the language of the earlier A T m o v e m e n t , depicting a better
social order under the rubric 'soft energy path', but Lovins' later works were aimed mainly
at reforming the existing system.125

In Soft Energy Paths, Lovins stated his intention to show that alternative energy made sense
within existing society:
If I seem to be presenting advocacy as well as analysis, it is not because I began with a

Energy Authority of N e w South Wales, "Remote area power assistance scheme (RAPAS)", Soft
Technology, No. 26, 1987, pp. 23-24; "Financial help for renewable energy users", Soft Technology,
No. 35, 1991, p. 18.
For example, it was reported that the proud new owner of a renewable energy R A P S system "recoils
at the suggestion byfriendsand neighbors that he had become a greenie". Brad Collis, "Wind power
sparks a revolution in the bush", The Age, 3 November 1994, p. 5.
Hajer, 1995, op. cit., p. 95.
Amory B. Lovins, Soft Energy Paths: Towards a Durable Peace, Friends of the Earth, San Francisco,
and Ballinger, Cambridge (Mass.), 1977. Soft Energy Paths was an outgrowth of an article published
the previous year in a journal aimed at U S decision-makers: Amory B. Lovins, "Energy strategy: the
road not taken?", Foreign Affairs, October 1976. The article provoked intense criticism from
establishment energy players. Later, many of the criticisms and Amory Lovins' rebuttals were
published. See Hugh Nash (ed.), The Energy Controversy: Soft Path Questions & Answers, Friends
of the Earth, San Francisco, 1979.
A n Australian example is Amory B. Lovins, Report to the Ministerfor Industry and Economic Planning
on Matters Pertaining to Victorian Energy Policy, Rocky Mountain Institute, Colorado, 1990.
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preconceived attachment to a particular ideology about energy or technology, such as the
'small is beautiful' philosophy that some have tried to read into m y results. It is instead
because the results of the analysis so impressed m e ... [A]s one brought up in the high
technology tradition, I was surprised that the analysis made a much stronger case for much
more unconventional conclusions than I had expected.126

Lovins' argument drew on the distinction between what he calls hard and soft technologies,
and between hard and soft energy paths. H e called for a shift to a soft energy path based on
soft technologies. Hard technologies are those which predominate in industrialised
countries; they include fossil fuels systems, nuclear p o w e r and other centralised electricity
plant. Hard technologies are complex, large-scale, centralised, costly and inflexible; and the
deployment of these locks society into a rigid energy supply pattern for m a n y decades. A
prominent feature is the increasing use of electricity in applications such as low temperature
heating that d o not require such a high-grade form of energy. In contrast:
[Soft technologies are] flexible, resilient, sustainable, and benign. They rely on renewable
energy flows ... They are diverse, ... flexible and relatively low technology,... matched in
scale and in geographic distribution to end use needs, ... matched in energy quality to enduse needs,... inherently, structurally more participatory ... [and] less coercive.127
N o t all renewable energy technologies would be classified as 'soft'; centralised solar p o w e r
stations, for example, d o not comply. 128

Energy paths, Lovins argued, are characterised by their sociopolitical structure. The use of
hard technologies constitutes a hard energy path, which:
[D]emands strongly interventionist central control, ... concentrates political and economic
power, ... increases bureaucratization and alienation, ... enhances vulnerability and the
paramilitarization of civilian life,... and nurtures—even requires—elitist technocracy.129
B y contrast the use of soft technologies may constitute a soft energy path, though a soft
energy path must use soft technologies.130 Lovins defined a soft energy path mainly as the
antithesis of a hard energy path: "one w h o s e political order is not dominated by hard-path
problems (centrism, vulnerability, etc.)".131 Occasionally Lovins slipped into language
depicting an almost Utopian society under a soft energy path:
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Lovins, 1977, op. cit., pp. 11-12.
ibid., pp. 38-39,151.
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[A] soft path simultaneously offers jobs for the unemployed, capital for businesspeople,
environmental protection for conservationists, enhanced national security for the military,
opportunities for small business to innovate and for big business to recycle itself, exciting
technologies for the secular, a rebirth of spiritual values for the religious, traditional virtues
for the old, radical reforms for the young, world order and equity for globalists, energy
132

independence for isolationists, civil rights for liberals, states' rights for conservatives.

Thus for Lovins a hard energy path is defined by its technologies; while soft technologies
are a necessary but not sufficient condition for a soft energy path. 133 Soft technologies m a y
be applied (and co-exist with hard technologies) under a hard path. B u t a hard and a soft
path are mutually exclusive:
The exclusivity [between the soft and hard energy paths] is not technical incompatibility of
hardware but rather institutional and cultural incompatibility and logistical competitiveness
of evolutionary paths within a sociopolitical context.
Lovins maintained that w e can choose our energy future—though presumably the hard path
is inevitable unless action is taken to change p a t h s — b u t our energy decisions will
ultimately shape political patterns.1 5

What Lovins was not clear about is how a change towards a soft energy path might occur.
Brian Martin noted that a soft energy path w o u l d represent an e n o r m o u s challenge to
existing political and economic structures.
M y basic conclusion is that a slow transition to a combination of hard and soft technologies
is possible, in which the soft components are introduced in such a w a y as to maintain
private control over production, maintain economic inequality, and maintain lack of local
control over the design of society.136
Lovins envisaged n o such obstacles:
[T]he social and economic advantages of [a soft energy path] are so great that, if w e let
them show themselves, a soft path would largely implement itself through existing market
and political processes ... Admittedly, [a soft energy path] does not coincide with the
perceived short-term interests of a few powerful institutions which I think have not yet
grasped its opportunities and hence wrongly see it as a threat. But it does run with, not
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Lovins, 1977, op. cit., p. 23. T o this statement one critic responded: "It is unlikely that even the
coming of a Messiah would bring such wonders". Gordon Corey, "Review of Soft Energy Paths",
Land Economics, Vol. 55, No. 3, 1979, pp. 417-426.
Amory Lovins, in Nash (ed.), 1979, op. cit., p. 252.
ibid., p. 42.
Lovins, 1977, op. cit., pp. 152-3.
Brian Martin, "Soft energy, hard politics", Undercurrents, no, 27,1978, pp. 10-13, p. 12.
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across, our political grain.
A s described in chapter 2, other analysts have s h o w n h o w difficult it is to change an
entrenched system, and that those with an interest in existing arrangements can present a
formidable barrier. Lovins failed to engage adequately with h o w existing arrangements in
the energy sector are sustained and h o w they might be transformed. H e w a s m o r e intent, it
seems, o n showing w h a t is technically rather than politically feasible.

Lovins' main contribution has been in the area of energy efficiency, and he continues to be
an inspiration to energy efficiency advocates.138 O n e of his m a i n challenges to orthodox
thinking in Soft Energy Paths w a s his assertion that energy d e m a n d growth rates need not
remain high, and he has been proved correct on this point. In 1998, Lovins noted:
Total U S energy use is n o w slightly below the level suggested in m y 1976 'soft energy
path' graph ... widely criticized at the time as wildly optimistic.139
While energy d e m a n d growth has slowed, this is not because developed countries adopted
Lovins' 'soft energy path'. A s Alexandra v o n Meier noted:
First, demand growth simply did not continue along the expected exponential trend and
eroded the motivation for large-scale efforts to add generation. Second, the nuclear fission
programs everywhere except in France have encountered enough public opposition to
jeopardize investments, discourage utilities from relying on the nuclear resource, and
prevent whole-hearted commitments to nuclear energy on the national level. Third, 'hard
path' construction and operating costs began to increase rather than decrease as they had for
three quarters of a century. Fourth, transmission and distribution constraints became more
significant. The weaknesses of the hard path have made those implementing it more
receptive to soft or supple options.140
Thus, today renewables are being introduced, but not within the socio-political order that
Lovins envisaged, nor with the type of social change envisaged by the advocates of A T .

Amory B. Lovins, "Soft energy paths", in Satish Kumar (ed.), The Schumacher Lectures, Blond &
Briggs, London, 1980, pp. 61-62.
Lovins was not thefirstcommentator advocating energy efficiency. Others had highlighted energy
conservation by reducing wasteful uses of electricity. See Barry Commoner, The Poverty of Power,
Bantam, N e w York, 1976; Andrew MacKillop, "Unravel the grid!", Ecologist, Vol. 3, No. 11, 1973,
pp. 412-418; Clark, 1974, op. cit. Australian examples are S. Encel, "The high-energy society:
cohesive policy needed for fuel and power", The National Times, 27 M a y - 1 June 1974; Ian Lowe,
"Energy options for Australia", Social Alternatives, Spring 1977, pp. 63-69.
Amory B. Lovins, "Energy lessons learned and to be learned: verities that will astonish some and
delight the rest", Whole Earth, Winter 1998, p. 31.
Alexandra von Meier, "Integrating supple technologies into utility power systems: possibilities for
reconfiguration", in J. Summerton (ed.), Changing Large Technical Systems, Westview Press,
Boulder (Colo.), 1994, p. 227.
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Today's energy systems are becoming a little m o r e environmentally benign; the use o
renewable energy is increasing; electricity systems are starting to b e c o m e m o r e diverse,
flexible and decentralised; natural gas and solar energy are displacing electricity rn heating
applications; and energy efficiency is being taken more seriously. But these changes pertain
to the technology only; the concentration of political and economic power rematns. A s
Pursell noted: "[the dominant] institutions showed a remarkable ability to expropriate
emerging technologies for their o w n benefit.

3.3.6 Politics of the A T m o v e m e n t
A s time went on, the social and political ideals associated with A T weakened, so that by the
1990s, an environmental technology would c o m e to be regarded by m a n y as fairly
compatible with existing socio-political structures. Indeed, the decline of the alternative
technology ideal is just one chapter in the story of the decline of 1970s radicalism. In this
section I analyse the political perspectives of the A T movement.

There was a range of political perspectives within the AT movement: those at the radical
end of the A T spectrum were quite explicit about their political strategy and h o w they s a w
the relationship between technology and society; others were less so.142 T h e radical
advocates of A T helped to set the scene for later debates about politics and technology. O n e
important contribution w a s the rejection of the c o m m o n view that technologies are
politically neutral. Influential A T analyst David Dickson wrote:
[AT's] general approach starts from the premise that the roots of the problems created by
modern technology are to be found as much in the design of the technology itself as in the
uses to which it is put. Eschewing any patching-up attempts of piecemeal social
engineering, it suggests that solutions can only be found through a radical overhaul of
society's technological and industrial base.143
In insisting on the non-neutrality of technology, advocates of A T were also insisting on a
definition of technology as more than just hardware and associated knowledge and skills.144
David Dickson defined 'technology' as:
[A]n abstract concept embracing both the tools and machines used by a society, and the
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relations between them implied by their use ... [This] definition allows us to see
technology, in c o m m o n with the legal or the education system, as a social institution.145
T h e non-neutrality thesis challenges the view that the detriments of technology are a feature
of only h o w it is used. It denies that technological change results from a neutral dynamic,
such as pursuit of efficiency or productivity,146 instead seeing these 'rational' imperatives as
value-laden.147 U s e of such terms draws attention a w a y from questions about what ends are
being served, so that ends are removed from political discourse.148

David Dickson argued not only that technologies are non-neutral, but also that the myth of
neutrality has an ideological function.149 B y viewing technology as a social institution, he
argued, it b e c o m e s apparent that the structure of technology is consistent with patterns of
p o w e r distribution in society. Technological innovation, while controlled by the ruling
class, helps to defend and perpetuate p o w e r structures.
A society's technology can never be isolated from its power structure, and technology can
thus never be considered politically neutral.150
In our society, Dickson argued, the concealment of technology's exploitative role helps to
maintain these p o w e r structures:
The myth of the neutrality of technology ... legitimates the contemporary social function of
technology by attempting to take it out of the realm of political debate. W e cease to
question the nature of the institutionalized structure of technology and the way in which it
has developed historically; w e accept both as natural, or rather as inevitable.151

Advocates of AT, drawing inspiration from critiques of industrial society, were concerned
not only about the overt purposes for which technologies are designed, but also about their
secondary (though not necessarily unintended) consequences. For example, a large power
station is primarily designed to generate electricity; its secondary consequences include
centralisation, domination by a technical elite, an increase in society's dependence on
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Dickson, 1974, op. cit., p. 17. See also Sclove, 1995, op. cit.
R. J. Badham, "Technology and public choice: strategies for technological control and the selection
of technologies", Prometheus, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1986, pp. 288-305.
See Bimber's reading of Habermas and others. Bruce Bimber, "Three faces of technological
determinism", in Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx (eds), Does Technology Drive History? The
Dilemma of Technological Determinism, M I T Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1994.
John Street, Politics and Technology, Macmillan, Basingstoke (UK), 1992.
Dickson, 1974, op. cit.
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electricity, and passive consumers. 152 Alternative technologies were not just 'alternatives' to
conventional technologies; that is, they were not seen as a directly substitutable m e a n s of
meeting the same ends. A T advocates challenged conventional ends, and thus used different
criteria for evaluating energy options. T h e ends they sought included a clean environment,
conserved resources, community participation and control, meaningful and non-explortative
work, and self-reliance. Technologies were valued if they could enhance such alternative
ends, rather than the conventional ends of ensuring plentiful energy supplies to underpin
economic growth. Lovins' approach w a s m u c h closer to the conventional. H e argued that
there were better w a y s of achieving conventional goals such as security of supply, and
energy ends such as w a r m houses and cold food.153 Lovins' ideas have been m o r e
influential than have those of the advocates of A T . A s noted in chapter 2, radical changes to
sociotechnical systems, especially those that entail significant behavioural change and that
challenge a wide range of vested interests, are unlikely to succeed.

Advocates of AT believed that both technologies and society had to be changed. But many
seemed unclear about whether it w a s possible to build a n e w society from the existing
technological base. Because of the wide-ranging interpretations of oppressive

and

alternative technologies, there w a s uncertainty about which technologies were unacceptable
and w h y . Peter Harper asked:
W h y not have computers, power stations, TV, hi-fi sets, and labour-saving devices? What
exactly is the case against them? W h y not distribute electricity through a grid? W h e n were
you last oppressed by the local electricity board?154
M o s t advocates of A T did not believe that alternative technologies could of themselves
usher in a better society. Elliott and Elliott (cited in section 3.3.2) were concerned about
government and industry interest in alternative energy technologies, because, without the
radical values, alternative technologies could be

as exploitative as

conventional

technologies. David Dickson warned:
While an alternative technology ... may well be a necessary prerequisite for creating a nonalienating, non-exploitative way of life, the development of such a technology is not, I
maintain, sufficient to ensure that this state of affairs will be brought about... [A] genuine
alternative technology can only be developed—at least on any significant scale—within the
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Tatum, 1997, op. cit., Richard Sclove used the term 'polypotency' to convey the idea that
technologies have many functions, effects and meanings. Sclove, 1995, op. cit.
Amory B. Lovins and L. Hunter Lovins, Brittle Power: Energy Strategy for National Security, Brick
House, Andover (Mass.), 1982; Lovins, 1974, op. cit.
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framework of an alternative society. The achievement of this is a political task ... To argue
that technological change is per se able to bring about a more desirable form of society is
technological determinism carried to Utopian extremes.155
Boyle writing in 1976 s a w renewable energy resources developing in t w o w a y s :
[A] benevolent mode in which they are employed to facilitate the decentralisation of
political and economic power, the redistribution of wealth and the liberation of the
individual; and a malignant mode in which they are used to prop up the centralised and
authoritarian structures of our existing industrial society.156
Peter Harper cited M i k e Reid speaking at an early A T meeting in the U K o n w h a t role A T
w o u l d play in bringing about social change:
None that w e would approve. Capitalism can absorb any A T hardware and turn it into a
profitable commodity ... Without politics, A T becomes nothing more than a set of trendy
technical fixes. It's expensive, difficult for ordinary people, inefficient, unreliable; and
monopoly capitalism goes rolling on.157

Not all advocates of AT were political.158 Many were far more interested in the technical
aspects of these small-scale technologies, and inspired by the challenge of building their
o w n . L a n g d o n W i n n e r argued that the m o v e m e n t "has exhibited an annoying tendency
toward hardware fetishism"159 A n d for others, the political philosophy w a s in individual
action. Robin Clarke suggested:
Having lost faith in any system of rescuing mankind as a whole, [most advocates of A T ]
operate in a world of self-help where individual action can mount. One (average) person
can do nothing to alter political structures or bring the technocratic nightmare any nearer.
But he or she can put his o w n house in order, and maybe help others to do the same.160
L a n g d o n W i n n e r w a s less charitable about the ideas underlying the A T m o v e m e n t . H e
argued that m a n y in the m o v e m e n t had g r o w n disillusioned with political action, and so
took u p "a certain kind of sociotechnical tinkering".161
Insofar as they had a coherent idea of h o w their labors would change the world, the
appropriate technologists usually entertained the better mousetrap theory. A person would
build a solar house or put up a windmill, not only because he or she found it personally
agreeable, but because the thing was to serve as a beacon to the world, a demonstration
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See the quote at the beginning of this chapter.
Winner, 1979, op. cit.
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model to inspire emulation ... [Society would be slowly reshaped] through a growing
aggregation of small-scale social and technical transformations. Radical social change
would catch on like ... [a] popular consumer item.

Some depicted a more modest socio-political role for alternative technologies, regarding it
as a m e a n s of consciousness raising. D a v i d N o b l e wrote:
The more imaginative ... strive to identify the alternative possibilities latent in the existing
apparatus and to develop them before their time, so to speak, to demonstrate technical
opportunities that must await changes in political power. S o m e believe that their alternative
designs will of themselves automatically bring about such political changes ... Others,
more sober, view the promotion of alternative technologies as a tactic, a w a y of raising
consciousness about the larger structure of power in society and the need for a broader
political struggle.163
Alternative technologies demonstrate that technological paths are not inevitable, that society
has choices:
It is vital that w e understand technology to be a social variable, as something that can be
changed according to the choices that inform it, as an inherited resource latent with
liberatory possibilities ... It is essential to dream alternative dreams, to hold out a vision of
a more humane future, but to believe that, under present political conditions, these
technologies might be turned to humane ends is a dangerous delusion. T o believe that
technological alternatives could be fashioned and promoted in such a w a y as to undermine
those in power is absurd.164
A T presented a vision of alternative sociotechnical futures.165 S a m L o v e suggested:
[T]he most important contribution of appropriate technology m a y not be its technical
innovations, but its creation of an optimistic social possibility.166
W i n n e r believed that the legacy of A T w a s not in the technologies t h e m s e l v e s — m a n y o f
t h e m didn't w o r k very w e l l — b u t w a s "located in the realm of ideas".
[T]hey did challenge many of the key premises in the m o d e m technical orthodoxy, They
helped broaden the meaning of such categories as 'efficiency', 'rationality', 'productivity',
'cost', and 'benefit' and added fresh (if not altogether novel) criteria of judgment—'human
scale', 'the interconnectedness of things', 'second law efficiencies', 'sustainability', and the
like—to the range of considerations that engineers, technicians, agriculturalists, planners,

ibid., p. 79.
David F. Noble, Forces of Production: A Social History of Industrial Automation, Alfred A. Knopf,
N e w York, 1984, pp. 324-325.
ibid., p. 351.
Brian Martin, "Science, technology and nonviolent action: the case for a Utopian dimension in the
social analysis of science and technology", Social Studies of Science, Vol. 27,1997, pp. 439-463.
Love, 1977, op. cit., p. 80. Emphasis removed. Here Love is referring to John Todd's writings.
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and consumers ought to take seriously in making choices. To a certain extent these notions
have now become common currency.167

AT represented a deliberate attempt to shape technological systems and society into a more
desirable form. Goals differed within the movement: some aspired to, and possibly
achieved, an individual solution (such as a self-reliant community based on alternative
technologies); others envisaged radical social change, well aware that this would be very
difficult to achieve. S o m e took their ideas into the commercial world, jettisoning the social
vision;168 it is these "entrepreneurial types" that appear to have had the most success.169 The
hardware thrived but the vision of society did not.

As described in chapter 6, in the 1980s much of environmentalism was transforming into a
pragmatic movement, concerned more with finding solutions to environmental problems
within the existing socio-political system than with achieving revolutionary socio-political
change. T h e meaning of an environmental technology also lost its radical connotations. The
substantive environmental concerns of the movement, such as resource depletion, pollution,
the greenhouse effect and the dangers of nuclear power, became more generalised concerns.
It is principally through association with these environmental issues that renewable energy
technologies have remained popular.

3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter I have described views about environmental technology and associated
sociopolitical ideas evident in the 1970s and early 1980s. The early A T m o v e m e n t helped to
popularise the idea of environmentally benign technologies, but for m a n y advocates,
environmental betterment w a s not the only or even the main purpose of these technologies.
A s Peter Harper stated: "there are those w h o worry about environment and resources, and
those w h o worry about alienation and exploitation."™ Thus other radical social movements
were influencing environmentalism and the A T movement.

Winner, 1986, op. cit., pp. 82-83.
Jorgensen and Karnoe, 1995, op. cit.
Andrew Jamison, "On the dialectics of sustainable technology", Conference on Cultural Politics of
Sustainable Technology, Amsterdam, 3 December 1998.
Peter Harper, 1974, op. cit., (n.p.).
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.

Sociopolitical meanings ascribed to wind power differed. For some it meant conserving
nonrenewable resources; for others it enabled self-reliance, or community participation and
control. For many, wind power represented the antithesis of technologies that they opposed,
particularly nuclear power. But this opposition also took different forms along the lines
described by Harper: nuclear power was condemned both for the environmental dangers it
posed, and because it was a large, centralised system associated with warfare.

Of course, the observation that interpretations of the sociopolitical meaning of a technolog
m a y differ is not novel. More interesting is the question of h o w this affected the
development and usage patterns of environmental technologies. It appears that there w a s a
relationship between the sociopolitical meaning ascribed to wind power and interpretations
of its efficacy—for a time. For example, for those w h o valued self-reliance, wind power
worked well because it enabled independence from the grid. But soon, conventional
definitions of efficacy seemed to be winning. The contradiction between using small-scale
wind systems to enable self-reliance and conserve resources was becoming apparent: larger,
centralised systems could achieve economies of scale and were deemed more practical for
urban dwellers, and those not living in windy locations. W i n d systems could not achieve
anywhere near the reliability of conventional power generators—indeed, in the 1970s, wind
power was a very immature technology.

In the end, the emancipatory social visions associated with wind power waned. After the
'limits to growth' debates and oil shocks, wind power was seen as a w a y of conserving
resources, and as an alternative to nuclear power. This meant large-scale wind power, rather
than small-scale, community-owned systems. With energy finally on the policy agenda,
conserving depleting fossil fuel resources by developing renewable energy resources
became a concern for environmentalists. W h e n the greenhouse effect became a public
policy issue in the late 1980s, the need to reduce the use of fossil fuels became to be seen as
urgent, thus reinforcing the meaning of wind power as a greenhouse gas-free energy source.
This is examined in chapters 6, 7 and 8.
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Chapter 4: Australian Energy Sector Structure and Policies
Pre-1988
4.1 Introduction
Before the 1990s, Australia had negligible wind power capacity.1 Apart from small wind
turbines powering individual households or small communities, there w a s one small wind
farm connected to the mini-grid at Esperance ( W A ) , and a few medium-sized wind turbines
in several states. Yet Australia w a s little different to most other countries: only D e n m a r k
and the U S A had installed significant wind power capacity.2

Typically, the electricity utilities and energy departments deemed wind power appropriate
only for remote areas, dismissing grid-connected wind power on the basis of cost,
intermittency, diffuseness, and technological immaturity. W i n d power, they argued, cost far
m o r e than electricity produced from hydro, coal-fired or gas-fired power stations; it
produced intermittent power and thus had little value to the electricity grid; its land
requirements were excessive since thousands of wind turbines were needed to produce the
same output as a compact fossil fuel plant; and it w a s an energy source for the future
requiring m o r e research and development. Thus the justification for the rejection of wind
power w a s couched primarily in terms of the characteristics of the technology.

Wind power advocates, however, argued that wind power was being dismissed because of
the characteristics of the energy sector institutions: governments and electricity utilities had
been captured by fossil fuel interests, while wind power lobbies were too w e a k to influence
energy policy; electricity utilities were committed to growth and disregarded environmental
concerns; utility engineers were ideologically committed to large, centralised power
stations, disdaining small-scale, decentralised options; utility engineers favoured familiar
energy sources and were ignorant about wind power; utilities had a narrow conception of
the economics of wind power, externalising social and environmental costs of electricity; or

For the non-Australian reader, a brief overview of Australia's political structure is provided. Australia
is a federation with six states: N e w South Wales ( N S W ) , Victoria, Queensland, South Australia (SA),
Western Australia ( W A ) , and Tasmania (an island state). N S W , Victoria and Queensland are the most
populous. There are also two territories: the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), which is a small area
within N S W , and the Northern Territory (NT). (In this thesis, N T is treated as a state.) There are three
levels of government: federal (also called Commonwealth); state or territory; and local. In this period,
electricity supply was primarily a state government responsibility.

in the routine operation of electricity utilities, wind power w a s simply ignored.

How then are these characteristics of the energy sector institutions to be explained? Can
they be ascribed to the technological attitudes of utility engineers and their political masters,
attitudes that might be improved with better information, education, or a change of
personnel or government? Since Australian electricity utility are state-based, and at times
state and federal governments have pledged to reform the electricity sector, w e might
expect a wide range of attitudes towards wind power if this w a s the case. Yet, the states
differ significantly in terms of size, climate, population and local energy resources. Might
such features explain differences in attitude towards wind power a m o n g the states? O r are
there more structural explanations, pertaining to the wider social and economic role of the
electricity supply industry?

I argue that we cannot explain the detailed history of wind power without understanding the
structure of energy sector. Thus, m y aims in this chapter are to analyse the structure of the
Australian energy sector as it relates to decisions about wind power, and to analyse the role
of the main players w h o have shaped, or attempted to shape, the fortunes of wind power in
Australia.

Groups

advocating

wind

power—renewable

energy

associations,

environmentalists, renewable energy researchers, the wind power industry—were mostly
small, with little influence. The dominant players were governments, energy agencies and,
most of all, the electricity utilities. The account of wind power in Australia is told in
chapter 5.

The chapter is organised as follows. The first section comprises a brief overview of
Australia's political economy. Following this, I examine the role of public enterprises, and
attempts to reform these. I then focus on the electricity supply industry (ESI), following
changes to its structure and outlook that have influenced the deployment of renewables. T h e
fourth section comprises an examination of state and federal policies towards renewable
energy, and the role played by the government agencies established to support renewable
energy. Finally, I describe the other actors promoting wind power.

2

See chapter 5 for a brief overview of the success of wind power in these two countries.
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4.2 Political Economy
T h e last few decades have seen a substantial shift in Australia's political economy. M a n y
changes mirror those in other developed countries; others reflect Australia's unique
circumstances. Driving these changes has been the decline in economic performance after
the postwar b o o m ended in the mid 1970s.3

Australia's postwar political economy has been usefully depicted by Stephen Bell as
comprising two 'models of development': domestic defence and postwar Fordism.4
Domestic defence, which w a s instituted in the w a k e of the 1890s depression with the
intention of securing economic prosperity, included the strong protection of manufacturing
industry and the regulation of wages. Following W W 2 , this model w a s overlaid with
another, dubbed

'postwar Fordism'. The

latter w a s

characterised by

Keynesian

macroeconomic management, a growing welfare state, and a capital-labour accord,
measures which for a time underpinned high economic growth. A s Bell argued, postwar
Fordism did not fundamentally alter the model of domestic defence. In particular,
microeconomic policy w a s neglected: there w a s little attempt, for example, to impose
efficiency criteria on industry in return for high levels of protection.5 Both the domestic
defence and the postwar Fordism models have n o w been largely abandoned.6

Since the 1970s, the end of the postwar boom and declining value of exports contributed to
Australia's worsening economic performance. Australia's economy depends greatly on low
value-added commodity exports; the volatility and general decline in commodity prices
have hampered economic recovery.7 Successive Australian governments have attempted to
restructure the economy, two main objectives being to reduce reliance on the agriculture,
minerals and energy resources sectors by improving the international competitiveness of the
manufacturing sector, and to exploit the strong minerals and energy resources sector by
attracting mining and energy-intensive industries. The first response has been partly
beneficial for renewables: governments have taken measures to foster an export-oriented

For a comprehensive analysis, see Stephen Bell, Ungoverning the Economy: The Political Economy
ofAustralian Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1997.
ibid., chapter 4. See also Francis Castles, Australian Public Policy and Economic Vulnerability, All
& Unwin, Sydney, 1988, pp. 91-104.
Bell, 1997, op. cit.
For an analysis of why they have been abandoned see ibid.
ibid.; Hugh Emy, Remaking Australia: The State, The Market and Australia's Future, Allen and
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renewable energy industry, the main areas of focus being the manufacture of solar heating
and remote area power supplies (including small-scale wind systems). T h e second response
has been detrimental for renewables: m u c h of Australia has very cheap electricity, and
governments have pursued further price reductions, leading to the 1990s restructuring of the
industry. This has m a d e it difficult for renewables to compete economically with
conventional energy sources. T h e quest for cheap electricity also m a k e s it m o r e likely that
the environmental costs of fossil fuel use will continue to be externalised. This, renewable
energy advocates argue, has been a major impediment to the uptake of renewables. A m o r e
generalised response to economic decline, owing m u c h to the spread of neoliberalist
economic ideas following disillusionment with Keynesianism, has been a shift of
responsibility for m a n y activities from the state to the market. T h e effect on the ESI is
examined in chapter 7.

Australia's federalist political structure, and inter-state rivalry, has hindered the federal
government's plans for economic restructuring, including efforts to restructure the ESI. For
example, states strive to protect their o w n industries and compete strongly to attract energyintensive industries, to the nation's overall economic detriment.

An episode of particular relevance to the electricity sector is the ill-fated 'resources boom'.
After the oil price hikes of 1979, the federal Fraser government proclaimed the onset of a
resources b o o m : a n e w w a v e of economic growth 'fuelled' by the export of coal, gas and
uranium, and the development of energy-intensive industries.8 Promises of economic
recovery enabled the Fraser government to win the 1980 federal election; but the rhetoric
left an enduring legacy, particularly in the electricity sector. With an expected influx of
energy-intensive industries such as aluminium smelting, substantial increases in d e m a n d for
electricity were envisaged. The federal government had invited:

Unwin, St Leon-ards, 1993, pp. 48-54.
Jim Falk and Peter Murphy, "New aluminium proposals and Australian energy policy", The
Australian Quarterly, Vol. 53, No. 2, 1981, pp. 141-158; Michael Meager, "Power and energy
survey", Australian Business, 4 February 1982, pp. 61-68; Jim Falk and Graham Larcombe, "N.S.W.
power and the on/off resources boom", Journal ofAustralian Political Economy, No. 14, April 1983,
pp. 44-62; Stephen Rosenthal and Peter Russ, The Politics of Power: Inside Australia's Electric
Utilities, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1988; Ian Lowe, "Minerals and energy", in Brian
W . Head and Allan Patience (eds), From Fraser to Hawke: Australian Public Policy in the 1980s,
Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1989. For an example of the resources boom rhetoric see John
Carrick (Minister for National Development and Energy), "The challenge of a new era", Sydney
Morning Herald, 13 April 1981, p. 7.
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[A] 11 State Governments to reassess the prospective demands on them for electricity and, if
necessary, submit proposals for consideration under the infrastructurefinancingguidelines
for new coal-based electricity supply projects with a view to achieving an acceleration of
their electricity supply capital works programmes.9
Yet the resources b o o m failed to appear. This had a deleterious effect on parts of the ESI,
particularly in N e w South Wales ( N S W ) , where the industry would be saddled with
overcapacity and large debts for m a n y years to come.

Despite efforts to increase manufacturing, Australia's minerals and energy resources sector
remained strong, with minerals, ores and fuels forming a major part of Australia's exports.10
Australia is richly endowed with cheap fossil fuel resources, and over the last few decades
has relied on cheap energy to entice energy-intensive industries and to sustain its trading
performance. B y the 1980s, coal w a s Australia's highest earning commodity export.11
Indeed, the belief that energy is primarily a resource to be exploited w a s reflected in government department structures: state and federal governments usually located energy affairs
within the department responsible for mineral resources. Such departments often included
energy conservation and renewable energy programs, but these were a minor activity.

Australia also has a very high per capita energy consumption, and considerable scope for
increased energy efficiency. With overcapacity in the electricity system and thus less need
for n e w supply, with m u c h potential for cost-effective energy efficiency, and with
governments increasingly reluctant to spend public funds on supporting renewable energy,
by the mid 1980s the prospects for increased use of renewable electricity in Australia w a s
not favourable.

This brief overview of Australia's political economy sets the scene for the remainder of this
chapter. Governments' attention to strengthening Australia's economic performance led to
greater emphasis on exploiting mineral and energy resources for industry development and
export, and on fostering an export-oriented manufacturing sector. Governments increasingly
regarded cheap and plentiful energy as a key ingredient for a strong economy. W h a t effect
would this have on renewable energy policy?

Fraser cited in Michael Gill, "Power boom rhetoric rebounds on PM", The Age, 21 December 1981.
R.A. Foster and S.E. Stewart, Australian Economic Statistics 1949-50 to 1989-90, Reserve Bank of
Australia, Occasional Paper No. 8,1991, Table 1.3.
ibid.
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4.3 Public Enterprises
T h e electricity utilities were 'public enterprises', a category I n o w examine briefly.12 W h a t
role w a s played by public enterprises in Australia's political e c o n o m y , and h o w has this
changed over time? W h a t were the intentions of governments with regard to the role and
performance of public enterprises, and h o w have these intentions changed over time?
Although the electricity utilities were nearly all state-based, I focus mainly on changes to
public enterprises initiated at federal level. This is fitting since changes at state level often
followed (though sometimes preceded) those at federal level, and from the late 1980s the
federal government became increasingly intent o n restructuring state public enterprises and
breaking d o w n state barriers in infrastructure provision.

Recently, governments have been handing over to the market responsibility for many
functions, including electricity supply and other infrastructure provision. Former state
monopolies have been opened to competition, corporatised and in s o m e cases privatised.
This marketisation represents quite a sea change: such functions had been undertaken by the
state throughout the postwar period, or even longer.

So why were such enterprises established as public bodies? This did not reflect party
politics; the establishment of infrastructure-related public enterprises w a s sanctioned by
both Labor and conservative governments. 13 Roger Wettenhall argued that all adopted a

12

Roger Wettenhall, "Public ownership in Australia", Political Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 4, 1965, pp.
426-440; N. G. Butlin, A. Barnard, J. J. Pincus, Government and Capitalism, Allen and Unwin,
Sydney, 1982; Alexander Kouzmin, J. R. Nethercote and Roger Wettenhall, Australian
Commonwealth Administration 1983: Essays in Review, School of Administrative Studies, Canberra
College of Advanced Education and Royal Australian Institute of Public Administration ( A C T
Division), Canberra 1984; Bruce Stone, "Statutory authorities as agents and objects of public policy",
in Brian Galligan (ed.), Comparative State Policies, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1988; Roger
Wettenhall and J. R. Nethercote (eds), Hawke's Second Government: Australian Government
Administration 1984-1987, School of Management, Canberra College of Advanced Education and
Royal Australian Institute of Public Administration ( A C T Division), 1988; John Halligan and Roger
Wettenhall, Hawke's Third Government: Australian Commonwealth Administration 1987-1990,
Faculty of Management, University of Canberra, and Royal Institute of Public Administration
Australia (ACT Division), Canberra, 1992; Martin Painter, "Reshaping the public sector", in Brian
Galligan, Ian McAllister and John Ravenhill (eds), New Developments in Australian Politics,
MacMillan, South Melbourne, 1997.
E. A. Boehm, "Ownership and control of the electricity supply industry in Australia", The Economic
Record, Vol. 32, Nov. 1956, pp. 257-272. There have been a number of conservative parties in
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For example, Robert Menzies, a pre-

and post-war conservative prime minister, stated in 1943: "few people would have any
quarrel with government control of railways, or tramways, or water supply, or such other
great public utilities".15 Government ownership and control of such enterprises w a s noncontroversial, indeed praiseworthy, if they, in the words of conservative Minister R.G.
Casey, were d e e m e d "development stimulators".16 Public infrastructure as development
stimulator has a long history in Australia; indeed it underpinned m u c h of Australia's early
economic

development

since European

settlement.17 There w a s

no

intention that

government activity restrict private enterprise; rather these public undertakings were
intended to aid industry development. 18 A government-owned E S I could be directed to
provide such aid, while a privately-owned one might be less amenable. State provision of
infrastructure w a s also consistent with the domestic defence and postwar Fordism policies
outlined above. T h e ESI, for example, provided employment in regional areas, and
underpinned high economic growth and rising living standards. Governments' commitment
to plentiful electricity supplies w a s consistent with industry assistance afforded at only a
general level; microeconomic neglect w a s also evident.

Recent efforts to create markets for government services and infrastructure provision were
preceded by attempts to implement administrative reform and improve the performance of
public enterprises. Early attempts to reform public enterprises at both state and federal level
began in the m i d 1970s. Inquiries into statutory authorities were held, highlighting their lack
of accountability and inadequate political control.19 B y the early 1980s, statutory authorities
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Australia's history, but they have not used that descriptor. In the post-war period, the main
conservative parties have been the Liberal Party and the National Party. (The latter was formerly the
Country Party and then the National Country Party).
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Cited in ibid., 1965, op. cit., p. 428.
Cited in ibid, p. 429.
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At the federal level, the Coombs Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration
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their o w n statutory authorities. Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration,
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First Report, A G P S , Canberra, 1979; Public Bodies Review Committee, Audit and Reporting of
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were being scrutinised as never before, a development fuelled by the growing attack on 'big
government'.20 T h e electricity utilities did not escape scrutiny: s o m e state governments
sought greater accountability and improved performance; neoliberalist commentators
criticised tariff setting methodologies and public ownership;21 and environmentalists
condemned the ESI's high growth orientation.

The effects of these early changes to public enterprises were positive or neutral for
renewables. S o m e energy agencies were directed to foster greater use of renewables and/or
a manufacturing industry of renewable energy technologies. In Victoria, the quest for
greater accountability from the electricity utility w a s coupled with a directive for the utility
to consider renewables. These cases are discussed below. But the quest to achieve improved
performance from public enterprises and the growing influence of neoliberal ideas, along
with the desire to improve Australia's economic performance through provision of cheap
energy would in the 1990s lead governments to push for corporatisation, and in s o m e cases
privatisation, of energy bodies. This trend would place the electricity utilities further from
direct government control. Opportunities for governments to directly influence uptake of
renewables would diminish, and they would thereafter resort to market mechanisms.

4.4 The Australian Electricity Supply Industry
4.4.1 Introduction
There are a number of existing histories of the Australian electricity supply industry (ESI);
however, none are adequate for the purposes of this thesis. In this section, and section 7.3,1
give an account of this history to provide a context for the history of wind power.

The ESI was undoubtedly the main institution in whose hands the fortunes of wind power
lay during this period. S o m e critics have argued that the principal barrier to the greater use

Public Bodies: Third Report to the Parliament, F. D. Atkinson Government Printer, Melbourne,
1981; Public Accounts Committee, Seventh Report: The Accountability of Statutory Authorities,
N S W Parliament, 1983; Stone, 1988, op. cit. The term 'statutory authority' is the general term used to
describe non-departmental government bodies. 'Public sector enterprises' denotes a subset of these,
comprising bodies which carry out commercial operations.
Stone, 1988, op. cit.; Phillip Lynch, Ministerial Statement: Review of Commonwealth Functions,
A G P S , Canberra, 1981, p. 3.
See for example, Michael G. Porter, Private Resource Development and Public Electricity Supply,
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of wind power and other renewables has been the attitude of the ESI.22 Several state
electricity utilities undertook investigations into the wind resource; yet very little wind plant
w a s installed. So what w a s the stance of the ESI towards wind power, and h o w are w e to
explain this stance?

In this section I examine the structure, activities and outlook of the former ESI, and the
background to the 1990s restructuring. I examine attempts to increase government control
over the ESI and achieve greater accountability, the growing misgivings about the ESI's
handling of electricity planning, changes in planning methodologies to acknowledge
benefits of more flexible options, tentative m o v e s towards greater private sector
involvement, and the forces shaping the m o v e towards a more commercial focus.

All of these changes helped to break down the old model of utilities as centralised,
technocratic, supply-orientated, expansionist monopolies. This old model seemed to offer
little opportunity for renewable energy. The 1980s changes to the ESI could have provided
s o m e openings for renewable energy. For example, most forms of renewable energy plant
offer greaterflexibilityin planning. A shift towards a commercial focus might have seen the
value of this benefit included in costings. Increased accountability, in particular the use of
public inquiries to scrutinise electricity planning, offered greater opportunity for outsiders
to advocate alternatives such as renewable energy. M o v e s towards greater private sector
involvement offered opportunities for renewable energy companies to compete—albeit on
the electricity utilities' terms. A n d in Victoria, attempts to increase government control over
the ESI offered hope to advocates of renewable energy: the A L P government coupled its
reforms of the energy sector with promises to foster use of renewable energy. This case is
examined in more detail.

Australia's former ESI was predominantly state-based. I concentrate on the State Electricity

Centre of Policy Studies, Monash University, 1983.
See for example Andrew Blakers, T o m Crawford, Mark Diesendorf, Geoff Hill and Hugh Outhred,
The Role of Wind Energy in Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Opportunities and Benefits for the
Australian Wind Energy Industry, Department of the Arts, Sport, the Environment, Tourism and
Territories, Canberra, 1991; Gavin Gilchrist, The Big Switch: Clean Energy for the Twenty-first
Century, Allen & Unwin, St. Leonards, N S W , 1994. For an overview see Andrea Bunting and
Stewart Russell, "What sustains unsustainability? Examining context, explaining obstacles, devising
strategies For renewables", Solar '97, Australian and N e w Zealand Solar Energy Society Conference,
Canberra, 1-3 December 1997.
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Commission of Victoria ( S E C V , often called S E C

within Victoria)—the authority

responsible for power generation, transmission and most distribution in Victoria—and the
Electricity Commission of N e w South Wales (Elcom)—the authority responsible for
generation and transmission, but not distribution, in N S W . Both utilities were subject to
significant external scrutiny during the 1980s.

4.4.2 Histoiy and General Features of the Electricity Supply Industry
Early in the twentieth century, electricity supply w a s controlled by private companies and
local authorities. From 1914 the ESI started to c o m e under the control of state governments;
and by 1952 the utilities were virtually all state-owned. Each state c a m e to rely principally
on fossil fuels and hydro resources found within its borders, a feature partly explained by
state governments' desire to develop local resources, and to ensure local control.

The

federal government did not play a direct role in electricity provision, apart from
involvement in the S n o w y Mountains Hydro scheme. O n c e public ownership w a s
established there were very few changes in the institutional form of the ESI until the 1990s.
Details of the transition to government control and public ownership, and the consequent
organisation of the industry vary a m o n g the states: in s o m e states a single authority w a s
responsible for nearly all generation, transmission

and

distribution, and

general

coordination and planning; in other states s o m e of these functions were performed by
separate public bodies. Here I examine briefly the general features of the ESI in the period
of the publicly owned, vertically integrated monopolies.24

Public Ownership and Control and the ESI's Role in State Development
That the ESI eventually came under state ownership accords with the view of public
enterprise as development stimulator. E.A. B o e h m (writing in 1956) identified several
drivers for public ownership and central planning. State governments wished to attract
industrial development, and needed plentiful cheap and reliable power supplies to foster
this. Technical progress was occurring in generation and transmission, with central

Hugh Saddler, Energy in Australia: Politics and Economics, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1981, Boehm,
1956, op. cit.; Rosenthal and Russ, 1988, op. cit.
For an overview of the Australian ESI during this time see: Michael Johnson and Stephen Rix (eds),
Powering the Future: The Electricity Industry and Australia's Energy Future, Pluto Press Australia
Leichhardt, N S W , and Public Sector Research Centre, University of N S W , Kensington, 1991, pp.
15-18; Rosenthal and Russ, 1988, op. cit.; G.D. McColl, The Economics of Electricity Supply in
Australia* Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1976, chapter 1.
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authorities enabling economies of scale to be realised. A public authority would heed the
public interest in terms of security and e c o n o m y of supply, particularly as long-term
investments were required. There were also financial considerations: public authorities were
exempt from taxation and able to raise capital at lower rates of interest.25

States varied greatly in the timing of the transition to public ownership, in part because of
the nature of local energy resource. Tasmania and Victoria, the first states to establish
public electricity authorities, were developing abundant local resources: hydro and brown
coal respectively. Both undertakings involved high capital costs virtually precluding the
private sector.26 In Queensland and N S W , the transition to public ownership took m u c h
longer. Looser structures were established with local authorities retaining a major role in
distribution or generation. Wilfred Prest noted: "Both states are fortunate in being amply
supplied with black coal and therefore have not been under the same pressure to establish
central authorities to exploit alternative sources of power." 27

Another driver for the establishment of public utilities was the desire to reduce dependence
on interstate black coal supplies.28 N S W coal miners were very militant in the early days of
the ESI. T h e establishment of the S E C V to exploit Victoria's poor quality brown coal
resources w a s hastened by the 1916 strikes in N S W ' s black coal industry.29 In the 1940s,
with Victoria still partly dependent on N S W coal, further strike action by N S W coal miners
prompted the S E C V to develop the Morwell briquette project in spite of the poor
economics. 30 South Australia's indigenous coal supplies were also of poor quality. Until
1946 its electricity utility w a s privately o w n e d and used N S W black coal. After disruptions
to coal supplies, the South Australian government nationalised the company, with the newly
formed E T S A instructed to use local coal resources.31

The ESI was a vital part of state development: plentiful, cheap and reliable power supplies

25
26
27

28

29
30

Boehm, 1956, op. cit.
Butlin et al, 1982, op. cit.
Wilfred Prest, "The electricity supply industry", in Alex Hunter (ed.), The Economics of Australian
Industry: Studies in Environment and Structure, Melbourne University Press, 1963, p. 131.
Russell Mathews, Public Investment in Australia: a Study of Australian Public Authority Investment
and Development, Cheshire, Melbourne, 1967, p. 159.
Rosenthal and Russ, 1988, op. cit.; p. 296.
Mathews, 1967, op. cit.; McColl, 1976, op. cit., chapter 7. (Briquettes are dried brown coal pellets,
which were used in peak load stations, and for industry and domestic heating.)
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encouraged industry development; power plant construction created jobs; and subsidised
rural electrification schemes brought power to nearly all citizens, and improved the
prosperity of agriculture.32 W h e r e feasible, the grid spread throughout each state; yet until
recently only the grids of N S W and Victoria were interconnected, through the S n o w y
Mountains Hydro scheme. This lack of interconnection to nearby states ( S A

and

Queensland) reveals m u c h about the importance accorded to state autonomy. A s s u m i n g the
transmission distances are not too long, there are substantial benefits to be gained by
interconnection: sharing of reserve capacity; assistance in meeting peak d e m a n d (assuming
these do not coincide in different states); economies of scale in generating unit size; and the
option of an alternative source of supply if local resources are limited or costly.

Despite

this, Queensland w a s quite unwilling to consider interconnection, refusing to participate in
the 1980 inquiry into interconnection.34 South Australia only agreed to a low-level
interconnection with Victoria in 1985 during a period of concern about the availability and
price of future natural gas supplies.

In summary, decisions about the early development of the publicly owned ESI were not
driven by narrow economic considerations; rather, governments used the industry to foster
industrial growth within the state, and decision-making w a s premised on the need for secure
electricity supplies. Local control w a s paramount. In Victoria, for example, the government
spent a very large s u m to enable the development of local coal resources. T h e irony today is
that renewables are deemed economically uncompetitive with a fuel source that received
large government funding in earlier times.35

Rosenthal and Russ, 1988, op. cit., pp. 301-302.
Boehm, 1956, op. cit.; R.G. Hawkins, "The market for energy services", in K.A. Tucker (ed.), The
Economics of the Australian Service Sector, Croom Helm, London, 1977; E.A. Boehm, "The impact
of electricity", The Economic Record, Vol. 31, M a y 1955, pp. 61-76.
A recent study found- there were substantial benefits in interconnection for both N S W and
Queensland. London Economics, Independent Review of the Economic Costs and Benefits of
Interconnection of the Queensland and New South Wales Electricity Grids, August 1997. The
economics of interconnecting S A and Victoria were greatly assisted by building of the transmission
line to Portland (Victoria) for the Alcoa aluminium smelter.
Rosenthal and Russ, 1988, op. cit., pp.11. The inquiry was Committee of Inquiry into Electricity
Generation and the Sharing of Power Resources in South-East Australia.
Baumgartner and B u m s make a similar point about nuclear power. "The economics of nuclear energy
would look different if every utility using it would have to pay royalties and fees to governments to
compensate them for their past investments". Thomas Baumgartner and T o m R. Burns, Transitions to
Alternative Energy Systems: Entrepreneurs, New Technologies and Social Change, Westview Press
Boulder, 1984, p. 19.
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Growth

Until recently, electricity d e m a n d growth rates were high and real electricity tariffs were
declining. T h e E S I built n e w p o w e r stations to keep ahead of d e m a n d while promoting
increased use of electricity to keep d e m a n d growth rates high. This strategy w a s adopted in
m a n y countries. Richard Hirsh described the situation in the U S A :
[U]tility managers pursued a technological strategy that enabled the production of
increasing amounts of electricity at decreasing prices ... Sometimes called the 'grow-andbuild' strategy, the technological approach aggressively promoted the sale of electricity,
especially to customers w h o could improve companies' load factors, so utilities would have
a reason to construct new power plants. Because manufacturers regularly developed
technology that generated electricity more efficiently, utilities' unit costs decreased when
they installed the plants. Lower customer prices followed, which spurred demand, and the
cycle repeated itself, leading to a self-reinforcing downward spiral in costs and prices.36

The electricity utilities of this period were supply-oriented; that is, they did not seek to
m a n a g e d e m a n d , apart from during short-term crises.37 H u g h Saddler noted: "the notion that
they are solemnly obliged to m e e t d e m a n d , whatever it might be, is held almost as an article
of faith by electricity authorities."38 Yet, d e m a n d w a s not an independent variable; for the
electricity authorities actively encouraged growth in electricity d e m a n d — i n d e e d , their
political masters expected this. For example, The State Electricity Commission

Act

1958

(Vic), required the S E C V :
[To provide a] safe economical and effective supply of electricity throughout Victoria, ...
[to inquire into] the prospects of establishing in Victorian new industries requiring large
quantities of cheap electrical energy ... [and] to encourage and promote the use of electricity
and especially the use thereof for industrial and manufacturing purposes.39

There was general consensus that high growth rates were desirable, and given the memory
of shortages in the early post W W 2

years,40 it w a s better to err on the side of excess

capacity. State and federal governments encouraged growth in electricity supply to foster
industry development, create jobs, and support rural communities. State governments were

Richard Hirsh, Power Loss, M I T Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1999, p. 46.
Thefirstutility to adopt a demand side management program was the S E C V . See State Electricity
Commission of Victoria, SEC Outlookfor Demand Management to the Mid 1990s, 1986.
Saddler, 1981, op. cit., p. 30.
Victoria, State Electricity Commission Act 1958, s 20.
See for example C. Edwards, Brown Power: A Jubilee History of the State Electricity Commission of
Victoria, State Electricity Commission of Victoria, Melbourne, 1969.
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particularly pro-development, motivated by their restricted revenue base.41 For politicians,
an electricity shortage was politically m u c h more damaging than overcapacity. Industry
supported high growth because electricity improved industrial processes and opened up n e w
markets in consumer goods. A n d undoubtedly the general public endorsed widespread
access to electricity supplies and increased use of electrical consumer goods during the
postwar-boom prosperity. At a broader level, high growth rates were in accord with postwar
Keynesian macroeconomic policies, including job creation through public works and
infrastructure provision for business development.

Another notable feature of this period was the relative crudeness of the economic
assessments of electricity projects. S o m e projects—particularly the S n o w y Mountains
Hydro scheme and Morwell briquette factory—were later deemed poor investments. This
is not surprising given that in this era, security of electricity supply, infrastructure provision
and job creation were paramount. It w a s not until costs started to rise in the 1980s that
economic assessments began to play a more crucial role.

Electricity planning methodologies were also quite crude, but while demand growth rates
remained high, forecasting errors mattered little. The utilities were committed to increasing
the size of generation units to achieve economies of scale and meet forecast demand. In
Victoria, for example, the planned Loy Y a n g A and B power stations were each rated
2000 M W , comprising four 500 M W

units. Compared with a 500 M W

unit, the few

megawatts that a wind farm could contribute appear paltry. Yet, 500 M W

of brown coal

plant requires a long lead-time and also constitutes a very large 'lumpy' addition, while
flexible, modular plant such as wind power can be built quickly in the size required. While
demand growth rates were high, the benefits offlexible,modular plant were of little
consequence; only w h e n growth rates stalled did the planning of inflexible, large plant
become problematic. Then, a commitment toflexible,modular renewable energy plant
could have helped to reduce planning uncertainty and the cost of under- or overcapacity. A s
described in chapter 5, wind power advocates were starting to m a k e this argument about
ESI planning in the 1980s, but to no avail.

Aynsley Kellow, Transforming Power: the Politics of Electricity Planning, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge (UK), 1996.
McColl, 1976, op. cit.; Mathews, 1967, op. cit.
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4.4.3 T h e Environmental Challenge
Postwar, the d e m a n d for electricity grew rapidly—at about 9 % per year throughout the
1 9 6 0 s — a n d construction of n e w power stations continued apace. Eventually growth seemed
to have become an end in itself. F r o m the early 1970s, environmental and community
groups waged protracted battles with electricity utilities over the Victorian Newport power
station and the Tasmanian hydro power projects, battles which highlighted problems with
electricity forecasting, public participation in decision-making

processes, and the

relationship between the promotion of growth and environmental protection. The dispute
over the Gordon-below-Franklin hydro power project has been well

documented

elsewhere;43 and arguments m a d e for greater use of wind power during this dispute are
discussed in chapter 5. In the Victorian Newport dispute, critics called for greater energy
conservation rather than use of renewables.44 Yet the latter helped to shape attitudes within
sections of the Labor Party and the environment m o v e m e n t towards energy issues, hardened
attitudes towards the S E C V , and w a s instrumental in bringing about environmental
planning legislation in Victoria.45

The Newport controversy began after the SECV announced plans to build a 1000 MW
peak-load gas-fired power station in Newport, in inner Melbourne. Opponents included
local residents, the local council and trade unions, the latter imposing work bans on
construction.46 The dispute ran from 1971 to 1977, a time of growing concern about
pollution and the depletion of energy resources, with m a n y of the criticisms centred on
these concerns. Critics began to examine closely the S E C V ' s planning methods and
promotion of growth.47 T h e S E C V maintained that Newport w a s needed for peak load, yet
peak d e m a n d w a s exacerbated by the S E C V ' s marketing efforts. The S E C V w a s continuing
to forecast high demand growth rates, even though by the early 1970s, growth rates had

43

Bruce Davis, "Adaption and deregulation in government business enterprise: the Hydro-Electri
Commission of Tasmania, 1945-94", Australian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 54, No. 2,
1995, pp. 252-261; Kellow, 1996, op. cit.; Rosenthal and Russ, 1988, op. cit.
44
The Newport power station dispute is discussed in Bruce Hartnett, "Newport: a conflict over power",
in Sol Encel, Peter Wilenski and Bernard Schaffer (eds), Decisions: Case Studies in Australian Public
Policy, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1981; Rosenthal and Russ, 1988, op. cit., pp. 269-273.
45
Patricia Whately, "The restructuring of the Victorian industry and energy portfolios under the Cain
Labor Government and its effect particularly on the State Electricity Commission of Victoria", M.A.
Thesis, University of Melbourne, 1992; Rosenthal and Russ, 1988, op. cit., pp. 273-5.
46
Bruce Hartnett, 1981, op. cit., p. 170.
47
Criticisms of the Newport project are raised in Anti-Newport Power Station Coalition, Newport:
Abuse of Power, Melbourne, 1974; and Deborah White, Newport—Can We Afford It?: The Issues and
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.

started to fall.48 Neither the government nor the SECV were promoting demand
m a n a g e m e n t , which would have seen growth rates reduce further. T h e S E C V in turn argued
that delays to the N e w p o r t p o w e r station project w o u l d

lead to subsequent

power

shortages—there were brief shortages in 1981, exacerbated b y an unfortunate coincidence
of events—and denied that N e w p o r t w o u l d cause environmental problems.

The dispute was resolved in 1977 after the Victorian government and the Trades Hall
Council set u p the N e w p o r t R e v i e w Panel, agreeing to accept its findings as binding.50 T h e
Panel found that alternative sites for the station w o u l d be too costly, r e c o m m e n d i n g that the
N e w p o r t p o w e r station be built, but with a reduced capacity of 5 0 0 M W . 5 1 H o w e v e r , the
N e w p o r t R e v i e w Panel w a s most candid in its criticism of the S E C V :
W e have been greatly concerned ... by the attitude of the State Electricity Commission ...
The S.E.C. has appeared to be most reluctant to concede that any of its decisions, whether
technical, commercial,financialor environmental were open to challenge. Such an
inflexible attitude does not bode well for the future ... The world is n o w more concerned
about energy and the use of resources, about pollution and what is or is not tolerable, about
big cities and h o w they should be allowed to develop than was current when Newport was
first contemplated ... W e therefore urge the Government to ensure that these vitally
important matters are built in to the thinking of all its agencies especially ... the S.E.C. If
new legislation is required it should be enacted. What is really needed is a change of
attitude so that environmentalists and the Commission itself will accept the same basic
values as they approach the continuing problems of Victoria's development.52
Such criticism seemed to have little impact on the S E C V . Its opinion of the dispute w a s
evident in the following statement conveyed in its next Annual Report.
[P]rotracted delays in the construction program and continuing industrial unrest are
seriously jeopardising the Commission's ability to carry out its responsibilities to the
Victorian community to provide it with economical and uninterrupted supplies of
electricity. The electricity consuming public of Victoria is justified in expecting the highest

the Alternatives, Australian Conservation Foundation, Melbourne, 1976.
Newport Review Panel, Report to the Government and the Trades Hall Council, Government Printer,
Melbourne, March 1977, pp. 14, 26.
J.C. Trethowan, "Newport or not?—SEC's answer", The Age, 4 January 1975.
Bruce Hartnett, 1981, op. cit., pp. 170-1.
Newport Review Panel, Final Report to the Government and the Trades Hall Council, Government
Printer, Melbourne, April 1977. For a criticism of the decision-making process which lead this
finding see D. G. Hill, "The Newport Power Station and the planning process", in Mark Diesendorf
(ed.), Energy and People: Social Implications of Different Energy Futures, Society for Social
Responsibility in Science (A.C.T.), Canberra, 1979.
Newport Review Panel, op. cit., pp. 17-18.
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possible standard of living by the availability of a reliable electricity supply system—as
symbolically illustrated in the photograph [of Melbourne's evening skyline] below. The
Commission accepts fully the need for adequate examination of all environmental aspects
of its operations but it must not be prevented from proceeding with planned construction
programs that are essential to the maintenance of supply to the community.53
Moreover, the S E C V secured the extra peak-load capacity it wanted: additional gas turbine
units at another location were quickly approved. 54 But this questioning of the S E C V ' s
electricity planning, hitherto unchallenged, exposed the S E C V ' s c o m m i t m e n t to growth and
its disdain for community and environmental concerns. Environmentalists' attitudes
towards the E S I were irrevocably changed.

4.4.4 The Shift towards a Commercial Focus and Greater Accountability
With the benefit of hindsight, we can regard the early 1980s as a turning point for the ESI.
There were early m o v e s from autonomy to political accountability, and the start of a shift
from a technological to a commercial focus. H o w d o w e account for this?

At a broad level this transformation corresponds with the general political and economic
developments of this period as described above. 55 T h e oil shocks of the 1970s had resulted
in governments taking a much deeper interest in energy matters, and energy-intensive
industries such as the aluminium industry scrambling to secure cheap electricity supplies.56
High interest rates increased the debt-servicing costs of the utilities; this and other rising
costs put pressure on electricity prices.57 A series of state and federal government inquiries
into statutory authorities led to calls for greater accountability of these bodies.58 Industrial
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State Electricity Commission of Victoria, Annual Report, 1977.
Hill, 1979, op. cit.
Other reasons have been identified. Richard Hirsh argues that in the U S A the reorientation of
electricity utilities was in part due to 'technological stasis'. Generating technology reached a
performance plateau, no longer delivering efficiency improvements or economies of scale, and the
values of the utility engineer-managers increasingly came into conflict with that of consumers and
regulators. Hirsh sees this as a U S phenomenon, rather than one c o m m o n to all utilities. Richard
Hirsh, Technology and Transformation in the American Electric Utility Industry, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge (UK), 1989.
For example Peter Maher, "Big user electricity shortage looms", Australian Financial Review,
4 September 1979, pp. 1, 6.
Hugh Saddler, Recent Trends in the Cost of Electricity Supply in Australia, Centre for Resource and
Environmental Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, 1984; Michael Gill, "The price of
power: more rises ahead", National Times, 15-21 February 1981, p. 10.
See section 4.3..

disputation—notorious in the E S I — w a s causing power restrictions and delaying power
station construction programs. 59 T h e end of the postwar b o o m , the shifting industry m i x and
near saturation of the domestic market meant that high electricity d e m a n d growth rates were
no longer assured. In a bid to restore economic prosperity, state and federal governments
were eagerly promoting a resources b o o m (which did not eventuate—see above) including
the development of energy-intensive industries. A n d in 1982-83 Australia experienced a
recession, throwing into doubt the earlier optimistic forecasts of electricity demand.

The ESI in NSW and Victoria were the first to face pressure for change. An important
catalyst in both states w a s power shortages during winter 1981. 60 P o w e r restrictions and
blackouts, thefirstin over two decades due to insufficient generating capacity rather than
industrial disputation, were highly embarrassing to the N S W and Victorian governments
and electricity authorities, particularly as they occurred in the midst of efforts to attract
energy-intensive industries.61 B y 1982, both the N S W and Victorian government had sought
to address perceived problems in the industry by revamping the m a n a g e m e n t structure of
their electricity authorities.

The NSW blackouts revealed that the Electricity Commission of NSW (Elcom)—already
under fire for being secretive and non-accountable—was presiding over a chronically
unreliable electricity system.62 Following this the N S W

government introduced a n e w

management structure at Elcom providing clear separation between the day-to-day
management of the utility and long-term planning, and requested E l c o m to conduct an
internal inquiry.63 The inquiry report, released in 1983, recommended

substantial

organisational changes and a slowdown in power station construction, for by this time
demand growth had stalled.64 Just as significant w a s the report's degree of candour: this w a s
the beginning of the ESI becoming more open to public scrutiny. Rosenthal and Russ noted:

59
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Rosenthal and Russ, 1988, op. cit., chapter 5.
As the electricity systems of N S W and Victoria are interconnected, one state would normally help the
other out during such emergencies. O n this occasion, both states were facing a shortage.
State Electricity Commission of Victoria, Annual Report, 1980-81, p. 9; Stephen Rosenthal and Rod
Wise, "Wran's crealcy power base", Australian Financial Review, 12 June 1981, pp. 1, 16.
ibid.; Alan Jury, "Anatomy of a qango—inside Elcom", Australian Business, 1 M a y 1981, pp. 40-41.
Graham Williams, "Elcom's strife deep-seated", Sydney Morning Herald, 1 April 1982, p. 10.
Mike Steketee, "Shake-up at the top for Elcom", Sydney Morning Herald, 31 March 1982, p. 1;
Rosenthal and Russ, 1988, op. cit., p. 12.
Electricity Commission of N e w South Wales, Performance and Future Direction: Statutory Report to
the Minister for Energy, N S W , 1983.
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The report ... was most uncharacteristic of Commission documents in itsfrankdiscussion
of problems ... and at the time represented the most comprehensive single document
produced on the affairs of an Australian electric utility.65

In Victoria, the 1982 management shake-up of the SECV was influenced not only by the
earlier shortages, but also by a change in government. The A L P government that took
power in early 1982 w a s determined to reform the S E C V . 6 6 The main theme of its 1982
Minerals and Energy election platform w a s improved management of the energy sector;
another theme w a s increased energy conservation.67 The A L P ' s opinion of the S E C V had
been influenced by the Newport power dispute, in which the Victorian branch of the A L P
had been active.68 Following this, environmentalists within the A L P had successful
incorporated within the party's platform the promise to pursue greater energy conservation
and development of renewable energy.69 T h e A L P government instituted the Victorian
Energy Plan ( V E P ) , to involve the community in energy policy formulation, to achieve a
coordinated planning approach to energy issues, and to produce an energy policy integrated
with other government policies.70 Funding w a s provided to community groups working in
the energyfield,a regular newsletter w a s published, and a large number of publications on
various aspects of energy planning were released for public comment. 71 It w a s intended that
integrated energy planning be achieved through the V E P task force, bringing together
planners from the state's energy agencies: the S E C V , Victorian Solar Energy Council,
Victorian B r o w n Coal Council, Department of Minerals and Energy, and Gas and Fuel
Corporation of Victoria.

The ALP was also determined to reform public administration, a crusade partly motivated
by the rather critical reports from the inquiries into statutory authorities.72 The n e w Labor
government immediately restructured the S E C V , removing its policy and planning powers,
and in view of the S E C V ' s poorfinancialperformance, required it to pay a rate of return on
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Rosenthal and Russ, 1988, op. cit., p. 12.
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Whately, 1992, op. cit.; Hartnett, 1981, op. cit.
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"The Victorian Energy Plan: a new approach to solving energy issues", Energy Forum: Newsletter of
the Victorian Energy Plan, Vol. 1, No. 1,1984, pp. 3; Glover, 1984, op. cit.
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its assets,73 a departure from the usual practice. Traditionally, electricity utilities were not
required to m a k e a profit; it w a s sufficient that they balance the books to provide electricity
at the lowest cost.74 T h e S E C V Act w a s also amended. In a shift a w a y from the emphasis on
supply and promotion concerns, and following the government's election promise to
promote energy conservation and develop renewables, the n e w SEC

(Amendment)

Act 1982

required the S E C V to achieve:
Efficient use of the State's natural resources in the production of electricity (including its
production by co-generation) and the substitution of more plentiful or renewable resources
for less plentiful resources;... giving of due consideration to environmental factors;... [and]
the implementation of energy conservation goals.75

Fears of insufficient power supplies that plagued the ESI during the early 1980s were shortlived: by 1983 electricity d e m a n d growth had fallen significantly, and the ESI w a s facing
the prospect of overcapacity. This had a devastating effect on s o m e utilities. M o s t were
constructing the types of power station that required a long lead-time: seven years for blackcoal power stations, longer for brown coal and large hydro. 76 Thus w h e n high growth
forecasts were not realised, s o m e utilities were left with overcapacity and large debts.77
Elcom w a s particularly hard-hit. Anticipating additional d e m a n d growth from the ill-fated
resources b o o m , it w a s committed to a construction program that would later leave it
burdened with significant overcapacity.

The realisation that high demand growth was no longer assured led to concerns about the
ESI's conventional planning procedures. A s described above, d e m a n d forecasting methods
had been rather crude, but these had sufficed in times of high growth. Errors in forecasting
mattered little, since demand would quickly catch up. But w h e n growth slowed and costs
rose significantly, small forecasting errors could be very expensive, as w a s proving the case
in Victoria and N S W . Electricity planning became quite problematic, particularly in light of
the long lead time required for conventional plant. T h e need for utilities to incorporate
greater flexibility in their forecasting techniques began to be raised.78 O f the Australian
utilities, the S E C V took this the most seriously. In 1983, it announced a shift in planning

ibid.; Rosenthal and Russ, 1988, op. cit.
74
Rosenthal and Russ, 1988, op. cit., p. 136.
Victoria, State Electricity Commission (Amendment) Act 1982, s4.
76
Rosenthal and Russ, 1988, op. cit., p. 56.
^ Kellow, 1996, op. cit., chapters 1 and 2; Rosenthal and Russ, 1988, op. cit., chapter 3.
This shift towards more flexibility planning is described in Kellow, 1996, op. cit.
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procedures, with planning to be based on a range of likely forecasts, rather than a 'most
likely' forecast.79 This required greaterflexibilityin the timing of n e w b r o w n coal plant.
T h e S E C V also began to encourage greater energy conservation and cogeneration.80
H o w e v e r , theflexibilityafforded by technologies such as wind p o w e r — w i n d farms can be
installed very quickly to meet d e m a n d — a p p e a r s not to have been considered. W i n d and
other non-hydro renewable resources were expected have little impact o n planning "because
of their cost and low potential capacity".81
The initiatives being undertaken on renewable resources ... will have reached sufficient
maturity to allow developments to be factored into the strategy for electricity supply and
demand beyond the mid 1990s. However, their energy contribution is not expected to
significantly impact on the major generating plant timings.82

With such concern about electricity planning, some governments were starting to take a
closer look at planning practices. In the m i d 1980s, the N S W and Victorian governments
established inquiries into electricity planning, which were remarkably comprehensive
compared with past practices.83 T h e Victorian inquiry, conducted in 1986-88 by the
parliamentary Natural Resources and Environment Committee ( N R E C ) , saw for the first
time a range of options being considered for future generating plant.

Prior to this, base load in Victoria had been met solely from brown coal plant located in
Victoria's Latrobe Valley—indeed the S E C V had been established to exploit this vast
resource.84 (Victoria has no significant deposits of black coal.) B r o w n coal is a wet fuel and
difficult to b u m ; hence it requires m o r e expensive boilers and longer lead times to construct
b r o w n coal plant. O n the other hand it is plentiful, cheap to mine and local. In a period of
high debt w h e n minimising the capital cost of n e w plant w a s an important consideration,
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State Electricity Commission of Victoria, Long-term Electricity Forecasting, 1983.
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Hydro and natural gas-fired plant were used for intermediate and peaking plant, though the Newport
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brown coal looked less attractive than it had in the past. In the N R E C inquiry, brown coal's
dominance w a s being threatened by Victorian natural gas and N S W black coal, both more
Of

expensive fuels but requiring less capital expenditure.

The use of natural gas for power generation has advantages in times of low demand growth:
gas fired power stations are quicker and cheaper to build, although the fuel is more
expensive than coal. Natural gas plant is also less polluting and emits less m u c h less carbon
dioxide than does coal fired plant—though greenhouse gas reduction had not yet emerged
as a significant policy concern at the time of the N R E C inquiry. A n d by this time, high
efficiency combined-cycle gas turbines were becoming a viable option. T h e Victorian
Labor Government, however, was opposed to the use of natural gas for power generation
arguing that it w a s a premium fuel, a position that it had adopted after the 1970s Newport
controversy.86 Since then, large natural gas reserves had been found in Bass Strait, sufficient
to support a large power station.87 The natural gas option w a s being pushed by B H P
Petroleum, w h o w a s keen to supply gas for such a project.88

The black coal option under consideration was a deposit at Oaklands owned by CRA. This
deposit was located in N S W , though close to the Victorian border, and power generation
was still a state-based activity—the S E C V would not be building a power station in another
state. However, this option saw alternatives to state-based power generation being
considered, a trend which accelerated in the 1990s.

The SECV, on the other hand, favoured the development of the brown coal-fired
Loy Y a n g B 3 and B 4 units, enabling the L o y Y a n g project to be completed. In this it w a s
supported by workers and community members in the Latrobe Valley—for the S E C V w a s
the region's major employer. The state government w a s electorally vulnerable in the
Latrobe Valley: it held a small majority and w a s facing an election in late 1988. The
promise of continuity of employment through construction of the next phase of L o y Y a n g

World, July 1987, pp. 26, 30-31.
Kellow, 1996, op. cit.; Natural Resources and Environment Committee, 1988, op. cit.
Rosenthal and Russ, 1988, op. cit., pp. 85-86; Russ, 1987, op. cit.
ibid.
ibid.
Peter Russ, "Victorian Electricity Inquiry examines the black coal option", Australian Electrical
World, 3 June 1987, pp. 9-12, 33.
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w a s thus politically attractive to the government. 90

The recommendations of the NREC inquiry stood in stark contrast to the traditional supplyorientation of the ESI. N R E C did agree that Loy Y a n g B 3 and B 4 be the next base load
power stations. But rather than just rubberstamping the S E C V ' s request for n e w brown coal
power station construction, N R E C recommended that the S E C V adopt an electricity
development strategy, introduce a range of measures to increase the efficiency of supply
including extending the availability and life of existing plant, give m u c h greater attention to
demand-side options, and again review all options before committing to construction.91
Following this, the S E C V and the Department of Industry, Technology and Resources
established a D e m a n d M a n a g e m e n t project.92

Soon after, the ALP government announced that Loy Yang B3 and B4 would go ahead. It
w o n the subsequent election, but in the following year, announced that the project had been
postponed indefinitely.93 Insufficient growth in demand, refurbishment of existing plant and
greater d e m a n d m a n a g e m e n t — a s well as Victoria's indebtedness—meant that the project,
or any other large-scale option, could no longer be justified.94

NREC's recommendations for greater energy efficiency were undoubtedly pleasing to those
advocating a shift towards more sustainable energy supply and use. But of interest here is
how

renewable energy w a s regarded by the inquiry, particularly given the state

government's stated commitment to increasing the contribution of renewable energy,
conveyed by a clause in the Terms of Reference directing the inquiry to:
Take into account ... consideration of the strategic role and economics of investment in
conservation, cogeneration and load management and progress with the development of
renewable energy resources.95

Apart from several renewable energy and energy conservation advocacy groups, few of
those making submissions gave consideration to renewable energy.96 Given the wording of

Kellow, 1996, op. cit.
Natural Resources and Environment Committee, 1988, op. cit.
Kellow, 1996, op. cit.
James Kirby, "Cain Govt U-turns over power station", Australian Financial Review, 13 July 1989, p. 4.
Kellow, 1996, op. cit.
Natural Resources and Environment Committee, 1988, op. cit., Terms of Reference.
Renewable energy proponents making submissions included the Australian and N e w Zealand Solar

the S E C V Act, the S E C V w a s obliged to do so. It suggested that hydro could m a k e a small
contribution, and that by 1995, wind might be contributing about 3 G W h to the grid.97 Since
this w a s

a rare opportunity to influence electricity planning, one

might

expect

environmental and renewable energy advocacy groups to be making cogent, forceful
arguments for the greater use of renewables.98 Yet few did, most accepting the S E C V ' s
position that renewable energy would continue to play a very minor role.99 A n exception
w a s the Alternative Technology Association.100 O n the other hand, the period of the inquiry,
1986 to 1988, were lean times for renewable energy advocates. Oil prices had fallen, and
the greenhouse effect was not yet on the policy agenda.

Notwithstanding the government's direction that the inquiry was to consider renewable
energy resources, N R E C ' s preliminary report all but ignored renewable energy. After
several renewable energy advocacy groups responded critically, the final N R E C report
included a n e w chapter on 'Small Scale Supply Options', in which cogeneration and
renewable energy were discussed. Apart from a recommendation to encourage m o r e
cogeneration, N R E C did not envisage a shift a w a y from large-scale to small-scale options;
indeed, it suggested that the promotion of small-scale options could be problematic:
There is a potential dilemma in pursing both large scale and small scale options caused by
the very different lead times of typical developments. Once commitment to a large scale
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100

Energy Society, the Alternative Technology Association, the Victorian Solar Energy Council, Deni
Greene (environment and energy consultant) and Rob Clarke (wind turbine manufacturer). A few
other individuals also advocated greater use of renewables.
State Electricity Commission of Victoria, Electricity Supply and Demand beyond the Mid 1990s. Part
Ha: Supply Options, Draft, 1987; Natural Resources and Environment Committee, 1988, op. cit., p. 79.
As described in chapter 5, in the early 1980s, the Australasian Wind Energy Association had used the
opportunity of a Senate Inquiry into a proposed hydro development in Tasmania to make strong
arguments for wind power.
Australian and N e w Zealand Solar Energy Society, Submission to the Natural Resources and
Environment Committee, Inquiry into Electricity Supply and Demand Beyond the Mid-1990s, 1987;
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Inquiry into Electricity Supply and Demand Beyond the Mid-1990s, July 1987. V S E C presented a
stronger submission following the release of the preliminary report. Victorian Solar Energy Council,
"Comments on Inquiry into Electricity Supply and Demand Beyond the Mid-1990s Preliminary
Report and Draft Recommendations", 1988, V S E C Papers, Victorian Public Records Office. O f the
wind energy industry, only Rob Clarke of Wind Technology Pty. Ltd. made a submission; he was
principally concerned with remote area power supplies. R. D. Clarke, Submission to the Natural
Resources and Environment Committee, Inquiry into Electricity Supply and Demand Beyond the
Mid-1990s, March 1987.
Alternative Technology Association, Submission to the Natural Resources and Environment
Committee, Inquiry into Electricity Supply and Demand Beyond the Mid-1990s, October 1987 and
February 1988.
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option is made, there is some risk that development of 'too many' small scale options could
lead to expensive over-capacity when construction of the large scale option is completed.
O n the other hand, there are risks that opportunities for potentially economic small scale
options ... could be lost if these are discouraged by the supply authority on relatively shortterm considerations.101
N R E C did r e c o m m e n d that the S E C V should expand its involvement in renewable energy
R & D , but s a w little role for renewable energy apart from in R A P S systems. W i n d power
w a s dismissed as a technology for the future.102

Indirectly, the NREC inquiry benefited renewable energy through its effect on renewable
energy advocacy groups. Just as the Australasian W i n d Energy Association had earlier
evolved into a lobby group through their involvement in the controversy over the Gordonbelow-Franklin hydro proposal—see chapter 5 — s o too did the Alternative Technology
Association ( A T A ) expand its focus into policy after their involvement with the N R E C
inquiry. It noted:
W e have been so inspired by our success in [the N R E C inquiry] to date that w e have
decided to form the Energy Research Group (ERG) with the aim of influencing
Government policy, and community attitudes regarding renewable energy and appropriate
technology. This group will concentrate on the policy work while the A T A in general will
continue on the more practical activities and information.103

4.4.5 Private versus Public Power
Apart from s o m e companies w h o generated electricity for their o w n needs, private industry
had little involvement in p o w e r generation during the postwar period. M a n y renewable
energy advocates s a w the state-owned monopoly utilities as a significant obstacle and
hoped that greater private sector involvement in power generation might offer n e w
opportunities for renewable energy. During the 1980s interest in private power generation
began to grow. S o m e groups advocated wholesale privatisation of electricity supply; other
argued that private generators should have access to the grid and be treated equitably.
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Natural Resources and Environment Committee, 1988, op. cit., p. 80. Sioshansi noted that from
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Several reasons for this change of thinking can be identified.

First, the rise of neoliberal ideas in the 1980s led to a push for privatisation of the ESI. This
c a m e principally from the Liberal Party and its intellectual allies. T h e main thrust of their
position w a s as follows. The traditional arguments for the public ownership of the E S I — i t
is a natural monopoly; aspects of electricity supply have the characteristics of a 'public
good'; electricity supply involves externalities such as pollution; the community's resources
should be equitably distributed—were not convincing. Public ownership also had
undesirable outcomes: incentive structures were insufficient to secure good m a n a g e m e n t
performance; and politically imposed cross-subsidies benefited certain interest groups and
led to economic inefficiencies.104 S o m e were arguing not just for privatisation, but also for
the introduction of competition in electricity supply.

Second, during the 'resources boom' governments and utilities had difficulty raising
sufficient capital for the massive power station construction program underway, and started
to look towards private investment.105 In one case, these difficulties led to the privatisation
of a power station. In 1981 the N S W
2640 M W

government needed to obtain capital; thus the

Eraring power station w a s sold to a partnership of Australian companies,

although Elcom continued to operate and maintain the power station.106

Third, private industry was applying pressure for private sector involvement in power
generation. The main company involved w a s C R A Ltd., a large Australian c o m p a n y with
interests in mining and minerals processing. C R A (later C R A and Mitsubishi in a joint
venture) developed in 1982 a proposal to build a large p o w e r station (about 1300 M W , later
2800 M W ) in inland N S W , about 50 k m from the Victorian border. C R A had been
exploring its lease at Oaklands since 1980 and had located a large deposit of subbituminous coal, which although not of export quality w a s suitable for p o w e r generation

|03 Alternative Technology Association, "Soft energy policy action", Soft Technology, No. 28,1988
Centre of Policy Studies, Energy Pricing Issues in Victoria, A Report Prepared for the Long Range
Policy Planning Committee of the Victorian Government, Victorian Government Printer, Melbourne,
1982; Gary Sturgess, "The case for private power", The Bulletin, 23 March 1982, pp. 55-56; Peter
Hartley and Chris Trengove, Who Benefits From Public Utilities? (2nd Revision), Centre of Policy
Studies, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria, 1985; Michael G. Porter, "The role of public utilities
in resource development", in Peter Abelson (ed.), Privatisation: an Australian Perspective,
Australian Professional Publications, Sydney, 1987.
Rosenthal and Russ, 1988, op. cit., p. 202.
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and cheap to mine.107 The Oaklands proposal was put to both the NSW and Victorian
governments, 108 and the proposal w a s considered at s o m e length by the Victorian N R E C
inquiry. C R A w a s also behind the ideological challenge to state-owned monopoly electric
utilities: its chairman, Sir Roderick Carnegie, w a s as early as 1984 calling for greater
attention to international competitiveness and pointing to costs from 'inefficient' public
sector bodies as a major impediment to this.109 Carnegie w a s an early advocate of the
introduction of competition into public enterprises.110

Fourth, the rise of environmental concerns led to calls for greater use of small-scale
generation options, mainly cogeneration and renewable energy plant. Proponents argued
that potential developers of cogeneration or renewable energy plant were disadvantaged
with respect to the publicly o w n e d electricity authorities. M a n y argued that uniform tariffs,
rural electrification schemes and government subsidies militated against the use of
renewables in remote areas. Renewable energy advocate, A n d r e w Blakers, drew attention to
the following inequities: government utilities could borrow m o n e y at a lower interest rate
than private companies; unlike a private company, m a n y electricity utilities were not
required to m a k e a profit or pay tax; private companies faced market risk, while government
monopolies could minimise this risk; and public electricity utilities usually did not have to
pay the public for the use of land and resources.111

Perhaps the biggest disadvantage for private generators, especially small-scale generators
seeking to sell electricity, w a s that they needed a buyer, usually the electricity utility. Yet
the utilities typically offered very low buyback prices. In the next section, I discuss h o w one
utility, the S E C V , c a m e under pressure during the 1980s to encourage the use of small-scale
private generation.
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4.4.6 T h e S E C V and R e n e w a b l e E n e r g y
The S E C V was the one utility whose Act explicitly m a d e mention of renewable energy.
W h a t progress then did the S E C V m a k e with renewables? Although it seemed like a m o v e
in the right direction, the changing of the S E C V Act by the Victorian Labor government in
1982 was not as favourable to renewable energy as might atfirstappear. T h e phrase which
refers to renewable energy is: "substitution of more plentiful or renewable resources for less
plentiful resources"; yet very plentiful is brown coal, the main fuel used for power
generation in Victoria. Nevertheless, the S E C V w a s obliged to m a k e s o m e effort to
investigate renewables, albeit mainly in conjunction with the Victorian Solar Energy
Council ( V S E C ) . The main renewable energy projects were a joint wind monitoring study
conducted by the S E C V and V S E C , and the installation and monitoring of a 60 k W wind
turbine at Breamlea, again with V S E C . These are described in chapter 5. T h e other projects
were a grid-connected photovoltaic installation at a display h o m e (a demonstration project
costing $30,000), the monitoring of twelve existing R A P S sites (also in conjunction with
V S E C ) and a feasibility study for a 50 to 100 k W demonstration photovoltaic system.112

The SECV, however, was doubtful about the short-term prospects for renewable energy. In
1986 it released its Review of Renewable

Energy Technologies for the Generation of

Electricity in Victoria, in which it m a d e an assessment of the economic viability of various
renewable energy technologies both then and for 2000. The only technologies considered
economically viable at the time were biomass and hydro, the potential of both being limited
by the availability of sufficient quantities of resources. W i n d power, it claimed, w a s the
next renewable resource "closest to economic viability", and considered 'possibly'
economically viable by the year 2000. 113

The SECV may have been reluctant to install wind power capacity itself, but how did
private companies wishing to install wind turbines fare? Unless all the power generated w a s
consumed by the private company itself—this w a s the case for the wind turbine installed by

W.K. Gregory and N.R. Pidgeon, "SEC programs in conservation, energy management and renewable energy", Electric Energy Conference, Brisbane, 20-22 October 1986; N.J. Wardrop, F. Darby,
K.I. Guthrie and G.J. Redding, "Electricity generation for the grid from renewable energy sources",
Bicentennial Electrical Engineering Conference 1988, Melbourne, 11-15 April 1988, pp. 140-146;
T.B. Tregaskis, "Victorian study on remote area power supply systems", Solar '86, Australian and
N e w Zealand Solar Energy Society Conference, Adelaide, 13-15 November 1986, pp. 396-402.
State Electricity Commission of Victoria, Review of Renewable Energy Technologies for the
Generation of Electricity in Victoria, 1986.
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Mars Confectionery, described in chapter 5—the company needed to sell the power to the
S E C V . O r if the c o m p a n y w a s seeking to supplement its S E C V supply with wind power, it
might be subject to the S E C V ' s tariff for standby p o w e r like other private generators.
H o w e v e r , in the case of the M a r s wind turbine, the S E C V agreed to treat it as an
experimental project and for a time did not apply the normal standby tariff.114

Since there were very few instances of private wind power operators seeking access to the
grid, it is instructive to examine the treatment of cogenerators, a larger group seeking to
supply p o w e r to the grid. Cogeneration is the simultaneous production of both heat and
power, typically by using the waste heat from p o w e r generation for low temperature heating
requirements. T h u s it affords great energy savings. Prior to 1982, the S E C V w a s opposed to
cogeneration, discouraging it through unfavourable buyback and standby tariffs.115 Indeed it
seems that this attitude w a s prevalent throughout the ESI. In 1980, Paul Altmann from
Australian Paper Manufacturers, wrote:
Over the last ten years w e have seen a hardening of supply authorities attitudes against
consumers w h o generate part of their own power and desire to operate in parallel, and w e
believe that this has resulted from a fear of competition from alternative fuels such as oil
and gas ... Several supply authorities, therefore, introduced promotional tactics and policies
to avoid partial supply to generating companies with or without parallel operation. N e w
tariffs were drawn up which made supply either not available or under terms [which] were
extremely unattractive to the.consumer concerned ... Supply authorities raised objections to
parallel operation on the grounds that malfunction of the consumer's generating equipment
may created [sic] disturbances in the authority's system.116

In California (USA), the use of cogeneration was increasing rapidly at this time thanks to
the introduction of the P U R P A legislation.117 T h e Victorian government w a s keen to foster
greater use of cogeneration and requested the S E C V to review its buyback and standby
tariffs. (Standby tariffs were of m o r e concern to potential cogenerators, since few intended
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State Electricity Commission of Victoria, letter to Mars Confectionery, 2 September 1982, V S E C
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Victoria", Australian Electrical World, M a y 1985, pp. 25-26.
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138

Andrea Bunting. The Social Shaping of Wind Power in Australia

to sell electricity to the grid.118 For a renewable energy generator w h o did not intend to use
the power generated, the buyback price w a s the critical one.)

In 1983, the SECV increased its buyback tariff for private generators to about 1 c/kWh
(peak) and 0.3 c/kWh (off-peak)—prices based on estimates of the cost of fuel s a v e d — a n d
stated that it w a s prepared to negotiate higher prices for long-term firm p o w e r available
during peak times.119 However, it would not have m a d e the latter available to intermittent
sources such as wind power. 120 Although these buyback tariffs were an order of magnitude
greater than those previously offered,121 they were still very m u c h lower than the S E C V ' s
selling prices, and far too low for any potential wind power generator. Private generators
were also discouraged from selling their excess electricity to a distant u s e r — a process
k n o w n as 'wheeling'—since they would still be required to transmit electricity through the
S E C V ' s electricity network. T h e S E C V stated:
The concept of wheeling power through the electricity supply system can notionally be
achieved through the buy-back arrangement.122

Following this, the Victorian government commissioned Deni Greene, formerly of
California's Cogeneration Task Force, to investigate the barriers to greater use of
cogeneration. Greene indicated there w a s a large potential for cogeneration in Victoria,
given the right incentives from the S E C V . 1 2 3 The S E C V increased buyback tariffs again in
1984 to about 6 c/kWh (peak) and 0.6 c/kWh (off-peak) but it seems it w a s not sufficient to
encourage cogenerators.124 In its 1987 economic strategy, Victoria: The Next Decade, the
Victorian government announced that a special package of incentives, comprising even
higher buyback rates and otherfinancialsweeteners, would be offered to encourage greater
uptake of cogeneration.125 The package, however, w a s very limited, with a total of 150 M W
to be accepted. In the same document, the government dismissed renewables thus:
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"Cogeneration—is it economic?", Australian Electrical World, January 1985, pp. 10-14. The tariffs
are taken from this reference.
Victorian Government, Victoria: The Next Decade, F.D. Atkinson Government Printer, Melbourne,
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Despite their philosophical attraction, most renewables are not economically viable when
compared to non-renewable resources. Nevertheless there are areas where the renewable
energy forms are economic and the Government is committed to ensuring that these are not
overlooked.126
It considered the main use of non-hydro renewables w a s in remote area p o w e r supplies.

Yet when the package of incentives was launched, renewable energy was also included; it
w a s described as the 'Cogeneration and Renewable Energy Incentives Package'. It w a s
targeted at private cogenerators or renewable energy generators of up to 10 M W

capacity.

S o m e registrations of interest were received for renewable energy projects but these were
mainly for small and mini hydro-power, and landfill gas.127 There were several registrations
for wind p o w e r projects, including a 10 M W wind farm. S o m e of these were located at the
sites which had been included in the V S E C / S E C V wind monitoring program (see chapter
5). 1 2 8 H o w e v e r , none of the wind p o w e r projects were considered economically viable
within the Incentives Package. 129

For cogenerators, on the other hand, the Incentives Package was quite attractive, and
registrations of interest exceeded the target of 150 M W . Indeed, the S E C V ' s target fell far
short of the amount of cogeneration that Deni Greene, in her 1984 report, had estimated to
be economically viable. Greene w a s quite critical of the S E C V ' s very modest efforts to
encourage cogeneration. She noted:
The failure of the S E C to actively promote the package or to couple it with a program to
inform companies unfamiliar with cogeneration about possible benefits undoubtedly means
that many potential cogenerators have failed tofileexpressions of interest... The potential
for co-generation is very, very large if no institutional barriers are erected to prevent its
installation and if an energy authority pays realistic prices for the electricity produced.130
In its Report upon Supply and Demand

Beyond the Mid-1990s, N R E C noted:

There has been considerable interest in the 'incentives' package and this may indicate that

126
127
128

129
130

1987, pp. 167-8.
ibid, p. no.
Whether the latter should be considered a form of renewable energy is controversial.
Richard Hoy, "Review of renewable energy projects within the S E C Cogeneration and Renewable
Energy Incentives Package", Solar '88, Australian and N e w Zealand Solar Energy Society
Conference, Melbourne, 17-19 November 1988.
ibid.
Deni Greene, Submission to the Natural Resources and Environment Committee, Inquiry into
Electricity Supply and Demand Beyond the Mid-1990s, Preliminary Report and Draft
Recommendations, February 1988.
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an increased level of cogeneration may now be economically feasible. The potential for
such an increase should be assessed, following a review of the effects of the 'incentives'
scheme and, if appropriate, further restructuring of the SECV's standby and buy-back
tariffs should take place.13'
The Minister responsible for the electricity sector agreed noting that there w a s "significant
scope for expansion of cogeneration in Victoria".132 H e m a d e no mention of increasing the
use of renewables through such measures.

Thus it seems that renewables were just an add-on to a package aimed at fostering greater
use of cogeneration. Indeed the S E C V had developed and implemented the package without
reference to V S E C , although V S E C had assisted s o m e companies with their wind farm
proposals.133 The government w a s prepared to structure incentives sufficient to encourage
cogeneration, but not non-hydro renewables.

Did the SECV encourage use of renewable energy for remote area power supplies? As
described above, R A P S w a s regarded by most utilities and energy agencies as the most
suitable application for renewable electricity. Yet even here the S E C V m a d e slow progress.
Critics noted that S E C V regional offices offered remote area dwellers quotations only for
the supply of S E C V electricity and did not provide information on renewable R A P S
systems.134 The S E C V

argued: "there is a lack of information available on costs,

performance, operating and maintenance aspects of such systems".135 It was, however,
collecting such information. A s noted above, from 1986 to 1988 the S E C V and V S E C
monitored twelve existing R A P S sites, to gather information on the performance on these
systems, to ensure that information w a s available to the general public and to provide
feedback to the manufacturers on these systems.136
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Natural Resources and Environment Committee, 1988, op. cit., p. 77.
Evan Walker (Victorian Minister for Industry, Technology ana Resources), "Ministerial Response to
the report of the Natural Resources and Environment Committee, 'Report upon Electricity Supply
and Demand Beyond the Mid-1990s"', December 1988, V S E C papers, Victorian Public Records
Office.
Victorian Solar Energy Council, ''Comments on S E C V submission to review of Victorian Solar
Energy Council", 1988, V S E C papers, Victorian Public Records Office.
Clarke 1987, op. cit.
R.D. Hoy, "How S E C V sees its role in renewable energy", Solar Progress, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1987 pp
8-10, at p. 8.
T.B. Tregaskis, "The Victorian study on stand alone power supply systems (SAPS)", Solar & Wind
Technology, Vol. 7, No. 1,1990, pp. 49-54.
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On the whole, despite SECV and government rhetoric, renewable energy fared very poorly
during this period. The environmental benefits and greater flexibility afforded by
renewables were sometimes acknowledged; yet cogeneration had similar advantages and it
was the main beneficiary of measures, albeit limited, intended to encourage private
generation. The S E C V ' s o w n efforts to install renewable energy systems were merely
token. In the main, renewables were still evaluated in conventional economic terms. Even
w h e n the economic hurdle was set lower, as for the Cogeneration and Renewable Energy
Incentives Package, only hydro and landfill gas could jump it. Renewables were evaluated
with reference to brown coal, an energy source considered to be very cheap, and thus
renewables were always considered too expensive. O f course, comparing the costs of brown
power coal with wind power is not straightforward, for calculated costs depend on a range
of assumptions andfinancialparameters. (This is discussed further in chapter 5.) The capital
cost of brown coal-fired power stations is higher than that of black coal, and the cost of
1 "XI

recent brown coal-fired power stations was m u c h higher than the cost of earlier ones.
Flexible power generation or energy conservation options, which could defer the need for
n e w brown coal-fired power stations, were considered of benefit—though the S E C V ' s
contractual commitment to the construction of brown coal-fired power stations limited such
a benefit.138 But fuel costs were very low: brown coal is very cheap to mine and has an
opportunity cost of virtually zero. A s described in chapter 5, 'non-firm' power generators
such as wind turbines were valued only for their fuel savings. O n this basis, wind power had
little hope of competing.

4.4.7 Overview
In this section I have described the slow changes to Australia's ESI during the 1980s,
focusing on h o w these influenced the treatment of renewable energy. With the benefit of
hindsight, the 1980s can be regarded as a period of transition for the ESI. In the 1990s, the
industry would be substantially restructured, with m a n y of the barriers to renewable energy
identified by environmentalists partially dismantled, but n e w

ones erected. This

restructuring is described in chapter 7.

Rosenthal and Russ, 1988, op. cit.
This point was made in Natural Resources and Environment Committee, 1988, op. cit., cited in
Kellow, 1996, op. cit.
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4.5 Renewable Energy Policies
4.5.1 Introduction
T o say that governments had 'renewable energy policies' might be to overstate the matter,
since it suggests that governments had definite objectives for the development of renewable
energy resources. It is important to distinguish between rhetoric and substance. Renewable
energy has popular appeal; thus governments and energy agencies often sought publicity for
very small renewable energy projects or proposals. Renewable energy regularly rated a
mention in documents about energy policy or electricity planning, typically out of
proportion to the activity around renewables.

To understand government policy objectives towards renewable energy, these need to be
situated within the broader framework of energy policy. I examine this more closely at
federal level, and then describe renewable energy policy objectives in several states.

4.5.2 Federal
Prior to the late 1970s, the Australian federal government paid little attention to energy
matters. There was no substantive energy policy and energy research funding w a s
uncoordinated.139 This started to change slowly in the w a k e of the 1970s oil shocks.140 In
1977 the National Energy Advisory Committee ( N E A C ) w a s established to assist in the
development of a national energy policy; in 1978 the National Energy Research,
Development and Demonstration Program ( N E R D D P ) w a s established to provide funding
for energy projects; and in late 1979 the federal government released an energy policy
review paper.

The period was, however, one where the major energy concern related to

the use of oil, for Australia was well endowed with other energy resources. Australia's oil
supplies were insufficient to meet the local demand for liquid fuels; moreover, the federal
government had adopted import parity pricing for Australian oil in the late 1970s. T h e main
'energy problem' was s u m m e d up in one N S W report:
[0]ver the next two decades the only real energy problem N e w South Wales (and Australia)
139

140

David J. Crossley, Energy Policy in Australia: The Social/Institutional Context and Procedures f
Policy Formulation, School of Australian Environmental Studies, Griffith University, 2nd ed., 1980;
Senate Standing Committee on Natural Resources, Solar Energy, A G P S , Canberra, 1977.
For a discussion of Australia's energy policies to 1986 see Robert E. Marks, "Energy issues and
policies in Australia", Annual Review of Energy, Vol. 11, 1986, p. 47-75.

Chapter 4: Australian Energy Sector Structure and Policies Pre-1988

143

faces is a shortfall in the supply, and the rising cost of liquid fuels. As a result, one of the
most urgent problems facing the State is the development of both conservation techniques
and energy alternatives for liquid fuels in transportation and stationary applications.142

How then was renewable energy and in particular wind power regarded in policy-making
circles? Mainly in terms of the capacity to displace liquid fuels, in power generation or
heating. Yet natural gas, if available, could also displace liquid fuels. Most electricity
authorities that had relied on oil for power generation quickly switched to natural gas. This
w a s not feasible in m a n y remote areas, and s o m e energy agencies expected that electricityproducing renewables—particularly photovoltaics and wind p o w e r — c o u l d be harnessed for
remote area power supplies, where they would displace diesel fuel. Solar heating looked
like a possible replacement for fuel oil, but with the increasing availability of natural gas,
the use of solar heating remained low.

In a number of other advanced capitalist countries, interest in renewable energy burgeoned
in the 1970s with s o m e governments, principally in the U S A , Europe and Japan, providing
significant funding for renewable energy research and development. 143 These countries
were motivated not only by fears of energy shortages, but also by the belief that renewable
energy technologies would b e c o m e a major growth area. A s a 1977 Australian Senate
Committee inquiry noted:
The emphasis overseas, particularly in Europe and the United States, is that solar energy
will become a multi-million dollar consumer business in the next decade or two.144
A few countries also introduced mechanisms to encourage greater use of renewable energy:
for example in D e n m a r k and the United States, wind power developments were fostered by
tax credits, subsidies and increased buyback prices for renewably generated power. 145 In
Australia, however, the main efforts—and these were very m o d e s t — w e r e in the area of
research, development and demonstration ( R D & D ) .

Prior to the establishment of NERDDP, much of the Australian renewable energy RD&D
work w a s conducted by the C o m m o n w e a l t h Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation

Department of National Development, Australian Energy Policy: A Review, A G P S , Canberra, 1979.
N e w South Wales Science and Technology Council, Solar Energy Research and Development in New
South Wales, 1980, p. ii.
Senate Standing Committee on Natural Resources, 1977, op. cit.
ibid., p. 19.
Paul Gipe, Wind Energy Comes ofAge, Wiley, N e w York, 1995.
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(CSIRO), although a significant amount w a s undertaken by tertiary institutions.146 Through
N E R D D P , funding for renewable energy R D & D became available to a wider range of
bodies, including industry.147 This program, which funded a range of energy programs
particularly fossil fuel R D & D , directed a reasonable level of funding to renewable energy
projects: between 1978 and 1989, about $26 million, representing 1 1 % of N E R D D P
funding, had been committed to the renewable energy subprograms. 148 T h e best funded of
these subprograms were Solar Thermal, Photovoltaics and R e m o t e Area P o w e r Supply;
while of all the subprograms within N E R D D P (37 in all) the W i n d Energy Technology
subprogram w a s one of the least funded and had one of the smallest average grant sizes.

State governments also became increasingly involved in funding renewable energy
projects,150 in some cases establishing bodies to facilitate this. (See below.) T h e states
varied significantly in support: in 1980/81 for example, Western Australia, Victoria and
N e w South Wales each provided roughly $ 1 M in funds for renewable energy projects;
South Australia and Northern Territory provided moderate funding; and Queensland and
Tasmania provided negligible funding.151 Per capita, Western Australia and Northern
Territory were the leaders in providing funds. Both were h o m e to m a n y

remote

communities, which could benefit from use of renewables in remote area power supplies.

That Australia chose to spend relatively little on renewable energy RD&D is one issue; we
should also ask w h y Australia devoted most of its limited funds on developing
photovoltaics for remote areas and solar heating, rather than, say, wind power.

The reason typically given for both was Australia's abundant fossil fuel resources,

146
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Department of National Development, Energy Research and Development in Australia 1976-77: A
National Survey, A G P S , Canberra, 1978.
For an overview of Australian energy research mechanisms and areas of focus, see Ian Lowe, " W h o
benefitsfromAustralian energy research?", Science and Public Policy, December 1983, pp. 278-284.
Department of Primary Industries and Energy, & Centre for Technology and Social Change,
University of Wollongong, Evaluation of National Energy Research, Development and
Demonstration Program, A G P S , Canberra, 1990, Appendix 4.
ibid., Appendix 4. Thefiguresgiven in this document relate to the period 1978 to 1989. N E R D D P
funding was also available for 1990. In this year two wind energy projects received relatively large
grants. However, the Wind Energy Technology subprogram was still poorly funded.
National Energy Advisory Committee, Renewable Energy Resources in Australia, A G P S , Canberra.
1981, p. 44.
Robert R. Booth, Susan G. Saunders and Alan Langworthy, "The status of solar energy research and
development n Australia", Solar World Forum, Proceedings of the International Solar Energy
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particularly coal for power generation. There was little sense of an energy crisis in the
electricity sector. T h e Director of Solar Energy Studies at C S I R O stated in 1975:
Electric power generation can with confidence be left to thermal power stations using black
and brown coal together with a small amount of hydro-electric power ... There is ... no
justification for the use in Australia of solar energy for large scale electricity generation.152
Yet w e can also point to a mindset governed by the country's industry mix, as described
above. In the 1970s, Australia had strong agriculture and mining sectors and a domesticoriented manufacturing sector. It is not surprising that Australia would focus its main efforts
on technologies of immediate use internally, rather than foster an export-oriented renewable
energy industry.153 This is not to say that export of renewable energy technologies w a s
insignificant: Australia in the m i d 1980s w a s one of the world's leading exporters of solar
water heaters.154 Australia also has a relatively small population; thus w e might expect
governments to target only a few areas, concentrating on those deemed useful in meeting
Australia's needs. In its 1976 submission to a Senate inquiry, C S I R O ' s Solar Energy
Studies Unit stated:
Australia's limited R & D resources will be stretched to the limit to support the solar heat
generation and renewable fuels program. [In solar power generation] there are large R & D
programs in the united States and Japan with which w e could not hope to compete.155
In the electricity sector, renewables were considered useful only in remote areas. M o s t
remote areas, it w a s assumed, had plenty of sunshine but not m u c h w i n d — t h o u g h at the
time the wind resource w a s poorly understood. There were s o m e exceptions: a handful of
islands and coastal communities were k n o w n to have strong winds, and these were
considered as possible candidates for wind power.

The interests of the renewable energy research community were another explanatory factor
for the relative neglect of wind. E v e n before thefirstoil shock, Australian researchers had
long undertaken solar energy R & D , their principal motivation being the use of solar energy

Society Congress, Brighton, England, 23-28 August 1981, pp. 3307-3312.
R. N. Morse, "A strategy for solar energy research in Australia", in Symposium on Solar Energy
Resources: Applications and Techniques, International Solar Energy Society (Australian and N e w
Zealand Section), Canberra, 11 November 1975, pp. 5-6.
This attitude would change in the following decades. Remote area power supplies, in particular, were
later seen as a potentially large export industry.
Gareth Evans (Federal Minister for Resources and Energy) "Speech to Solar Energy Association",
Commonwealth Record, 14 November 1985.
CSIRO Solar Energy Studies, Submission to Senate Standing Committee on Natural Resources,
Inquiry into Solar Energy, Hansard, Australian Parliament, 17 June 1976, p. 199.
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in remote areas.156 Australia's solar energy research community had been represented for
m a n y years by the Australian and N e w Zealand Section of the International Solar Energy
Society—see below. (Although the term 'solar energy' w a s often taken as the umbrella term
in the 1970s, these researchers were principally concerned with direct solar energy. T h e
term 'renewable energy' did not c o m e into widespread usage until the 1980s.15 ) In global
terms, Australia w a s one of the leading countries in solar energy research.158 C S I R O had
developed a number of solar technologies including water heaters, solar stills, airconditioning units and drying kilns; and solar water heaters were in use in m a n y parts of
Australia, particularly the Northern Territory.159 W i n d power, on the other hand, had few
advocates in the research community, and thus few to lobby policy makers. For example, in
the Inquiry on Solar Energy conducted by the Senate Standing Committee on Natural
Resources in 1976-77, only a few submissions referred to wind power. 160 O f course, wind
p 0 w e r _ t h e small-scale variety, that i s — w a s not u n k n o w n : earlier in the twentieth century
there were m a n y wind generators in use on Australian farms,161 but these either were
replaced by diesel generators or became redundant after rural electrification. In the 1980s,
however, a group of wind power advocates formed an association, and m a d e a m o r e
concerted effort to lobby for greater use of wind power. (See section 4.4.6 and chapter 5.)

Thus, it is not surprising that 1970s studies into future Australian renewable energy R&D
paid little heed to wind power. In 1972-73, a period of growing concern about an
impending 'energy crisis' prior to the 1973-74 oil shock, the Australian A c a d e m y of
Science undertook a study into the advisability of Australia increasing its solar energy
research. Its recommendations focused mainly on solar heating, but also included a program
of research into system components for various solar electricity technologies. There w a s no
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mention of wind energy. 162 A few years later the Senate Standing Committee on Natural
Resources inquired into "whether and in what w a y s solar energy can be developed as an
alternative energy

source".163 Probably

the most

important of the

Committee's

recommendations were that a national energy strategy be developed, and that priorities be
determined and funds be allocated for energy research. But the Committee envisaged only a
narrow role for renewable energy:
The evidence suggests that solar energy will not make any significant contribution to
Australia's energy needs before the end of the century. Solar energy should take its place
within an overall energy strategy. The only areas which the Committee considers worthy of
encouragement for commercial development at this stage are low grade heat applications
for industrial purposes, heating and cooling of buildings, and small scale power generation
for remote and isolated areas.164
It essentially dismissed wind power:
Large scale commercially viable wind systems capable of making a significant contribution
to electric power generation are unlikely to be available before the last decade of this
century ... [T]he development of large scale wind power generation systems does not
appear at this stage to merit a special research and development effort in Australia.165
Similar sentiments were expressed by the Australian Science and Technology Council.166
N E A C , in its proposal for an energy R & D program, w a s quite dismissive of wind power,
apart from recommending support for small-scale vertical-axis wind generators for remote
areas. It concluded that, since Australia did not have high winds, and costs were high:
[0]n the subject of wind energy, further research and development work within Australia
would not at this time be justified.167

Some have argued that those with a vested interest in conventional energy sources saw
renewables as a threat, and sought to have renewable energy R D & D funding directed to
those technologies considered the least threatening. Niche applications, such as the
development of photovoltaics for remote area p o w e r supplies, pose little threat to
conventional technologies. M a r k Diesendorf, an early advocate of wind p o w e r in Australia,
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ibid.
ibid.
Australian Science and Technology Council, Energy Research and Development in Australia: A
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while acknowledging the excellent w o r k undertaken by Australian photovoltaic researchers,
suggested:
Considering the current costs and the likely future costs of photovoltaics in the next ten
years, it's always been extraordinary to m e that the lion's share of the little renewable
energy funding that exists in Australia has always gone to photovoltaics. A n d it's hard not
to wonder why this is because photovoltaics are still so expensive that it is less threatening
to the coal industry interests and it's not seen as a serious competitor ... So in trying to
promote more R & D funding for wind power m y colleagues and I have always suffered
negative government attitudes ... In the early days, the late 70s and early 80s, the attitude
was ... "Well this is science fiction; we'll never see wind power this century as contributing
anything in the commercial market" and then during the 1980s, as the massive growth
occurred in the wind energy industry ... the federal government representatives ... were
saying, "oh well, this is now becoming a commercial technology, therefore w h y should
Australia fund it for R & D " . So there never was a time when they considered it should
receive R & D funding, and I think the reason was that it always looked like being the
cheapest of the new renewable energy sources.168

The relative neglect of grid-connected wind power compared with other forms of renewable
energy demonstrates the problem with analysing the social shaping of too broad a category,
such as 'environmental technologies' or even 'renewable energy technologies'. It suggests
that greater insight can be gained from a detailed study of the treatment of one technology,
such as undertaken in this study. It also highlights another level of 'institutional barrier' to
wind power arising from the comparative treatment of renewable energy technologies. In
particular, certain renewable energy technologies were favoured over others not because
they were cheaper or were a viable long-term replacement for conventional energy sources,
but because they were considered appropriate in niche applications.

Not only was wind power relatively neglected within renewable energy research programs,
but also the total funds for renewable energy research declined throughout the 1980s. 169 T h e
rise and fall in support for renewable energy research during the 1970s and 1980s is often
associated with the rise and fall in the price of oil; for in that period, policymakers' interest
in renewable energy w a s driven primarily by fears of energy shortages rather than by
environmental considerations. S o m e also perceived problems with planning of renewable

Mark Diesendorf, Interview, 29 M a y 2000.
N E R D D P renewable energy funding was reduced over period 1978 to 1988. Department of Primary
Industries and Energy, & Centre for Technology and Social Change, 1990, op. cit., Appendix 4.
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energy R D & D and its lack of sufficient attention to commercialisation of renewable energy
technologies,170 concerns that would be addressed in renewable energy R D & D programs of
the 1990s. These matters have been well described by Dick Collins, a former M e m b e r of the
National Energy Research, Development and Demonstration Council ( N E R D D C ) :
Prior to 1973, research on renewable energy was not particularly fashionable ... Following
thefirstoil crisis ... [there were] substantial increases in the amount of funds available ...
Many scientists and engineers entered the field and a major research, development and
demonstration program emerged. Public attitudes towards renewable energy were very
positive ... This enthusiasm and funding peaked in the late 1970s. The 1980s have seen a
steady decline in funding ... This has also been accompanied by a general public disenchantment with thefield.It is probably not coincidental that the rise and fall of the fortunes
of renewable energy have coincided with similar variations in the price of oil... The boom
period ... saw the entry, and subsequent exit of large numbers of individuals and companies
attracted by the available funding. Programs which were instituted were in large measure
not well planned, designed or executed. Major demonstration projects were built but often
never commissioned or never monitored. A s a result, much of the information which could
have been obtained from an orderly activity is simply not available to us today.171

Apart from the provision of energy RD&D funding, there were virtually no other federal
government initiatives to support renewable energy. N E A C had argued in 1981 that since
Australia w a s rich in fossil fuels, it had n o need for the "more forceful measures of
encouragement" being used in a few other countries. Instead:
The most effective encouragement for renewable energy would be to support research,
development and demonstration projects rather than by special tax incentives designed to
assist market penetration by renewables.172
T h e federal government concurred, apart from providing sales tax exemption for solar
appliances and other oil-replacing equipment. 173 Interestingly, the government w a s not loath
to use tax incentives to achieve various other energy policy objectives such as the
conversion of oil-fired industry equipment to operate on alternative fuels.174 A n d in what
renewable energy advocates argued w a s a glaring inconsistency, the government for a time
provided tax deductions to farmers w h o elected to connect to their local electricity grid, but
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not to those w h o installed a renewable energy R A P S system.

The federal Labor government that came to power in 1983 might have had a different
attitude, inasmuch as the A L P ' s policy statement of 1982 proclaimed:
Consistent with Labor's long-term aim of a sustainable energy economy, a Labor
Government will give high priority to energy conservation and the development and
introduction of renewable energy sources.176
A n d after lobbying from organisations including the Australasian W i n d Energy Association,
the Labor Party at its 1984 National Conference inserted the following statement into its
Minerals and Energy platform:
A Labor Government will ... [investigate the feasibility of offering selected financial
incentives and assistance to encourage the more rapid adoption of energy-efficient
technologies and practices, including renewable energy technologies, in cases where such
technologies and practices have demonstrable nett social benefits.177
H o w they were to interpret "nett social benefits" w a s not clear, and before long it w a s seen
strictly in narrow economic terms, with the idea of financial incentives (other than for
R D & D ) off the agenda.

The ALP was at times willing to acknowledge that renewables had significant social and
environmental benefits compared with fossil fuels, but tended to be silent o n h o w these
benefits were to be assigned a value, and h o w traditional economic assessments might be
modified to incorporate recognition of these benefits. For example, in a 1985 speech to
renewable energy researchers, the Minister for Energy stated:
Renewables ... are oftenfreeof the environmental problems traditionally associated with
fossil fuels. They can also often be installed at the point of demand, thus providing energy
in areas difficult to supply by conventional non-renewables. Moreover, the present
technology of some renewable systems makes it possible to offer incremental supply
increases that can be more responsive to small increases in demand, at a lower investment
cost hence at lower risk. They also offer the prospect of long term industry development...

ibid., pp. 4-5; Neville Jones, "Wind energy in Australasia—the need for a policy", South Wind, No.
10-11, 1982, pp. 10-11; See also Alan Langworthy's letter to the Minister for Resources and Energy
regarding this matter, and the Minister's non-committal reply. Alan Langworthy, "Open letter to
Senator Peter Walsh", iSbM^^/w-/, No. 12-13, 1983, p. 14.
Australian Labor Party, 1982, cited in Peter Penn, "Wind and the Department of Resources and
Energy", South Wind, No. 14-15, 1984, pp. 11-12.
Australian Labor Party, Platform Constitution and Rules Approved by the 36th National Conference,
Canberra 1984, Australian Labor Party, Canberra, 1984, p. 171. Australasian Wind Energy
Association, "Stop Press", South Wind, No. 16, 1984, p. 6.
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Nevertheless, even though these advantages are important, the main criterion for the
consumer will be whether the technology is commercially or economically viable.178

In the latter half of the 1980s, Australia's energy policy again came under review. From
1986 to 1988, the federal government undertook a national review of energy policy under
the title Energy 2000. Its discussion paper on renewable energy aimed:
•

to establish the present status and prospects to the year 2000 for renewable
technologies in Australia;

•

to identify any impediments to the introduction of renewables; and

•

to examine a general approach for their introduction, including whether special
treatment is merited for renewables; and possible means to redress impediments and
constraints to renewables realising their potential.179

The main thrust of the review was that renewable energy was too expensive; and it
predicted that by the year 2000, the percentage contribution of renewables to Australia's
energy consumption w o u l d decrease.180 L o w growth rates were predicted for the traditional
forms of renewable energy used in Australia: hydro-electricity, w o o d and bagasse. T h e
percentage contribution of solar energy (principally solar water heating) w a s expected to
double, but it w a s starting from a very low base. In the area of electricity generation, the
report repeated the standard view that non-traditional forms of renewable energy had the
best prospects in remote areas.181

The report suggested that the main impediments to the commercialisation of renewable
energy technologies were technical and economic. M o s t forms of renewable energy, it
stated, were uncompetitive compared with conventional energy sources. T o change this
required either "technical breakthroughs, which reduce the intrinsic cost of the renewable
system, and/or fundamental increases in the price of competing non-renewables". Since the
latter were thought unlikely, "significant technical innovation" w a s needed for renewables
to b e c o m e competitive.182 T h e report recognised that there were institutional impediments
to greater use of renewables, but concentrated o n the subsidies to diesel fuel and the
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electricity utilities' uniform tariff policy, both of which adversely impacted on the prospects
for remote area power supplies. T h e idea that renewables should receive any financial
incentives beyond R D & D funding—as had been suggested in the A L P ' s 1984 platform—
w a s rejected.183 T h e report contained no suggestion that the structure of the ESI might be an
impediment to the greater use of renewable energy—as w a s often argued by renewable
energy advocates.

The final Energy 2000 national energy policy paper was released in early 1988. It
announced as major policy goals the following: maximising the export performance of the
energy sector to improve Australia's balance of payments position; and increasing the
efficiency of Australia's energy sector to improve the international competitiveness of local
industry.184 (Here the report foreshadowed the 1990s restructuring of energy sector,
described in chapter 7.) Energy d e m a n d w a s expected to g r o w at 2 . 2 % per a n n u m , that is,
by about 3 0 % by 2000, while energy exports (excluding crude oil, the major energy import)
were expected to grow by 4 % per annum, 1 8 5

The policy statements on renewable energy were in effect a reiteration of the statements in
the earlier discussion paper. T h e fate of renewables would be left to the market.
[The benefits of renewable energy] do not provide a compelling case for the artificial
stimulation of the utilisation of renewable energy technologies in Australia. The most
effective means by which renewable energy technologies can achieve sustained growth is
as a result of normal market forces rather than government intervention. Subsidies or price
support for renewables would place afinancialburden on the public and would not
necessarily result in the optimum allocation of resources.186
The one policy measure that the government w a s prepared to implement to support
renewable energy w a s the provision of extra funding for renewable energy and energy
efficiency R D & D , to the tune of $5 million over the following 5 years.

An interesting omission from the final Energy 2000 report is acknowledgment of the
'greenhouse effect' as a likely influence on energy policy. T h e timing of the report is the
important factor here. The greenhouse effect did not become a major political issue until
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after the Toronto Conference on The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global
Security held in June 1988.187 Energy 2000 w a s released a short time before this conference;
were it released later, such an omission would have been politically unthinkable. (The effect
of greenhouse politics on energy policy is discussed in chapter 7.) Yet from the mid 1980s,
the greenhouse effect w a s receiving increasing publicity, with some Australian scientists,
environmentalists and energy policy commentators raising concerns about the implications
for fossil fuel use. Furthermore, C S I R O had convened in 1987 a major conference on the
greenhouse effect, which w a s attended by a number of officers from the Department of
Primary Industries and Energy.188

The greenhouse effect had the potential for putting a severe dent in the government's plans
for the energy sector, and the report's omission suggests that the government w a s not yet
ready to deal with this. Given that the government w a s predicting high growth rates in
energy demand and anticipating that a booming energy export sector would improve
Australia's economic performance, the omission is not surprising.

On the whole, there was a sizeable gap between the ALP's earlier rhetoric on renewable
energy and what they actually achieved w h e n in government, evident at both federal and
state level. This reflected Labor's desire to co-opt the environment movement, while from
the mid 1980s—at least at the federal level—presiding over a shift towards neoliberalist
economic policies. A few years after coming to power, the federal Labor government had
dropped most of the rhetoric. In effect, the fate of renewable energy w a s to be left to the
market.

4.5.3 Victoria
F r o m the late 1970s, Victoria had an agency whose function it w a s to promote and support
renewable energy. The Victorian Solar Energy Research Committee w a s established in
1977 to provide advice on promising lines for solar energy research, and to provide funding
for renewable energy projects. In 1981 this became a statutory authority, albeit a small one:

ibid., p. 12.8.
This conference called for a reduction in carbon dioxide emissions, proposing a target of 2 0 %
reduction of 1988 emissions by the year 2005 (often referred to as the 'Toronto target'). This target
was cited often in the following years.
G. Pearman (ed.), Greenhouse: Planning for Climate Change, CSIRO Division of Atmospheric
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the Victorian Solar Energy Council ( V S E C ) . 189

V S E C provided funds mainly for technical projects; but V S E C w a s soon w a s making links
between increased manufacture and use of renewable energy technologies, and employment
growth. This n e w direction w a s driven by outsiders from the alternative technology and
trade union movements, influenced by similar developments in the U S A . 1 9 0 In the late
1970s, John Andrews, an early alternative technology advocate w h o later worked for
V S E C , and Jack M u n d e y , a pioneer in linking environmentalism and trade unionism,191
established a group called Environmentalists for Full E m p l o y m e n t (Vic.).192 In 1981 they
received funding from V S E C and the Department of E m p l o y m e n t and Training for a
feasibility study into 'solar jobs'. T h e study identified that the main job creation
opportunities were in the areas of building retrofitting and manufacture of solar heating
appliances.193

In 1982, an ALP government was elected in Victoria. The ALP had included in its minerals
and energy election platform the promise to foster greater energy conservation and use of
solar energy.

Soon after the election, it clarified its renewable energy policy objectives

thus:
•

to systematically encourage the commercialization and maximum market penetration
of feasible solar products, with an emphasis on Victorian manufacture;

•

to develop and implement a long-term strategy for a shift in the Victorian economy
from dependence on fossil fuels to dependence on solar based renewable energy
195

sources.
The second objective w a s undoubtedly too radical for a party in p o w e r and in a short time it
w a s transformed into the more vague objective:
•

to contribute to the Government's long-term strategy for a reduction in dependence on
fossil fuels with a consequent increased contribution from solar-based renewable

190
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Research, Melbourne, 1988.
Victorian Solar Energy Council, Annual Report, 1982.
John Andrews, "Solar job generation", Habitat, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1979.
Jack Mundey was a trade unionist prominent in the 'Green Bans' movement of the early 1970s, in
which trade unions placed bans on environmentally damaging projects.
John Andrews, Interview, 15 August 2000.
John Andrews, Solar Jobs in Victoria: The Economic Impact of the Solar Industry, September 1982
Australian Labor Party, 1982, op. cit.
David White, Minister for Minerals and Energy, letter to Victorian Solar Energy Council, 23 June
1982, cited in Andrews, 1982, op. cit., p. ii.
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energy sources.196
This revised objective permitted the government and its agencies to take only minor
action—although it did lead to a few investigations into the potential for renewables,
including the Victorian wind monitoring study (described in chapter 5).

The first objective reflected the government's endorsement of the Solar Jobs study.197
V S E C w a s directed to shift its emphasis to the commercialisation and promotion of solar
equipment. 198 V S E C thus became a marketing body—"marketing without selling".199 This
marketing approach to renewable energy w a s formalised in the government's 1985
Renewable

Energy Strategy, in which it presented a plan to stimulate the growth of n e w

Victorian industries based on renewable energy technologies. The targeted areas were solar
pool heating, domestic solar water heating, photovoltaic systems for remote domestic power
supply, biogas from wastes, and small hydro-electricity schemes. 200 The n e w government
also gave V S E C a greater role in energy planning and policy formulation. Previously, the
department responsible for energy policy in Victoria w a s the Department of Minerals and
Energy ( D M E ) . But the D M E ' s Energy Division w a s quite small,201 so in reality the large
energy agencies such as the S E C V were the de facto energy planners. The incoming
government changed this with the establishment of the Victorian Energy Plan, described in
section 4.4.4.

The interest in renewables and energy conservation was short-lived. In 1984 the
government released Victoria: The Next Step, a ten-year plan for the economic development
of Victoria, in which it signalled its intention to align energy policy with its economic
strategy.202 The government's energy strategy was further expounded in the 1985 report,
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Department of Minerals and Energy, Victorian Energy Plan: Progress Report on Energy Planning,
Melbourne, 1984, p. 22.
Jim Simmonds (Minister for Employment and Training) and David White (Minister for Minerals and
Energy), "Foreword", in Andrews, 1982.
Victorian Solar Energy Council, Annual Report, 1982; Department of Minerals and Energy, Victorian
Energy Plan, 1984, op. cit.
Fred Darby, "Market solar—VSEC style", Solar '86, Australian and N e w Zealand Solar Energy
Society Conference, Adelaide, 13-15 November 1986, pp. 98-107.
Department of Industry, Technology and Resources, Victorian Energy Planning Program:
Renewable Energy Strategy, Melbourne, 1985.
Department of Minerals and Energy, Annual Report, Melbourne, 1980-81.
Victoria: The Next Step was the cover title of Department of Management and Budget, The Economic
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Victoria's Energy:

Strategy and

Policy Options.203

Victoria's areas of competitive

advantage, the government stated, included its abundant b r o w n coal deposits and reserves
of natural gas and oil. Economic and employment growth in Victoria w o u l d be furthered by
exploiting these energy resources. T h e government w a s n o w intent on attracting energyintensive industries to the state. Renewable energy and energy conservation w e r e still
mentioned but were clearly considered of minor importance. In 1985, reflecting this shift in
emphasis, the Department of Minerals and Energy w a s absorbed within the n e w Department
of Industry, Technology and Resources. T h e former Minister of Minerals and Energy had
introduced a number of initiatives for fostering renewable energy and energy conservation;
the n e w Minister displayed little interest in renewables and these earlier initiatives were
w o u n d down. 2 0 4 This too coincided with the m o r e widespread decline of interest in
renewables.

The government's seemingly conflicting energy policies, and the eventual waning interest
in renewables and energy conservation has been described by John A n d r e w s :
Labor came in with a strong policy to conserve energy, to develop renewables. At the same
time it also had a strong policy that it was going to have economic growth, it was going to
develop the state, exploit competitive advantages, and so on ... There was quite a strong
push to really do something to encourage conservation and renewables, so far as one could
at a state level ... In parallel, and separate from that there were also a lot of people
beavering away to promote economic growth through exploiting brown coal resources, oil
and gas and electricity based on brown-coalfiredgeneration ... There was a lot of talk
about us having excess electricity capacity that w e must find a demand for, hence the
interest in smelters and other electricity-intensive industries. A n d n o w I think that
politically took a lot of the impetus away from renewables and conservation at the time.
W h y would you bother to conserve if you had oodles of brown coal, plenty of oil, plenty of
natural gas and you were talking about exploiting those, why would you bother to be
conserving at the same time? ... The oil shock of '73 was well forgotten by then. Natural
gas in Victoria was some of the cheapest in the world; so was brown coal electricity.205
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Victorian Energy Planning Program, Victoria's Energy: Strategy and Policy Options, Department of
Industry, Technology and Resources, Melbourne, 1985.
Alan Pears, "Submission to V S E C Review Panel", M a y 1988, V S E C papers, Victorian Public
Records Office.
John Andrews, Interview, 15 August 2000.
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4.5.4 N e w South W a l e s
T h e N S W government, like most other governments, released its newly formulated energy
policy in the late 1970s, an energy policy that w a s centred on questions of the cost and
availability of oil.206 Unlike Victoria, N e w South Wales had no commercial oil or gas fields,
but it did have m u c h higher quality coal. In the area of renewable energy policy the
government proclaimed:
N e w South Wales has only two major energy resources—coal and sunshine. The
Government has given its full support to the development and application of methods for
using the Sun as a renewable energy source.207
Support for renewable energy w a s directed at solar heating applications, and production of
fuel from crops to replace oil.208 The government saw little role for wind power, apart from
in s o m e remote locations, as N S W w a s thought to have low average wind speeds—a
conclusion based on meteorological wind data rather than surveys on wind energy
potential—and wind generators were considered too costly.209 A s described in chapter 5, the
lack of interest in wind power started to change in the mid 1980s.

Unlike Victoria, NSW did not have a statutory body dedicated to supporting and promoting
renewable energy. Instead such activities as existed were carried out mainly by the Energy
Authority of N e w South Wales ( E A N S W ) . The state's main electricity utility, Elcom,
showed little interest in renewables. T h e E A N S W had been established in 1976 to provide
advice on energy matters, and to conduct planning and investigations for the N S W energy
sector.210 Renewable energy advocacy w a s only a minor activity for the E A N S W ; yet it had
a solar energy advisory committee, provided some funding for renewable energy projects
(by 1983, $3.8 million spread over 20 projects211), worked with university research groups
on various projects, and established a Solar Energy Information Centre (later the Energy
Information Centre) to provide information to the general public.212 The E A N S W ' s attitude
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N e w South Wales Government, Energy Policy Summary and Background Paper, 1979.
ibid., p. 24.
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ibid., p. 25.
The government body responsible for energy changed its names many times. In 1987-88 it became
the Department of Energy; in 1988-89 it was the Department of Minerals and Energy; in 1991-92 it
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Energy Authority of N e w South Wales, Annual Report, Sydney, 1983, p. 29.
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N e w South Wales, A Survey of Energy Research, Development and Demonstration Projects 198081: N.S. W. Government Initiatives and Support, Sydney, 1982.
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to renewable energy R D & D w a s that, given the large expenditures being m a d e in other
countries, it would often be better to import renewable energy technologies rather than
developing them within Australia. Renewable energy R D & D undertaken in N S W should
therefore address local needs.213

The EANSW provided funding to a few renewable energy research projects. Two major
projects, both receiving over $1 million, were the development of a 25 k W solar p o w e r
station designed by researchers from the Australian National University and installed at
White Cliffs in western N S W , and the development of evacuated tubular solar collectors for
use in heating applications by researchers at the University of Sydney. 214 Several wind
energy projects were also funded; these are described in chapter 5.

4.5.5 Other States
Other states had different arrangements for supporting renewable energy R D & D , although
the degree of support varied significantly. In South Australia, several energy agencies were
involved in investigating the potential of renewables in both the grid and remote areas.
This included an extensive wind energy survey. (See chapter 5.) In the Northern Territory
the Department of Mines and Energy also undertook investigations into the potential for
renewable energy in remote areas.216

Western Australia was probably the state most favourably disposed towards renewable
energy. Like so m a n y other states, W A had in the late 1970s expressed support for the
development of renewables. Its energy policy, released in 1978-79, stated:
Encouragement will be given to the development of renewable energy sources ...
Recognition will be given to the need to provide special incentives to encourage the early

Energy Authority of N e w South Wales, Annual Report, Sydney, 1979, p. 38.
Energy Authority of N e w South Wales, Annual Report, Sydney, various years.
Leon Byass and Monica Oliphant, "A South Australian position: alternative and remote area power",
Solar '86, Australian and N e w Zealand Solar Energy Society Conference, Adelaide, 13-15
November 1986, pp. 409^15.
P.R. Edwards, "A wind power survey of the Northern Territory of Australia", Solar World Congress:
International Solar Energy Society Congress, Perth, 1983, pp. 2395-2402; Subhash Chandra and Mai
Wedd, "Alternative sources of energy for power generation in remote areas in the Northern
Territory", Solar '86, Australian and N e w Zealand Solar Energy Society Conference, Adelaide, 1315 November 1986, pp. 403^08.
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development and utilization of renewable energy sources.217
Perhaps W A took renewable energy relatively seriously because it is a large state with a
limited electricity grid and m a n y remote communities. Greater use of renewable energy for
power generation would reduce the state's high dependence on liquid fuels. Since most
states had adopted uniform electricity tariffs, remote consumers supplied by the public
electricity authorities tended to be heavily subsidised for their power supplies. Thus
electricity authorities had an incentive to seek cheaper alternatives to diesel fuel.218 T o
facilitate this, the State Energy Commission of Western Australia ( S E C W A ) established in
1978 its R e m o t e Area Power Supply Investigation.219 S E C W A undertook a number of wind
energy studies and installed a number of medium-sized wind systems. These are described
in chapter 5.

The key body established in WA to support renewable energy was the Solar Energy
Research Institute of Western Australia ( S E R I W A ) , a government-funded body. S E R I W A
undertook or supported a range of renewable energy R & D projects including several in the
area of wind energy.220 But in 1986, the time w h e n support for renewable energy w a s
generally in decline, funding w a s withdrawn and S E R I W A closed down. 2 2 1 T h e newly
formed Minerals and Energy Research Institute of Western Australia ( M E R I W A ) took over
responsibility for government-funded energy research including renewable energy.222
Following this, renewable energy researchers at Murdoch University w h o had previously
collaborated with S E R I W A formed the Murdoch University's Energy Research Institute
(MUERI)inl987.223

State Energy Commission of Western Australia, Annual Report, 1978-79, pp. 9-10.
In one case it was estimated that each isolated consumer costed over $1000 per year in subsidies.
Matthew Rosser ( S E C W A ) , "Ten Mile Lagoon wind farm performance analysis", Wind Energy
Workshop, Asia Pacific Wind Energy Centre, Monash University, Clayton (Vic), 4 July 1994.
State Energy Commission of Western Australia, Annual Report, 1977-78, p. 5; T.S. Crawford,
"Remote area power investigation in Western Australia 1979-1986", Engineering Conference:
Developing Remote Areas, Darwin, 11-15 M a y 1987, pp. 416-419.
Department of Resources and Energy, Compendium of Australian Energy Research, Development
and Demonstration Projects, A G P S , Canberra, various years.
State Energy Commission of Western Australia, Annual Report, Perth, 1986-87, p. 27.
Ministry of Economic Development and Trade ( W A ) , Energy Policy and Planning Branch,
"Renewable energy developments in Western Australia", Solar '88, Australian and N e w Zealand
Solar Energy Society Conference, Melbourne, 17-19 November 1988, pp. 2.15-2.17.
Murdoch University Energy Research Institute, '"Shopfront'for energy research", 1997, Accessed
1 January 1999, <http://wwwcomm.murdoch.edu.au/synergy/9701/shopfront.html>.
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4.5.6 Overview
A s in m a n y other countries, the 1970s oil shocks led Australian federal and state
governments to pay m u c h greater attention to h o w energy was being used. With increasing
oil prices threatened, the main emphasis was on fuel switching or greater energy
conservation in applications that relied on oil. M u c h of Australia's electricity system used
local coal, which was in plentiful supply. Large electricity generators that consumed oil
were able to switch to an alternative fossil fuel; however, most remote area power supplies
( R A P S ) continued to rely on diesel fuel.

In countries that were more dependent on oil, renewable energy initially seemed a
promising alternative. Renewable energy research and development programs were
initiated, in some cases receiving substantial funding. Australia followed this trend, but on a
m u c h smaller and restricted scale. Australian renewable energy R & D focused on areas
which were considered locally beneficial, in particular, remote area power supplies. A s long
as there were plentiful coal and natural gas supplies for power generation, there seemed no
need for grid-connected renewable energy. Indeed, w h e n natural gas supplies were
threatened for a short period in South Australia, the government initiated an investigation
into grid-connected wind power—this episode is described in chapter 5 — b u t turned this
into an exercise in using wind power for remote areas once the crisis was over. Only in
Victoria, did environmentalists influence the government to consider grid-connected
renewable energy, and this was short-lived.

By the mid 1980s, concerns about energy prices rises had dwindled, and the environment
movement was experiencing a lull. Interest in renewable energy waned. Renewable energy
R & D had produced mixed results. Substantial technical improvements were achieved in
some cases, but costs did not fall as rapidly as hoped. Concerned about Australia's
economic decline, federal and state governments saw increased opportunities in the
exploitation of Australia's cheap, plentiful coal and natural gas supplies. The push was on
to entice energy-intensive industry and encourage greater fossil fuel exports. Increasingly,
governments emphasised the need to reduce energy prices. This led to restructuring of the
energy industries as described in chapter 7. It would also provide less opportunity for
renewable energy technologies, which were increasingly being described as too expensive.
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4.6 Other Renewable Energy Actors
4.6.1 Introduction
A number of other actors, in particular non-state bodies, promoted greater use of renewable
energy and sought to influence renewable energy policy. These bodies were quite small.
S o m e were able to influence the priorities of renewable energy R & D . S o m e renewable
energy researchers also worked in energy agencies, and would have had a small influence
on the agency's renewable energy activities. In the main, however, non-state renewable
energy bodies were not part of the policy process. Over time, these bodies increasingly
recognised the need to act as a lobby for renewables, and would achieve greater success in
the 1990s. In this section, I briefly describe the main groups and h o w they sought to
influence renewable energy policy.

4.6.2 Renewable Energy Associations
During this period there were a number of organisations representing groups of renewable
energy advocates, including the renewable energy industry (mainly manufacturers and
installers of solar equipment), environmentalists and alternative technology advocates.
Representing solar energy researchers w a s the Australian and N e w Zealand section of the
International Solar Energy Society, or I S E S ( A N Z ) . In 1985, I S E S ( A N Z ) became an
autonomous body, the Australian and N e w Zealand Solar Energy Society ( A N Z S E S ) .

As described above, solar energy researchers dealt mainly with applications for direct solar
energy, rather than for indirect forms such as wind energy. Their main interest was in
developing renewable energy technologies, rather than acting as a lobby group for
renewables.224 O f course, I S E S ( A N Z ) was well-versed in the environmental arguments for
renewable energy from the very early days;225 yet it seems that m a n y believed that the main
barriers to renewable energy were technical and economic.226

Mark Diesendorf, Interview, 29 M a y 2000.
When environmentalism became popular in the early 1970s, the editor of ISES(ANZ)'s magazine,
Solar Energy Progress, was quick to express support for this and make environmental arguments for
greater use of solar energy. See Robert V. Dunkle, "Editorial", Solar Energy Progress, No. 10, 1971;
also No. 11,1972 and No. 12, 1973.
Mark Diesendorf, Interview, 29 May 2000.
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During m u c h of the 1980s, the Australasian W i n d Energy Association

(AusWEA),

described below, w a s a stronger lobby for renewables than w a s I S E S ( A N Z ) . S o m e in
A u s W E A urged I S E S ( A N Z ) to follow suit. For example, at its 1985 conference A n d r e w
Blakers, drawing on his experiences in lobbying for wind power in Tasmania, appealed to
I S E S ( A N Z ) thus:
ISES should change its character from being primarily a technical society, and become
more actively involved in removing institutional and political barriers [to the widespread
use of solar technologies].227
In a recent interview, M a r k Diesendorf, a founder and former president of A u s W E A ,
reflected on his role in politicising A N Z S E S :
Around about 1987, [ANZSES] started to have serious discussions about energy policy at
the annual conferences, and in fact I gave a paper in 1987 on ... non-technical barriers to
renewable energy, which then gave people permission to talk about these things, instead of
just talking about the technology.228
F r o m the late 1980s, A N Z S E S became a more active policy player. These developments are
described in chapter 7.

4.6.3 T h e Alternative Technology Association
The Alternative Technology Association ( A T A ) is an organisation representing those
interested in the practical aspects of renewable energy, particularly the building of smallscale systems. It began in 1976 w h e n a group of people from Friends of the Earth Australia,
keen to share skills and ideas, formed the Alternative Technology Co-operative, later called
the Alternative Technology Association ( A T A ) . 2 2 9 F r o m 1980 onwards it produced the
magazine Soft Technology, later called ReNew,

to provide a forum for information

exchange. S o m e A T A members later started their o w n renewable energy technology
businesses.230 The magazine Soft Technology included articles on small-scale alternative
technologies for housing, solar heating, renewable electricity, transport and biogas
production. The magazine dealt predominantly with the technical aspects of these
technologies, providing information on do-it-yourself projects, or on aspects of buying,
installing and using alternative technologies.
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Over time, the A T A became one of the more active lobbies for renewable energy,
particularly in Victoria, where it is predominantly based. For example the A T A wrote a
number of fairly detailed submissions to the N R E C inquiry, described above. Later it
became a more active participant in decision-making about renewable energy.

4.6.4 Wind Energy Researchers
Australia had only a few wind energy researchers, mostly in universities, C S I R O and
electricity utilities. S o m e funding was available for wind energy R D & D through state
funding bodies, N E R D D P , and other mechanisms; but altogether the level of funding to
wind energy w a s small. Within N E R D D P , the W i n d Energy Technology subprogram was
one of the poorest funded.231 About twenty projects were supported within this subprogram,
and while m a n y of these grants were awarded to university and C S I R O researchers, some of
the largest grants within this subprogram were awarded to state government bodies. These
were the following: the Hydro-Electric Commission of Tasmania ( H E C ) to investigate the
feasibility of wind power; the Energy Authority of N S W to test the Malabar wind generator;
the State Energy Commission of Western Australia ( S E C W A ) with Westwind Turbines to
install a small wind farm at the remote community of Esperance; and the South Australian
Office of Energy Planning and the Electricity Trust of South Australia ( E T S A ) to install a
wind generator in the remote town of Coober Pedy.232

One of the first bodies to undertake research into wind power was CSIRO, with a number of
divisions involved in various projects. CSIRO's wind energy research included the
production of wind speed m a p s for Australia, and wind monitoring in north-west
Tasmania.233 It seems that the C S I R O Executive were not too enthusiastic about CSIRO's
involvement in wind energy research. M a r k Diesendorf, founder of A u s W E A and a C S I R O
wind energy researcher, stated that the C S I R O Executive attempted to obstruct his early
attempts to seek research funding, and that in the early 1980s, started to shut d o w n its
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renewable energy research.234 A u s W E A m a d e clear its opposition to C S I R O ' s withdrawal.
In 1983, members of the A u s W E A published a letter stating: "Several projects have been
terminated prematurely and the researchers concerned ... have been instructed to finish
quickly and m o v e into otherfieldsof research."235 A u s W E A also used its contacts to have
the issue raised in Parliament.236 The Minister for Science and Technology did not deny that
there had been a change in emphasis of research but stated that this w a s in accord with
changing economic and technical realities.237 C S I R O did undertake some further wind
energy research: later projects included a study of wind flow over complex terrain to help
improve siting of wind generators, and production of wind m a p s for Australia.

Wind energy research—primarily wind energy monitoring programs and assessment of
wind energy resources—was also undertaken by state energy authorities in nearly all states.
Various university groups also conducted research into wind generation.23' Projects
included the assessment of wind resources, and wind turbine development.240

4.6.5 The Wind Energy Industry
The main Australian manufacturer of medium-sized wind generators during this period, and
the only one surviving into the 1990s, was Westwind Turbines of Kelmscott in Western
Australia.241 Westwind participated in a number of W A wind energy projects, including the
manufacture of wind turbines for Australia'sfirstwind farm at Esperance. (See chapter 5.)
Another Australian wind turbine manufacturer, the Wodonga-based W i n d Technology Pty
Ltd, received funding from V S E C in the early 1980s to build a 16 k W wind turbine, and
later was awarded a N E R D D P grant to build a 75 k W wind turbine for installation at
Breamlea.242 (See chapter 5). The company withdrew from the Breamlea project in 1986.
Later, Westwind supplied a 60 k W turbine for Breamlea.

1

Mark Diesendorf, Interview, 29 May 2000.
Neville Jones, Hugh Outhred and Alan Langworthy, "Wind energy and CSIRO", Search, Vol. 14,
No. 11-12, 1983, pp. 303-304.
Senator Ryan, Hansard, Senate, Australian Parliament, 12 October 1983.
Barry Jones (Federal Minister for Science and Technology), "CSIRO wind energy research", South
Wind, No. 14-15, 1984.
Department of Resources and Energy, Compendium, op. cit., various years.
Graham Bowden, "Wind energy", Australian Natural History, Vol. 19, No. 11, 1979, pp. 370-1.
Department of Resources and Energy, Compendium, op. cit., various years.
Blakers et. al, 1991, op. cit., p. 43.
Victorian Solar Energy Council, Annual Report, various years.
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N E R D D P awarded grants to the three local wind turbine manufacturers (the third being the
manufacturer of small-scale wind turbines for R A P S systems).243 But by the mid 1980s, the
federal government concluded that further wind turbine R D & D work in Australia w a s
probably not warranted since commercial wind turbines were readily available from
overseas.244 This signalled the death knell for attempts to establish a local wind turbine
manufacturing industry: all medium-sized wind turbines installed in Australia after 1987
were imported.

4.6.6 The Australasian Wind Energy Association
Although there w a s little happening in the area of wind power during the 1980s, Australia
did have a wind energy association. From 1980 to 1987, there existed a group actively
promoting wind power in Australia and N e w Zealand: the Australasian W i n d Energy
Association ( A u s W E A ) . 2 4 5 The group also produced a newsletter, South Wind, which
reported on wind energy developments overseas and in Australia.

When AusWEA was formed, there was much public interest in solar energy, with several
organisations and magazines catering for the solar energy community and disseminating
information about solar technologies. W i n d

energy w a s considered the neglected

"Cinderella".246 A u s W E A ' s founding members were mainly scientific and engineering
researchers, and a public servant from the federal Department of National Development and
Energy.247 Founder and later president, M a r k Diesendorf, w a s a scientist at C S I R O , w h o
was interested in socially responsible science and technology, and opposed to nuclear
power. Diesendorf saw wind power research and advocacy as a w a y of furthering these
interests within his professional work. 248 H e began researching the potential for large-scale
wind power in Australia during the late 1970s, and in 1978 he received a N E R D D P grant to
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Department of Resources and Energy, National Energy Research, Development and Demonstration
Program, Review of the Wind Energy Subprogram, A G P S , Canberra, 1986, pp. 45-^19.
ibid., p. 45-49.
Although A u s W E A represented Australia and N e w Zealand, most of its activities related to Australia.
C. Neville Jones and Mark Diesendorf, "Editorial", South Wind, No. 1, 1980, p. 2.
C. Neville Jones, Mark Diesendorf, Alan Langworthy, Jetse Kalma, Graham Bowden, Pratish
Bandopadhayay, Paul Edwards and Ken Sayers, "Announcement", South Wind, No. 1, 1980, p. 3.
Department of National Development and Energy was later the Department of Resources and Energy.
Diesendorf (ed.), 1979, op. cit.; Mark Diesendorf, Interview, 29 May 2000.
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study the integration of large-scale wind power into electricity grids.249 (This project is
discussed in chapter 5.)

AusWEA enabled wind energy enthusiasts throughout Australia and New Zealand to form a
community. A u s W E A grew quite quickly, with membership numbering over 100 in the first
year: about 3 0 % of these had a scientific or engineering interest in wind power, while others
had practical knowledge of wind energy systems or wanted to build small-scale wind
energy systems.250 The tasks A u s W E A first set itself were mainly information gathering on
existing wind generators in Australasia, wind energy R & D , technical details of wind
generators, and planned wind generator projects. It also planned information dissemination
via workshops and written material.251

AusWEA ran public meetings, workshops and field days on wind power in most states and
thus were able to recruit members from across Australia.252 (There were far fewer active
members from N e w Zealand.) A u s W E A ' s activities were mainly pitched at a practical level
for individuals and local environment groups with an interest in building small-scale wind
generating

systems, an

approach

reflecting the wishes

and

composition

of the

membership.253 O n e member, Tony Stevenson, was a key contributor to A u s W E A ' s
workshops and field days. Stevenson had m u c h practical experience with small wind
systems, including the restoration of old farm wind turbines. H e also ran "Survival
Technology", a company specialising in small wind systems.254

On the practical side there was much overlap between AusWEA and the Alternative
Technology Association ( A T A ) . But A u s W E A ' s focus extended beyond practical education
and wind energy R D & D . S o m e members of A u s W E A thought from the start that A u s W E A
needed to be more than a group of wind power enthusiasts, that A u s W E A needed to act as a
lobby group for wind power. They saw the public meetings and workshops as a means of
promoting wind power to a range of groups, including governments.255 In 1982, A u s W E A

1
1

Department of National Development and Energy, Compendium of Australian Energy Research,
Development and Demonstration Projects, AGPS, Canberra, 1980.
Mark Diesendorf and John Carlin, "Report on inaugural meeting", South Wind, No. 2,1980, p 3 ^
ibid.
Mark Diesendorf, Interview, 29 May 2000.
Diesendorf and Carlin, "Report on inaugural meeting", 1980, op. cit.
Geoff Booth, "Obituary to Tony Stevenson", South Wind, No. 20, 1986, p. 6. Stevenson died in 1985.
Mark Diesendorf, pers. comm., 2 January 2003.
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became embroiled in the Gordon-below-Franklin controversy in Tasmania and started
voicing its criticisms of the Hydro-Electric Commission of Tasmania. It took this
opportunity to lobby earnestly for wind power.

AusWEA lobbied not only for greater use of wind power in Australia including the removal
of institutional barriers, but also the development of a local industry to manufacture wind
energy systems. There were a few manufacturers of small wind energy systems for remote
area power supplies, but A u s W E A ' s sights were set on promoting the manufacture of
medium-sized wind systems. For this to succeed, a local market w a s vital. Their efforts to
secure a market in Tasmania and establish a local manufacturing industry are described in
chapter 5. Later, M a r k Diesendorf and others undertook a pilot study on the development of
a manufacturing industry in W A . 2 5 6

By 1985, as public interest in renewable energy was waning, AusWEA was in decline.
Diesendorf thought that the lack of institutional support for A u s W E A w a s a major
contributor.257 Circulation of South Wind had dropped and publication w a s becoming m o r e
irregular.258 With m u c h of the administrative w o r k falling on a small group, A u s W E A tried
to decentralise, encouraging the formation of local groups—these already existed in
Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne, Canberra and Forest (northwest Tasmania)—and suggesting
that A u s W E A act as a federation.259 In 1986, the editor of South Wind, reflecting on
organisational problems noted:
[S]uccess in implementation [of the decentralisation] depends on ... the injection of some
new active members in most of the States. Some regional groups are getting perilously
close to not being viable. This partly reflects the current political outlook on the energy
question. Energy is no longer big news and the surface impression is that there is no longer
any energy crisis. But the events at Chernobyl and the warnings of the consequences of
increased carbon dioxide levels from burning fossil fuels both confirm undeniably the need
for a massive switch worldwide to sources of benign renewable energy.260

The last prediction proved correct: two years later the advent of greenhouse politics
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Mark Diesendorf, Tom Lyons, Alan Langworthy and Denny McGeorge, A Wind Energy
Manufacturing Industry for Western Australia?, Appropriate Technology Development Group
Incorporated, North Fremantle, 1985.
Mark Diesendorf, pers. comm., 2 January 2003.
Australasian Wind Energy Association, South Wind, various issues.
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provided advocates of renewable energy with a far more compelling raison d'etre than had
the oil shocks, although it was not enough to save A u s W E A . In late 1987, A u s W E A w a s
dissolved into A N Z S E S .

4.7 Conclusion
In chapter 9, I examine h o w well this account of the structure of Australia's energy sector
and history of energy policy explains the account of wind power in this period. Here I
reflect on the main themes raised in this chapter that relate to wind power.

There seemed little reason for Australia's energy authorities to seriously consider use of
wind power in this period. Only in a few remote areas did wind power appear attractive.
The account of attempts to install wind power in these areas is given in chapter 5.

Key to the analysis of renewable energy policy in this period are trends in Australia's
political economy. A s noted above, attempts to restructure Australia's economy have
focused on exploiting Australia's minerals and energy resources by attracting mining and
energy-intensive industries, and improving the international competitiveness of the
manufacturing sector. The availability of plentiful, cheap electricity has been considered
vital. Although wind power was frequently dismissed as 'too expensive', decision-making
about electricity plant was made not purely on the basis of cost but also on the need to
underpin economic growth, and provide regional employment.

In their renewable energy policies, governments favoured those technologies in which
Australia had a competitive advantage from its past R & D activities, which could be of use
in high-cost local energy applications—in particular, remote area power supplies—and
which could form the basis of an export manufacturing industry.

On the basis of these trends, there seemed little role for grid-connected wind power. Yet
wind power did make some headway in this period. This is discussed in chapter 5.

Australasian Wind Energy Association, "Editorial", South Wind, No. 20, 1986, p. 3.
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Chapter 5: Wind power in the 1980s
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter and chapter 8, I give an account of h o w wind power has fared in Australia.
Chapters 4 and 7 have set the scene for this account, by providing a description and analysis
of Australia's energy sector as it pertains to decision-making about wind power. But I have
a further aim. In chapter 2, the concept of interpretative flexibility was introduced to depict
the idea that different social groups m a y interpret the meaning of a technology in quite
different ways, and that this concept m a y be used to explain not only the development path
of a technology, but also whether and h o w the technology is used. In this chapter and
chapter 8, while recounting the history of wind power, I also explore differing
interpretations—or more often in the early years, expectations—of the technical capability
of wind power. H o w have negotiations over these differing expectations and interpretations
shaped the treatment of wind power, and have different groups m o v e d towards consensus?
H o w then does 'interpretative flexibility' complement a contextual explanation for the
treatment of wind power?

During this period, most advocates of wind power, particularly those in the Australasian
W i n d Energy Association ( A u s W E A ) , had little influence over usage patterns of wind
power. They were quite vocal, however, in challenging the electricity utilities'
interpretation of the technical capability of wind power. In arguing that the meaning of the
technical characteristics of wind power w a s interpretively flexible and that the electricity
utilities were in effect insisting on a single interpretation, advocates of wind power were
exposing another layer of institutional barrier: the legitimacy conferred upon the electricity
utilities' to define the technical capability of wind power. (In some cases, of course, this
legitimacy was tempered by or shared with another energy agency, such as those with
responsibility for renewable energy.) W i n d power advocates were keen to undermine the
ESI's legitimacy, placing great hopes on the reform of the industry. H o w the 1990s
restructuring of the ESI influenced this legitimacy is explored in chapter 8.

Chapters 4 and 7 provide an important context for both this chapter and chapter 8
respectively in their description of the structure of and changes to the energy sector and
renewable energy policies, and their description of the various relevant groups. Chapters 3
and 6 also provide an important context. A key driver for m a n y advocates of wind power
was their commitment to environmental improvement. Their interpretation of wind power

of Wind rower in

as an environmental technology influenced not only their actions in confronting energy
sector players, but also h o w they envisaged the deployment of wind power.

The chapter is divided as follows. In the next section I briefly describe how advocates of
wind power viewed the question of what was the appropriate size for a wind turbine. In the
late 1970s and early 1980s it was uncertain h o w the technology would develop. The
question was settled quickly, after large wind turbines proved unsuccessful. In the following
section I discuss the circumstances facing potential private developers of wind power, and
describe several private wind power projects or proposals. I follow this with an examination
of the attitude of the electricity supply industry (ESI) to wind power, lookingfirstat wind
power for remote areas, followed by wind power for grid areas. For the latter, I examine in
some detail an important debate on the value of wind power to the grid. Finally, I draw out
the main themes of the chapter.

5.2 Turbine Size
Wind turbines come in a range of sizes. Small turbines suitable for a remote household m a y
be rated at 1 k W or less. At the other end of the scale, there are n o w commercially available
turbines rated at well over 1 M W (or 1000 k W ) . 1 Thus to speak now of small, m e d i u m or
large wind turbines is to speak of commercially available, reliable machines. But in the
early years there was an important distinction between medium-sized and large wind
turbines. Early large wind turbines were never anything more than experimental and very
costly machines, and often failed ones at that. Successful wind turbines of today are
descended from the medium-sized turbines of the 1970s and 1980s.

The history of wind turbine development is quiet sobering for those who put their faith in
government-sponsored

R&D

programs. Following the

1973—74 oil shock, some

governments in Europe and North America provided significant funding for wind turbine
development, yet these programs failed to produce a commercially viable machine. M u c h of
this R & D work was performed by the aerospace industry and was geared towards building
very large turbines, capable of generating several megawatts. Street and Miles observed:
The underpinnings of this seem to have been,first,belief that the experience of building

Typically a wind turbine generates on average 20 to 4 0 % of the rated power, depending on the wind
regime.
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large turbines for aircraft was a sufficient basis for the approach to [wind power], combined
with, second, engineering fascination with large-scale projects.2
Cavallo et al noted that earlier work in the U S A had suggested that wind turbines of at least
5M W

would be required if wind w a s to become competitive with fossil fuels for power

generation, hence the push to develop such large machines.3

Most modem wind turbines are descended from the Danish medium-sized turbines, which
in turn were based on the 1950s w o r k of the D a n e Johannes Juul.4 Danish wind turbine
manufacturers started small, improved their designs incrementally by learning from the
performance of m a n y

operating turbines, and increased the size of machines very

gradually.5 Today's wind turbine manufacturers produce commercial machines of about the
same size as the unsuccessful experimental models of the earlier period. Yet it has taken
about twenty-five years to reach this stage, not the few years imagined earlier. In the early
period, a variety of different wind turbine designs were developed, including vertical-axis
turbines, and horizontal axis with upwind and d o w n w i n d rotors, and different numbers of
blades; but most commercial wind turbines today are based on the Danish style of a
horizontal-axis, three-bladed, upwind rotor and active y a w control.6

The period of optimism from the mid 1970s to the early 1980s has been described as 'big is
beautiful'.7 It w a s widely held that large wind turbines would soon be commercially
available; few foresaw the immense technical difficulties that would confront the
developers of these turbines. It w a s not until the early 1980s, w h e n medium-sized wind
turbines, especially those of Danish origin, became commercially available and their use
grew rapidly (in part due to the wind b o o m in California) that m a n y wind power enthusiasts
began to change their thinking and promote use of medium-sized units.

Penny Street and Ian Miles, "Transition to alternative energy supply technologies: the case of
windpower", Energy Policy, Vol. 24, No. 5,1996, pp. 413^126, at p. 416.
Alfred J. Cavallo, Susan M . Hock and Don R. Smith, "Wind energy technology and economics", in
Thomas B. Johansson, Henry Kelly, Amulya K.N. Reddy and Robert H. Williams (eds.), Renewable
Energy: Sources for Fuels and Electricity, Earthscan, London and Island Press, Washington, 1993.
Juul's work is described in Kristian Hvidtfelt Nielsen, "Interpreting wind power vs. the electric power
system: a Danish case-study", Centaurus, Vol. 41, No. 1, 1999, pp. 161-177.
Ulrik Jorgensen and Peter Karnoe, "The Danish wind-turbine story: technical solutions to political
visions?", in Arie Rip, Thomas, J: Misa and Johan Schot (eds), Managing Technology in Society: The
Approach of Constructive Technology Assessment, Pinter, London, 1995.
'Yawing' means turning the wind turbine to face the wind.

. i /«•; kJVisit*- urn*yu*£

<-y •*'

_

The wind b o o m in California began in 1982.8 Federal and state tax credits were available
for investment in renewable energy technologies, and the introduction of the Public Utilities
Regulatory Policies Act ( P U R P A ) in 1978 provided an opportunity for independent power
producers. Califomian wind developers found the Danish wind turbines to be m u c h more
reliable than those from the U S A . The substantial market for Danish wind turbines led to a
rapid maturation of the Danish wind turbine design. The Califomian wind b o o m ended in 1986
after the withdrawal of tax credits. In Denmark, however, government support for the
installation of wind turbines (including subsidies and the requirement for favourable buyback
prices) began in the late 1970s, and continued in a more steady fashion throughout the 1980s.
The Danish machines proved reliable, not only because manufacturers could learn from
problems with the m a n y small and medium-sized wind turbines in operation, but also because
the Danish government had established The Test Station for Smaller Turbines at Ris0 in
1978, to provide assistance to manufacturers and to accredit wind turbines.

How did early 'big is beautiful' thinking affect attitudes towards wind power in Australia?
W e might expect environmentalists to have been ambivalent about large machines: a
m o d e m wind turbine can have an overall height of 100m, and s o m e experimental large
machines of the 1970s and 1980s were even larger. Environmentalists were understandably
delighted that wind power appeared viable in the short term, and drew on the optimistic
claims emanating from the large turbine research programs to bolster their arguments for
wind power. Yet the prospect of very large wind turbines sat uneasily with the idea of an
alternative technology. The incongruity lay not only in the size of these large turbines, but
also in the cost and capacity. While large turbines could have been used to meet the needs
of a village or community (as did the Tvindmill—see below), it w a s more likely that such
turbines would be owned and operated by the electricity utilities.

Street and Miles, 1996, op. cit.
The history of wind power in California and Denmark is compared in Rinie van Est, Winds of
Change: A Comparative Study of the Politics of Wind Energy Innovation in California and Denmark,
International Books, Utrecht, 1999. See also Jorgensen and Karnoe, 1995, op. cit.; Paul Gipe, Wind
Energy Comes of Age, Wiley, N e w York, 1995; Robert W . Righter, Wind Energy in America: A
History, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1996; Rene Kemp, Arie Rip and Johan Schot,
"Constructing transition paths through the management of niches", in Raghu Garud and Peter Karnoe
(eds), Path Dependence and Creation, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah (New Jersey), 2001.
See series of articles on wind power in the environmental magazine Chain Reaction, Vol. 3, No, 3,
1977, pp. 8-34; Mark Diesendorf, "Recent Scandinavian R and D in wind electric power: implications for Australia", Search, Vol. 10, No. 5, 1979, pp: 165-173; Mark Diesendorf, Submission to
Senate Select Committee on South West Tasmania, Hansard, Australia Parliament, 22 July 1982.
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M a n y Australian wind energy enthusiasts still favoured the small-scale, do-it-yourself focus
of the alternative technology m o v e m e n t , s o m e joining A u s W E A and/or the Alternative
Technology Association. Others tried to accommodate the possible advent of large turbines
with their social and political ideals. For example, M a r k Diesendorf, a key wind energy
lobbyist and one of the founders of the Australasian W i n d Energy Association, advocated
the use of large wind turbines; yet he w a s particularly inspired by the 'Tvindmill', a
community-built turbine located at Tvind in Denmark. 1 0

The 2 MW Tvindmill, at the time the world's largest wind turbine, was built over three
years and operational by 1978. 11 It w a s intended to provide heat and electricity for three
local schools, and w a s built by school teachers, students and a range of volunteer workers,
with expert advice provided where necessary. T h e project received no government or
industry funding, and w a s financed by the teachers at the schools.12 T h e schools clearly
identified with Maoist politics: a slogan of the Tvind folk high school w a s 'let a hundred
windmills bloom'. 13 Rinie van Est described the teachers' aims thus:
The teachers at the Tvind schools were sure Denmark would get nuclear power plants. To
escape both the economic stranglehold of the oil monopolists, as well as the undemocratic
centralization policy of the utilities, they decided to build a wind turbine. This was seen as a
direct and practical way of changing the centralization tendency within society ... Tvind
became a place of pilgrimage for ecological practitioners who wanted to study its
impressive wind turbine, as well as a c o m m o n experience for experts and practical-minded
people. And, although the utilities as well as the government considered the leftist-oriented
Tvind people as "a bunch offreaks",the project gained "great sympathy within the Danish
population", and "won the respect of many professionals."14
The

Tvindmill, though

very

large, seems

to incorporate

much

of what

1970s

environmentalists s a w as constituting an environmental technology: decentralisation,

11
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Mark Diesendorf and Brian Martin, "Large scale wind power for Western Australia", Proceedings of
Solar Realities in Western Australia in the 1980's, University of W A , 1-2 November 1979, pp. 4752; "Can w e tap the power in the wind", Ecos, No. 19, 1979, pp. 16-20; Mark Diesendorf, "A
community use ofwindpower", in Mark Diesendorf (ed.), Energy and People: Social Implications of
Different Energy Futures, Society for Social Responsibility in Science (A.C.T.), Canberra, 1979.
A lower rating generator was used, and so the Tvindmill did not ever generate this amount.
Mark Diesendorf, "A community use ofwindpower", 1979, op. cit.
"Let a hundred windmillsflourish"is Rinie van Est's actual translation of the title of a 1976 Tvind
publication. The usual English translation of Mao's call is to 'let a hundred flowers bloom', van Est,
1999, op. cit., p. 11.
ibid. Maribo Pederson is quoted.
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community ownership and control, liberatory work practices, and the demonstration of an
alternative to technologies considered oppressive. Yet, as described in chapter 3, ideas
about what constituted an environmental technology were shifting, and the socio-political
vision once associated with these technologies was on the retreat.

In Australia, there was no attempt to install a large wind turbine during the 1980s. Until the
installation of the 150 k W wind turbine at Malabar in 1986 (see section 5.4.4), all installed
wind turbines were rated 60 k W or less. Yet w h e n Australian energy authorities discussed
wind power, they focused mainly on the potential of large machines. 15 B y about 1983, wind
energy advocates were becoming convinced that medium-sized wind turbines offered the
best prospects; but it took several years more before the electricity utilities were convinced
that 'medium is better'. A s described below, this w a s a cause of m u c h disagreement
between wind power advocates and the utilities.

5.3 Private Wind Turbines
5.3.1 Barriers to Private Wind Turbines
Later in this chapter, I discuss the electricity utilities' attitudes to wind power. Yet wind
turbines could be installed by other groups or individuals. S o m e remote householders
installed small wind turbines to supplement diesel and/or solar power. A private group or
individual could install a medium-sized wind turbine to service a remote community;
however, since most of the larger remote communities were already supplied power by the
electricity utility, this would usually have required the utility's cooperation. Diesendorf et al
noted that in some states, constraints were placed on non-utility bodies or individuals
generating electricity. For example, in Tasmania, those wishing to generate more than about
7.5 k W had to obtain the permission of the Hydro-Electric Commission of Tasmania
(HEC), and were not permitted to sell electricity to their neighbours.16

Most utilities applied uniform tariffs; hence remote area customers supplied by the utility

See for example National Energy Advisory Committee, Renewable Energy Resources in Australia,
AGPS, Canberra, 1981. See also discussion in section 5.5.
Mark Diesendorf, Tom Lyons, Alan Langworthy and Denny McGeorge, A Wind Energy
Manufacturing IndustryforWestern Australia?, Appropriate Technology Development Group
Incorporated, North Fremantle, 1985. H E C was later called the Hydro-Electric Corporation.
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paid the s a m e tariff as urban customers, even though most remote areas were supplied by
expensive diesel generation. This gave the utility an incentive to find cheaper alternatives
such as wind power, but it gave little incentive to potential private generators. Diesendorf et
al, citing Vivian, noted that the average resident of Currie on King Island received an
effective annual subsidy of $1582, while the owners of small wind turbines o n the island
received n o subsidy for the electricity they generated.17

A private group or individual could install a grid-connected wind turbine and sell power to
the utility, but the buyback price offered by the utilities w a s typically very low. A m o r e
likely scenario for private wind generation w a s for a private c o m p a n y to install a gridconnected wind turbine to meet s o m e of its o w n electricity demand, reducing electricity
purchases from the utility. T h e economics of such an arrangement should have been m o r e
favourable than that of selling wind-generated electricity to the grid, since the avoided costs
(i.e. the normal electricity tariff paid) would be significantly higher than the buyback rate.18
Yet, the utility could dictate connection requirements. T h e S E C V , for example, initially did
not allow low voltage customers to connect their o w n generator to the grid, and applied a
hefty standby charge to companies that generated electricity to meet s o m e of their o w n
needs. This standby charge w a s waived for a period in the late 1980s w h e n the S E C V w a s
trying to encourage private generation. (See section 4.4.6.) Declining block tariff structures,
used by most utilities, were also a disincentive to private generation, as privately generated
p o w e r w o u l d be displacing the cheapest electricity purchased from the utility.19

Aside from the electricity utilities being able to dictate terms for potential private
generators, there were several other reasons w h y a level playing field did not exist for
private generators. A n d r e w Blakers and M a r k Diesendorf argued that the state-owned
electricity utilities received significant subsidies:
A state electricity commission (SEC) wishing to build a new fossil-fuelled or hydro power
station has until recently received a government guarantee for borrowing money, and so
still pays a lower interest rate than the market rate. A n S E C does not have to make a profit,
does not pay dividends (the State Electricity Commission of Victoria is now an exception),
and pays essentially no tax. Furthermore, an S E C often acquires fuels at extraction cost,
which in several states is well below the market price. The Hydro-Electric Commission of

ibid.
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Tasmania pays nothing for public land flooded by its dams. By contrast, a small private
company which wishes to construct a wind farm to sell electricity to the grid must pay
market interest rates, must make a profit, must pay tax, and must pay for the land used.

Not surprisingly, very few privately owned medium-sized wind turbines were installed
during the 1980s, despite the efforts of s o m e wind power enthusiasts.21 Here I describe two
successful Victorian cases: that of a 16 k W wind turbine installed by the M o o r a M o o r a
community, and that of a grid-connected 55 k W unit installed by M a r s Confectionery. I also
describe an unsuccessful attempt by a private group to install wind turbines on King Island.

5.3.2 Moora Moora
O n e group that m a y have installed their o w n wind power systems w a s alternative lifestylers.
A s described in chapter 3, s o m e alternative lifestylers were keen to generate their o w n
power using renewable energy, although individual households would have chosen small
systems. There also existed larger alternative communities, which were possible candidates
for medium-sized wind power.

One alternative community which did use wind power was the Moora Moora Cooperative,
comprising about twenty-five households. T h e Cooperative w a s located near Healesville,
about 60 k m east of Melbourne (Victoria).22 In 1979, residents had resisted S E C V plans to
extend the grid to their community; it w a s apparently the first community to oppose gridconnection.23 In 1986, the community installed a locally built 16 k W Darrieus vertical-axis
wind generator.24 The project received a small grant by the Victorian Solar Energy Council

23

Andrew Blakers and Mark Diesendorf, "Putting down the sun", Soft Technology, N o , 18, 1985, pp.
12-16, at p. 12. See also Andrew Blakers, "Subsidies and electricity commissions", South Wind, No.
14-15, 1984, p. 10.
For example, a wind power enthusiast, Paul Hutchinson of South Australia, set up the Wind Power
Research Foundation in the early 1980s, with the intention of installing demonstration grid-connected
wind generators, but none were installed. Australasian Wind Energy Association, "Private funding",
South 0 W , N o . 14-15,1984, pp. 19-20.
Moora Moora cooperative is described in Peter Cock and Robert Rich, A Community's Experience of
Living with Appropriate Energy Technology: a Case Study of the Moora Moora Co-Operative,
Victoria, Department of Geography and Environmental Science, Monash University, 1992.
ibid.
Darrieus wind turbines have several advantages compared with horizontal axis turbines. They do not
require a yawing mechanism, and the gearbox and generator can be located at a low level for ease of
maintenance. O n the minus side, they are not self-starting, and are difficult to regulate in high speeds.
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The community had reasoned that

winds would be strong and consistent enough to ensure the project w a s viable—they were
located on a windy mountain—and that they could share use and maintenance of the
machine. The project w a s unsuccessful, in part because the winds were too light and
unreliable, and the system w a s technologically too complex. The community concluded that
solar panels, supplemented by fossil fuel generators, were a m u c h more reliable option.26

5.3.3 Mars Confectionery
In contrast to the M o o r a M o o r a turbine, Mars Confectionery's private turbine w a s installed
in the grid area with the cooperation of the electricity authority. Installed in 1983 at the
company's factory in Ballarat (Victoria), the imported 55 k W Windmatic unit w a s the first
medium-sized wind turbine on the Australian mainland.27 The driver w a s said to be the " U S
parent's philosophical commitment to research into renewable energy".28 Mars had sought
funding through both N E R D D P and V S E C but w a s unsuccessful. V S E C denied funding
because the technology w a s imported rather than being manufactured locally; however, it
provided a grant towards the cost of monitoring the wind turbine's performance.29

The SECV treated the Mars turbine as an experiment in connecting a generator to the low
voltage grid. Usually, the S E C V ' s Standby and Parallel Supplies tariff, which applied to
cogenerators and other private generators, was available only to high voltage users. L o w
voltage parallel generation plant, the S E C V claimed, could be unsafe: "Under certain
circumstances, parallel connected generation plant can backfeed into the supply grid
creating a potentially lethal situation".30 T h e power output of Mars' turbine w a s used within
the factory; thus Mars was not selling electricity to the grid. Usually, the S E C V required a
cogenerator in a similar position to pay a standby tariff of several dollars per k W per month
for the power normally supplied by the cogenerator. The S E C V agreed to waive the normal

25
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Victorian Solar Energy Council, Annual Report, 1986.
Cock and Rich, 1992, op. cit.
Jan Giezen, Windpower in Ballarat: A Report on the Experience With the First Industrial Size Win
Driven Generator on the Australian Mainland, Mars Confectionery of Australia, Ballarat, 1984.
Stephen Rosenthal reporting on interview with Jan Giezen in Stephen Rosenthal, "Windmill helps
power Victorian Factory", Australian Financial Review, 23 May 1983, p. 28.
ibid.; Giezen, 1984, op. cit.
ibid.,p. I.
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standby charge.31 Normally the standby charge applied to the nameplate rating of the
customer's power plant.32 Yet to apply this charge to the nameplate rating of a wind turbine
seems excessive, since wind turbines produce on average around 2 0 to 4 0 % of their rated
power, and the Mars wind turbine's output w a s m u c h less than this. Clearly the S E C V ' s
Standby and Parallel Supplies tariff w a s not designed around the characteristics of
generators with a highly variable output.

The Mars generator later suffered mechanical problems. Its power output was poor, as it
had been sited in a low wind speed area; the limited wind monitoring performed before
installation had overestimated the average wind speeds.33 In 1988, the turbine w a s destroyed
in high winds after the brake system failed.34

At both Mars and Moora Moora, the installers of the wind turbines were generating power
for their o w n use. The third example I describe w a s an unsuccessful attempt to install wind
turbines with the aim of selling electricity to the utility.

5.3.4 Tasmanian Wind Enterprises
In 1983 a group called Tasmanian W i n d Enterprises ( T W E ) proposed to buy two 55 k W
Danish wind turbines to install on King Island.35 T W E wished to sell power to the H E C at a
price representing 9 0 % of the cost of diesel saved, a price which it considered would allow
it to m a k e a profit.36 The project w a s approved by the Tasmanian government in principle,
and negotiations handed over to the H E C . 3 7 The H E C and T W E were quickly able to reach
an acceptable agreement on the technical requirements for connection of wind turbines to

3

State Electricity Commission of Victoria, Letter to Mars Confectionery, 2 September 1982, V S E C
Papers, Victorian Public Records Office.
State Electricity Commission of Victoria, Cogeneration of Electricity: Proposal for a New Standby
and Parallel Supplies Tariff, 1983. This was the case for the existing tariff.
Giezen, 1984, op. cit.
Mars Confectionery, Report on Wind Generator, 1988, unpublished report in V S E C papers, Victorian
Public Records Office.
The saga of the HEC's efforts to install wind turbines on King Island is described below.
J.R. Fox and J. Greenhill, King Island Wind Energy Project: Report on Negotiations Between the
Hydro-Electric Commission and Tasmanian Wind Enterprises 1983-1984, 1984, unpublished
document; Steve Beckenham, "The use of wind power in Tasmania", South Wind, No. 12-13, 1983,
pp. 27-31; Australasian Wind Energy Association, "Private funding", 1984, op. cit. The group
intended to form a company when agreement was reached with the H E C .
Fox and Greenhill, 1984, op. cit.
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the grid; it w a s the commercial aspects that were the m a i n source of contention. T h e H E C
and T W E disagreed o n h o w the purchase price of wind p o w e r should be related to the price
of diesel fuel saved: the H E C argued that wind p o w e r w a s worth 7 0 % of the cost of fuel
savings; while T W E argued: "based o n mathematical models, Western Australian and
overseas wind generator experience with similar systems", the value w a s over 9 0 % . Both,
however, agreed to a joint study to settle the question.38 A matter of greater dispute w a s
price indexation. T h e H E C offered to index the price to the cost of diesel fuel, but only up
to a certain price; thus, it would quickly b e c o m e a fixed price contract. T h e early 1980s w a s
an era of moderately high inflation, and T W E w a s not willing to accept the H E C ' s offer,
instead seeking to have the price indexed to the price of diesel fuel, the consumer price
index, or the Tasmanian electricity price.39 F o x and Greenhill recalled:
W e pointed out to the H E C that while T W E was accepting all the risks associated with a
relatively new technology for a modest return on its investment, the H E C was taking no
risk since the contract would ensure that the electricity would throughout the contract
period be supplied to them at or below their cost of production. W e were told that our
indexation proposals would result in T W E making excessive profits. Ironically w e were
told almost in the same breath that wind energy was not economic on King Island and that
the H E C believed T W E would fail financially.40
Since they could not reach agreement o n this matter, negotiations broke d o w n .

5.3.5 Overview
With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that in the first t w o cases, the advocates'
expectations of wind power's technical capability were overly optimistic. Both machines
were unreliable and produced little power, in part because of this unreliability and in part
because the wind regime w a s worse than anticipated. While it cannot be k n o w n h o w the
wind turbines proposed by T W E would have performed, it is k n o w n that the early 1980s
expectation of escalating oil prices did not eventuate. These were, of course, early days for
wind power: wind turbines were still experimental, and m a n y commentators were optimistic
about their economic and technical prospects. Indeed, the s a m e can usually be said about
the supporters of any n e w technology; expressing optimism about a n e w technology is
usually a necessary strategy to secure funding, build support networks and develop markets.

ibid.
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W h a t themes then can be drawn from these three cases? The drivers were similar: all three
were seeking to demonstrate the technical or economic viability of wind power at a time
w h e n wind power was an immature technology. There are also clear differences: M o o r a
M o o r a was an alternative community wishing to use alternative technologies; Mars
Confectionery was a company keen to project a 'green' image; and T W E w a s a group of
wind energy enthusiasts wishing to counter the electricity utility's position that wind power
was not viable.

There are also clear differences in the role played by the electricity utility: Moora Moora,
keeping with the popular A T ideal, sought independence from the electricity utility; Mars
Confectionery worked cooperatively with the utility (which had been directed by the
government to investigate renewable energy); while T W E w a s unable to form a cooperative
relationship with the Tasmanian utility. M o o r a M o o r a w a s able to circumvent the electricity
utility; thus the utility's ability to impose its interpretation of wind power's technical
capability was irrelevant. M o o r a M o o r a was also able to tap into the resources of another
energy agency, V S E C , which had a more favourable interpretation of wind power's
capability. T W E , on the other hand, through its proposed demonstration wind farm, sought
to undermine the electricity utility's legitimacy as the authoritative voice on assessing wind
power's economics and technical performance, but w a s thwarted in its attempt.

5.4 Wind Energy for Remote Areas
5.4.1 Introduction
The electricity utilities and energy agencies that investigated the use of wind power during
the 1980s were, in most instances, seeking alternatives to diesel generation. Diesel fuel was
used extensively for power generation in remote areas, with uniform tariff policies giving
utilities an incentive to find cheaper alternatives. Following the 1970s oil price hikes,
energy policy was concerned mainly with reducing liquid fuel usage. For a time there were
fears that oil prices would continue to rise. S o m e utilities pursued grid extension, to the
dismay of renewable energy advocates, w h o saw remote area power supplies as an ideal
niche market for renewables.41 Yet, in nearly all states, the electricity utility or another

See for example Gilchrist's scathing criticisms of the decision to proceed with electrification of far-
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energy agency undertook studies, albeit limited, into the use of wind power in remote areas.

Because of the wind's intermittency, it cannot be used alone to provide power in a remote
area. It is possible to use battery storage, but since the wind m a y not blow for days, wind
systems require a large battery system. T o reduce storage requirements, wind can be used in
conjunction with other generators such as diesel or photovoltaics: these are called hybrid
systems. R e m o t e area power supply ( R A P S ) systems c o m e in a range of sizes. R e m o t e
householders often had to purchase their o w n generating system, or pay for connection to
the grid. M a n y remote communities were supplied by a local network, o w n e d and operated
by the electricity utility. W i n d power in remote communities w a s viewed by utilities as a
w a y of supplementing, rather than replacing, diesel plant.

There are many reasons why remote householders living in windy areas would not opt for
wind plant: uncertainty about the wind resources; lack of information; concerns about
unreliability; lack of suppliers and maintenance services. Finding a suitable location for a
wind turbine w a s also difficult. Muriel Watt from the E A N S W noted:
It [is] much easier to site a R A P S system based on solar than on wind. The E A N S W had
tremendous problemsfindingsuitable sites for their systems ... People don't build their
houses in the windiest part of their property, in fact they tend to do the opposite.42
Rodney Jensen, w h o had conducted a national market research survey on R A P S systems
thought that the lack of knowledge about the wind regime and its intermittency w a s a major
deterrent to potential users:
[I]t is difficult to predict the feasibility of a wind turbine in marginal inland areas and many
homesteads have found wind power in the past to be an unreliable source of power even on
a limited basis as a lighting plant. Such households have in most cases 'up-graded' to diesel
sets and would not go back to wind power in spite of the great advances that have been
made in electronics and aerodynamics that make wind power far more viable today than it
was in the past.43
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west N S W . Gavin Gilchrist, The Big Switch: Clean Energy for the Twenty-first Century, Allen &
Unwin, St. Leonards, N S W , 1994. Berrill claimed that Queensland's rural electrification proceeded in
locations where wind power may have been suitable. Trevor Berrill, pers. comm, December 2000.
Muriel Watt, Wind Energy Workshop, National Energy Research, Development and Demonstration
Program Workshop, Department of Resources and Energy (Aus.), and the Energy Authority of N e w
South Wales, Sydney, 21-22 November 1985, p. 42. Quote is taken from a summary of Watt's
comments.
Rodney Jensen, 'The state of the art in diesel, wind and solar power for remote area", APACE
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Economic considerations were an important factor, since wind power systems incur a
capital cost. Governments initially did not provide assistance to users of R A P S systems,
though this started to change in the late 1980s. In 1987 N S W became the first state to
introduce financial assistance in the form of the R e m o t e Area P o w e r Assistance Scheme.
But, as Watt noted, few were likely to choose wind:
[W]ith the current restricted supply of reliable, locally manufactured wind generators, combined
with the almost non-existing servicing facilities, it is likely that grant recipients will choose
44

diesel, diesel-battery and photovoltaic based systems in preference to wind generators.

The remainder of this section deals with the use of wind power by remote communities
rather than by remote householders. M a n y off-grid areas are in northern and inland
Australia, where it was believed that the wind resource w a s poor. In a few remote locations,
mostly islands, the wind resource was k n o w n to be good, and it w a s in these locations that
energy agencies and electricity utilities focused their attention.

5.4.2 W e s t e r n Australia
The electricity utility with the best record for using wind power in remote areas w a s the
State Energy Commission of Western Australia ( S E C W A ) . Parts of the W A

coast

experience high winds; yet S E C W A had a more compelling reason for its interest in wind
energy. S E C W A

supplied power to m a n y isolated communities: in the early 1980s,

S E C W A ' s remote area diesel stations had a combined capacity of 140 M W . 4 5 M a n y of the
W A wind power projects were undertaken as part of S E C W A ' s R e m o t e Area P o w e r Supply
Investigation established in 1978.46 S E C W A regarded grid extension as uneconomic in
most cases, and saw photovoltaics and wind power as the most promising renewable energy
technologies to replace diesel power. 47

Apart from SECWA, other groups worked on WA wind projects, and a synergistic
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Newsletter, No. 23, 1984.
Muriel Watt, "The status of wind energy development in N S W " , Solar '86, Australian and N e w
Zealand Solar Energy Society Conference, Adelaide, 13-15 November 1986, pp. 377-387, at p. 385.
T.S. Crawford (SECWA), "Wind power projects in Western Australia", Proceedings of Solar and
Wind Data Network for Australia, Canberra, 19-20 October 1981.
State Energy Commission of Western Australia, Annual Report, 1977-78, p. 5.; T.S. Crawford,
"Remote area power investigation in Western Australia 1979-1986", Engineering Conference:
Developing Remote Areas, Darwin, 11-15 M a y 1987, pp. 416-419.
Crawford, 1981, op. cit.; Crawford, 1987, op. cit.
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relationship w a s evident. T h e Solar Energy Research Institute of Western Australia
( S E R I W A ) funded several wind energy projects.48 A manufacturer of medium-sized wind
turbines, Westwind Turbines, w a s located in W A . It worked very closely with S E C W A on
several wind projects, and built a number of wind turbines rated up to 60 k W . Murdoch
University and the University of Western Australia undertook several wind projects in
technology development and site assessment.49

SECWA's (and Australia's) first two medium-sized wind turbines were installed in 1980 at
Rottnest Island, a small tourist destination located off Perth. O n e w a s a 50 k W

DAF

vertical-axis turbine from Canada, the other a 22 k W M A N downwind, horizontal-axis
turbine from W e s t Germany. Both were experimental models. The D A F turbine w a s judged
a "spectacular failure".50 Plagued by operational and mechanical problems, it w a s damaged
in 1983 by gale force winds.5 T h e M A N turbine, one of only two prototypes of this design,
also suffered mechanical failure, and the locally manufactured tower proved inadequate.
The turbine w a s replaced with a n e w M A N design, and the tower w a s also replaced; yet the
M A N turbine still proved unsatisfactory, requiring "excessively frequent overhauls".52 B y
1985, both turbines had been dismantled.53 Interestingly, neither came from Denmark,
where the most successful turbines were developed; and both the vertical-axis and the
downwind, horizontal-axis turbine design soon lost out to the dominant Danish design of an
upwind, horizontal-axis turbine.

In 1983, SECWA installed on Rottnest Island a Danish 55 kW Nordtank upwind,
horizontal-axis turbine.54 Although difficult to maintain, the Nordtank turbine w a s the most
reliable and cost effective of the three turbines55—indeed, the performance of Danish
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S E R I W A also developed solar technologies for remote area power supplies.
A list of the renewable energy R D & D projects carried out in Western Australia between 1979 and
1986 is given in Crawford, 1987, op. cit.
M . Rosser ( S E C W A ) , "Ten Mile Lagoon wind farm performance analysis", Wind Energy Workshop,
Asia Pacific Wind Energy Centre, Monash University, Clayton (Vic), 4 July 1994.
T.S. Crawford ( S E C W A ) , "Experience with three wind energy converters operating in parallel with
diesel generators at Rottnest Island", Electric Energy Conference 1984: Low Fault Level Systems,
Perth, 7-9 M a y 1984, pp. 144-148.
ibid., T.S. Crawford (SECWA), "Regional reports: Western Australia", South Wind, No. 18,1985, p. 4.
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Crawford, 1984, op. cit.
T. Crawford ( S E C W A ) , "Large scale R A P S applications", Wind Energy Workshop, National Energy
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medium-sized wind turbines w a s improving rapidly during the early 1980s. T h e Nordtank
unit remained in operation for ten years, until is sustained a blade failure.56

Combining wind power with diesel generators on Rottnest Island revealed a number of
operational problems, both technical and human. 5 7 Since the m a x i m u m p o w e r rating of the
wind turbines constituted a high proportion of the island's m i n i m u m p o w e r d e m a n d (about
100 k W ) , and since the diesel generators were operating to provide spinning reserve for the
wind turbines, the diesel generators would sometimes be operating at low load.58 This led to
poor fuel efficiency, thereby reducing fuel savings. Lightly loading the diesels also put the
engines at risk of cylinder bore glazing, which could greatly increase the maintenance
costs.59 Moreover, the plant operator on Rottnest Island reportedly considered the wind
turbines to be a nuisance, and had no incentive to operate the system to maximise the wind
energy output and minimise diesel consumption. 60 P o w e r and Godley noted:
The Rottnest Island power station operator has not been particularly cooperative in running
the system as w e would like ... [W]ind systems will have to be designed to be more
acceptable to operators if w e are to expect the operator to cooperate in their use.
Operator uncooperativeness also suggests s o m e incompatibility between the operating
characteristics of wind turbines and the culture and practices of electricity system operators,
as discussed in section 2.2.5. A s Power and Godley imply, this could be a significant barrier
for wind power. I return to this point in section 5.5.2.

SECWA's experience at Rottnest Island reflects the rapid development in wind turbine
technology between 1980 and 1983. It also reflects S E C W A ' s lack of knowledge about the
operation of wind-diesel systems. S E C W A noted that Australia had little information about
the operation of wind-diesel systems from other countries; indeed, only a few such systems
existed.62 Difficulties on Rottnest Island did not deter S E C W A from continuing its wind
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43^16; Crawford, 1984, op. cit.
Rosser, 1994, op. cit.
These are discussed in Crawford, 1984, op. cit.
'Spinning reserve' refers to on-line capacity that operates at less than full load, and is available to
meet demand immediately in the event of a contingency, such as loss of generator.
'Glazing' of the cylinder bores of a diesel engine refers to the deposit of a hard residue on the
cylinder wall from burnt engine oil. This hinders proper mating of the piston rings and cylinder walls.
The removal of glazing requires that the engine be disassembled.
Crawford, "Large scale R A P S applications", 1985, op. cit.
V.F. Power and R. Godley, "Development of improved wind turbine control", Solar World Congress,
International Solar Energy Society Congress, Perth, 14-19 August 1983, pp. 2374-2377.
Crawford, "Large scale R A P S applications", 1985, op. cit.
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power program, but it elected tofirstconduct tests within the grid area.63 A n d since the high
penetration of wind power on Rottnest Island had caused problems with the diesel
generators, S E C W A concluded that until further experience w a s gained, the wind capacity
on a diesel system would be limited to one third of the m i n i m u m system load.64

The three Rottnest Island wind turbines were imported; but the next SECWA medium-sized
wind turbine w a s manufactured by a small W A company, Westwind Turbines. Westwind
began manufacturing wind turbines in the early 1980s.65 The owners were motivated by a
strong opposition to nuclear energy and a desire to develop alternatives,66 clearly sharing
the sentiments of alternative technology advocates and environmentalists described in
chapter 3. Initially, Westwind built a 11 k W wind turbine, but it proved a disaster.67 It then
gained experience with an imported turbine, through being contracted to import, assemble
and install the Nordtank unit for S E C W A ' s third Rottnest Island wind turbine project.68 In
1984, w h e n S E C W A had m o v e d its wind testing program to the mainland, Westwind built
and installed two grid-connected turbines (30 k W and 60 k W ) for S E C W A at South
Fremantle.69 T h e following year thefirstproduction version of the Westwind 60 k W turbine
w a s installed at the W o o d m a n Point water treatment works in W A . 7 0

Westwind's 60 kW turbine served as prototype for Australia's largest wind development of
the 1980s: a small wind farm at Salmon Beach, Esperance.71 Located on W A ' s south coast
about 700 k m east of Perth, Esperance has a population of about 6500. It has S E C W A ' s
largest diesel-powered isolated grid. In the early 1980s, S E C W A had undertaken a wind-
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Crawford, 1984, op. cit.
T.S. Crawford, "Wind energy developments in Western Australia 1980-1986", Solar '86, Australian
and N e w Zealand Solar Energy Society Conference, Adelaide, 13-15 November 1986, pp. 388-395.
Stann noted that a 2 0 % penetration 'rule of thumb' was being used. I. Stann, "Pushing wind to its
limit", Solar '91, Australian and N e w Zealand Solar Energy Society Conference, Adelaide, 5-7
December 1991, pp. 100-108.
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Australia'sfirstmedium scale windgenerator", South Wind, No. 14-15,1984, pp. 7-8.
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Rosser, 1994, op. cit.; Department of Resources and Energy, Compendium of Australian Energy
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T.S. Crawford and J.A. Hartley, "Operational experience and environmental impact of the 360 k W
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monitoring program at 18 coastal and inland sites, mostly off-grid, from B r o o m e in the
north to Esperance and Eucla on the south coast. Esperance recorded the highest average
wind speed of 7.2 m/s. 72 In 1986, S E C W A and Westwind were awarded $265,000 from
N E R D D P to develop the Esperance wind farm.73 The grant w a s to cover 4 0 % of the project
costs.74 Oil prices plummeted in 1986; following this, the wind farm w a s deemed a breakeven project for S E C W A .

The wind farm comprised six 60 kW Westwind turbines, which supplemented a 14 MW
diesel power station. The turbines supplied only a small proportion of electricity demand:
the Esperance load typically ranged from 2 M W to 6 M W and the average energy supplied
by the wind turbines was 2 % of total energy demand. 76 The m a x i m u m instantaneous
proportion that the wind turbines could contribute (if they were generating at full capacity
during periods of m i n i m u m system demand) was less than 2 0 % . Thus while the use of wind
power led to some savings of diesel fuel, the effect on the operation of the diesel generators
was minimal: the diesel generators would not be forced into low-load operation, a situation
that had caused problems on Rottnest Island. In the 1990s, S E C W A investigated w a y s of
increasing the penetration of wind power. This is described in chapter 8.

The Esperance wind farm was commissioned in March 1987, with the turbines proving very
reliable. The wind farm was recently decommissioned due to urban encroachment.

5.4.3 Bass Strait Islands
King Island and Flinders Island, located in windy Bass Strait and considered part of
Tasmania, also relied on diesel power generation. King Island in particular has long been
considered a suitable location for wind power development.78 The island's two mini-grids,
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centred on the main towns, did not reach m a n y farms (though this started to change in the
mid 1980s 79 ); so some householders had installed their o w n small wind energy systems.80
A n agent of Dunlite (a manufacturer of small wind turbines) was resident on King Island
and thus w a s available to service the wind turbines.81

For many years the Hydro-Electric Commission of Tasmania (HEC) investigated the
prospects for larger-scale wind power on King Island. The H E C ' s interest predates the oil
shocks: it called for tenders for a wind turbine as early as 1961.82 The most promising
turbine offered, though still in the prototype stage, w a s a 116 k W turbine from the U K . It
was reckoned capable of producing power at a significantly lower cost than diesel (1.52
p / k W h compared to 2.18p/kWh) but the proposal was rejected.83 However, wind power
R & D programs were being terminated in the early 1960s.

The 1950s had been a promising time for wind power in Europe. After World War 2, fears
of fuel shortages led a few countries to investigate the potential of wind power for gridconnection. In Denmark, Johannes Juul (whose designs formed the basis for the successful
Danish models of the 1970s and 1980s) undertook extensive experimentation with wind
turbines, and built the 200 k W

Gedser wind turbine; Golding published in 1955 a

comprehensive book on wind power (which w a s republished in 1976); and the United
Nations held in 1961 a conference on n e w sources of energy, including wind power. 84 B y
the early 1960s, the promise of nuclear power and the further discoveries of oil allayed fears
of energy shortages. Interest in wind power faded rapidly.

After the oil shocks and wind power's subsequent renaissance, there were several proposals
by the H E C and others to install wind turbines on King Island but none came to fruition.
While S E C W A was actively experimenting with wind power, the H E C confined itself to
wind monitoring and paper studies, mostly funded by the federal government. A s described

Stuart Campbell and John van Leeuwen, Energy Supply for King Island, Monash University,
Graduate School of Environmental Science, 1988.
H.L. Vivian, Electricity Supply for King Island: An Evaluation of Small-Scale Wind Generators
Centre for Environmental Studies, University of Tasmania, 1983; Mark Diesendorf, "Wind power for
King and Flinders Islands?", South Wind, No. 2, 1980, p. 11.
Vivian, 1983, op. cit.; Diesendorf, Submission, 1982, op. cit.
Vivian, 1983, op. cit.
ibid., p. 78.
Nielsen, 1999, op. cit.; E.W. Golding, The Generation ofElectricity by Wind Power, E.& F.N. Spon,
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below, some advocates of wind power in A u s W E A suggested that the H E C w a s not serious
about wind power for King Island: its investigations were merely perfunctory. A t this time,
the H E C was embroiled in a bitter environmental struggle over its plan to build the Gordonbelow-Franklin hydro power station. M e m b e r s of A u s W E A were also opposed to the hydro
project, suggesting that wind power be considered for the Tasmanian

mainland.85

Undoubtedly A u s W E A ' s attitude towards the H E C w a s shaped by the hydro controversy.

In 1978, the HEC again sought tenders for wind turbines for King Island calling for
generators rated at least 100 k W . 8 6 At that time, most, wind turbine developers were
optimistic about the rapid development of large and medium-sized wind turbines, barely
anticipating the immense technical difficulties they would face. T h e Danish

wind

entrepreneurs, whose designs later proved more successful, were building turbines mostly
rated less than 50 k W , 8 7 an exception being the 2 M W Tvindmill. T h e H E C approached 34
firms, but received only one offer for a turbine rated over 100 k W . This 140 k W machine
was experimental and the H E C deemed it uneconomic. 88 It is possible that the H E C sought
a relatively large machine because it believed that larger machines were more cost effective.
In another study published soon after the H E C noted:
[US] economic studies of horizontal axis machines confirm that the unit cost of the
on

electrical energy decreases with increasing machine size at least up to 2-3 M W .

Over the next three years, the HEC with the aid of a NERDDP grant continued its
investigation into the potential for wind power on King Island, monitoring wind speeds at
five sites. High average wind speeds (about 8 m/s) were recorded at three King Island sites,
and higher (10.5 rn/s) at one Flinders Island site, but the latter experienced frequent
excessive wind speeds, an undesirable feature.90 During these three years the Danes had
made substantial improvements in medium-sized wind turbine technology. But it w a s not
until after 1982, w h e n the market for wind turbines market took off in California, that
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Danish wind turbines c a m e to be accepted as the most reliable. Turbine reliability improved
rapidly during the early 1980s as the Danish and California markets burgeoned.

During these three years, the HEC seemed to be shifting its view that bigger was better and
cheaper—at least for wind turbines on King Island. In a 1981 study for the H E C , H u g h
Outhred (member of A u s W E A and electrical engineering academic) compared the predicted
performance on King and Flinders Islands of two wind turbines: a 5 k W Dunlite turbine
from Australia, and a 200 k W W T G turbine from the USA. 9 1 The latter w a s then one of the
largest commercially available wind turbines.92 The H E C had advised Outhred that the
installed cost of the W T G turbine on King Island could be three times higher than on
mainland U S A ; thus the capital cost of the 200 k W turbine w a s put at A U $ 3 5 0 0 / k W , while
the 5 k W machine w a s put at A U $ 2 0 0 0 / k W . 9 3 Outhred concluded that the small wind
turbines were m u c h cheaper than diesel generation even with no real increase in the oil
price, while the large turbine w a s cost effective only if there w a s a modest increase in the
real oil price.94 H e recommended use of both small and large wind turbines: small turbines
could be privately o w n e d and distributed around the network, since land requirements,
operating costs and losses would be less than if they were owned and operated by the H E C ;
while large wind turbines were better able to exploit the windiest locations.95

Outhred was in effect arguing that an arrangement similar to that in Denmark, where private
owners of distributed wind turbines sold power to the grid, would produce power
significantly cheaper than that from diesel generation. Such an arrangement would have
required not only a private individual or group willing to install wind turbines, but also the
cooperation of the H E C , an agreement on technical connection requirements, and an
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appropriate buyback price set by the H E C . A s described above, w h e n such an arrangement
was proposed, the buyback price was the sticking point.

In 1981, the HEC was awarded a NERDDP grant of $100,000 for the installation and
monitoring of two medium-sized wind turbines on King Island.96 The H E C sought tenders
for wind turbines in the range 20 to 60 k W , noting: "because of the larger number of
manufacturers involved, more competitive prices would be obtained for generators under
60 k W in size".97 In contrast to S E C W A , w h o a year earlier had installed two experimental
turbines on Rottnest Island, the H E C

was adamant that it "was not interested in
no

experimental or unproven prototype equipment".

The HEC received only two tenders.99 It concluded that it was too expensive to proceed,
and that it would need a capital contribution of nearly $250,000 to m a k e the project
economic, and thus did not accept the N E R D D P grant.100 M a r k Diesendorf of A u s W E A
hotly disputed the H E C ' s conclusions. H e performed his o w n calculations based on the cost
of Danish 55 k W machines and data estimated from other sources—the H E C did not m a k e
public its economic evaluation or the data on which it w a s based—and concluded that wind
power should be significantly cheaper than diesel generation, even without the $100,000
subsidy. H e also challenged the H E C ' s tendering process, arguing that the H E C had not
advertised its call for tenders in any overseas publication and had specified too tight a
timeline for overseas manufacturers. Diesendorf concluded that the Danish wind turbine
manufacturers had not been able to tender, suggesting: "the H E C must have used a very
expensive aerogenerator from elsewhere as a basis for costing".101 H e invited the H E C to
respond in South Wind with details of its economic evaluation, but received no response.

As described in section 5.3.4, a private group sought to install wind turbines on King Island
in 1983-84, but could not gain the H E C ' s agreement on the price indexation clause in the
contract. It was not until 1998 that medium-sized wind turbines were installed on King
Island. This is described in chapter 8.
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5.4.4 N e w South W a l e s
N S W was not regarded as a favourable location for wind power. A s described in chapter 4,
the N S W government's rhetoric about renewable energy referred to the state's solar rather
than wind resources. Most remote locations in N S W were thought to have low average wind
speeds. N S W also has a very extensive electricity network, and the state's ESI has favoured
grid extension to remote areas rather than remote area power supplies using renewable
energy. Indeed the N S W electricity utilities took very little interest in renewable energy
during this period, leaving it to the Energy Authority of N e w South Wales ( E A N S W ) to
undertake most of the investigations into renewable energy.

There was one remote area in NSW known to have a good wind resource—Lord Howe
Island. A small island, located about 700 k m from the N S W coast, it is a popular tourist
destination. In 1982 it was entered on the U N E S C O World Heritage List. Like most other
remote locations Lord H o w e Island relied on diesel fuel for its power generation, a costly
option but one which in this case posed a special problem: disposal of the 200-litre fuel
drums. About 3000 drums were imported per year (1979 figures), and returning the empty
drums to the mainland was expensive.102 In 1979, the Lord H o w e Island Board requested
that an examination of the island's energy usage be undertaken by E A N S W . Emerging from
this examination was a proposal for a wind turbine to be interconnected into the island's
electricity grid, enabling significant fuel and cost savings.103 Wind monitoring revealed that
the island had average wind speeds in excess of 8 m/s in some locations.104

Aside from the drum disposal problem, Lord Howe Island, which had an excellent wind
resource, would probably have been thefirstsite in N S W where wind power would be an
economic proposition. Yet it was not to be. O f course the decision regarding wind power for
the island was not simply an economic one. The main economic benefits of installing a
wind turbine on the island would accrue to the Electricity Commission of N e w South Wales
(Elcom)—the cost of providing electricity to the island was about 53c/kWh, while the
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average tariff was only 13c/kWh 1 0 5 -yet the project would have to be approved by the Lord
H o w e Island Board, w h o had no such economic incentive. Indeed, it is unlikely that remote
communities would wish even to draw attention to the fact that they were being so heavily
subsidised—publicity about a wind turbine might thus be deemed undesirable. Local
environmental concerns would also play a role. It is often the case that w h e n choosing a site
for a wind turbine, the windiest sites are found to have the highest visual impact. Lord
H o w e Island was small and a World Heritage area; hence, the environmental aspects of
wind turbine siting were particularly crucial. Thus the windiest site, Transit Hill, w a s
discounted on environmental grounds, while the more environmentally appropriate site near
the airport was thought to have significantly lower wind speeds.

In 1986, EANSW proposed to the Lord Howe Island Board to install a 150 kW generator,
identical to the one installed at Malabar (see below). The Board deferred its decision until
the testing at Malabar was complete.107

Meanwhile the EANSW was also exploring wind power options for the mainland. In
February 1984 the N S W Energy Minister announced that the state government would be
embarking on a comprehensive wind energy program, including an investigation into the
feasibility of installing a wind turbine at Malabar in Sydney, a study to locate windy sites in
N S W , an examination into increased use of wind and solar energy for remote area power
supplies, and the encouragement of a local wind energy industry.108

EANSW soon installed a medium-sized wind turbine at Malabar. Although installed in the
grid area, it was intended to be a test facility for investigations into remote area wind power.
Since wind power was being investigated for use in remote areas of N S W (particularly Lord
H o w e Island), it was thought that a pilot wind turbine w a s necessary to allow experience to
be gained in the use of the technology, and the technology to be appropriately evaluated.109
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Prior to this, the only wind turbines installed in Australia were rated 60 k W or less. The
investigation at Malabar led to the installation of a 150 k W wind turbine, the largest in
Australia until the 1990s. B y 1984, w h e n this project was proposed, wind power was
starting to be seen in a n e w light: the technology had been developing rapidly overseas, and
medium-sized units (over 100 k W ) were looking promising.110 W i n d monitoring conducted
at Malabar over a four-month period in 1984 indicated that this w a s a high wind site: the
average wind speed was 6.3 m/s (at 22 m elevation) while the long term average was
estimated to be 7.1 m/s. 111 After tenders were called for generators in the 100-200 k W
range, a 150 k W Windmaster generator manufactured by H M Z of Belgium was selected.112
(The generator w a s later deemed to be rated 175 kW. 1 1 3 ) The wind turbine w a s installed in
September 1986. For m u c h of its shortfirstlife, the Malabar wind turbine was used in a
N E R D D P - f u n d e d project to evaluate the use of wind generation in parallel with a diesel
generator, thus simulating an isolated community power supply.114

In 1989, a study into electricity supply on Lord Howe Island reported that the Malabar wind
turbine would be m a d e available for use on the island, and transported and installed for
about $200,000, with the net annual savings to Elcom from such a project estimated at
$62,000.'15 But one month after this study, a lightning strike knocked out the transformer of
the Malabar generator. The wind turbine was left at the Malabar site but decommissioned.

The other main part of the NSW's wind energy program was the identification of windy
sites in the state. The E A N S W did little wind monitoring. Several other bodies such as the
Bureau of Meteorology already collected information on wind speeds, though not in the
form required for assessing wind power potential.116 The E A N S W used these various data
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to draw general conclusion about wind speeds in the state. T h e windiest locations were
thought to be along the coast (annual averages of about 6-7 m/s) and in s o m e exposed areas
in the Great Dividing Range (annual averages of up to 8 m/s), while m u c h of the inland w a s
considered to have low wind speeds (about 3^1 m/s).

The presumption that inland sites generally had a poor wind resource had been challenged
by K e n Inall from the Australian National University. Since 1978, Inall had been
monitoring a few sites in north-western N S W and the A C T to assess the wind energy
resource.118 Inall found that measured wind speeds greatly underestimated the wind
resource due to the effect of the night-time temperature inversion layer, which occurred in
m a n y inland areas. O n clear nights, the ground at inland sites tends to cool rapidly, and the
layer of cold air near the ground can become decoupled from the winds at higher levels. T h e
thickness of this inversion layer varies from about ten to hundreds of metres.

M o s t wind

speeds measurements were taken at a standard height, typically 10 metres, usually well
within the inversion layer. A wind shear rule w a s then applied to enable the wind speed to
be estimated at greater heights. T h e exponent of the wind shear rule w a s a function of the
terrain.120 However, this wind shear rule is of little use if there is a temperature inversion
layer and its thickness is unknown.

At White Cliffs, a small town already home to Australia's first solar power station, Inall had
measured the wind speed at two locations, one on a hill. T h e higher site, where the
inversion layer w a s often below the height of the anemometer, w a s found to have m u c h
higher average wind speeds. Inall concluded:
The few anemometers installed at inland areas of Australia do not indicate that the winds
would provide an effective source of ener3gy. If, however, as is probably the case, they are
not mounted high enough to clear the still night air, the records could underrate the energy
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by 3-5 fold; such a factor would influence greatly the viability of a wind-power system.121
W o r k by Inall and others on the inversion layer suggested that the potential for wind power
in inland Australia might be m u c h greater than previously assumed, although there was
insufficient knowledge about the properties of the inversion layer to assess this potential.122
It also suggested that using the wind shear rule to extrapolate wind speeds could lead to a
significant underestimation of the potential for wind power. Later, wind power investigators
would place anemometers at the intended hub height.

The Malabar turbine was the only sizeable wind turbine installed in NSW during the 1980s,
and this project and other wind power studies were initiatives of the E A N S W , rather than
the electricity authority Elcom. But in the 1990s, Elcom (later called Pacific Power) would
become N S W ' s wind power champion. This is described in chapter 8.

5.4.5 Queensland and the Northern Territory
Meteorological considerations suggest that high wind speeds should be found in the
southern states of Australia, particularly along the coast. The southern coast of mainland
Australia lies between latitudes 32° S and 39° S; while the island of Tasmania lies south of
40° S. Strong westerly winds (the 'roaring forties') prevail in oceans around and south of
latitude 40° S. Coastal regions at higher latitudes were expected to have the best wind
resource, while the northern states, particularly Queensland and the Northern Territory
(NT), were considered poor candidates. S o m e areas were k n o w n to be exceptions: the
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation ( C S I R O ) produced in the
mid 1980s monthly wind speed m a p s based on Bureau of Meteorology data showing that
parts of Far North Queensland coast had very good wind resources.123

A sizeable remote community in the windy region of Far North Queensland lives on
Thursday Island, a small island in the Torres Strait. Thursday Island, with a population of
about 4000, had the largest isolated power station in Far North Queensland. Since
Queensland had uniform electricity tariffs for remote areas, the electricity authorities were
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seeking to reduce the cost of diesel generation.124 The State Electricity Commission of
Queensland (later the Queensland Electricity C o m m i s s i o n — Q E C ) and the Far North
Queensland Electricity Board started to investigate the use of wind power in the early
1980s,125 but it would take another decade before wind power for Thursday Island would
become a serious proposition. This episode is described in chapter 8.

A more extensive Queensland wind energy study was undertaken not by a state energy
agency but by a group of wind energy researchers headed by Neville Jones, an engineering
academic at the University of Queensland. T h e researchers were funded by a N E R D D P
grant of $95,000, with some financial assistance from the Queensland Energy Advisory
Committee. 126 Jones, a founder and former president of the Australasian W i n d Energy
Association, had long been interested in wind power, having undertaken research on wind
turbines in the U K during the 1970s.127 H e w a s also involved with the appropriate technology group, A P A C E . Trevor Berrill, a m e m b e r of Jones' research team had been inspired
by the U K alternative technology movement, w a s a m e m b e r of the anti-nuclear group
128

Friends of the Earth and had m u c h experience with solar hot water and R A P S systems.

The group began a wind monitoring study at 22 locations across southern Queensland. It
was a pilot survey, aimed at identifying wind patterns across the south of the state and sites
worthy of further investigation.130 The results of the survey revealed generally low average
wind speeds in the range 3 to 5 m/s, apart from one coastal site, Cape Moreton, which
recorded average wind speeds of nearly 8 m/s.131

In a few locations, the researchers used several anemometers, and so could assess how wind
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speed varied with height. Like Inall, the researchers found that inland sites were affected by
the night-time inversion layer. They determined that this had the effect of greatly increasing
the wind shear rule exponent, in one site from a predicted value of 0.15 to an actual value of
0.46, and in another site from 0.20 to 0.35.132 This meant that if wind speed measurements
taken at 10 m were extrapolated to hub height using the standard wind shear exponent, the
wind resource could up to four times greater than estimated.

Berrill maintained that there were a number of remote sites in Queensland where wind
power could have been competitive with diesel. While the wind speeds at 10 m were low, at
greater heights the wind regime w a s good due to the inversion layer. But the electricity
utilities were not willing to accept this, and deduced from the 10 m wind data alone that the
wind resource w a s poor. Soon after, the Q E C extended the electricity grid to a number of
these remote communities in the state's west.133

As in Queensland, it was thought that the Northern Territory did not experience the high
wind speeds found in the southern states. Nevertheless, in 1981 the N T Department of
Mines and Energy c o m m e n c e d a wind-monitoring program. The N T has m a n y small remote
communities, and it w a s thought that wind energy might be a viable alternative to diesel
generation.134 W i n d speeds in the north of N T were found to be very low; however, the area
around the inland town of Tennant Creek w a s considered to have a reasonable wind
resource.135 A small wind turbine of capacity 8 k W was installed in Tennant Creek in 1983
as part of a hybrid wind/diesel/fbattery system, but it w a s principally intended to be an
evaluation unit for remote homesteads.136 The following year the N T Department of Mines
and Energy undertook a study into the feasibility of integrating a 150 k W wind turbine into
the Tennant Creek grid, but found that wind would cost more than diesel generation. Yet,
there were plans to supply natural gas to Tennant Creek, and as natural gas is a m u c h
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cheaper fuel than diesel, wind power would become even less economically attractive.
Thus the wind proposal w a s shelved.

5.4.6 Over-view
Although it w a s c o m m o n claimed by energy agencies and electricity authorities that wind
power was suitable only for remote areas, only S E C W A actually installed and tested
medium-sized wind turbines in remote areas. The E A N S W tested a medium-sized wind
turbine by simulating a remote community, and other agencies or utilities installed, tested or
provided funding for small-scale remote systems.138 S E C W A , however, tested nine wind
turbines in the range 2 k W to 60 k W in a number of locations, and built the country's first
wind farm at Esperance.139 S E C W A w a s willing to experiment with wind power during the
period w h e n the technology w a s n e w and its performance unknown. In comparison, the
H E C , the authority responsible for power generation and supply in the windiest parts of
Australia (in Tasmania), w a s unwilling to experiment with wind power in the period w h e n
the technology w a s immature. Even w h e n the technology had matured, the H E C took well
over a decade to install a wind turbine.

To the extent that they seriously considered wind power, the utilities focused on remote
locations with wind speeds of least 7-8 m/s, such as Lord H o w e , Rottnest, King and
Flinders Islands. Yet, in its 1986 review of the N E R D D P W i n d Energy Subprogram the
Department of Resources and Energy noted:
The evaluation indicates that for [isolated homesteads, and small and large remote area
communities] wind hybrid systems are already probably economic, or close to economic, at
remote locations with average wind speeds in excess of 4-5 m/s.140
There are m a n y more remote communities in locations with average wind speeds in this
lower range. B y focusing on areas with high wind speeds, the utilities were adopting a
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conservative approach. Yet apart from in W A , wind turbines were not installed even in
these high wind speed areas, calling into question the c o m m o n l y portrayed idea that
electricity utilities evaluate energy options simply on the basis of cost.

On the other hand, there was only a short time when wind power was attractive to the
utilities. In the late 1970s, wind power w a s an immature and often unreliable technology.
The reliability and cost of medium-sized wind turbines improved rapidly during the first
half of the 1980s, thanks to the burgeoning Danish and Califomian markets. In 1986, oil
prices plummeted, and so too did interest in wind power. The electricity utilities usually
took a long time to evaluate wind power: they were accustomed to long-term planning of
electricity projects. The nature of the wind resource also caused delays. Since wind speeds
are very site-specific, and exhibit seasonal and yearly variation, it is generally
recommended that wind speed monitoring be undertaken for at least a year, preferably two.

In remote areas, wind power was required to fit in with an existing diesel system, rather
than the other w a y around. This could cause problems at reasonable levels of wind power
penetration. During periods of high wind power output and low demand there is little
demand on the diesel generators; yet the diesels still operate to provide spinning reserve.
Diesel generators operate inefficiently at low loads, and frequent low-load operation m a y
necessitate additional maintenance or shorten the generator's life. The usual rule was that
diesels should not operate below 4 0 % load; though some high-speed diesels could operate
successfully at lower loads.141 Diesel power stations usually consist of a few larger
machines; but for the optimum performance of a wind-diesel system, a number of smaller
diesel machines, which can be stopped and started as required, m a y be preferable.142 This is
particularly so if the operating decision is taken not to provide 1 0 0 % spinning reserve for
wind.143 Yet wind w a s evaluated in terms of h o w it performed compared with an existing
system, rather than an optimum wind-diesel system being designed from scratch.

Finally, can remote area wind power be considered an environmental technology?
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Crawford, 1986, op. cit.
Crawford, "Large scale R A P S applications", 1985, op. cit. See also Hugh Outhred, "Large scale
R A P S applications", Wind Energy Workshop, National Energy Research, Development and
Demonstration Program Workshop, Department of Resources and Energy (Aus.), and the Energy
Authority of N e w South Wales, Sydney, 21-22 November 1985, pp. 46-48.
This is discussed further in chapter 8.
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Environmental considerations were not driving the electricity utilities' interest in wind
power; the main incentive was cost. Yet, utilities operating wind turbines were happy to
parade these as evidence of their green credentials. Environmentalists regarded remote area
wind power as an environmental technology for other reasons: environmentalists of the
1970s were concerned about oil depletion; remote area wind power enhances self-reliance,
an important issue in early environmentalism; wind power reduces local environmental
problems caused by carriage and use of diesel fuel; and remote area wind power offers a
niche market, providing an opportunity for the technology to mature.

5.5 Wind Power in the Grid Areas
5.5.1 Introduction
Since Australia is well endowed with relatively cheap coal, natural gas and hydro resources,
w h y would electricity utilities consider using wind power for grid-connected electricity?
Countries which did institute a wind energy program, whether providing R & D funding for
wind systems development or stimulating greater use of wind power, were motivated
mainly by the fear of future energy shortages or price hikes. M a n y depended on imported
oil for electricity generation.

In Australia, very few grid-connected wind turbines were installed in this period, and all
were for testing and/or demonstration. In W A and N S W , grid-connected turbines were
installed to evaluate their performance for remote areas. However, during the 1980s, several
states undertook investigations into the potential for wind power in the grid areas. There
were two main drivers for this: pressures from environmentalists, and concerns about future
fuel supplies. Environmental pressures were evident in Victoria and Tasmania; indeed, in
both states the ESI had been the target of environmental protests from the early 1970s. The
effect of the Newport dispute on Victorian energy policy was explored in chapter 4. In
Tasmania, protests over hydro power developments and the cessation of the Gordon-belowFranklin project compelled the H E C to be seen to investigate alternatives. Future fuel
supplies were a concern in all states except Queensland, N S W and Victoria—these three
had plentiful supplies of black or brown coal. South Australia had limited reserves of poor
quality coal and was plagued by uncertainties over future natural gas prices. In Tasmania,
large areas had been turned into national parks and conservation areas leaving very few
potential hydro sites available for exploitation. Western Australia and Northern Territory
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depended on oil for power generation, though W A was able to shift to coal and natural gas
soon after thefirstoil shock. Recently, natural gas has also become available in N T . O f
these states, South Australia undertook the most substantial investigation into wind power.

In this section, I examine the background to and outcomes of the wind investigations in
Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania. ButfirstI explore a crucial debate of the 1980s
over h o w wind power should be valued. This was over wind power's capacity credit.

5.5.2 Capacity Credit
Debates about the value of wind power often focused on whether an intermittent, variable
energy source had any value beyond its fuel-saving capability. While electricity utilities
assume that conventional generating power stations are available w h e n required (though as
discussed below, this assumption m a y be problematic) they cannot m a k e such an
assumption about wind power.

Wind is an intermittent source of energy, as wind speeds fluctuate significantly. The power
in the wind is proportional to the wind speed cubed. At mid-range wind speeds, a m o d e m
wind turbine can capture about 4 0 % of this power. At high wind speeds below the turbine
cut-out wind speed, the power output of the turbine remains approximately constant, hence
the wind turbine captures a decreasing fraction of the energy in the wind. Because of this
predominantly cubic relationship, the variations in the wind speed give rise to a highly
variable power output, and the bulk of the energy output of a wind turbine over a period is
generated at the relatively infrequent high wind speeds.

In some locations, wind speeds exhibit a daily or seasonal pattern, not necessarily
correlating with electricity demand. 144 High wind speeds give rise to a wind chill, and thus a
possibly higher heating demand, some of which m a y be met using electricity. Yet, in m u c h
of Australia, the peak electricity demand is in summer and can be attributed to the increased
use of air-conditioning. (There is a m u c h better correlation between air-conditioning
demand and solar radiation. Hence, solar power—another variable energy source, albeit one
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Diesendorf et al found a positive correlation between wind power and electricity demand in parts of
W A . Mark Diesendorf, Brian Martin and John Carlin, "The economic value of wind power in
electricity grids", BWEA International Conference on Wind Energy, Brighton, U K , 27 August 1981.
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not as unpredictable as wind power—may have added value because of this attribute.)

Grid electricity systems usually have little or no storage capacity. In some cases, limited
pumped hydro is available, but this is usually intended as a means of increasing the
proportion of base load plant by increasing off-peak demand. If there is no storage,
electricity demand and supply are matched at every instant. Operators of wind systems
cannot ensure that their plant generates power w h e n it is needed. Hence, it w a s usually
assumed that wind power needed to be deployed in conjunction with storage systems or
backup generating capacity. Storage systems m a y be appropriate for small-scale stand-alone
systems, since batteries (or recently, flywheels) can be used, but for large-scale wind power,
energy storage can be very expensive. If backup generating capacity is considered
necessary, then the value of wind power to the electricity utility equals the savings achieved
by not operating the backup generating units. The main saving is the fuel cost, and this is
assumed to be mainly the fuel cost of base load plant, i.e. of the plant using the cheapest
fuel. In other words, it is assumed that the incorporation of wind plant in a power system
does not eliminate the need to have an equivalent amount of capital-intensive conventional
base load generating plant in the system. Indeed, the incorporation of wind power at a high
penetration level could adversely affect operation of other generators. If a large amount of
wind power is available during times of low system demand, then energy must be dumped,
or other generating plant will be forced to operate at lower loads, and hence less efficiently.

The term used for a measure of the firm generating capacity of a power plant is capacity
credit. Traditionally, electricity utilities regarded variable energy sources as non-firm,
and thus assigned these sources no capacity credit. This has been a major concern to wind
power advocates, since it greatly reduces the value attributed to wind power. M a n y
conventional base load power stations in Australia, particularly Victoria's brown coal plant
and Tasmania's hydro plant, have high capital costs and low fuel costs; thus the major cost
associated with these options is the return on capital. If wind power is assigned no capacity
credit, then its value is compared only to the fuel and operating costs of the alternative.
Thus the value of wind power m a y be deemed very low.

The term 'capacity credit' can be taken to mean several things. Milborrow noted three uses, "1. The
ratio (Conventional plant displaced by wind plant)/(Rated capacity of wind plant); 2. The ratio (Firm
power displaced by wind plant)/(Rated capacity of wind plant); 3. The monetary value of the capacity
savings". D. Milborrow, "Capacity credits—clarifying the issues", Wind Energy Conversion 1996,
B W E A Conference, Exeter University, 25-27 September 1996, pp. 215-219.
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Initially, the assumption that wind power had no capacity credit w a s not based on any
studies into h o w wind power would perform within an electricity grid; and wind power
advocates soon set out to undertake such studies. In 1978, M a r k Diesendorf, a C S I R O
researcher and later a founder of the Australasian W i n d Energy Association ( A u s W E A ) ,
received a grant from the newly established National Energy Research, Development and
Demonstration Program ( N E R D D P ) to undertake a study entitled "Integration of wind
power on a large scale in state electricity grids with short term storage".146 Over the next
few years, Diesendorf and several colleagues analysed wind speed and electricity demand
data to determine h o w wind power performed within electricity grids.147

Diesendorf and his co-researchers argued against the assumption that wind power was
unreliable and conventional plant reliable, since all types of plant were subject to forced
outages and hence all were unreliable to some extent. They argued that forced outages of
conventional plant had to be included in any analysis of the reliability of electricity grids
containing wind power. 148 (During the 1970s and 1980s, the reliability of conventional
generating plant was relatively low. Recently, particularly since the introduction of
competition into the ESI, the reliability of conventional plant has improved significantly.
For example, the availability of several Victorian brown coal power stations increased from
67 per cent in 1991-92 to about 89 per cent in 1994-95.149)

Diesendorf et al based their analysis on the conventional measure of system reliability: the
'loss of load probability' ( L O L P ) . This is the probability that a given level of generating
capacity would be unable to meet demand. Typically L O L P might be one or two hours per
year. Their analysis of the capacity credit for wind power w a s based on maintaining the
same L O L P . They showed that for small penetrations, where wind provided less than 5 % of
total energy, the capacity credit of wind power was about equal to the average power
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Department of National Development and Energy, Compendium of Australian Energy Research,
Development and Demonstration Projects, A G P S , Canberra, March 1980.
Diesendorf and his colleagues published widely on this. For an overview see Mark Diesendorf and
Brian Martin, "Optimal generation planning for electricity grids containing wind farms", Solar World
Congress, International Solar Energy Society Congress, Perth, 14-19 August 1983, pp. 2323-2329.
Diesendorf, Martin and Carlin, 1981, op. cit.
Cited in Industry Commission, Jhe Electricity Industry in South Australia, 1996, Accessed 23
December 2002, <http://www.pc.gov.au/ic/research/independent/saelect/finafreport/saelect.pdf>.
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generated from the wind. 150 Diesendorf et al found that at larger penetrations of wind
power, greater than about 4 0 % energy contribution, the capacity credit of wind p o w e r
tended towards a constant value. They determined that to maintain the s a m e L O L P ,
additional conventional peak load plant, rated at about half the average wind p o w e r output,
needed to be added. This plant would rarely be operated.151 (Peak load plant generally has
high running costs and a low capital cost compared with base load plant.)

Much of the work of Diesendorf et al was based on wind turbines at a single site. Other
researchers had already established that wind turbines in spatially dispersed sites had s o m e
capacity credit.152 Diesendorf et al, however, found that wind turbines at a single site
experiencing the same wind regime had capacity credit, even though they would at times be
generating no power. Dispersal, they found, further increased the capacity credit.

T h e use

of spatially dispersed wind turbines can greatly reduce the variability of wind power, since
each would experience a different wind speed at any given time. This would have the effect
of smoothing the output, particularly the short-term fluctuations, and greatly reducing the
chance of zero or m a x i m u m output.154 Medium-term fluctuations, which are a function of
broader weather patterns such as high and low pressure systems and passing fronts, can be
smoothed only if wind turbines are dispersed over a m u c h larger area.155 In Australia, such
dispersal would require that the state grids be interconnected and operate as a single system.
The latter scenario would become possible for the southern and eastern states after the
formation of the National Electricity Market in 1995.'56 T h e electricity grids of N S W and
Victoria had been interconnected for s o m e time, with these t w o states sharing p o w e r to
some extent, and the S A grid w a s connected to Victoria in 1990. A t the time of writing, the
Queensland grid is connected to the south-eastern states, and there are plans to connect
Tasmania's grid.
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Although wind turbines are often specified by their rated power, which is usually but not always the
same as their maximum power, they usually produce less power. A more meaningful quantity is the
average power. Average power divided by rated power is called 'capacity factor'. 'Capacity factor' is
a completely different concept to 'capacity credit'.
Diesendorf and Martin, "Optimal generation planning", 1983, op. cit.
See study by Kahn cited in Diesendorf, Martin and Carlin, 1981, op. cit.
ibid.
Michael Grubb, "The integration of renewable electricity sources", Energy Policy, Vol. 19, No. 7
Sept 1991, pp. 670-688.
Bent Sorensen, "History of, and recent progress in, wind-energy utilization", Annual Review of
Energy and Environment, Vol. 20, 1995, pp. 387-424.
See chapter 7.
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Yet, in the early 1980s, utility engineers considered that the characteristics of wind power
m a d e wind fairly incompatible with the existing electricity system.157 That is, given the
configuration and operating conventions of the existing system, the variability and
uncontrollability of wind power m a d e it seem m o r e of a nuisance, rather than a useful
addition to generating capacity. Matt Duxbury of S E C W A expressed this in terms of
difficulties that system operators might have with wind power:
There is a good deal of debate on [the issue of capacity credit], with statistical studies
indicating that dispersed wind farms wind can contribute to firm capacity. The problem
appears to be in the long term nature of theoretical studies as opposed to the immediate
human decision making process by which operational staff ensure that supply meets
demand. Wind, with a 30 per cent capacity factor, has to an operator a 70 per cent forced
outage rate, and will not be relied upon to meet the expected load.158
This quote suggests that wind power advocates such as Diesendorf and his colleagues, and
electricity utilities were approaching the issue of capacity credit in quite different ways.
Diesendorf and colleagues undertook a theoretical study of h o w wind power could
successfully operate in conjunction with other generators. They were, if you like, assuming
an ideal system governed by rules of operation, and finding wind power satisfactory.
Duxbury, however, referred to the culture and practices of system operation, and shows
h o w wind p o w e r can be unsatisfactory with respect to these.159

We can see a similar incongruity (with positions switched) in how the ESI perceived the
reliability of the electricity system. A s industry and the public became increasingly
dependent on electricity, the reliability of the electricity generating system c a m e to be seen
as a critical issue by the electricity utilities and their political masters. Electricity d e m a n d
varies significantly over a day and throughout the year. T h e yearly peak d e m a n d might
occur for only a few hours per year, say during a heat w a v e or a cold snap. There had to be
sufficient generating capacity in the system to meet this peak load, plus a reasonable level
of reserve. Part of the reserve w a s spinning reserve: standby generating plant that could be
brought into operation immediately should a generator fail. Power blackouts caused by
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See also section 2.2.5.
Matt Duxbury ( S E C W A ) , "The competitiveness of wind energy", Outlook 1992, National
Agricultural and Resources Outlook Conference, Alternative Energy Symposium, Canberra, 4-6
February 1992, pp. 11-17 at p. 11.
Brian Wynne, "Unruly technology: practical rules, impractical discourses and public understanding",
Social Studies ofScience, Vol. 18,1988, pp. 47-67.

insufficient generating capacity always provoked a major political outcry: the ramifications
of the winter 1981 blackouts in Victoria and N S W are discussed in section 4.4.4. Yet it w a s
far more likely that load would be lost due to industrial action (especially during the strikeprone 1970s and early 1980s) or the failure of a distribution line, rather than load being lost
due to insufficient generating capacity. Gary Gavin noted:
For the S E C V the L O L P has an optimal value of 3 hours per year (0.0003), but this
'optimal' value is indeed just that. In the winters of 1981, 82 and 83 the probabilities of
restriction were 0.50, 0.10 and 0.14 respectively ... It is important to recognize that [wind
systems] can often be subjected to stringent L O L P s that bear no comparison to reality.
This is another instance of the 'rules' of system operation being at odds with the practices,
with wind power this time being judged unfavourably with respect to the rules.

Because the electricity utilities had come to be almost exclusively supply-oriented, they did
not attempt to control peak d e m a n d to avoid being caught with insufficient generating
capacity. Their main response w a s to build m o r e p o w e r stations.161 Yet there are several
methods for reducing the possibility of having insufficient generating capacity during peak
demand. O n e is to have in place interruptible supply contracts with large industrial
customers; however, the electricity utilities rarely used such contracts.162 Another m e t h o d is
to interconnect electricity grids to allow different regions to share reserve capacity; yet,
during the 1980s only N S W and Victoria were interconnected, and s o m e electricity utilities
opposed interconnection. A third method is to encourage electricity consumers to shift or
reduce their d e m a n d during peak periods by providing appropriate price signals to
electricity consumers. 163 This would depend on the development of appropriate, cheap
metering and switching technologies. Traditionally, this strategy w a s used to increase offpeak load, improving the system load factor.164 During the 1980s, there were limited
attempts to use this strategy for peak reduction: under instruction from the Victorian
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Gary Gavin, "Wind generated electricity for Victoria", M . Env. Sc. Thesis, Monash Univ., 1983, p.
49. It should be acknowledged that the latter probabilities apply to a shorter time period.
See chapter 4. The S E C V started a demand management program in the late 1980s.
Hugh Saddler, Energy in Australia: Politics and Economics, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1981. In some
cases interruptible contracts were used with very large customers such as aluminium smelters.
Interruptible supply was discussed as a possible technique for peak load reduction in State Electricity
Commission of Victoria, SEC Outlook for Demand Management to the Mid 1990s, 1986. In the
Victorian N R E C inquiry (see chapter 4) it was recommended that the S E C V should make greater use
of interruptible supply contracts. Victoria, Parliament, Natural Resources and Environment
Committee, Report on Electricity Supply and Demand Beyond the Mid 1990s, 1988, p. 25.
T.W. Berrie, Power System Economics, Peter Peregrinus, London, 1983.
Load factor is the ratio of average demand to maximum demand.
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introduced time-of-use pricing for larger customers, and

investigated its use for domestic customers. 165 It w a s not until the restructuring of the E S I in
the 1990s that a m e c h a n i s m for linking electricity prices to the availability of generating
capacity w a s introduced. A fourth m e t h o d is to have certain non-essential appliances
switched off during peak times. This can be done either through intelligent meters or
switches—again this w o u l d require the appropriate technology d e v e l o p m e n t — o r by using
separate circuits.166

Diesendorf and Martin proposed a combination of the last t w o methods:
Consider a future electricity grid containing a large component of generating plant in the form
of wind farms. This grid has incorporated the advances in microelectronics and power
electronics which are already available in the early 1980s, and also a system of tariffs
(experimental in one or two grids in 1983) called spot pricing. During periods of high wind
and low load, an ordinary 1983 grid would have to spill excess wind energy. However, in our
future grid, electricity consumers have switches on their hot water circuits which are sensitive
to small changes in gridfrequency.Before leaving for work in the morning, most of the
consumers have programmed their personal microcomputers with the maximum prices they
are prepared to pay that day for electricity on the hot-water circuit, refrigerator circuit, etc.
W h e n load drops, the spot price of electricity drops too, and this information is transmitted
over the mains to the customers' microcomputers. Where a strong wind begins to surge
across the wind farms, the gridfrequencyincreases slightly, the spot price of electricity drops
even further, and electricity is switched automatically into millions of hot water boosters.167

After the restructuring of the ESI, spot pricing was introduced, but only large electricity
users were able to take advantage of this, with very f e w choosing to d o so. T h e idea that
small electricity consumers could take advantage of spot pricing to regulate their electricity
d e m a n d s e e m s unlikely in the near future.

The value of wind power in an electricity grid at medium to high levels of penetration
depends also o n the existing configuration of the electricity system, particularly the
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State Electricity Commission of Victoria, Proposal to Introduce a Residential Time of Use Electricity
Tariff, 1988.
Such a system was used on Fair Isle in the U K . A wind turbine was installed in 1982 to supplement
the diesel generator. There were two independent grids, one for the usual loads, and the other for
heating loads. The latter was switched off when there was insufficient power. Bent Sorensen, A Study
of Wind-Diesel/Gas Combination Systems, Energy Authority of N e w South Wales, June 1986.
Diesendorf and Martin, "Optimal generation planning", 1983, op. cit., p. 2326.
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characteristics of other generating units. T o meet variations in demand, electricity grids
must include generating units that can respond quickly to change, such as hydro or gas
turbines. Such,units m a k e it easier to incorporate wind power into the grid. T h e N S W Victorian grid includes m u c h hydro power (used for peak load); and Tasmania relies almost
solely on hydro power. In the 1980s, some state governments were discouraging the use of
natural gas in gas turbine generating plant, arguing that natural gas w a s a scarce fuel that
should be preserved for direct heating applications.168 This view shifted in the late 1980s as
n e w reserves of natural gas were found. Natural gas is n o w considered a very promising
fuel source, particularly as it can be used in high efficiency combined-cycle gas turbine
plants and it produces far less greenhouse gas emissions than does coal. With greater use of
natural gas plant plus the proposed connection of the Tasmanian and mainland grid
(enabling greater sharing of the flexible hydro plant), the future Australian electricity grid
m a y be more compatible with a reasonable penetration of wind power.

Although the Australian electricity utilities were originally of the view that wind power had
no capacity credit, some started to shift their views during the 1980s. T h e attitudes of the
utilities which investigated grid-connected wind power is described below. T h e federal
Department of Resources and Energy too seemed to accept the findings of Diesendorf and
others that at low levels of penetration wind power could displace conventional plant
producing the same average output.169

5.5.3 South Australia
In Australian states, security of energy supplies and the quest to develop local resources
have long been critical influences over the choice of fuel for power generation. If gridconnected wind power were to be developed on a large scale, likely prerequisites would be
high quality wind resources, and expensive or inadequate fossil fuel or hydro resources.
South Australiafitsthe bill: m u c h of its coastline experiences high winds; its indigenous
coal resources are remote and of poor quality; and although natural gas became available in
1969, uncertainties over gas contracts have plagued the S A government. 170 It is not
surprising that S A w a s thefirststate to consider wind power.

This is discussed in Stephen Rosenthal and Peter Russ, The Politics of Power: Inside Australia
Electric Utilities, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1988.
j*9 Department of Resources and Energy, N E R D D P , Wind Energy Subprogram, 1986, op. cit.
Rosenthal and Russ, 1988, op. cit.
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Thefirstextensive survey of SA's wind energy resources w a s carried out by L. Mullett of
the Electricity Trust of South Australia ( E T S A ) in the 1950s. It seems that E T S A w a s
considering the possibility that wind could generate electricity on a "public supply scale".171
At the time, large wind turbines were not available, but this w a s a (brief) period of
optimism about the potential of wind energy. Mullet thought that wind turbines rated up to
5 M W might soon be available.172 H e monitored 28 sites along the coast and windy crests of
hills, and found wind speeds ranging from about 5.4 m/s to 9.8 m/s at heights of around 1 to
3 metres.173 Based on the criterion that winds speeds of at least 1 9 m p h (8.5 m/s) were
desirable for wind generation, he concluded:
Economic quantities of wind are to be found on flat country near ocean coastlines with a
southwesterly aspect, but inland sites for wind power require the use of a hill at least 200 ft.
high in open surroundings.174
But nothing c a m e of the study: the era of cheap oil ended hopes of developing wind power
at this time. Later E T S A started using natural gas for electricity generation.

In the early 1980s, the state's dependence on natural gas from the Cooper Basin was
becoming a problem for the S A government. Throughout the 1970s, the price of natural gas
had been very low, but in the early 1980s, the Cooper Basin producers successfully imposed
a hefty price rise.175 T h e natural gas contract w a s due to expire in 1987 and E T S A w a s
facing the prospect of a large price rise for natural gas. T o reduce its long-term vulnerability
to future price rises, and undoubtedly to put pressure on the natural gas producers, the S A
government investigated the potential of alternative fuel supplies. This included an
investigation into wind power.

Early moves were made in 1981, a time when there was still much optimism about the
potential of large wind turbines. E T S A placed an advertisement seeking expressions of
interest from manufacturers of large turbines (at least 1 M W ) . It stated that E T S A w a s
looking at the option of grid-connected wind power, that E T S A w a s initially seeking
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L.F. Mullett, "Surveying for Wind Power in Australia", Journal of the Institution of Engineers,
Australia, March 1957, pp. 69-73.
ibid.
ibid. Mullett's figures were in miles per hour, and feet. I have converted these to metric. His recorded
wind speeds were higher than those measured in the 1980s, perhaps due to the state of anemonetry.
ibid., p. 73.
This episode is described in Rosenthal and Russ, 1988, op. cit.
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information on available generators, and later they would expect to seek commercial
tenders.176 E T S A received seven proposals for turbines rated between 5 0 0 k W and 3 M W ,
177

but concluded that wind generated electricity w a s not cost competitive.

Investigations into wind power started in earnest after the release of a report into South
Australia's future electricity options. In 1983, the S A government established the Stewart
Committee to report on SA's options for meeting future electricity demand. T h e main
options examined by the Stewart Committee were the use of interstate coal, the further
development of local coal resources, and interconnection with Victoria. T h e Committee also
considered alternative energy sources including wind power. It concluded that wind power
was one of the most favourable alternative energy sources, and recommended that a wind
monitoring program be instituted immediately and a medium-sized demonstration wind
farm be developed by

1986-87. 178 The Committee also m a d e a number of other

recommendations, including that the South Australian and Victorian grids be interconnected
so that S A could purchase electricity from or sell to Victoria. This recommendation w a s
approved, and by 1990 the two grids were interconnected. Although transmission costs
were significant, South Australia would have access to electricity generated from Victoria's
cheap brown coal; consequently, prospects for wind power in S A became less favourable.179

Following the Stewart Committee's report, ETSA and the South Australian Department of
Mines and Energy, with funding assistance from the State Energy Research Advisory
Committee ( S E N R A C ) , c o m m e n c e d in 1984 a wind monitoring survey of S A . T h e y also
proposed to build by 1987 a grid-connected wind generating system of capacity up to
500 k W , for demonstration and evaluation.180 Thirty sites were monitored, about half within
the E T S A grid (mostly coastal sites), the remainder in remote areas (mostly inland sites).
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Electricity Trust of South Australia, "The Electricity Trust of South Australia invites proposals for a
wind-powered electricity generator", Australian Financial Review, 9 July 1981, p. 50. Australasian
Wind Energy Association, "South Australia seeks large wind generator", South Wind, No. 4-5,1981, p. 4.
Advisory Committee on Future Electricity Generating Options, Possible Contribution of Alternative
Energy Sources to Electricity Supply in South Australia Before the Mid 1990 's, Adelaide, 1984.
Advisory Committee on Future Electricity Generating Options, Main Report, Adelaide, 1984,
Advisory Committee on Future Electricity Generating Options, Possible Contribution, 1984, op. cit.
Noted in Department of Resources and Energy, N E R D D P , Wind Energy Subprogram, 1986, op. cit.
Department of Resources and Energy, Compendium of Australian Energy Research, Development
and Demonstration Projects, A G P S , Canberra, 1986. Leon Byass and Monica Oliphant, " A South
Australian position: alternative and remote area power", Solar '86, Australian and N e w Zealand Solar
Energy Society Conference, Adelaide, 13-15 November 1986, pp. 409^*15.
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The wind speeds in the remote areas were relatively low (about 4 to 5 m/s at 10 m height)
while in the grid areas the wind speeds were m u c h more favourable—generally about 6 to 7
m/s, and up to 7.7 m/s at two sites on the Fleurieu Peninsula and the Eyre Peninsula.181
i

In contrast to some other electricity utilities, which were reluctant to release details of their
economic evaluations of wind power, E T S A and its study partners published a relatively
detailed study of the economics of wind-generated electricity.182 Their analysis considered
capital and operating costs, and the effect of the wind farm on the operation of the E T S A
grid (that is, the reduction in electricity supply from other power stations).183 They included
the effect of the location of the wind farm on network losses; for example, if a wind farm
were located close to a point of high demand, network losses could be reduced. They
analysed the cost of wind power for wind farms in three sizes (1.5 M W , 5 M W and 15 M W )
forfivetypes of wind turbines ranging in size from 90 k W to 330 k W , and for five separate
grid area sites stretched along the South Australian coast.184 T w o of the sites, Lake Bonney
near the Victorian border and Cape Jervis (Starfish Hill) on the Fleurieu Peninsula, later
became the sites of proposed wind farm developments.185 The other three sites were on the
western coast of the Eyre Peninsula. Using a real discount rate of 7 % and a 30-year life,
they concluded that the lowest cost for a 15 M W wind farm w a s 6.8 c/kWh for the Lake
Bonney site—perhaps a surprising conclusion since Lake Bonney had the lowest average
wind speeds of the five sites. This suggests that the proximity of a wind farm to a large
load, in this case the city of M o u n t Gambier, plays a large role in the economics of wind
power. 186 The lowest overall cost was 6.1 c/kWh for a 1.5 M W wind farm at Starfish Hill.

ETSA accepted that wind power had a capacity credit equivalent to the cost of conventional
plant producing the same average output, although it based this evaluation on generalised
studies rather than detailed statistical calculations for each site. Using a capacity credit of
1.4 c/kWh and a fuel credit of 2.5 c/kWh, it was determined that the value of wind power in
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Electricity Trust of South Australia, Department of Minerals and Energy (Office of Energy Planning)
and State Energy Research Advisory Committee, South Australian Wind Energy Program 19841988: Technical Report, Adelaide, 1989, p. 14.
ibid.
ibid., chapter 5.
ibid., pp. 24-26.
See chapter 8.
ibid, p. 67. See discussion on discount rate in sections 2.2.4, 5.5.4 and 5.5.5.
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the grid areas was only about 4 c/kWh. 187 The study therefore concluded that wind power in
the grid areas would not be competitive with conventional fossil fuel plant in the
i oo

foreseeable future.

The study also included calculations for the economics of wind farms in five remote
communities. Four of these had a very low average load and so could accommodate only a
wind turbine rated up to 60 k W . Coober Pedy, a mining town in the states' north, had a
m u c h higher average load (about 1 M W ) than did other remote communities, and could
accommodate a larger wind turbine.189 The wind regime at Coober Pedy w a s not very
favourable: its average wind speed was only 4.0 m/s. 190 (Wind turbines typically cut in at
about 3 to 4 m/s.) It was calculated that the cost of wind power at Coober Pedy w a s about
15 c/kWh, and about 17 c/kWh at some of the other remote locations. These costs were only
slightly higher than the cost of diesel, leading E T S A et al to conclude that wind power w a s
nearly competitive with diesel fuel in some remote areas.

After this study, the South Australian government sought funding through NERDDP for a
300 k W demonstration wind turbine to be installed at Coober Pedy. 192 In 1990, the S A
Office of Energy Planning and E T S A were awarded a $200,000 N E R D D P grant to install
and monitor a wind turbine.193 A 150 k W Nordex wind turbine w a s commissioned in March
1991. It was thefirstdemonstration unit to be installed in a low wind speed area. This
episode is examined in chapter 8

Although a wind turbine was finally installed in South Australia, the purpose of the exercise
underwent quite a shift. The Stewart Committee had originally recommended that wind be
investigated as an alternative for the grid areas; but by the time the wind study w a s
completed, SA's electricity future w a s more secure. E T S A ' s focus then shifted to the
investigation of wind power in remote areas. A n d what w a s originally proposed as a small

187
188
189

191

ibid, pp. 68-71.
ibid.,p.%2.
ibid., pp. 72-73.
ibid., p. 14. This was the average wind speed over one year only.
ibid.,p.%2.
South Australian Government, "South Australian wind energy program", Solar Progress, Vol. 10,
No. 2,1989, pp. 21-22.
Department of Primary Industry and Energy, Compendium of Australian Energy Research,
Development and Demonstration Projects, A G P S , Canberra, 1990.
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wind farm eventually turned into a 150 k W unit in a low wind speed area.

5.5.4 Victoria
Unlike S A , Victoria had little concern about fuel supplies, at least for base load power
generation. Victoria has abundant reserves of cheap brown coal; however this fuel has
disadvantages: brown coal power stations are capital intensive, and inflexible in their
operation. (Their large greenhouse gas emissions would become a concern in the 1990s.)
For peaking plant, the S E C V relied on Victorian and S n o w y Mountains hydro plant, and
natural gas plant. A s described in chapter 4, plans to build the gas-fired Newport power
station led to a long and bitter dispute. Subsequently, the state government declared natural
gas a scarce fuel and prohibited its use in n e w power stations.

As described in chapter 4, after a Labor government was elected in 1982, the SECV was
required to consider the use of renewable energy. O n e of its major renewable energy
activities w a s a joint wind monitoring study conducted with the Victorian Solar Energy
Council ( V S E C ) . Soon after the change of government, the S E C V began a review of wind
power, assisted by C S I R O . 1 9 4 Prompting this review w a s a government statement that an
inquiry would be conducted into future power projects that would "have regard to the
Government's intention to develop a comprehensive energy plan for the future with major
emphasis on energy conservation, together with the possibilities for renewable energy
sources".195 V S E C w a s also keen to be involved in a study of Victoria's wind resources and
sought a joint study.196 John Andrews, a V S E C officer working on the joint study, later
noted that the S E C V w a s not too enthusiastic about working jointly with another agency:
I think they were sceptical; they were also a bit wary of working with ... the Solar Energy
Council. It was thefirsttime they really had to work with people from another agency and
have to take these seriously. The direction from the Minister and the Minister's office was
the S E C V needs to take this seriously, and you've got to be cooperative.197
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State Electricity Commission of Victoria, Planning Investigations Department, Wind Generation for
Victoria, Vols 1,2 and 3, 1983.
Latrobe Valley Ministerial Council, cited in ibid, Vol. 1, 1983, p. 1. By the time an inquiry was
conducted, the state government's priorities had changed. See N R E C inquiry discussed in chapter 4.
SECV, Wind Generation for Victoria, 1983, op. cit.; John Andrews, "SECV report 'Wind Generation
for Victoria' and follow up programme", Internal memo, 1983, V S E C papers, Victorian Public
Records Office.
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The joint S E C V - V S E C wind study was about grid-connected rather than remote area wind
power. Unlike in most other Australian states, Victoria's electricity distribution system
reached most of the populated areas. Several other states, particularly W A , were interested
in developing wind and solar systems for their remote communities. Victoria had few
remote communities, although it did have m a n y houses isolated from the grid.

In 1983, the SECV released its review of wind power entitled Wind Generation for
Victoria. It also proposed a wind energy program for Victoria as follows:
•

Selection of suitable sites for wind monitoring along the Victorian coast (1983);

• W i n d monitoring at up to seven sites (1984/85);
•

Installation of experimental medium-sized (50-150 k W ) wind generator (1987/88);

• Installation of a large capacity wind generator (1990).198
The S E C V had no firm commitment to proceeding past the wind monitoring stage. It
recommended that a wind generator be installed only if wind speeds were found to be
significantly higher than thought, if wind generators became demonstrably more reliable,
and if generator costs were reduced substantially.199 In any event, all three conditions were
satisfied. Indeed, before the wind monitoring study, it was not clear whether Victoria
experienced high wind speeds. The Bureau of Meteorology had collected wind speed data
for m a n y years; yet most recorded averages were very low: only five monitored Victorian
locations had average wind speeds more than 6 m/s. 200

The SECV's portrayal of wind power in the report was not encouraging, and the economics
were presented as very unfavourable. The report was written in late 1982 and published in
January 1983, a time when wind turbines were improving rapidly, and m a n y wind power
advocates were looking to medium-sized rather than large wind turbines. During the early
1980s, Danish manufacturers achieved substantial improvements in performance, reliability
and cost of medium-sized wind turbines. These developments were not reflected in the
SECV's analysis, leading Tony Stevenson from A u s W E A to remark: "It is as if the Report
had been written in 1981, but only released, without significant updating, in 1983".201

John Andrews, Interview, 15 August 2000.
SECV, Wind Generation for Victoria, Vol. 1, 1983, op. cit., pp. 8-9.
ibid., pp. 8-9.
R. D. Hoy, "Review of wind speeds in Victoria for wind energy assessment", in S E C V Wind
Generation for Victoria, Vol. 3, 1983, op. cit.
Tony Stevenson, "SEC report may delay wind power", South Wind, No. 12-13, 1983, pp. 18-19.
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In 1982, the only medium-sized wind turbines operating in Australia were the two
experimental models installed on Rottnest Island in 1980, both of which broke d o w n
frequently. In 1983, medium-sized wind turbines were installed at Rottnest Island and
Ballarat (Victoria), with both proving far more reliable. The S E C V seemed uninterested in
medium-sized wind turbines, reflecting the 'big is beautiful' attitude of the period. (See
section 5.2.) It looked to the wind energy R & D programs underway in the U S A and s o m e
European countries, which were focused mainly on developing large multi-megawatt wind
turbines—ultimately with little success. T h e S E C V stated:
[I]t will be necessary to adopt large wind generators in the range of 1 - 5 M W if any
significant contribution is to be made by wind power in the Victorian electricity system.202
Such large wind turbines were still in the experimental stage, with a capital cost, the S E C V
estimated, of around $ 3 0 0 0 / k W for supply, installation and connection.

The SECV's predilection for very large wind turbines worried its critics, since it made wind
power m u c h less attractive. Stevenson remarked:
Clearly the S E C is only interested in large, megawatt-rated, grid-connected aerogenerators,
which are currently only being built as single prototypes and are therefore still expensive.
The S E C appears to be ignorant of the current overseas boom in medium-sized ...
aerogenerators.203
The capital cost per kilowatt of large machines, Stevenson argued, w a s m u c h higher than
that of medium-sized machines, and their size severely limited their siting: multi-megawatt
generators needed to be connected to the 66 k V transmission grid, but smaller generators
could be connected to the widespread 11 k V and 22 k V distribution lines.204

Debates about appropriate turbine size and grid connection requirements reflected, I
suggest, m o r e than just 'big is beautiful' thinking by the S E C V . M a n y early wind power
advocates thought that wind turbines would be installed singly, rather than in wind farms,
and be o w n e d and controlled by individuals, cooperatives, or small companies, rather than
by the electricity utilities.205 This w a s the arrangement developing in Denmark. The
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SECV, Wind Generation for Victoria, Vol. 1, 1983, op. cit., p. 22.
Stevenson, 1983, op. cit., p. 18.
ibid. Andrews of V S E C made similar remarks. John Andrews, M e m o , V S E C papers, Victorian
Public Records Office, 1983.
For example Diesendorf and Martin wrote: "wind power, at least potentially, can be controlled by the
individuals or communities which utilise it". Mark Diesendorf and Brian Martin, "The pros and cons

electricity utilities, however, envisaged that they would o w n and operate any wind systems,
and thus would probably require a sizeable capacity at any one site.206 T h e arrangement that
would soon become more popular in the U S A , the wind farm, would allow greater
economies than the single turbine arrangement through sharing of site preparation,
installation and grid connection costs.

In its report, the SECV argued that wind power had no capacity credit; hence, the value of
wind-generated power would equal the cost of fuel saved, estimated at 1.1 c/kWh.

The

S E C V ' s explanation varied from "on the basis of existing information", to "the limited
reliability of wind turbine generators", to thefluctuatingenergy output, to the inability to
calculate the appropriate capacity without a detailed computer simulation.208 A s described
above, by this time, Diesendorf and his colleagues had published several articles contending
that wind power had some capacity credit; yet the S E C V did not cite this research.209 It w a s
aware, however, that a U S electricity utility would be paying a capacity payment of about
0.8 c/kWh for wind power. 210 The S E C V ' s failure to consider capacity credit w a s a bone of
contention for its critics. John Andrews from V S E C remarked that instead of disallowing a
capacity credit the S E C V should have stated: "the capacity credit of wind generators is still
a completely open question".21'

There were disputes too about the cost of wind power. The SECV estimated the cost at 15
to 30 c/kWh, 212 m a n y times more than its value to the grid. Critics disputed this too, arguing
that the cost of wind power w a s 4 to 5 c/kWh, and hence the cost differential between wind
power and conventional power w a s quite small.213 The estimation of the cost of wind power
was based on a number of parameters; in essence, the utilities and wind power advocates
disagreed about the value of these parameters.
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of wind power", Habitat Australia, Vol. 10, April 1982, pp. 7-9, at p. 9.
See discussion by Gipe about distributed wind systems versus wind farms. Gipe, 1995, op. cit.
SECV, Wind Generation for Victoria, Vol. 1, 1983, op. cit., p. 28.
ibid, pp. 7, 17,27,28.
The S E C V had been assisted by other CSIRO wind power researcher, but made no mention of
Diesendorf s work. (Diesendorf was a CSIRO researcher.)
SECV, Wind Generation for Victoria, 1983, op. cit., p. 11.
Andrews, M e m o , 1983, op. cit. Stevenson made a similar criticism. Stevenson, 1983, op. cit.
Indeed, they rounded up from 13.5 and 28.2 c/kWh.
Value calculated by A u s W E A in ibid. Andrews estimated 5 c/kWh. Andrews, M e m o , 1983, op. cit.
A u s W E A members were publishing other estimates of the cost of wind power, which I also draw on.
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First, wind power advocates argued that the capital cost of installed wind turbines w a s about
half of that estimated by the S E C V , and would drop to one third.214 The S E C V based its
estimate on the cost of very large wind turbines (2.5 M W ) , which were experimental. W i n d
power advocates based their estimate on the cost of commercially available medium-sized
Danish wind turbines (55 k W ) . 2 1 5 T h e parameter used for capital cost comparison w a s the
cost per rated kilowatt. Yet, this parameter can be misleading. Since wind turbines m a y
have different energy outputs for the same wind regime, it is better to use a parameter that
incorporates the average power. Usually cited is the capital cost per kilowatt and the
capacity factor (average power divided by rated power). Large wind turbines were designed
to have a significantly higher capacity factor than were the medium-sized turbines.216
Hence, the discrepancy between the cited capital cost per unit average power for large wind
turbines and for medium-sized w a s not as great as implied by the wind power advocates.
Using the respective capacity factor figures for the wind turbines cited by Stevenson ( 2 4 % )
and the S E C V ( 3 6 % ) , the price multiplier of 2 to 3 becomes only 1.35 to 2. 217 Hence, the
difference in wind turbine price w a s only a partial contributor to the difference in the cost of
wind power. If the two groups' estimation of the future price of wind turbines began to
converge, as it undoubtedly would in light of evidence from actual wind power projects, it
would not fully resolve the question of the cost of wind power. A s it turned out, the wind
power advocates were correct in their prediction of the success of medium-sized turbines
and in their cost predictions, and within a few years, the S E C V would c o m e to agree.218

The detailed costing for a small wind farm proposed by A u s W E A put the supply, installation and
connection cost at $1600/rated k W (Feb. 1983 dollars). Estimates of future costs were between $900
and $1200/rated k W (mid 1982 dollars) Beckenham, 1983, op. cit. Blakers estimates the fully
installed cost at $1200/kW (about $1000/kW in 1982 dollars). Andrew Blakers, "How much is
windgenerated electricity?", South Wind, No. 14-15, 1984, p. 9.
Andrews cites the range 50 to 100 k W . Andrews, M e m o , 1983, op. cit.
This was the case for the 2.5 M W M O D - 2 wind turbines on which the S E C V based its calculations.
Beckenham, 1983, op. cit.
Stevenson, 1983, op. cit.; SECVj Wind Generation for Victoria, Vol. 1, 1983, op. cit. The S E C V
based their capacity factor on an availability of 80%. Stevenson did not state his assumed availability.
The cost of future wind power projects expressed in 1982/83 dollars was about AU$1000 to
AU$1500/kW. Moreover, the value of the Australian dollar fell markedly in the mid 1980s. See also
Gipe, 1995, op. cit., chapter 7. In 1986, the S E C V still referred to large turbines, but stated: "[w]ith
current technology, wind turbines in the size range 50 to about 300 k W seem the most viable for the
commercial supply of energy to electricity grids". They put the installed price of wind turbines at
$1500/kW (about $1200/kW in 1983 prices). State Electricity Commission of Victoria, Review of
Renewable Energy Technologies for the Generation ofElectricity in Victoria, 1986.

Second, the S E C V based its calculation on a wind turbine availability of 8 0 % . 2 1 9 A t the
time, there w a s insufficient operating experience with these large turbines, although 8 0 %
220

w a s a reasonable estimate of the availability of wind turbines installed in the early 1980s.
The S E C V did not expect availability figures to improve: "the reliability figure of 8 0 %
assessed in this study is already about as good as might be expected in a fully proven
design".221 It also suggested that their estimate of availability could be m u c h too high since
"the remoteness of most of the possible high wind sites ... could considerably extend the
time required to carry out repairs".222 W i n d power advocates suggested a higher availability
figure—Blakers used 8 5 % ; Gavin used 9 0 % — a n d were more optimistic about the prospects
for improved reliability of wind turbines.223 A s it transpired, wind turbine reliability
improved rapidly; and within a few years, the availability of medium-sized wind turbines
installed overseas w a s over 9 5 % .

Third was the difference in the annual cost on capital. The SECV based its calculation on an
annual cost on capital of 11.75%, using a real discount rate of 1 0 % over a life of 2 0 years.
W i n d power advocates argued that a real discount rate of 5 % should be used, the rate
typically used by the ESI. Using 5 % over a life of 30 years gives an annual cost on capital
of 6.5%, nearly half that calculated by the S E C V . 2 2 5 T h e choice of discount rate used by the
electricity utilities in their analysis of wind power continued to be a frequent point of
contention. Indeed, w h e n criticising the H E C ' s economic assessments, described below,
wind power advocates argued that a discount rate higher than 5 % should be used. Given the
short lead time for wind plant, higher discount rates would give wind power an advantage
relative to hydro power. Thus wind power advocates appear to have disputed the choice of
discount rate to bolster their case, rather than holding a fixed position on the question.

Despite its negative analysis of wind power, the SECV along with VSEC soon began the
proposed wind energy program. The wind monitoring took place from 1985 to 1987, with
ten Victorian coastal sites monitored. T w o of the locations (Toora and Kilcunda North)

SECV, Wind Generation for Victoria, Vol. 1, 1983, op. cit., p. 26. Availability is the proportion of time
that a wind turbine is available to produce power, even if there is insufficient wind to produce power.
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See Gipe's figure 6.12 for Califomian wind power plants. Gipe, 1995, op. cit., p. 167.
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"[ ibid, p. 26.
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Blakers, "How much is windgenerated electricity?", 1984, op. cit.; Gavin, 1983, op. cit.
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Gipe, 1995, op. cit.
See Stevenson 1983, op. cit.
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were found to have average wind speeds of 8 m/s or more, and a further four (Cape
Bridgewater, Apollo Bay, Port Fairy and Cape Liptrap) had average wind speeds over 7
m/s.22" These wind speeds were significantly higher than available data had suggested.227
However, Bureau of Meteorology wind monitoring sites were not selected with wind
generation in mind, and thus were not necessarily at the locations with the highest winds.
(The S E C V had acknowledged this in its original report.) Several of the sites monitored by
the S E C V and V S E C have since been considered as locations for wind farms.

The SECV and VSEC also installed a medium-sized wind turbine, but not as a direct
outcome of the wind monitoring study. In 1985, Victorian-based wind turbine manufacturer
W i n d Technology Pty Ltd received a N E R D D P grant to build a 75 k W grid-connected wind
turbine, to be installed at Breamlea, near Geelong.228 B y 1985, the state government was
developing its renewable energy strategy, and this project had been publicised by V S E C ,
the S E C V and the Victorian Department of Industry, Technology and Resources as
evidence of progress in implementing renewable energy projects.229 However, in late 1986
W i n d Technology Pty Ltd withdrew from the project.230

VSEC and the SECV then elected to fund the project jointly. They called for tenders for
wind turbines in the range 50 to 80 k W , and received responses from three companies, two
from overseas. The third was Westwind, which was also supplying turbines for the first
Australian wind farm at Esperance. It offered a turbine that had been built concurrently with
the six turbines earmarked for Esperance.231 Westwind was awarded the contract for a 60
k W turbine at the Breamlea site, and the turbine was commissioned in N o v e m b e r 1987. 232
Although the wind turbine w a s considered to be Australian-made, some of the components
were in fact imported: the blades were from D e n m a r k and the gearbox w a s from

'6 R. D. Hoy, "How S E C V sees its role in renewable energy", Solar Progress, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1987, pp. 810; State Electricity Commission of Victoria, and Victorian Solar Energy Council, Wind Monitoring
Study: Final Report, 1987.
'7 S E C V Wind Generation for Victoria, Vol. 1, 1983, op. cit., p. 18.
'8 Victorian Solar Energy Council, Annual Report, 1985.
9
Victorian Solar Energy Council, Annual Report, 1985, p. 14; State Electricity Commission of
Victoria, Annual Report, 1984-85, p. 66; Department of Industry, Technology and Resources,
Victorian Energy Planning Program: Renewable Energy Strategy, 1985, Melbourne, p. 16.
0
Nick Wardrop and Richard Hoy, "The Breamlea connection", Solar Progress, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1988,
pp. 3-4.
1
V S E C Papers, Victorian Public Records Office.
2
Wardrop and Hoy, "The Breamlea Connection", 1988, op. cit.; State Electricity Commission of
Victoria, and Victorian Solar Energy Council, Wind power in Victoria, Melbourne, 1988.
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Belgium.233 The Breamlea wind turbine w a s subsequently monitored for a year to verify
234

wind speeds, turbine performance and running costs.

The cost of the Breamlea wind turbine was $180,000—since it was a one-off installation
intended for evaluation, the cost w a s quite high.235 Furthermore, Breamlea w a s not well
suited for wind power: the average wind speed w a s only 5.9 m/s, and the capacity factor
was about 0.18, about half of what could be expected at a good site.236 T h e S E C V estimated
that the cost of wind power from Breamlea w a s 23.5 c/kWh, though it acknowledged that
for a 10 M W wind farm at a site with an average wind speed of 8 m/s, wind power would
cost about 6 c/kWh. 237

After the initial performance monitoring of the Breamlea turbine, the turbine was not well
maintained: from mid 1992 to the end of 1994, it produced very little power. 238 In 1994, the
S E C V w a s broken up and the Breamlea wind turbine w a s sold. It w a s bought by the
Alternative Technology Association for only $18,000. 239 T h e A T A overhauled the machine
and began to sell power to one of Victoria's n e w distribution companies, Citipower. T h e
Breamlea turbine still operates successfully today.

The SECV was also planning to install larger wind turbines following the Breamlea project.
In early 1987, the S E C V announced that it would be calling for tenders for larger wind
turbines over the following twelve months. 240 It also estimated that there would be 2 to 3
M W of wind power on the state's grid by the mid 1990s.241 B y the following year, however,
the greenhouse effect w a s firmly on the policy agenda, and there were n e w plans for wind
power in Victoria. This is explored in chapter 8.

Paul Somerville, "Power industry gets some wind in its sails", Engineers Australia, 27 May 1988
N.J. Wardrop, "Monitoring of the Breamlea demonstration wind turbine", Solar '88, Australian and
N e w Zealand Solar Energy Society Conference, Melbourne, 17-19 November 1988, pp. 8.1 - 8.7.
State Electricity Commission of Victoria, Environment and Planning Unit, Performance of the
Breamlea Demonstration Wind Turbine: A Joint Project with Renewable Energy Authority of
Victoria, unpublished report, 1991.
Michael Gunter, Breamlea historyfiles,<http://www.suburbia.com.au/~mickgg/breamlea/>.
SECV, Performance of the Breamlea Demonstration Wind Turbine, 1991, op. cit.
Gunter, Breamlea historyfiles,op. cit.
Alternative Technology Association, "The Breamlea wind generator", 1997, Accessed 2 March 2003,
<http://www.ata.org.au/breamlea.htm>.
State Electricity Commission of Victoria, Submission to NREC Inquiry into Electricity Supply and
Demand Beyond the Mid-1990s, Part 1 la, Draft, 1987, p. 64
Victorian Government, Victoria: The Next Decade, F.D. Atkinson Government Printer, Melbourne,
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Also in 1987, the S E C V launched its Cogeneration and Renewable Energy Incentives
Package, described in section 4.4.6. This w a s a limited package of incentives, aimed at
private cogenerators or renewable energy generators of up to 10 M W capacity. The package
comprised higher than usual buyback rates and other financial sweeteners, including the
waiving of the standby charge for up to three years.242 The package w a s intended to
encourage private cogeneration, with renewable energy attached seemingly as an afterthought. Although no wind projects were accepted under the package, it is interesting to see
h o w non-firm generators were treated. A s noted above, the S E C V ' s attitude in the early
1980s w a s that non-firm generators had no capacity credit, and hence a very low value. In
the Incentives Package, however, the S E C V offered a m u c h higher buyback rate for nonfirm generators: the rate w a s increased from about 2.15 to 8.87 c/kWh in peak periods, and
from 0.9 to 1.42 c/kWh in off-peak periods.243 Averaged over peak and off-peak, the S E C V
would pay about 5c/kWh instead of 1.5 c/kWh. Although there were some registrations of
interest by intending wind farm developers, none of these wind power projects were
considered viable within the package.244 Rates for non-firm capacity dropped back to
around their previous rate after the close of the Incentives Package.

5.5.5 Tasmania
Tasmania relied mainly on hydro power for its electricity, supplemented by a 240 M W oilfired power station at Bell Bay. A s the southernmost state of Australia, Tasmania has some
of the country's best wind resources; and wind power advocates have long regarded
Tasmania as the most likely location for grid-connected wind power. The federal
government agreed, with a 1986 report remarking:
A m o n g the major Australian State grids, the prospects for wind power appear greatest in
Tasmania. By Australian standards Tasmania possesses good wind resources and has a very
limited amount of additional low cost conventional energy resources (hydro) available for
exploitation ... The predominantly hydro-based Tasmanian grid could provide a particularly
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1987.
Richard Hoy, "Review of renewable energy projects within the SEC Cogeneration and Renewable
Energy Incentives Package", Solar '88, Australian and N e w Zealand Solar Energy Society
Conference, Melbourne, 17-19 November 1988.
These are the tariffs for the period 1988/89 for 6.6, 11 and 22 kV. They were slightly higher for low
voltage generators. Victorian Government Gazette, S60, 30 June 1988, p. 3.
Richard Hoy, "Review of renewable energy projects", 1988, op. cit.
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cost-effective source of back-up peaking plant to a wind farm.

The main obstacle to the use of wind power in Tasmania, advocates argued, was the adverse
attitude of the Hydro-Electric Commission of Tasmania ( H E C ) . In 1985, after A u s W E A ' s
considerable efforts lobbying for the use of large or medium-sized wind turbines in
Tasmania had c o m e to nothing, Diesendorf et al remarked:
The fact that there is still not a single medium-sized aerogenerator in Tasmania (including
King Island) is a tribute to the political power of the H E C and the reluctance of the Federal
Department of Resources and Energy to try to circumvent that power.
O n several occasions—usually with substantial financial assistance from the federal
government—the H E C investigated the prospects for wind power on the Tasmanian
mainland or Bass Strait Islands, or called for tenders for wind turbines.24' Yet it did not
install any wind power capacity until the late 1990s; indeed, by this time it seemed quite
enthusiastic about wind power. This is described in chapter 8.

Much has been said about the hydro-industrialisation ideology of the Hydro-Electric
Commission, its highly influential position within the Tasmanian state, and its relative
independence from political control.248 This m a y be a partial explanation of the H E C ' s
reluctance to pursue wind power developments. O f course, in its inaction, the H E C w a s
little different from most of the other utilities—with the possible exception of S E C W A .

Tasmania was the scene of one of the major environmental battles in recent Australian
history, over the proposed Gordon-below-Franklin hydro-electric scheme. 249 It w a s a battle
not only about flooding of a wilderness area, but also about electricity planning and whether
Tasmania needed the extra generating capacity. Several A u s W E A

m e m b e r s threw

themselves into the dispute with gusto, marking the transformation of A u s W E A from a
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group of wind turbine enthusiasts into a wind power lobby group.

In its 1979 report that recommended the Gordon-below-Franklin scheme, the HEC
undertook an analysis of wind power, but concluded that wind power was too expensive.
Using wind speed data from existing recording stations, the H E C identified windy sites: on
the main island these were coastal areas in the south-west, north-east, and northern part of
the west coast.251 The H E C ' s analysis assumed the use of multi-megawatt wind turbines,
which were under development overseas. It noted that to achieve the same average output of
the proposed hydro schemes would require 740 wind turbines of 2 M W rating, or over 6300
wind turbines of 140 k W rating. Basing its analysis on six 100 M W wind farms located
along the south-west coast, and an average wind speed of 6.7 m/s, the H E C concluded that
wind power would cost 5.8 c/kWh, compared to l.Oc/kWh for power from its proposed
hydro development.252

Hydro power has similarities with wind power, aside from being renewable and subject to
the vagaries of the weather. Both have low operating costs and no fuel costs; hence future
fossil fuel prices do not affect project economics. Both are capital-intensive, so the
economics are greatly affected by the choice of discount rate. A s described earlier, some
advocates of renewable energy have argued that high discount rates discriminate against
capital-intensive technologies such as renewables when compared with fuel-intensive
technologies such as fossil fuel plant. But the choice of discount rate affects the economics
of hydro power and wind power differently. W h e n compared with large-scale hydro power,
wind power m a y appear more economically attractive at higher discount rates, because it is
modular and thus capacity can be built gradually to meet demand as required. Large-scale
hydro, on the other hand, constitutes a 'lumpy' addition: there would be unused capacity
incurring interest charges for a number of years until demand had grown sufficiently.

Because of the outcry by environmentalists over the Gordon-below-Franklin scheme, a
Senate Inquiry was called. This gave opponents of the hydro scheme an opportunity to
challenge the H E C ' s assessment of the need for and the economics of the hydro scheme.
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Three members of A u s W E A — M a r k Diesendorf, H u g h Outhred and A n d r e w Blakers—took
this opportunity to m a k e detailed submissions on the case for wind power.

Andrew Blakers argued that the HEC's choice of discount rate, 5%, was too low. The HEC
could use such a low discount rate, he argued, because it w a s a monopoly and thus incurred
little economic risk, because it paid no taxes or dividend to the government, and because it
considered the opportunity cost of capital in relation to other H E C projects, rather than
alternative uses of capital. H e noted that the Treasury had indicated that an appropriate real
discount rate should not be less than 1 0 % . Using 1 0 % , Blakers calculated that if wind
turbine prices dropped to around $1500/kW, then wind power would be competitive with
the hydro proposal.253 Yet, what determined the choice of discount rate? H u g h Outhred,
A u s W E A m e m b e r and engineering academic, argued:
[The discount rate] is basically used for selecting a project. It does not necessarily have to
have any relation to thefinalcosts of operating the project. It is just a way of making a choice.
If you put in a low discount rate you are basically saying that it is a good idea to have a large
public capital investment. It you put in a high discount rate you are saying it is not ... This
discount rate is really entirely related to the initial phase of deciding what you are going to do.
Once you have decided what to do then you have to pay the actual costs of the system.254
H e noted that most other states used a discount rate of 8 % to 1 2 % , "the justification being
that the present conditions of capital shortage are not compatible with a bias towards
additional capital investment".255

Differences between modular and 'lumpy' generation plant go beyond whether the plant has
idle capacity incurring interest for a few years. Blakers noted that modular systems have
benefits that should recognised in the assessment of different options. C o m p a r e d with largescale plant, modular systems have steady rather than fluctuating requirements for capital
and labour. Modular systems are more reliable than a large-scale system, since a breakdown
of one small-scale generating unit has little effect on system output, while breakdown of a
large-scale unit could lead to power shortages. A n d probably their greatest benefit, Blakers
argued, is that they eliminate the penalty associated with errors in d e m a n d forecasting.
Large-scale additions to generating plant necessitate long-term d e m a n d forecasts. Should
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d e m a n d growth slow, as it did in the 1980s, the extra capacity will sit idle for m u c h longer,
and thus the effective cost of power from this plant will be m u c h higher.256 So a decision to
use wind power rather than large-scale hydro power meant that the decision to build plant
could be deferred. This meant not only that interest charges would be reduced, but also that
supply and d e m a n d could be better matched. Efforts to reduce d e m a n d growth could delay
the need for a decision even further. In his submission, M a r k Diesendorf argued:
Because of the short construction time for aerogenerators, it is possible that sufficient wind
power capacity could be installed in northwest Tasmania to produce the same annual
average power as the proposed hydro-electric projects in southwest Tasmania, on the same
time schedule, even if wind power plant were not ordered for another 4-5 years ... More
time can be gained for the development of wind power and other alternatives by instituting
a substantial programme to increase the efficiency of Tasmanian energy use.257
In the meantime, Diesendorf argued, the H E C needed to gain operating experience with
both medium-sized and large wind plant.258

Blakers also noted that wind (and solar) power and hydro power can be complementary
sources. Hydro w a s well suited to matching thefluctuationsin wind power, and providing
peak load. W i n d (and m o r e so, solar) would improve the reliability of Tasmania's hydro
system by "drought-proofing" the system.259

Large-scale wind power and large-scale hydro power both require large areas of land;
indeed the dispute over the Gordon-below-Franklin project w a s principally over the loss of
large areas of wilderness. (The requirement for large areas of land has also been used as an
argument against wind power.) T h e wind power advocates argued that wind w a s a more
environmentally benign option than hydro power. Blakers noted that a wind farm would
results in no loss of wilderness area as wind turbines can be built on farmland. W i n d power
entailed no land clearing and infrastructure costs would be low. 260

Wind power advocates also stressed that if the HEC willing to use wind power then
Tasmania could establish a viable wind turbine manufacturing industry, probably
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manufacturing turbines under licence. H u g h Outhred argued that distance meant it w a s
unlikely that a Tasmanian

wind

industry would

face serious competition

from

manufacturers in the Northern Hemisphere, and that there w a s a large potential market in
Australia as well as in N e w Zealand, the Pacific Islands and South East Asia. Outhred also
suggested that an Australian wind industry would initially require government support,
particularly in funding a design, testing and certification facility.

The three wind power advocates also disputed the HEC's economic assessment of wind
power, and produced their o w n assessment, in which the unit cost of wind power w a s m u c h
closer to the H E C ' s estimate of the unit cost of the hydro plant. It argued that wind turbines
should be installed in the northwest of Tasmania, rather than the southwest. T h e northwest
offered a number of advantages, including m u c h higher average wind speeds, and lower
network costs. Referring to the southwest region chosen by the H E C for wind power cost
estimates, Outhred suggested: "in terms of wind generation, it is going to be the most
expensive place you can possibly think of'.262

The new federal Labor government blocked the Gordon-below-Franklin scheme in 1983.
Subsequently the H E C proceeded with two alternative hydro schemes: the King and the
Anthony schemes. But demand did not grow as the H E C had envisaged. It had predicted an
annual growth rate of about 3 % , but in the decade to 1993, the average growth rate w a s only
1.1%.

In 1994, A n d r e w Blakers revisited the issue. H e argued that the King and Anthony

schemes had left the H E C in financial difficulty; yet these hydro schemes need not have
been built. H a d the H E C chosen back in the early 1980s to use wind power, it could have
deferred the decision to construct n e w plant until it w a s necessary. A s it transpired, Blakers
claimed, n e w plant was not needed.264 T h e resultant overcapacity in supply, he argued,
m a d e the state quite vulnerable:
The oversupply of capacity in Tasmania puts the state government in a very weak bargaining
position when negotiating the price of electricity with the major industrial customers. These
companies are aware of the idle capacity in the Tasmanian system and the great need to obtain
income to service the $1,700 million accumulated debt of the H E C T . Pressure can be applied
to the Tasmanian government, by way of threats to close factories in Tasmania, in order to

Outhred, Submission, 1982, op. cit. The latter had proved successful in Denmark.
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induce the H E C T to drop prices or to sell generating units to individual companies at a very
low price. Comalco, which traditionally takes about a quarter of Tasmania's electricity, has
been having discussions with the H E C T on both of the above points.265
T h e crux of Blakers' argument is that because wind power is less risky, its economics
should be judged m u c h more favourably w h e n compared with a large-scale hydro scheme.
T h e H E C had chosen the riskier option and lost out.

Of course, in 1994 Blakers had the benefit of hindsight; in 1982 the HEC would probably
have viewed the risks differently. For the H E C , undoubtedly the main risk w a s having
insufficient capacity to meet future demand, and like other electricity utilities, it took a
conservative approach. In 1982, relying on wind power becoming technologically, let alone
economically, viable within a 'few years required a leap of faith. A t the time, the
development path of wind power w a s not clear. W i n d power advocates were m u c h more
optimistic about the development of wind turbines. So in 1982, w h e n Blakers and
Diesendorf were claiming that if the H E C opted for wind power the construction of n e w
capacity could be deferred, they were premising this on the belief that wind turbines would
quickly mature and drop substantially in price. They had argued:
Once mass production is well under way, it has been estimated by large U S corporations
that the capital cost of large aerogenerators such as M O D - 2 will fall to $800 to $1000 per
rated kilowatt in 1980 prices.266 Projected aerogenerator prices for just a few years ahead
indicate that wind power may be a competitive option by 1985 at reasonable discount rates,
and will almost certainly be competitive by 1992, the earliest date at which the proposed
Gordon below Franklin dam could be completed.267
Blakers and Diesendorf were correct in predicting that wind turbines would quickly mature
and drop in price. However, in their submissions, they chiefly had in mind large wind
turbines, and were basing this belief on claims m a d e by the corporations developing large
machines. 268 These claims turned out to be far too optimistic. It w a s medium-sized wind
turbines that quickly matured. A u s W E A m e m b e r s were quick to recognise this, and by 1983
shifted their focus to the Danish medium-sized machines. 269
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The n e w federal Labor government had helped to stop the Gordon-below-Franklin scheme,
and for a short time appeared to be receptive to the case for building wind power capacity in
Tasmania. A s part of their wind energy campaign in Tasmania, A u s W E A m e m b e r s put
forward a proposal to build a wind farm near Marrawah in north-west Tasmania and to
create a wind power manufacturing industry in Tasmania. 270 A u s W E A lobbied the n e w
Minister for Resources and Energy, Peter Walsh, for support. Just before the High Court
decision of July 1983 to halt the Gordon-below-Franklin hydro project, Walsh attended an
A u s W E A wind energy seminar held in Launceston in northern Tasmania, and w a s quoted
as saying: " A North West wind energy project could be part of a development package for
Tasmania if the Commonwealth w a s successful in the High Court challenge to the Gordonbelow-Franklin dam. 271

The AusWEA proposal comprised three stages. The first was for a small demonstration
wind farm of capacity 430 k W , comprising seven medium-sized Danish and Dutch wind
turbines. It estimated the installed cost, including supervision, monitoring and research, at
$900,000. The second stage w a s a transition period towards local manufacture of wind
turbines under licence, with some local manufacture and local assembly of imported
components. Several local industries had indicated their interest in manufacturing wind
turbine components. The third stage w a s the establishment of a local wind turbine
production facility producing turbines under licence for the domestic and export market.272
The aim of this proposal is to create a 'sunrise industry' with substantial employment and
development potential for Tasmania. The proposal is not aimed at meeting all of the
electricity load forecast by the H E C but rather to provide a local industry manufacturing
medium sized wind turbines for an initially small Australian market, with the potential to
expand in the future to larger machines should this prove desirable.273
A u s W E A calculated that the cost of wind power in north-west Tasmania w a s about 2.2 to
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3.5 c/kWh. P o w e r produced from Tasmania's oil-fired Bell B a y power station, used w h e n
there w a s insufficient hydro power available, w a s estimated at 5 c/kWh. Thus wind power,
A u s W E A argued, could replace power from Bell B a y station.

One of AusWEA's founders, Alan Langworthy, ran a company called Energy Systems
International Pty Ltd, and this c o m p a n y applied for a N E R D D P grant of about $1 million to
build the demonstration wind farm.274 Since the N E R D D P wind energy grants were usually
m u c h smaller than $ l m — w i n d energy w a s never a high priority area for the N E R D D P 2 7 5 —
advocates had hoped that additional funding could be provided through the proposed
compensation package to Tasmania. 276 (Tasmania received a compensation package of
about $290 million from the federal government w h e n the Gordon-below-Franklin project
w a s blocked.277)

Towards the end of 1983, the federal Energy Minister visited Denmark to inspect wind
power facilities and to discuss the status of the technology with wind power practitioners.
O n his return, his attitude towards wind power had hardened. H e stated in Parliament:
The conclusion that I have drawn from the information given overseas is that, with isolated
exceptions ... and with present technology, the cost of either wind power or solar power is
vastly in excess of that of the alternative supplies which are available for the overwhelming
majority of Australia, that is, any part of Australia which has access to cheap coal. For
example, in Denmark wind generated power is estimated to cost 4c per kilowatt hour. That
is at the point of production, not the point of delivery. Sydkraft, in Sweden, manufacturers
of wind generating machines, estimate a cost of between 3c and 4c per kilowatt hour with
the improved machines that it intends to produce shortly. The cost with the existing
machine is higher that that. The wind speeds at those locations are close to the best known
average wind speeds at an Australian site.278
A u s W E A challenged the claim that the cost of wind power w a s 'vastly in excess' of the
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cost of electricity from coal. Blakers noted that the average generation cost of electricity in
N S W w a s about 3.6c/kWh, and that the average price of electricity sold to bulk consumers
in N S W w a s about 4.7c/kWh. H e also noted that not all states had access to cheap coal, and
that two such states, S A and Tasmania, were very windy. 279 T h e Minister's response (when
this claim w a s raised in parliament) w a s to emphasise the problem of intermittency:
[T]he cost figures for wind-generated electricity in Denmark were at the point of
production, not the point of delivery; nor did they include an allowance for the cost of
additional generating plant required to ensure that electricity is available when there is no
wind. The cost of generating electricity from wind in Denmark is not directly comparable
with the cost of purchasing electricity generated in N e w South Wales.

With the Minister no longer favourably disposed towards wind power, AusWEA's hopes
that the federal government would grant $1 million for a wind farm in Tasmania were
dashed. T h e Energy Minister later explained the decision not to fund the project:
The project was not supported by N E R D D C , principally because of the lack of support
from the Hydro-Electric Commission. The project did not originate with the H E C , nor was
it prepared in consultation with that organisation. At the time of submission, it had not
received the official approval of the Commission ... [Furthermore] N E R D D C is not
convinced that medium-scale wind generators are an entirely appropriate form of electricity
generation for Tasmania ... N E R D D C holds the view that, before a major demonstration
project is carried out in this area, there would be merit in conducting a thorough study on
the technical and economic feasibility of wind farms in Tasmania.281

NERDDP then provided the HEC with $170,000 to undertake a feasibility study of wind
power in Tasmania. This w a s to include an assessment of wind resources, wind monitoring,
and an evaluation of the possibility of local manufacture of wind turbines.282 T h e H E C ' s
study comprised two parts. T h e first w a s on the usage of wind energy on a small scale,
including the economics of such developments. T h e H E C concluded: " W i n d p o w e r plant is
not yet competitive with hydro or thermal generation under the economic conditions
expected in the remainder of this decade."283 T h e second part w a s an investigation into the
feasibility of large-scale wind power generation and the effect of this on the operation of the
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Tasmanian grid. The study concluded that the Tasmanian hydro system could accept a
contribution from wind energy of up to 300 M W , while suitable sites identified could yield
on average 118 M W . The H E C also concluded that wind power had no capacity credit,
since the availability of hydro plant was very high.284 Given the latter conclusion, the idea
that wind plant capacity could be built to meet rising demand, to avoid risking overcapacity
by committing to inflexible options with long lead times, carried little weight.

The HEC did not follow this study with any wind power development. Yet, even if it had
been favourably disposed towards wind power, by the mid 1980s Tasmania was faced with
low demand growth rates and the prospect of overcapacity. B y 1985 the H E C was stating
that it would not need wind power until at least the mid 1990s.285 Interestingly, while
several other states were at this time building demonstration wind turbines, the H E C
deemed that demonstration wind turbines were not necessary "because it is accepted that the
technology is sound and the H E C considers that there is no necessity to demonstrate it".286
So the state with arguably the best wind prospects in the country saw out the 1980s and
most of the 1990s without a single publicly owned medium-sized wind turbine.

5.5.6 Overview
During most of the period examined here, the development path of wind turbines w a s not
clear, with m u c h of the debate over grid-connected wind power reflecting this. W i n d power
advocates readily drew on optimistic claims from overseas wind turbine developers about
expected performance and cost,firstabout the prospects of large wind turbines, and later—
w h e n it had become apparent that R & D programs for large wind turbines were not
producing reliable machines—about the prospects of Danish medium-sized wind turbines.
The electricity utilities were more sceptical about future improvements in performance and
reductions in price, basing their assessments on more conservative estimates.

The weak position of wind power advocates, however, meant that most could do little
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except challenge the electricity utilities' assessments and lobby governments to pressure the
utilities to consider wind power. S o m e wind power advocates were in a position to work
with the utilities: those in V S E C , for example, worked closely with the S E C V on the wind
monitoring study and the jointly funded demonstration wind turbine.

In Victoria and Tasmania, pressure from environmentalists was a key driver for the utilities'
investigations of wind power. A s described in chapter 4, the Victorian government had been
influenced by environmentalists within the A L P to encourage greater use of renewable
energy. In Tasmania, the federal government's funding of wind studies w a s influenced by
the environmental battle over the Gordon-below-Franklin hydro plant proposal. South
Australia's situation was more in keeping with that of European countries: it saw wind
power as offering security of supply. After the Gordon-below-Franklin controversy, m u c h
of Tasmania's wilderness areas became national parks and conservation areas. With very
few potential hydro sites left available for exploitation, Tasmania too w a s seeking security
of supply through investigation of wind power.

5.6 Conclusion
H o w then are w e to explain the history of wind power in Australia prior to 1988? In
particular, has an analysis of debates over the efficacy of wind power added anything to a
contextual explanation?

A contextual explanation seems very fitting. The monopoly position of the electricity
utilities meant that installation of any private grid-connected wind turbine would be on
terms dictated by the utilities. That the utilities took a conservative position in analysing the
technical requirements for wind power is to be expected, given their obligation to provide a
safe and reliable electricity supply. The utilities investigated wind power only during
periods of uncertainty about future fuel supplies, or for locations reliant on expensive liquid
fuels. The anomaly was the Victorian wind monitoring study: in this case, a reluctant utility
was directed to study wind power by a government influenced, for a time, by the
environment movement, and supported by an established renewable energy agency.

By providing a chronological account of debates over the efficacy of wind power, I have
demonstrated that the electricity utilities were, in the main, not engaging with the arguments
raised by wind power advocates. They could avoid such engagement because of the
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dominant position that they held. The efforts of wind power advocates were directed at
gaining a hearing for their alternative assessments of the efficacy of wind power.
Occasionally forums for such a hearing arose: the Senate Inquiry over the Gordon-belowFranklin hydro scheme was one example. But these did not lead the utilities to change their
stance towards wind power.

One could argue that these debates over the efficacy of wind power had little direct
influence, and that the efforts of wind power advocates were to no avail. However, an
important observation from the analysis of this period is that there were some spaces for
debates to occur. B y highlighting the emergence and the employment of such spaces for
debate, this chapter and the two previous chapters have demonstrated the strength of
integrating contextual and interpretative approaches.

As described in chapters 3 and 4, we can identify several contributing factors for the
emergence of such spaces: pressure for electricity utilities to be more accountable;
increasing attention to energy policy following the 1970s oil shocks; the slowdown in
electricity demand growth; and the burgeoning environmental movement. While these
contextual factors helped to create spaces for debate over the assessment of wind power, the
important observation is h o w these spaces were used—and expanded—by wind power
advocates. These contextual factors encouraged some people outside the established energy
sector to gain expertise in renewable energy technologies and other energy matters. The
formation of A u s W E A , in particular, provided a means for wind power advocates to make
the most of these opportunities, and by providing an organisational framework, lent greater
legitimacy to the claims of wind power advocates. In some cases their lobbying efforts led
to the utilities undertaking wind studies. Yet, the enthusiasm of wind power advocates for
engaging in these debates was very m u c h influenced by contextual factors. This can be seen
clearly in the period from the mid 1980s, w h e n interest in wind power declined.

Apart from attempting to gain a hearing for alternative assessments of wind power's
efficacy, wind power advocates undertook a number of studies during this period, seeking
to demonstrate that the efficacy of wind power was greater than that portrayed by the
utilities. These studies helped to increase the level of knowledge about wind power, and laid
the groundwork for wind power projects from the late 1990s. These later projects are
explored in the following chapters.
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Chapter 6: The A g e of Green Business
6.1 Introduction
In chapter 3,1 explored meanings attributed to renewable energy technologies in the period
prior to 1988. Advocacy of renewable energy was linked with several issues: the alternative
technology ( A T ) movement; concerns about energy resource depletion following the 1970s
oil shocks; the anti-nuclear movement; and concerns about the electricity utilities'
environmental record and planning practices. M u c h early popular support for renewable
energy w a s premised on opposition to the dominant technologies and practices of the
electricity industry, rather than direct experience with renewable energy generation.
Conventional generation technologies were considered centralised, too large, the domain of
technical experts, and environmentally damaging. There w a s no community control over
h o w the utilities operated or the type of energy source used. The utilities paid little heed to
community and environmental concerns, claiming that high growth was necessary for the
industry to continue underpinning economic growth. S o m e early renewable energy
advocates sought more than just community participation or control over energy issues. The
A T movement, in particular, sought to create both environmentally benign technologies,
and a less oppressive, more participatory society.

Thus, to varying degrees many early supporters of renewable energy linked greater use of
the technologies with critical sociopolitical objectives. Which groups then were advocating
renewable energy in the 1990s and early 2000s; what did they see as the purpose of using
these technologies; and what sociopolitical objectives were they pursuing? H o w do these
apply more broadly to environmental technologies?

From the late 1980s, popular concern about the enhanced greenhouse effect led to wind
power and other renewables being depicted primarily as energy sources that emitted no
greenhouse gases. Australian policy makers, however, initially regarded wind power as a
remote area power source: until the late 1990s, nearly all wind capacity was in non-grid
areas. Though evident earlier, the idea that environmental technologies such as renewables
could offer n e w business opportunities started to permeate government and business in the
1990s. Initial interest was in technologies for which Australia held a competitive advantage:
in renewables, these were primarily photovoltaics and associated technologies for remote
area power supplies. But in the late 1990s, w h e n governments introduced mechanisms to
•

promote grid-connected renewable energy, n e w commercial interests entered the scene.
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S o m e communities feared loss of landscape values from proposed wind power facilities,
and joined a growing opposition m o v e m e n t seeking to stop these developments.

Many advocates of renewable energy hope to maintain a high level of public acceptance for
renewables, regarding this as necessary if use of renewables is to become widespread. Yet
n e w commercial interests are n o w promoting wind power, and state governments are keen
to secure wind developments. The public m a y well support wind power in the abstract while
deeming specific development proposals unacceptable. Maintaining high levels of public
support m a y then m e a n that the kinds of renewable energy projects admitted b e c o m e
severely limited. Hence the question that I wish to explore in this chapter is: A s the support
base for wind power widens, and the locus of opposition to wind power shifts, what role
does public support for wind power play in explaining the uptake of wind power?

To explore this question, I continue the discussion from chapter 3 on the phases of
environmentalism, as they apply to views on wind power. I then explore h o w well the
concept of 'ecological modernisation', which some have used to categorise the recent phase
of environmental technology policy, describes the changing role and support base for
environmental technologies. Then

follows an analysis of h o w

the

environmental

acceptability of renewable energy generators has shifted, as a result of disputes over
renewable energy projects. The controversy over wind power projects is then analysed
using a Victorian case study. While this chapter is mainly a historical analysis, I also briefly
analyse trends that m a y shape the future of wind power in Australia.

6.2 Environmentalism
In chapter 3, I introduced A n d r e w Jamison's conceptualisation of six phases of m o d e m
environmentalism: awakening (pre-1968), age of ecology (1969-74), politicisation (197579), differentiation (1980-86), internationalisation (1987-93), and integration (1994present).2 I described thefirstfour. I also described attitudes towards renewable energy in
i

For example, M.E. Watt, G.N. Watt and M . Diesendorf, "Sustainable renewable energy systems" ISES
2001 Solar World Congress, International Solar Energy Society, Adelaide, 25 November - 2 December
2001; Hugh Outhred, Karl Mallon, Rob Passey, Muriel Watt and Iain MacGill, "The sustainability of
renewable energy projects - wind", A discussion paper for the A C R E Energy Policy Group Draft
Australian Cooperative Research Centre for Renewable Energy, Murdoch University, June 2002
Andrew Jamison, The Making of Green Knowledge, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001Andrew Jamison, "The shaping of the global agenda: the role of non-governmental organisations" in
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Australia during these phases. Here I describe the two more recent phases.

The late 1980s saw the re-emergence of environmentalism, with the focus shifted to global
environmental problems, and solutions expressed in terms of 'sustainable development'.3
Increasing attention w a s given to the threat of global climate change from greenhouse gas
emissions. Renewable energy c a m e to be interpreted as an energy source that emitted no
greenhouse gases, rather than as just a renewable or non-polluting source. Also significant
during this phase w a s the effect of globalisation and the dominant neoliberal ideology on
environment policy-making, with the role of the state shifting from regulating the
environmental activities of business to working in cooperation with business to achieve an
environmentally cleaner outcome. 4

The sixth phase Jamison called the "entrepreneurial age", with environment organisations
focused on facilitating a shift towards cleaner production and consumption patterns.5 This is
discussed in section 6.3.

All in all, Jamison argued, the environment movement was transformed from 'outsider'
status in the 1970s, to (for s o m e of its members) 'insider' status in the 1990s:
"environmentalism itself has been transformed from a critical social m o v e m e n t into an
influential

international

science

and

technology

network

of

actors".6

(Some

environmentalists have of course retained a critical stance.) Jamison also described this
transformation of the environment m o v e m e n t in terms of the three dimensions of
'knowledge interests' of the movement. 7 T h e technological interest, which in the 1970s
focused on a critique of certain large-scale technologies (such as nuclear power) and
advocacy of small-scale, environmentally benign technologies, has been transformed into a
concern with 'cleaner production'. T h e organisational interest, which in the 1970s focused

3
4
5
6
7

Scott Lash, Bronislaw Szerszynski and Brian Wynne (eds), Risk, Environment and Modernity:
Towards a New Ecology, S A G E Publications, London, 1996; Andrew Jamison, "Introduction: issues
and concepts", in Andrew Jamison (ed.), Public Engagement and Science and Technology Policy
Options (PESTO) Final Report, Center for Social Science Research on the Environment, Aarhus
University, Denmark, 1999, Accessed 5 October 1999, <http://www.au.dk/~cesamat/>.
Jamison, 2001, op. cit.
ibid.
ibid.
Jamison, 1996, op. cit., p. 240.
Knowledge interests of the A T movement are described in chapter 3. Ron Eyerman and Andrew
Jamison, Social Movements: A Cognitive Approach, Polity Press, Cambridge (UK), 1991.
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on grass roots initiatives, opposition to expert elites, democratic knowledge production etc.,
has been transformed into one where experts and professionals dominate. T h e cosmological
interest, which in the 1970s w a s a holistic world-view, has been transformed into a concern
Q

with 'sustainable development'.

Thus, while many 1970s environmentalists were critical of industrial society and identified
alternative technology with social change, today's dominant environmental message poses
no threat to capitalist growth, as corporations j u m p on the bandwagon to produce n e w
'clean technologies'. Jamison noted:
The wave of clean technology that has descended upon us ... can best be seen, I think, as a
translation of alternative technological criteria—and an alternative technological praxis—
into new product criteria.9

Jamison's analysis deals mainly with trends in Europe; however, as in the previous four
phases described in chapter 3, m u c h of this analysis is applicable in Australia. T h e main
difference is that Australia's environment m o v e m e n t has focused m o r e on wilderness and
forestry preservation, in response to the activities of Australia's resource-based industries.
Moreover, Australian industry and governments have been slow to heed the 'green
business' message, hampered by the dominance of the resource-based industries.

6.3 The Greening of Business
6.3.1 Introduction
The traditional antagonism between environmentalists and the business community is well
known. The business community, apart from pockets such as eco-tourism, has mostly been
sceptical of environmentalists' apocalyptic warnings, and has expressed concern that tighter
environmental regulations will reduce profits and competitiveness.

Recently there has been a distinct change in rhetoric, with many companies trying to
acquire a 'green' tinge, and some business leaders proclaiming 'eco-efficiency' as the n e w
mantra.

9

io

While m a n y of the environmental pronouncements of business in the 1980s were

Jamison, 1996, op. cit.
ibid., p. 241.
The term 'eco-efficiency' was coined by the World Business Council for Sustainable Development.
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a public relations exercise, by the late 1990s these were gaining more substance. Prominent
British environmentalist Jonathon Porritt noted:
[D]riven by a swathe of new legislative pressure, fearful of the loss of reputation that comes
from being branded an environmental pariah, and increasingly aware of the very real
opportunities of doing good business by doing it in a leaner, greener way, the environment
is now a serious issue for a very large number of the very largest companies.11
M o r e critically, one could argue that business or its representative bodies are starting to
accept the inevitability of tighter environmental regulations and are taking a proactive
position, to ensure that they are well placed to set the agenda. A s Bjorn Stigson, President
of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development ( W B C S D ) , expressed it:
[T]he concept of sustainable development [is being widened] to put much more emphasis
on Corporate Social Responsibility ... Corporate Social Responsibility has become an
institutionalised part of the northern hemisphere debate about the expectations which civil
society is placing on corporations. W e have from W B C S D taken a leadership role to make
business part of the ongoing debate and help to define the terms of the future debate.12
Defining the terms of the debate also means that business can influence what are depicted as
the major environmental problems: for example, companies pushing wind power will affirm
global warming as a more pressing problem than coastal protection. Solutions can also be
presented in terms benefiting business, that is, solutions requiring consumption of greener
goods, rather than reduced consumption.

6.3.2 Ecological Modernisation
In s o m e business and policy circles, protection of the environment is n o w regarded as
compatible with economic growth. Individual companies are finding that reducing their
environmental

impact m a y

save m o n e y , and s o m e are looking to enhance their

competitiveness through the innovation of environmental technologies. This change in
thinking has only recently started to permeate the Australian business community, but w a s
embraced in s o m e European countries m u c h earlier. It w a s spelled out in the influential
1987 Brundtland Report, Our Common

11

12

Future:

Livio D. DeSimone and Frank Popoff, Eco-efficiency: The Business Link to Sustainable
Development, M I T Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1997.
Jonathon Porritt, "Environmental politics: the old and the new", in Michael Jacobs (ed.), Greening the
Millenium? The New Politics of the Environment, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford (UK), 1997, p. 68.
Bjorn Stigson, "The international sustainable development agenda: drivers, motives and values",
W B C S D - B C A Forum, Sydney, 19 July 1999, Accessed 15 December 1999, <http://www.bca.com.
au/sustainabledevelopment.htm>.
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W e see ... the possibility for a new era of economic growth, one that must be based on
policies that sustain and expand the environmental resource base ... Experience in the
industrialized nations has proved that anti-pollution technology has been cost-effective in
terms of health, property, and environmental damage avoided, and that it has made many
13

industries more profitable by making them more resource-efficient.
This perspective—a distinct change from the environmental message of the 1 9 7 0 s — w a s an
expression of a n e w environmental discourse that started to gain ground a m o n g poltcy elites
during the 1980, dubbed 'ecological modernisation'.14

In the 1970s, the radical environmental critique maintained that environmental protection
required radical social change, while the dominant policy response treated environmental
problems as discrete, well understood, able to be smoothly administered by specialists in
'Environment Departments', and adequately addressed by end-of-pipe treatments.

Yet

there w a s agreement that environmental protection had to be traded-off against economic
growth. Ecological modernisation represents an overturning of this assumption. A principal
belief is that environmental protection and economic growth form not a zero-sum but a
positive-sum game. 1 6 Environmental d a m a g e is considered a matter of inefficiency, and
protection of the environment can be achieved through the innovation of clean technologies
and production processes, which in turn will launch a n e w w a v e of economic growth. 17

A starting point for this change in thinking was the idea embraced by a few companies that

16
17

World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 1987, pp. 1, 16.
Albert Weale, The New Politics of Pollution, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1992; Gert
Spaargaren and Arthur P.J. Mol, "Sociology, environment, and modernity: ecological modernization
as a theory of social change", Society and Natural Resources, Vol. 5, 1992, pp. 323-344; Maarten A.
Hajer, The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process,
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995; Maarten A. Hajer, "Ecological modernisation as cultural politics", in
Lash, Szerszynski and Wynne (eds), 1996, op. cit.; Arthur P.J. Mol, "Ecological modernisation and
institutional reflexivity: environmental reform in the late m o d e m age", Environmental Politics, Vol.
5, No. 2, 1996, pp. 302-323; Andrew Gouldson and Joseph Murphy, "Ecological modernisation:
restructuring industrial economics", in Jacobs (ed.), 1997, op. cit.; Duncan Liefferink and Arthur P.J.
Mol, "Voluntary agreements as a form of deregulation?", in Ute Collier (ed.), Deregulation in the
European Union: Environmental Perspectives, Routledge, London, 1998; Marit Reitan, "Ecological
modernisation and 'realpolitik': ideas, interests and institutions", Environmental Politics, Vol. 7, N o .
2, 1998, pp. 1-26. Until recently, the term 'ecological modernisation' was used mainly in Germany
and the Netherlands. The idea is embodied in some versions of the term 'sustainable development'
Weale, 1992, op. cit.; Hajer, 1995, op. cit.
Weale, 1992, op. cit.; Hajer, 1995, op. cit.
Weale, 1992, op. cit; Hajer, 1995, op. cit.
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'pollution reduction' equals 'resource conservation' equals 'money saved'.18 Thus, rather
than relying on end-of-pipe treatments, industry should use clean technologies, which save
m o n e y because they conserve resources. There are similarities with the idea of conserving
energy through development of energy-efficient equipment. Arguments m a d e by energy
efficiency proponents that energy use and economic growth can be decoupled are thus
extended to the relationship between environmental degradation and economic growth. In
the 1970s, s o m e were also starting to recognise that pollution control offered n e w business
opportunities. In 1979, Michael Royston wrote:
Awareness in the enterprise about pollution leads in its turn to an awareness of the new
business opportunities which exist, both in the narrow area of pollution control and in the
wider one of the environment. It is therefore not surprising that the pollution-control sector
is in full expansion and carries with it the promise of a successful future.19

The experiences of vanguard companies undoubtedly contributed to business starting to
endorse aspects of this perspective. But the idea of ecological modernisation has other roots
too. Intellectually, it can be traced to the 1980s w o r k of G e r m a n scholars reflecting on
modernity and the ecological crisis.20 Pragmatically, it can be traced to the change of
strategy adopted by s o m e environment groups during the 1980s towards a m o r e cooperative
approach with business, and to the n e w environmental policies adopted by

some

governments after the failure of earlier environmental strategies. Thus, as Spaargaren and
M o l noted, the concept of 'ecological modernisation' is used at two levels: as a theoretical
framework used to analyse institutional changes needed to solve the ecological crisis; and as
a political program to direct environmental policies.21

As a theoretical framework, ecological modernisation is a theory of industrial society in the
Schumpeterian tradition: it puts forward a third phase in the historical development of
industrial society characterised by an "ecological switchover", a transformation of
production and consumption towards ecological goals.22

18

19
20

21
22

One of thefirstcompanies to promote the idea that reducing pollution can be profitable was 3M. In
1975, the company instigated the 'Pollution Prevention Pays' program, or 3P. 3 M , "About 3 M environmental, social and economic sustainability", 2002, Accessed 7 December 2002, <http://www.
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Spaargaren and Mol, 1992, op. cit.
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[Ecological modernisation] theory focuses on the ecological transformation of production
and consumption, which is currently taking place in Western Europe and can be regarded as
the third and, until further notice,finalphase in the historical development of m o d e m ,
industrial society ...[geological modernisation theory identifies m o d e m science and
technology as principal institutions for ecological reform, rather than the main culprits of
ecological and social disruption ... [It] stresses the increasing importance of economic and
market dynamics in ecological reform and the role of innovators, entrepreneurs and other
economic agents as social carriers of ecological restructuring, in addition to state agencies
and new social movements ... [It] is critical of the traditional, strong and bureaucratic state
in the redirection of processes of production and consumption, ... [instead seeing] the state
in a facilitating rather than an interventionist role.23
O n e weakness of the theory, Spaargaren and M o l noted, is the technologically determinist
view of social development.
The ecological switchover is analyzed as a logical, necessary, and inevitable next stage in
the development of the industrial system—the system correcting itself for the construction
fault of neglecting ecology.24

An analysis of ecological modernisation as a political program, however, is in keeping with
a social shaping of technology approach. It suggests that governments can consciously steer
the development of technological systems in a cleaner direction through fostering measures
to stimulate the innovation of clean technologies and techniques, in order to ecologically
reform production and consumption patterns. Such a program has been adopted by s o m e
Western European (principally G e r m a n and Dutch) environment organisations and political
parties.25 Recently this approach has been promoted b y Australian environment groups. 26
Moreover, s o m e Australian business leaders and analysts are starting to follow their
overseas counterparts, espousing s o m e elements of the ecological modernisation program. 27

Ecological modernisation proposes a strong role for environmental regulation. While many
industry groups argue that tighter regulations reduce competitiveness, and pressure
governments to implement lax environmental regulations, this view is starting to shift.
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S o m e business analysts are n o w arguing that being green can enhance competitiveness:
environmental regulations should be seen as an impetus for innovation. For example,
Michael Porter and Claas van der Linde, w h o were concerned about U S industry falling
behind that of Europe and Japan in the innovation of clean technologies, stated:
[Companies] are constantly finding innovative solutions to pressure of all sorts from
competitors, customers and regulators. Properly designed environmental standards can
trigger innovations that lower the total costs of a product or improve its value. Such
innovations allow companies to use a range of inputs more productively ... Ultimately, this
enhanced resource productivity makes companies more competitive, not less.28

Recognising that tighter environmental regulations are inevitable in the future, proactive
companies m a y innovate early to gain first mover advantage; that is, they b e c o m e well
placed to secure a prominent position in international markets as d e m a n d for greener
products and processes grows. 29 A n example of this is the strong position of Danish firms in
the booming wind turbine market, a consequence of successful innovative w o r k carried out
in the 1950s and 1970s.30 A number of countries have adopted a strategy of encouraging
their industries to develop green products and processes, to capture this first mover
advantage. Curtis M o o r e and Alan Miller, in their 1994 book Green Gold: Japan,
the United States and the Race for Environmental

Germany,

Technology, described this strategy,

urging the laggard United States to catch up to the leaders, G e r m a n y and Japan.31
Germany's strategy is to use stringent environmental regulations to foster technological
innovation, while Japan's success is due not only to tight environmental regulations, but
also to the government's close links with industry and successful technology policy
initiatives. M o o r e and Miller see the main problems of the U S A in this regard as being the
hostility to environmental regulation during the 1980s, the government's 'hands-off
approach to industry, and cheap energy.32 Australia has tended to follow the U S trend, and it
too has benefited from cheap energy, which can be a deterrent to the innovation of energy

28
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efficient and renewable energy technologies.

Although ecological modernisation theory suggests a win-win outcome overall, some
sectors m a y be losers. Weale noted:
[Not] all actors in the policy system will recognise the case for improved pollution control
... [T]hose who incur the costs of stringent pollution control will have an incentive to argue
against its introduction if they cannot capture the economic benefits, and undoubtedly the
operators of many coal-fired power stations fall into this category.
In Australia, parts of government and most large industry groups still uphold the view that
environmental protection and economic growth have to be traded-off. This can be attributed
to the dominant position held by industries which see themselves as losers from the
adoption of stricter environmental standards. For example, economic modelling undertaken
in 1997 by the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics ( A B A R E ) of the
effect of reducing greenhouse gas emissions indicated that the economic cost would be very
high. T h e modelling, which w a s funded in part by fossil fuel companies and industry
associations, w a s criticised by environmentalists in part for overestimating costs by
neglecting the role of technological change. 34 Furthermore, 131 economists signed a
statement claiming that the modelling overstated the costs and understated the benefits of
reducing greenhouse gas emissions in Australia.35 Yet the findings were endorsed by the
federal government resulting in Australia refusing to accept a greenhouse gas emissions cut
at the 1997 Kyoto climate change conference. In effect, the fossil fuel companies, on which
Australia relies heavily for exports and cheap energy, were able to ensure that the zero-sum
g a m e view prevailed.36 Indeed, Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen argued that Australia is n o w
taking more of the role formerly assumed by the U S A of defending fossil fuel interests.37

There are still many who are sceptical about whether ecological modernisation as a
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normative project is desirable or even feasible.38 Unlike sustainable development, as
described in the Brundtland Report, ecological modernisation is silent about questions of
social justice, particularly in the Third World; its principal focus is the First World.39
Ecological modernisation focuses on the means (clean technologies and processes) while
the ends (economic growth) remain the same. This absolves the pursuit of economic growth
from blame, and overlooks the pursuit of more socially desirable ends. Indeed, radical
environmentalists doubt whether environmental sustainability can be achieved under
existing social and institutional arrangements. Ecological modernisation m a y be "simply an
attempt to legitimise and sustain the very structures and systems that have been responsible
for environmental decline".40 The ecological modernisation message is thus about
maintaining sociopolitical structures, quite at odds with the earlier environmentalist
message of sociopolitical change.

6.3.3 Consequences for Wind Power
W h a t then are the consequences of the greening of business for the treatment of wind power
in Australia? A s noted above, a number of countries have implemented a clear strategy of
fostering the innovation of green products and processes to ensure that their industries can
capture international markets. This strategy has been adopted by the European Union for
renewable energy technologies. Europe has m u c h of the world's renewable energy industry,
and Denmark is world leader in wind turbine manufacture.

Given the Danish lead and the stabilisation of the Danish wind turbine design, there is
probably little role for Australia in the innovation of large-scale wind turbines. However,
there are significant opportunities in the innovation of methods to increase viability of wind
power (such as wind speed forecasting), and in the design of small wind turbines and
complementary technologies to support grid-connected or remote-area wind power.
Following the introduction of mechanisms to support renewable energy, a large number of
companies not previously associated with renewable energy are seeking n e w opportunities
in the design, installation and maintenance of wind power facilities and the provision of
technical, legal and financial support. It is too soon to say whether these companies will
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246

Andrea Bunting. The Social Shaping of Wind Power in Australia

become proactively greener as a result of their involvement in this n e w business
opportunity, that is, whether they will begin to generate and carry out ideas about h o w to
facilitate a shift to cleaner production and consumption patterns rather than merely seizing
on a niche created by government regulations. Will these companies also abandon their
more environmentally damaging activities to secure a greener image? Indeed, m a n y
companies becoming involved in wind power and other forms of renewable energy still
have interests in fossil fuels and mining activities.

What the entry of these companies into wind power suggests is that the support base for
wind power has widened considerably, with these companies and governments motivated in
particular by the development opportunities associated with wind power, not just the cleaner
environmental outcomes. These companies are n o w espousing the environmental case for
wind power and forming alliances with environment groups; yet their interpretation of wind
power is clearly associated with the business opportunities created through government
regulation. In the final section of this chapter, I shall return to explore h o w this shifting
support base might affect the deployment of wind power.

6.4 Environmental Acceptability of Renewable Energy Generators
6.4.1 Introduction
The meaning of 'renewable energy' has long incorporated notions of environmental
acceptability. But when harnessed for power generation, all energy sources have some
environmental impact. A s the public has gained more experience with renewable energy
generators and their environmental impacts, debates have arisen about the acceptability of
these impacts. Following bitter environmental disputes over large-scale hydropower,
environmentalists in the main have branded this an unacceptable renewable energy source.
M a n y advocate 'new' renewables (that is, excluding conventional forms) to emphasise the
difference. More recently, environmentalists have raised concerns about the use of energy
sources such as biomass which are theoretically renewable but which m a y be used in an
unsustainable manner. A n d while energy sources m a y be renewable, the manufacture, usage
and disposal of the energy conversion technologies m a y require the use of non-renewable
materials, or m a y be environmentally damaging or energy-intensive. Techniques such as
life cycle assessment and energy pay back time have been developed to assess these
technologies.
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A s noted in section 6.1, renewable energy advocates hope to maintain high public
acceptance, regarding this as necessary if use of renewables is to b e c o m e widespread. T h e y
are keen to refine the definition of 'renewable energy', and to exclude sources regarded as
objectionable from receiving assistance under renewable energy support mechanisms. M a n y
n o w advocate 'sustainable energy' rather than 'renewable energy'. Yet, 'sustainable' is
subject to varying interpretations. Muriel Watt et al defined it thus:
[S]ustainable systems would not deplete the capital of resources or the environment
(amenity, biodiversity) or the economy. All of these factors must satisfy the criteria,
otherwise only 'renewable', 'environmentallyfriendly'or 'economically beneficial' can be
claimed. Hence, sustainable energy incorporates, is different from and has broader social
value than each of the above if applied independently.41

Sustainability is often taken to include the avoidance of adverse socio-cultural impacts. The
forced removal of communities for hydro or geothermal projects is undoubtedly one of the
most severe socio-cultural impacts of renewable energy;42 yet other m o r e seemingly benign
technologies m a y have adverse impacts which are rarely acknowledged. For example, the
usage of photovoltaics ( P V ) for rural electrification in developing countries is usually
considered to have positive socio-cultural impacts. Catherine Matthews and Richard
Hindmarsh, w h o are critics of the entry of large oil companies into the photovoltaic
industry, questioned whether aid programs that provide these technologies are for the
benefit of the rural communities or the photovoltaic industry:
Aid programs are well known for their role in subsidising the development and transfer of
western technologies, often inappropriate for non-western cultures and economies. In the
promotion of P V to developing countries, there is little recognition that renewable energy
technologies are not value or culturally neutral. Little attention is paid to the specific needs
or circumstances of people in non-western cultures with regard to their requirements for
energy technologies, or whether they indeed want the technology. Associated with the latter
are ethical questions about the user pay initiatives used in many renewable energy aid
programs. Ought the poorest underwrite the development of expensive renewable energy
technologies such as photovoltaics?43
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Catherine Matthews and Richard Hindmarsh, "Moving solar energy from periphery to 'power'",
Ecopolitics XIII Conference, Lincoln University (NZ), 29 November - 1 December 2001.
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Matthews and Hindmarsh's work raises an interesting point for the issue of public support
for renewable energy technologies. A s government subsidies for renewable energy increase,
companies which are normally the target of environmentalists' campaigns, such as fossil
fuel companies, are moving

into the renewable

energy

industry. While

some

environmentalists welcome this, others argue that such companies are seeking to comer this
new market and are still engaging in unsustainable practices in their main business. This
m a y well harm public support for renewables. A s noted in the case study in section 6.5, the
level of trust that renewable energy developers engender in the local community can affect
whether or not locals support their projects.

In the remainder of this section, I examine debates about the acceptability of renewable
energy generators in Australia under mechanisms introduced from the late 1990s. The
development and outcomes of these mechanisms are discussed further in chapters 7 and 8.
The two main mechanisms used to foster renewable electricity generation are green power
schemes, described in the next section, and the Mandatory Renewable Energy Target
( M R E T ) , described in section 6.4.3. Under green power schemes, which are operated by
most electricity retailers, electricity consumers can elect to pay a premium on their
electricity bill. In return, their retailer undertakes to purchase an equivalent amount of
electricity from renewable energy sources. About 1 % of consumers have signed up. M R E T
is the requirement that by 2010, electricity retailers and wholesale buyers source an
additional 2 % (later set at 9,500 GWh/year) of electricity from renewable energy or
specified waste sources. The measure includes a $ 4 0 / M W h (4c/kWh) penalty cap.
Renewable energy generators produce renewable energy certificates, which are traded; thus
it is designed to produce a least-cost outcome. M R E T is expected to stimulate significantly
more renewable energy plant than green power.

6.4.2 Green Power
Green power schemes (or green pricing of electricity) have'been introduced in a number of
countries as a mechanism for increasing power generation from renewable energy sources.
Consumers purchase green power in order to displace some power generated from fossil

ibid; Matthews and Hindmarsh, "Bringing solar down to earth", 2001, op. cit.; C a m Walker, "Green
corporations or scoring greenbacks", Arena Magazine, June-July 2002, pp. 44-46.
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fuel with renewable electricity, thereby reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The consumers
also hope to increase the market for renewable energy generators, thereby assisting the
longer-term viability of renewables.

Green power schemes are voluntary; thus a key consideration is what the public consider to
be environmentally acceptable forms of power generation.45 A s with other forms of
environmental labelling, green power relies on convincing consumers that they should pay a
higher price for a more environmentally sound product. Consumers must be convinced that
their purchase will lead to overall environmental improvement (for green power, that new
green generators will be built), and that environmental claims of the supplier are genuine.
Increasingly, environmental labelling programs rely on independent verification.46 The
main driver for the introduction of Australian green power schemes w a s the development of
green power accreditation guidelines by the Sustainable Energy Development Authority
( S E D A ) of N S W in 1997. 47 Later, national guidelines were developed.48

Architects of green power schemes must therefore grapple with how consumers define an
environmentally sound electricity generator, and communicate the attributes of approved
green power generators effectively. Truffer et al noted that environmental labels on
electricity that are based on simple criteria are easier to communicate; yet to be acceptable,
labels should deal adequately with the complexities of environmental impacts. T o meet the
simplicity requirement, labels admitting only renewable energy sources or fuel sources with
low C O 2 intensity are often used. T h e complexities of environmental impacts can be partly
conveyed by employing techniques such as life cycle assessment.49 They noted that some
impacts, particularly location-specific impacts such as degradation of landscape values by
wind farms, are more difficult to handle. Consumers too m a y have preconceived notions
about what are the more environmentally benign technologies, which m a y not accord with

45

46

47

48
49

For a comparison of the definition of 'green' for green power programs in four English-speaking
countries see Mary Jane Patterson and Ian J. Rowlands, "Beauty in the eye of the beholder: a
comparison or 'green power' certification programs in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and
the United States", Energy and Environment, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2002, pp. 1-25.
Environmental Protection Agency (USA), Environmental Labeling: Issues, Policies and Practices
Worldwide, E P A 742-R-98-009,1998.
Sustainable Energy Development Authority, Green Power Accreditation Program, Version 1.0a,
February 1997.
National Green Power Accreditation Program, Accreditation Document, Version 2, November 2001.
Bernhard Truffer, Jochen Markard and Rolf Wustenhagen, "Eco-labeling of electricity: strategies and
tradeoffs in the definition of environmental standards", Energy Policy, No. 29,2001, pp. 885-897.
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findings from life cycle assessment; thus labels need also to deal with these perceptions.
S E D A ' s 1997 accreditation guidelines noted:
As contribution to Schemes is entirely voluntary, customer perceptions are of equal or
greater significance than any 'objective' view of the environmental merit of a particular
electricity generator.51

Although Australian green power schemes are intended to capitalise primarily on popular
concern about climate change, they admit only renewable energy generators rather than all
generators with low greenhouse gas intensity such as natural gas-fired plant. Yet not all
types of renewable energy generators are considered by the public to be environmentally
acceptable. T o handle these concerns, warnings and exclusions have been incorporated into
green power accreditation guidelines. Over time, these warnings and exclusions have
become m u c h more specific. This tightening of eligibility criteria reflected concerns that
were being raised about environmental impacts as renewable energy projects were being
proposed. In 1997, S E D A ' s guidelines excluded hydro-electric p o w e r plant which caused
n e w flooding of eco-systems, and m a s s - b u m incineration, and included a warning about the
"sensitive issue" of using waste timber from old growth forests. T h e y m a d e n o mention of
possible environmental concerns over wind power. 52 These exclusions reflected previous
environmental conflicts in Australia over pollution from municipal waste incinerators,
flooding of wilderness areas by large-scale hydro plant, and logging of old growth forests.
That wind power proposals had caused m u c h controversy overseas w a s not reflected.

However, the warnings and exclusions in the 2001 guidelines were much more specific:
The followingftiels/technologiesare not acceptable for the purposes of the definition of a
Green Power generator.
1) Utilisation of any materials (including wastes) derived from forests other than
sustainably harvested plantation forests. Plantation-derived wastes should not be
sourced from plantations that clear, or have cleared after 1990, existing old growth or
native forests.
2) Generators that involve the incineration of industrial, commercial or municipal solid
wastes.
3) Hydro-electric projects, which require new dam construction ... that results in largescale flooding of ecosystems.

50
51

ibid.
S E D A , Green Power Accreditation Program, 1997, op. cit., Appendix A. Emphasis removed.
ibid.
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4) Hydro-electric projects, which involve major diversion of rivers and do not adequately
allow for environmental flows.53
W i n d p o w e r w a s considered generally acceptable, subject to the following warning:
Wind turbines and windfarms have the ability to impact the local environment, particularly
in relation to visual amenity, noise and bird-strike. Sufficient consultation with local
stakeholders and efforts to minimise the impact on local amenity should be undertaken to
ensure their acceptability under the program.54

The changes in warnings and exclusions between 1997 and 2001 reflected battles conducted
during the interim over the environmental acceptability of renewable energy plant. For
example, the negative environmental impacts of wind p o w e r had been highlighted in
conflicts over the visual effect of w i n d farms o n scenic landscapes, particularly at C a p e
Bridgewater (described below). T h e exclusion of material from old growth forests reflected
the bitter fight over the inclusion of this in the M R E T . 5 5

The 2001 guidelines noted that specific projects might generate controversy, and that public
acceptance of particular renewable energy technologies could change over time. It
acknowledged the need for public consultation both for individual projects, and for the
guidelines themselves.
The accreditation criteria reflect the current environmental data, consumer and expert
opinions of what constitutes 'green environmentally friendly' and 'sustainable energy'
generation. Over time it is possible that a changing environment or technology will mean
that the accreditation guidelines will change. All stakeholders will be consulted accordingly
of any proposed amendments to the operation and conditions of the National Green Power
Accreditation Program and the Accreditation Document, and be given reasonable time to
provide feedback in the review process prior to such amendments taking affect (sic). For
generator assessments specifically, the Project Manager undertakes an informal stakeholder
consultation process for all applications. All written comments obtained through this
process will be considered. A formal public consultation process may be undertaken where
the N G P A S G deems necessary e.g. in situations where a generation project is potentially
contentious; there are issues of public concern, or there is disagreement regarding its
acceptability under the program.56

53
54
55

56

National Green Power Accreditation Program, 2001, op. cit., p. 13.
ibid., p. 21.
Senate Environment, Communications, Information technology and the Arts References Committee,
Report on Renewable Energy (Electricity) Bill 2000 and Renewable Energy (Electricity) Charge Bill
2000, Canberra, August 2000.
National Green Power Accreditation Program, 2001, op. cit., p. 16. The Project Manager is the person
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However, not all accredited green power generators were uncontroversial. O n e very
controversial example w a s a Solid Waste to Energy Recycling Facility

(SWERF™)

commissioned in Wollongong in 2001. The facility uses municipal waste to generate
electricity, with a pyrolytic gasification process used to convert m u c h of the waste into fuel
gas.57 A later proposal for a S W E R F ™ facility in Perth w a s blocked after local protests.58

Although green power subscribers are influencing uptake of renewable energy, they have
little influence over the green power product offered or the type of renewable energy plant
installed. Thus, the w a y in which public concerns about the acceptability of renewable
energy sources are translated into green power exclusions is shaped more by environmental
campaigns than by popular choice. This situation m a y change with full retail contestability
(whereby small consumers can choose their electricity retailer) as long as public awareness
of environmental impacts of renewable energy is also raised.

Some environment groups believe that green power schemes should be leading to more
sustainable energy options, not just renewable energy plant. They claim that d e m a n d
management should be promoted, and energy sources should be assessed not solely on their
greenhouse impact, but on their total environmental impact—upstream and downstream as
well as in the power generation process.59 Following the start of full retail contestability in
2002, a group of nine environment organisations sought to raise public awareness and
encourage electricity suppliers to improve their 'green' credentials. T h e group surveyed all
the suppliers about their green power schemes and h o w they would meet their M R E T
requirement. The suppliers were then ranked according to a range of environmental criteria,
including what sources of renewable energy they used, whether sustainability guidelines
were applied particularly in the case of biomass, and whether the supplier also encouraged
demand management. The group considered some forms of biomass to be problematic, but
wind power was deemed environmentally benign. The green power product nominated as
'market leader' offered 1 0 0 % wind energy from a n e w wind farm, linked to the promotion

administering the National Green Power Accreditation Program, not the proponent of the renew
energy project. N G P A S G stands for National Green Power Accreditation Steering Group.
57
"First Wollongong and then the world", A ustralian Energy News, Issue 22, December 2001.
Liz Tickner, "Waste recycling plant blocked", The West Australian, 13 April 2002.
See for example Greenpeace Australia, Submission to Inquiry into Renewable Energy (Electricity)
Bill 2000 and Renewable Energy (Electricity) Charge Bill 2000, Senate Environment,
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of d e m a n d management. T h e vast majority of suppliers, however, were considered to be
doing little beyond complying with the green power accreditation guidelines.60

One problem that green power schemes do not deal adequately with is the matter of
ownership and control. A s described in chapter 3, m a n y early supporters of renewable?
energy favoured community ownership and control, in part because they opposed politically
centralised institutions. Green power facilities are in the main owned and operated by the
large electricity companies, though a number of other companies and government agencies
are also players. Only a few generators, such as the 60 k W Breamlea wind turbine and some
small-scale photovoltaic systems, are o w n e d by individuals or community groups.61 Owners
of such small systems can face obstacles from electricity distribution companies w h e n
seeking to connect their system to the grid.62 A s described below, it has been argued that
local ownership m a y help to reduce local opposition to wind power developments.63

6.4.3 The Mandatory Renewable Energy Target
The idea of a Mandatory Renewable Energy Target ( M R E T ) w a s announced by the
Australian Prime Minister in late 1997, and passed into law in late 2000. M R E T is less
restrictive than green power in its definition of eligible renewable energy plant. There are
two main reasons. First, M R E T does not need to be as responsive to consumer perceptions
of environmental acceptability as do the voluntary green power schemes. Second, as M R E T
is mandatory, governments sought to appease a range of interest groups w h e n determining
the form of the legislation. M o s t business interests were concerned about the economic
impact, and secured concessions including a least-cost rather than portfolio approach, and a
relatively low penalty cap.64 S o m e businesses, however, sought to benefit by being admitted
as eligible renewable energy generators.

Communications, Information technology and the Arts References Committee, July 2000.
Nature Conservation Council of N S W , "Green electricity watchfirstreport", February 2002,
Accessed 19 June 2002, <http://www.nccnsw.org.au/ncc/context/greenelectricity/>. There were nine
environment groups were involved in the project.
Green Power, "Green Power approved generators", July 2002, Accessed 7 December 2002,
<http://www.greenpower.com.au/images/dl/GPAccreditedGensJul02.pdf>.
Australian Cogeneration Association, Removing Impediments to Cogeneration and Renewable
Generation in the National Electricity Market, Melbourne, June 2000.
D. Toke and D. Elliott, "A fresh start for U K wind power?", International Journal of Ambient
Energy, Vol. 21, No. 2,2000, pp. 67-76.
See chapter 7.
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»65

The original statement referred to "renewable or specified waste-product energy sources
and s o m e groups sought to have this loose definition interpreted in their favour. T h e
inclusion of coal-seam methane (a 'waste' product from the coal industry) w a s rejected.
However, there w a s m u c h debate over the interpretation of acceptable biomass and hydro
plant, reflecting concerns over the ability of existing large players to dictate terms in their
favour, and over the inclusion of sources excluded by green p o w e r schemes. T h u s the
output of existing renewable energy plant in excess of a specified baseline w a s admitted,
which has favoured existing hydro plant.66 M R E T also does not specifically exclude n e w
flooding hydro plant, municipal solid waste incineration and w o o d waste from old-growth
native forests, all of which are excluded under the green power accreditation guidelines.

The failure to exclude waste from old-growth native forests was the most contentious issue
in the lead up to the passing of the legislation,67 with environment groups noting that the
burning of w o o d chips from native forests w a s likely to b e c o m e m o r e economic as a result
of its inclusion.68 The minor parties holding the balance of p o w e r in the Senate were
particularly hostile, but were unable to secure its exclusion.

Although wind power is seen by many environmentalists as a sustainable form of renewable
energy, there is a growing opposition movement. This is discussed next.

6.5 Controversies over Wind Power Developments
6.5.1 Introduction
The introduction of renewable energy support mechanisms has led to m a n y wind farms

John Howard (Prime Minister), Safeguarding the Future: Australia's Response to Climate Change
20 November 1997, Accessed 23 September 1998, <http://www.environment.gov.au/portfolio/esd/
climate/pmstate.html>.
In 2001, 2 3 % of renewable energy certificates were registered for hydro plant, most of which was
existing. Office of the Renewable Energy Regulator, "Registry for Renewable Energy Certificates"
2002, Accessed 16 June 2002, <http://www.rec-registry.com/>.
However, the relevant legislation does specify that renewable energy sources be ecologically
sustainable, and places restrictions on the eligibility of wood waste from native forests. Renewable
Energy (Electricity) Regulations 2001 (Commonwealth).
Senate Environment, Communications, Information technology and the Arts References Committee
Report, 2000, op. cit.
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being proposed across Australia, as companies pursue the commercial opportunities offered.
While wind power m a y be popular with the general public because it embodies the idea of
greenhouse gas-free power generation and the hope of job creation in environmental
technologies, the task of constructing wind power facilities has not been straightforward. In
particular, wind farm developers have not had a smooth ride through the planning process.
In keeping with overseas experience, local objections to Australian wind farm proposals are
increasing. Developers have classified this as a N I M B Y (not in m y back yard) response:
most objectors profess support for wind power but do not want them near their homes or
sites of recreational activity. Overseas, wind power objectors have had remarkable success
in stopping wind farm developments, particularly in the UK, 6 9 and wind farm objectors in
Australia have been able to draw on the resources and successes of these groups.

The windiest sites are often coastal and elevated sites, which may be very scenic locations.
Although opponents usually cite a number of concerns such as noise and bird strike, the
principal concern seems to be the loss of visual amenity. Opponents argue that addressing
climate change by using wind power should not be at the expense of landscape values.
M o d e m wind turbines are very tall, perhaps 100 metres high, and thus m a y have a
significant visual impact on a landscape.70

In the next section, I describe the controversy over a proposed wind farm near Portland in
Victoria. I then use this example to analyse some of the issues of contention, and show h o w
these conflicts are helping to reshape the meaning of wind power.

6.5.2 The Portland Wind Farm Controversy
In 1997, Perth-based Energy Equity Corporation (EEC) lodged a planning application to
build a wind farm near Portland on Victoria's western coast, with the intention of providing
green power. After considering three sites—Cape Nelson, Cape Bridgewater and
Bridgewater L a k e s — E E C proposed a 25 M W wind farm at Cape Bridgewater, comprising
about 33 wind turbines. Cape Bridgewater was one of ten Victorian coastal locations
monitored for wind speeds by V S E C and S E C V in the mid 1980s, and was found to have an

69
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Toke and Elliott, 2000, op. cit.
M . J. Pasqualetti, P. Gipe and R. Righter (eds), Wind Power in View: Energy Landscapes in a
Crowded World, Academic Press, San Diego, 2002.
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excellent wind regime. T h e proposal w a s approved by Glenelg Shire Council, but a n u m b e r
of local opponents appealed, citing concerns about noise, fauna and flora impacts,
archaeological impacts, and the visual impact of 7 0 - m high wind turbines o n the landscape.
Cape Bridgewater w a s widely acknowledged as an area of significant natural beauty with
exceptional landscape qualities including s o m e of the highest cliffs in the state. It also
formed part of the Great South W e s t Walk, a tourist destination. T h e opponents' appeal w a s
71

heard by the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal ( V C A T ) in 1998 and upheld.

In making their decision, VCAT was placed in a difficult position. The Victorian Planning
Minister had decided that no Environmental Effects Statement w a s required, but that V C A T
should consider a range of environmental issues. There were no government guidelines on
wind power development, and the state government had s h o w n little interest in fostering
renewable energy. T h e recently adopted Victorian Coastal Strategy required that significant
coastal features be adequately protected; yet the responsible department and agency were
not represented at the V C A T hearing, adopting a "wait and see" approach.72 V C A T w a s
aware that by permitting a wind farm in a renowned coastal landscape, it would be setting a
precedent. It w a s unimpressed by arguments that C a p e Bridgewater w a s the only Victorian
site where wind power could compete favourably with p o w e r from b r o w n coal, instead
citing approvingly a statement from opponents:
[I]f wind farm technology is so marginal that it can only be cost effective at Cape
Bridgewater and not at alternate sites ... where average wind speeds are [slightly] slower,
then this is technology that will never have an impact of significance, and the price
Victorians are being asked to pay is too high. But if... wind farms can be cost effective at
slightly slower wind speeds, albeit a little less profitable, then this is technology that w e
should embrace because of its wide application. Wind farms could and should then be sited
in areas of lesser significance.73
Cape Bridgewater, V C A T argued, should be preserved as a tourist destination—its natural
and scenic attributes, infrastructure, and proximity to Portland could facilitate significant
tourism opportunities.74

Meanwhile, Sustainable Energy Australia Pty Ltd (SEA), a small Portland-based company,

72

74

Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Results of Planning Appeal Hearing: Tribunal
Application No. 1997/88762, Permit Application No. 190/97/H, Melbourne, 1999.
ibid.
ibid. Opponents cited were Brampton and Jacqueline Page.
ibid.
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was planning a wind farm for the coastal farming area east of Portland. Its initial proposal
for a seven-turbine wind farm at Tyrenderra was withdrawn after a few locals raised
objections, with S E A stating that it did not want to waste money on or create antagonism
through an appeal.75 S E A then announced plans for an 18 M W

14-turbine wind farm at

Codrington, about 40 k m east of Portland. The announcement was m a d e soon after V C A T
had handed d o w n its Cape Bridgewater decision. In light of this, S E A elected to seek
planning permission before conducting wind speed tests to determine if the site was
viable.76 Not the industry's usual practice, this reflected that community opposition was
becoming the major obstacle for wind farm developers. A s S E A had successfully gained
local community support, its proposal received planning approval with little controversy.
S E A and its wind farm proposal were taken over by Pacific Hydro Limited (PHL), a
Melbourne-based company with hydropower assets in Australia and overseas. The
Codrington wind farm was commissioned in mid 2001.

In late 2000, with the Codrington project proceeding, PHL announced plans for a Portland
W i n d Energy Project ( P W E P ) . This would be a large wind farm of around 140 M W spread
over four sites—Yambuk, Cape Sir William Grant, Cape Nelson and Cape Bridgewater—
spanning about 60 kilometres. P H L would also negotiate with a wind turbine manufacturer
to establish a manufacturing facility in Portland, creating hundreds of n e w jobs. P H L was
required to prepare an Environmental Effects Statement (EES), and the P W E P

was

considered by an independent planning panel established by the Victorian government.

Given that the Cape Bridgewater* site had been previously rejected by VCAT, why did PHL
include this site in its proposal? The company believed that the climate was n o w more
favourable for wind power: the federal government had instituted M R E T ; the n e w Victorian
government was enthusiastic about wind power developments; the local council was
developing a wind power strategy; and the promise of jobs in wind turbine manufacturing
was very attractive to a community with relatively high unemployment. 77 While Cape
Bridgewater was the most controversial of the four sites in the proposal, it was also the

75

76
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"Bob Robins: why I oppose windfarm", Portland Observer, 16 October 1998, p. 6; "No wind farm
for Tyrendarra", Portland Observer, 19 October 1998, p. 3.
M McKinnon "Wind man bends to public view", Warrnambool Standard, 1 February 1999.
Jeff Harding (Pacific Hydro Limited), pers. comm., 2002; See also Connell Wagner, "Background
report - Glenelg Shire strategic wind farming study", 2001, Accessed 25 May 2002, <http://www.
glenelg.vic.gov.au/ publications/planning/wind farming study.pdf>.

258

Andrea Bunting. The Social Shaping of Wind Power in Australia

windiest and thus the most lucrative. P H L represented the four-site P W E P as an integrated
whole, indicating that the whole project would not proceed if only part were approved. This
strategy m a d e it difficult to achieve a compromise: if only Cape Bridgewater were rejected,
Portland would not get a wind turbine manufacturing facility. Moreover, as V C A T had
argued earlier, an approval for Cape Bridgewater would set a precedent for wind farm
proposals at other scenic locations.

The proposal generated great controversy in the Portland region with the issue aired
frequently in the local media. M a n y locals m a d e submissions to the planning panel and
thousands signed petitions both for and against the wind farm.78 A poll in the Portland
district found 8 8 % support for the proposal, while a Cape Bridgewater landowner claimed
that the level of opposition in Cape Bridgewater w a s 7 7 % . 7 9 (Cape Bridgewater has a
population of about 100, while the population of Portland is about 10,000.)

Supporters of the project welcomed the promised economic and employment benefits, and
denounced the opponents for trying to thwart this opportunity. Meanwhile, opponents railed
against the visual intrusion on the capes, some donating funds to fight the proposal. They
argued that more greenhouse gas reductions could be achieved by implementing energy
efficiency measures in industry, transport, commercial buildings and dwellings. Privately,
some opponents expressed mistrust in P H L and concern that the company's strategies had
divided the community. 80 P H L had engaged in a community consultation process, but w a s
criticised by opponents for not revealing the full effect of the development. In particular,
opponents claimed that PHL's photomontages showing the effect of the wind farm on the
landscape were of poor quality, did not adequately represent the impact of the turbines and
were taken from too great a distance. Opponents then published their o w n photomontages. 81

In August 2002, the Victorian government approved the project, subject to several
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These are availablefromPlanning Panels Victoria, Department of Infrastructure.
Auspoll, Report to Pacific Hydro Limited: Portland Wind Energy Project - Quantitative Research
July 2001; David C. Mercer, "The Great Australian wind-rush and the devaluation of landscape
amenity", R M I T University, unpublished manuscript, 2002.
Based on personal communication with some protestors. See also Auspoll survey, where 1 2 % of
respondents thought that P H L had not been open and honest in their dealings with the community
(Auspoll, 2001, op. cit.). Similar comments were being made about wind farm developers in other
areas of the state. See Ross Macaw, " W e must act now to save the Prom", The Age, 8 July 2002.
Rockin' Rollerskates Productions, 2002, Accessed 1 M a y 2002, <http://www.rockinrollerskates.com>.
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conditions. A t the time of writing it appears that Pacific Hydro has accepted the conditions
and will proceed with the wind farm. A t the same time as handing d o w n its decision on
PWEP,

the

developments.

Victoria

government

released

planning

guidelines

for

wind

farm

These guidelines were intended to greatly assist wind farm developers in

gaining planning permission. In particular they take the planning decision for all reasonable
sized projects out of the hands of local councils.

In handing down its decision on the Portland Wind Energy Project, the government was
clearly supportive of wind power and the economic benefits it could bring, stating:
The expansion of renewable energy generation is a key priority of the Victorian
Government ... In light of Victoria's coastal wind resources and existing electricity
infrastructure, as well as the Commonwealth's M R E T and 'green power' purchasing, wind
energy development is a vital economic priority for Victoria ... O n balance ... the benefits
of P W E P , particularly in terms of greenhouse gas abatement, security and diversity of
energy supply and regional economic development, far outweigh the potential disbenefits.83
T o reduce adverse impact on landscape values—the major concern of P W E P opponents—
the government required s o m e minor modifications to the original proposal, in particular
that the most visible turbines at Cape Bridgewater be relocated to other sites.

The government noted that a key benefit of the project was reduction in greenhouse gas
emissions, and that the project would m a k e a 7 percent contribution to the M R E T . The
suggestion m a d e by several opponents that there were other w a y s of decreasing greenhouse
gas emissions, such as by increasing energy efficiency, were not addressed. Indeed, this
suggestion by opponents has more to do with the appropriateness of M R E T as a mechanism
for reducing greenhouse gas emissions compared with alternatives such as energy efficiency
programs. M R E T w a s a federal government initiative, whereas assessing the effects of
specific projects w a s a state government responsibility. Given the traditional inter-state
rivalry over industry development, it is not surprising that state governments would support
M R E T developments in their o w n states.

The economic outcomes of the project were also considered a major benefit. While
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Victorian Government, Policy and Planning Guidelines for Development of Wind Energy Facilities
in Victoria, 2002, Accessed 18 August 2002, <http://www.seav.vic.gov.au/ftp/renewable_energy/
wind/WindEnergyGuidelines.pdf>.
Department of Infrastructure, "Portland Wind Energy Project assessment", Melbourne, August 2002,

construction of the wind farms was expected to provide a significant short-term economic
boost for the region, the establishment of a wind turbine manufacturing facility in the
Portland region was seen as having clear economic benefits for regional Victoria. T o ensure
that the promised outcomes could be realised, the government also stipulated that approval
of P W E P was subject to the requirement that the wind turbine manufacturing facility w a s
actually established. (At the time of writing, N E G Micon plans to establish this facility.)

The latter requirement is particularly interesting. The government's approval of PWEP may
well have set a precedent for the development of wind farms in scenic areas; indeed, the
P W E P controversy helped to expedite the development of Victorian wind farm planning
guidelines. Yet the Portland region will be one of the few regional areas to reap long-term
economic benefits from the establishment of manufacturing facilities. Later wind farm
proposals in other areas of Victoria will undoubtedly benefit from the P W E P decision, not
only because of the precedent, but also because the guidelines will smooth the planning
process for developers. Yet the locals in these other areas will see m u c h less economic
benefit. Overseas experience suggests that local opposition to wind farm developments will
probably not diminish as wind farms become a more familiar sight on the landscape, while
lack of substantial economic benefits to the community m a y well reduce local support.

6.5.3 Competitive W i n d P o w e r M a r k e t s and W i n d F a r m Siting
Controversies over wind farms being sited in scenic locations are in part a result of
competitive measures used to foster wind power. The available wind resource is usually the
critical factor determining the economic viability of a wind farm project. T h e power in the
wind is proportional to the cube of wind speed: a 1 0 % increase in wind speed can produce a
3 0 % increase in power output. In Australia, high average wind speeds are found at some
locations along the southern coastlines and in some elevated locations in hilly terrain, such
as the Great Dividing Range. Parts of Australia's coastline are considered to have
significant scenic value. Indeed, Victoria has recently instituted a Victorian Coastal Strategy
to effectively manage development in these areas.84
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Accessed 7 December 2002, <http://www.doi.vic.gov.au>, pp. 1-3.
Victorian Coastal Council, Victorian Coastal Strategy 2002, 2002, Accessed 7 December 2002,
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W i n d farm developers often cite the critical relationship between wind speed and economic
viability to justify their efforts to secure controversial sites for wind farms. Yet, in view of
the 1999 V C A T decision over the Cape Bridgewater proposal (described above), they do
not argue that such sites are the only ones where wind farms can compete with coal-fired
power stations—such an argument suggests that wind power has a very limited potential.
Instead, developers argue that it is necessary initially to develop the most economically
viable sites in order to achieve sufficient economies of scale for the development of a wind
industry, and that once the industry is established, it will be economically feasible to
develop the less windy, less controversial sites.85

In the developers' rush to secure windy sites and the state governments' desire to foster
renewable energy projects, inter-state rivalry has become evident. For example, in its
submission to the P W E P planning panel, the Sustainable Energy Authority Victoria noted
that if areas in Victoria with high wind speeds were not m a d e available to developers, wind
power projects could be developed interstate, resulting in "Victoria missing out on
economic and regional development benefits".86

It is not only the competitive support mechanisms that encourage developers to push for
wind farms at controversial sites. In Australia, governments have been slow to establish
planning guidelines for wind farm or clear policies on wind power development.87 With
governments not taking the lead, planning policy is developing in an ad hoc manner as
developers try to secure the most profitable wind farm sites. A s V C A T recognised in the
Cape Bridgewater controversy, if wind farm developers succeed at a scenic site they will set
a precedent, helping to drive wind energy policy in their favour. But not all developers are
willing to risk the high cost of an appeal on these controversial sites.

Overseas experience suggests that planning uncertainty can hinder wind power
development. David Toke and David Elliott compared the success of wind power in
Germany and Denmark with the stagnation of wind power in the U K . B y the late 1990s
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See for example Sinclair Knight Merz, Portland Wind Energy Project Environmental Effects
Statement and Planning Report, 2001.
Sustainable Energy Authority Victoria, "Response to Portland Wind Energy Project Environmental
Effects Statement", Submission to Planning Panels Victoria, Department of Infrastructure, Dec 2001.
The Victoria government released its guidelines in August 2002. Victorian Government, Policy and
Planning Guidelines, 2002, op. cit.
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over 8 0 % of proposed wind farms in the U K were being refused planning approval by
District Councils. Part of the reason for Germany and Denmark's success, they argued, w a s
QO

that authorities had designated some areas as appropriate for wind farms.

6.5.4 Energy Supply and D e m a n d
Opponents of wind farms argue that greenhouse gas reductions would be better achieved by
increasing energy efficiency. Yet there are m a n y reasons for supply-side options being more
readily implemented than demand reduction. Increasing energy efficiency is often deemed
'too difficult' because m a n y measures require individual action by energy consumers.
Supply-side electricity options, whether fossil fuel-fired or renewable energy, are visible
ways of ensuring that electricity demand is met. Energy efficiency measures are less
tangible. Pro-development politicians are happy to endorse n e w power stations—once coal
plant, n o w renewable energy plant. A s described below, m a n y people are ill informed about
the potential of energy efficiency, and favour renewable energy rather than energy
efficiency. W e can also recognise continuity in the ESI's attitude. A s in the previous era,
electricity companies are very m u c h focused on supply-side rather than demand-side
options, promoting high demand growth to justify building more power stations. A s
described in chapter 5, early supporters of wind power saw wind farms as an important part
of a demand management strategy—they could be built quickly to meet an unexpected
supply shortfall, and electricity consumers could tailor their usage to meet fluctuations in
supply. Today, however, electricity companies regard wind farms as solely a supply option.

Of course, many environmentalists advocate greater energy efficiency and wind power.
They argue that fostering wind power is a long-term strategy, so that ultimately our energy
supply and use patterns will become wholly sustainable. Thus wind power has to be
supported n o w to give time for the technology to develop and for the supporting institutions
to adapt to a shift in the technological regime.89
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Toke and Elliott, 2000, op. cit.
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6.5.5 O w n e r s h i p a n d Control
Electricity companies can no longer ride roughshod over community and environmental
concerns. They are n o w often required to produce an environmental impact study and to
engage in community consultation. Pacific Hydro scaled back its original P W E P proposal to
satisfy some opposition, but w a s not prepared to abandon the Cape Bridgewater site, even
though this site had been rejected by an earlier V C A T hearing.

Part of the local opposition to the wind farm seems to be directed towards the developers,
rather than just the development.90 O n e important factor is whether the local community
trusts the developers—and m a n y developers go to great lengths to build this trust. Equally
important is the issue of w h o gains and w h o loses from the development. Landowners can
receive sizeable rents for allowing wind turbines on their properties, and local business m a y
benefit from construction or increased tourism from visitors to the wind farm. But other
locals receive no gain while perceiving a loss of visual amenity. This m a y lead to a
community becoming bitterly divided over a wind farm proposal. In the case of the P W E P ,
Pacific Hydro sought community support by promising a wind turbine manufacturing
industry, and increased tourism. Such a strategy, however, m a y not win over those w h o still
perceive a loss—in the case of Cape Bridgewater, eco-tourist operators were a m o n g the
most vehement of opponents 91 —nor is the strategy viable for subsequent wind farms.

As described in chapter 3, the early AT movement favoured community or cooperative
ownership and control of renewable energy plant. This was certainly a successful strategy in
the early Danish wind industry. It also ensures that the profits of a wind farm accrue to
locals rather than outside developers, and it m a y help to overcome concerns about the
developer's approach and motives. Today, some see this as a w a y of overcoming
opposition. Toke and Elliott suggested this as a w a y of revitalising the U K ' s wind
prospects. They noted that most U K wind farms are proposed by large developers, an
outcome of the competitive bidding mechanism used to foster renewable energy, which
advantages those with greater resources.92 M R E T has created a similar situation in

This sentiment was expressed to m e by several opponents of the P W E P .
A number made submissions responding to the Portland Wind Energy Project Environmental Effects
Statement (Planning Panels Victoria, Department of Infrastructure) expressing their fears about the
effect of the wind farm on their ecotourist businesses.
Toke and Elliott, 2000, op. cit.; Catherine Mitchell, "A comparison of the means and cost of
subsidizing wind energy", Proceedings of Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part A: Journal of
i

264

Andrea Bunting. The Social Shaping of Wind Power in Australia

Australia. Economies of scale m e a n that large wind farms usually have a m u c h lower per
unit cost than a smaller wind farm or single turbine—the latter being m o r e affordable for a
wind cooperative. Indeed, the sparseness of Australia's electricity grid and the consequent
high cost of building the associated network exacerbate these economies of scale.
Financiers favour projects valued at least in the tens, preferably in the hundreds, of millions
of dollars.93 Greater community ownership of wind farms would undoubtedly require a
different type of support mechanism than M R E T .

6.5.6 Environmental Trade-Offs
In terms of environmental protection, both proponents and opponents of wind farms claim
the moral high ground—for reducing greenhouse gas emissions or preserving landscapes
respectively. M a n y renewable energy advocates see emission reduction as the overriding
concern. S o m e justify this by cautioning that if greenhouse gas emissions are not reduced,
climate change could have a significant impact on coastal and natural ecosystems.94

Wind farm debates exhibit a tension between local and global environmental impacts.95
M a n y see the main issue as h o w to resolve the environmental trade-off between the
greenhouse benefits and what s o m e perceive as degradation of the landscape.96 Yet, as
Michael Buxton argued in his submission to the P W E P planning panel, this trade-off is not
necessary if there are other means of achieving equivalent greenhouse gas emission
reductions, whether by finding a less scenic albeit less cost-effective wind farm site, or by
reducing electricity demand through implementing greater energy efficiency.97 Both require
government to play a stronger role, in the former case by replacing M R E T with a less
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Power and Energy, Vol. 209, No. A3, 1995, pp. 185-188. The U K renewables support mechanism
was the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO), which commenced in 1990. There was a N F F O order
every couple of years, with contracts awarded through a competitive bidding process. The Regional
Electricity Companies were required to purchase a certain amount of renewable electricity N F F O
brought the cost of wind power down significantly. However, small-scale projects were at a
disadvantage m the competitive system. Catherine Mitchell, "The renewables NFFO", Energy Policy
Vol. 23, No. 12, 1995, pp. 1077-1091.
These figures have been suggested at wind energy conferences that I have attended
For example Sustainable Energy Authority Victoria, Response to PWEP EES 2001, op cit
David Elliott, Energy, Society and Environment, Routledge, London, 1997
For example Freehills Melbourne, "Portland Wind Energy Project: reply and closing submission on
behalf of Pacific Hydro Ltd", Submission to Planning Panels Victoria, Department of Infrastructure,
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competitive renewables support measure or by providing an assistance package to the wind
industry,

in the latter case by formulating a d e m a n d management strategy and

implementing regulations on energy efficiency performance standards.

Given that there are alternatives, despite requiring government intervention, the debate can
be reinterpreted as one of whether to trade off landscape values for local economic growth.
For residents of the Portland region w h o are concerned about maintaining local landscape
values, this is indeed the dilemma: they are torn, as are m a n y communities, between
preserving their local environment and generating jobs—albeit green jobs. A s one
organisation opposing the P W E P asked: "[Would] this same level of support ... be obtained
if the jobs and economic benefits were not obtained".99

6.5.7 I m a g e s of W i n d P o w e r
Early support for wind energy w a s premised on the idea that wind turbines were relatively
small-scale, and until recently, most wind machines in Australia were small. S o m e people
are shocked w h e n they learn the size of m o d e m wind turbines. M u c h of the support for
wind power m a y well be premised on an unrealistic perception. In his submission on the
P W E P , local opponent and geography researcher, David Mercer, s u m m e d up this sentiment:
W h e n speaking about wind energy one always has to be questioning the 'image' that this
term evokes. Variously, people may conjure up in their own minds the single, small
generator at Breamlea in Victoria. Or they may be thinking of the small-scale facility on
King Island, or the much smaller, older-generation towers that are common in parts of
Denmark etc. Small-scale wind energy, for example, is often entirely appropriate in
particular locations. Indeed,{examples abound in the Portland region. They are so
unobtrusive as to be unnoticed for the most part. Most opponents of large scale wind energy
projects are not opposed to small-scale wind energy developments that can, and frequently
do, sit well in the rural landscape. What is at issue is the gargantuan size, and large number
of generators involved in contemporary wind energy developments such as P W E P , and the
fact that there are no regulations in place governing the open-ended expansion of these
developments across the landscape. These are industrial facilities in rural settings, and as a

Limited", Submission to Planning Panels Victoria, Department of Infrastructure, 2002.
98
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ibid.
Western Coastal Board, "Western Coastal Board Written Submission the Portland Wind Energy
Project Environmental Effects Statement", Submission to Planning Panels Victoria, Department of
Infrastructure, 30 November 2001, p. 4.
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general rule they are getting larger, year by year.

For supporters of wind power, however, wind turbines represent greenhouse-friendly
energy technology. T o politicians, wind farms represent a regional development opportunity
and a highly visible sign of government support for renewable energy. T o local supporters
of a wind farm, they represent local economic opportunities and a positive environmental
emblem for the region.

This, of course, differs from the alternative technology movement's view of wind power.
Advocates of A T hoped that their efforts would contribute to the greater public good, but
they were either furthering their lifestyle choice, or were participants in a social m o v e m e n t
and thus were motivated by beliefs in social and technical change. Whether they were
producing their o w n power, developing or demonstrating alternative technologies, lobbying
decision-makers or educating others about alternative technologies, any personal cost borne
by advocates of A T w a s offset by the personal benefits of achieving self-reliance or
furthering their ideals.

6.6 The Shifting Support Base for Environmental Technologies
In this chapter I have shown h o w the support base for environmental technologies—in
particular, renewable energy technologies—has shifted. O n c e advocated principally by
environmentalists and a few vanguard industries, usage of environmental technologies is
n o w also supported by a wide range of business interests and governments. While this shift
is most evident in several European countries and Japan, sections of Australian business are
slowly following this trend. The main driver for business interest in environmental technologies is the economic gain, though there m a y be a range of contributing factors leading
business to identify advocacy of environmental technologies as a viable interest, such as
concern for environmental sustainability a m o n g shareholders, employees or management.
Business can profit either by using environmental technologies to b e c o m e m o r e 'ecoefficient', or by becoming manufacturers, installers or distributors of environmental
technologies. The number of 'green' businesses is expected to grow as d e m a n d for
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David C. Mercer, "Comments on Portland Wind Energy Project Environmental Effects Statement and
Planning Report", Submission to Planning Panels Victoria, Department of Infrastructure, November
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environmental technologies increases, whether from business and consumers realising the
benefits of eco-efficiency, from more stringent environmental regulation locally or in export
markets, or from greater consumer d e m a n d for environmentally sustainable goods.

As the support base for environmental technologies widens, a diversity of views become
evident about the relative importance of environmental problems and what constitutes an
appropriate solution to a given environmental problem. 'Green' businesses are undoubtedly
keen to identify as very important the environmental problems which their product can
address, and portray their product as the solution to the identified problem. A n example is
the automotive industry's promotion of 'greener' motor vehicles. T h e industry portrays the
main environmental problem caused by motor vehicles as air pollution; yet if congestion or
excessive land use are considered important environmental issues, then 'green' vehicles are
no solution at all. Likewise, alternative methods of reducing air pollution, which offer no
role for a 'green' vehicle, are ignored.

This quest to prioritise problems and define solutions is particularly evident in the dispute
over the siting of wind farms in scenic and/or environmentally sensitive locations. The
Portland dispute w a s frequently described as involving environmental trade-offs, with the
wind industry portraying climate change from greenhouse gas emissions as a m u c h more
serious problem than the preservation of landscapes. Similarly, the industry portrays the
'solution' as supply-side rather than demand-side: that is, building renewable energy plant,
rather than reducing greenhouse gas emissions through greater energy efficiency.

Of course the wind industry is not able to set the agenda; rather, its claims reinforce an
already high level of public concern about the threat of climate change, and a c o m m o n view
that renewable energy plant offers a solution. W i n d power is popular: for example, a recent
Victorian poll found a 9 5 % level of support (although the survey w a s loaded in favour of
supply-side options).101 T h e wind industry frequently appeals to high levels of public
support to justify their projects or to argue for increased government support for wind
power. But h o w valid is it to point to public support for wind power, since the public m a y
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Auspoll, Report to Pacific Hydro Limited: Portland Wind Energy Project - Quantitative Research,
February 2002. The question began: "The demand for energy is increasing at an alarming rate. There
are a number of ways of meeting this with some of the options being discussed being a new coal
power plant, gas power plants or wind farms." The poll also found that 8 7 % of respondents thought
the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions was an issue of high or very high importance.
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not be sufficiently well informed to m a k e a sound judgment?

M a n y laypeople have little

understanding of h o w the electricity industry operates, and s o m e have little idea about w h a t
103

energy sources are currently used for power generation.

Recently, survey techniques have been developed to enable informed opinion to be elicited,
not through educating the general public about the issues of interest, but by educating a
representative sample. S o m e of these techniques have been used in energy planning: these
include the Planning Cell method developed in G e r m a n y by Peter Dienel, and the
Deliberative Poll™ developed in the U S A by James Fishkin.104

The Deliberative Poll™ has been used by several electricity utilities in the US state of
Texas. For this poll, sample groups were polled before and after an intensive period of
deliberation over an energy plan. Options canvassed included renewable energy, energy
efficiency, fossil fuels and purchases of p o w e r from interstate. Typically t w o thirds of
respondents chose renewable energy as their first option in the 'before' poll, while few
chose energy efficiency. In the 'after' poll, support for energy efficiency increased greatly,
and support for renewable energy as first preference plummeted. H o w e v e r , a significant
number in the 'after' poll placed renewable energy second: in eight Deliberative Polls™, the
proportion placing renewable energy as theirfirstor second choice in the 'after' poll w a s
between 5 4 % and 8 5 % . T h e range of support for energy efficiency w a s very similar, while
fossil fuel generation and purchased p o w e r had m u c h lower support. 'After' polls also
indicated also a m u c h greater willingness to pay extra for renewable energy.105

102

103

104

105

Vincent Price and Peter Neijens, "Opinion quality in public opinion research", International Journal
of Public Opinion Research, Vol. 9, No. 4, 1997, pp. 336-360.
Those promoting green power schemes have cited this ignorance as a major problem in getting
customers to sign up for green power. For example some people think that N S W ' s electricity already
comes from renewable energy sources. Monica Leggett and Marie Finlay found that the idea of
renewable energy held by many lay people bore little resemblance to the idea held by
engineers/scientists. Monica Leggett and Marie Finlay, "Science, story, and image: a new approach to
crossing the communication barrier posed by scientific jargon", Public Understanding of Science,
Vol. 20, 2001, pp. 157-171. Jesse Tatum suggests that such ignorance may be due to how our energy
systems are structured. In contrast to past times, people today need have nothing to do with the
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In the Victorian poll mentioned above, 8 6 % of interviewees favoured wind power over coal
or gas-fired plant, but they were not presented with energy efficiency as an alternative
option.106 Given the large scope for energy efficiency in Australia, it is likely that the Texan
Deliberative Poll™ results would be largely reproduced in Australia: that is, an informed
public would favour efforts to decrease electricity demand ahead of the construction of
renewable plant. Indeed, as described above, opponents of wind farm projects have m a d e
m u c h of this neglect of demand-side measures.

As described in section 6.4.1, there is evidence that public support for renewables is
becoming more discerning. Support for biomass has eroded. A s the public witnesses more
controversial wind farm proposals, it seems probable that support for wind power will
become more contingent. A n d if companies with a history of poor environmental
performance m o v e into the area of renewables, or renewable energy companies start to ride
roughshod over community concerns, some members of the public m a y well start to
question the motives of these companies and object to their projects.

When discussing the level of public support for renewables, it needs to be acknowledged
that the public is not unified: there are m a n y 'publics'. Here I a m not just reiterating the
argument from the wind industry and supporters of wind power that a small but vocal group
is objecting to wind farms, whereas the silent majority is in favour.107 N o r a m I merely
distinguishing between rural communities, w h o m a y be directly affected by a wind farm or
other renewable energy plant, and city dwellers. Publics differ in h o w they conceive of
environmental problems, and the priority that they give these compared with other issues.
They differ in h o w they rank concern about global environmental problems, local effects of
global problems, or local environmental problems. They differ in their understanding of
energy systems and the range of options available to address particular environmental
problems, and in the value placed on different options. Given that m u c h popular support for

2 October 1999, <http://www.awea.org/faq/survpub.html>; Public Utility Commission of Texas,
"1999 Report to the 76th Texas Legislature: statewide integrated resource plan (S1RP) executive
summary", 1999, Accessed 15 April 2001, <hl^://www.puc.state.tx.us/electric/reports/sirp_
exsum.cfin>; Environmental Defense Fund, "Clean energy for the energy capital of the United States:
Houston Light & Power customers voice strong opinions in Deliberative Poll", 1998, Accessed 9
October 1999, <http://www.edf.Org/pubs/NewsReleases/l998/Feb/a_electricity.html>.
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Auspoll, 2002, op. cit.
This sentiment was expressed in a number of submissions by locals supporting the P W E P .
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renewable energy is from a position of relative ignorance, cogent arguments put forward by
wind energy opponents m a y in the future become more influential.

6.7 Conclusion
I n o w return to the question I raised at the start of this chapter of whether public support for
wind power is a necessary precondition for the widespread deployment of wind power
technology. O f course, w e can point to the experience in the United Kingdom, where
opposition almost brought wind power to a standstill. But wind power is still relatively
popular in the U K and the stagnation appears to have more to do with planning procedures
and the use of competitive support mechanisms. 108 If governments can introduce more
effective planning procedures (which they are starting to do), and implement renewables
support mechanisms which allow wind farm developers to m a k e a profit in less windy, less
scenic locations, then undoubtedly the developers' current difficulties in obtaining planning
permission will diminish.

The support base for wind power now includes significant sections of business; while
opposition to wind power is no longer the powerful electricity supply industry, but small
albeit well-organised groups of local residents. The resources and energy-intensive
industries have traditionally been opposed to renewables support mechanisms that could
increase the price of electricity, yet some of these companies are n o w moving into the
renewables business.

A key issue for the long-term future of wind power is whether those supporting wind power
are able to secure its transition from being viable only in a protected space—in Australia,
the opportunities provided by the M R E T and green p o w e r — t o becoming a mainstream
generation technology. This depends on h o w wind power is interpreted by different players.
The ecological modernisation message along with the growing attention to climate change
as an environmental problem suggests that wind power—interpreted as a greenhouse-gas
free power generator—may continue to prosper. O n the other hand, wind power interpreted
as a development opportunity has a less secure future; if government support for renewables
diminishes, business will readily shift its attention to n e w opportunities.
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W h a t then have I contributed towards the theoretical framework by analysing perspectives
on what constitutes an environmental technology, and representations of wind power as an
environmental technology? A key outcome is that by analysing h o w the environmental
meaning of wind power is interpreted by different groups, I have demonstrated h o w the
strategies of m a n y actors are aimed at making their interpretation of wind power robust in
the eyes of the public.

Indeed, the Australian wind power industry is being urged to draw on modem advertising
strategies to enhance the robustness of wind power's image as an environmentally benign
form of energy supply. A t a 2002 wind industry conference, Karl Mallon, consultant to
A u s W E A and former renewable energy campaigner for Greenpeace, presented a paper
entitled Windpower®

the brand, where he proposed:

It is the safe and sexy image of wind power that is driving the markets ... Both markets,
M R E T and GreenPower, are meeting a social demand for iconic clean energy, rather than
direct climate protection.
H e m a d e the following suggestions:
1. Wind power has an iconic cache is driving markets (sic).
2. The Australian industries receives this brand-value forfree(sic).
3. The Brand is not indestructible
4. Damage to the brand will reduce positive political space.
5. Developers, Government and the collective industry can protect, develop and promote
the brand to mutual benefit.
6. Wind power has a politically powerful access to the public.109

In trying to make an image more robust, there is an advantage in reinforcing what is already
c o m m o n l y believed.110 Thus, the wind industry starts from a position of advantage
compared with opponents of wind farms, as they are attempting to m a k e m o r e robust an
already prevalent image of wind power. But they are starting to recognise that this image is
vulnerable in the face of attempts by opponents of wind farms to cultivate an alternative
image of wind power (particularly through the media) of wind farms being industrial
facilities which blight landscape values, and of renewable energy support mechanisms as
granting profits to outside developers at the expense of the local community.

108
109

110

Toke and Elliott, 2000, op. cit.
Karl Mallon, "Windpower® the brand", paper presented at Australian Wind Energy Association
Conference, Adelaide, 24-26 July 2002.
See also section 9.2 on 'cultural resources'.
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Chapter 7: Australian Energy Sector- Post 1988
7.1 Introduction
In 1988, the threat of climate change from greenhouse gas ( G H G ) emissions became a
public policy issue, in effect redefining the meaning of wind power and other forms of
renewable energy in the eyes of the public. Advocates n o w promoted renewables as energy
sources which did not produce the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide (C0 2 ). Most of
Australia's electricity supply industry (ESI) was dependent on coal, a heavy producer of
CO2, making the ESI the highest GHG-ernitting sector.

With renewable energy again popular, some policy makers were receptive to the idea of
building a manufacturing industry for sustainable energy technologies. Ideally, this would
require development of both local and export markets. The main beneficiaries of such
policies were solar water heating, photovoltaics and remote area power supply ( R A P S )
systems, technologies where Australia had significant expertise. Yet, the dominance of the
minerals and resources sector in Australia meant there was only modest attention given to
building a renewable energy industry.

The other major development of the late 1980s and early 1990s was the attempt by the
federal government to restructure the Australian economy and improve international
competitiveness. Previous efforts had focused on trade liberalisation and restructuring of
some industries. The scope was expanded to include elimination of structural problems
thought to be imposing costs on exporting industries. O n e of these was the cost of energy.
The Australian government hoped that, by reducing the price of electricity for business,
Australian industry would become more internationally competitive. Thus a significant
episode of this period was the restructuring of the Australian ESI. The effect of this on the
fate of renewables has been mixed. O n one hand, customers were eventually allowed to
choose their o w n electricity supplier, with some suppliers choosing to project a 'greener'
image; on the other hand, the cost of electricity has decreased, making it harder for
renewables to compete.

In the late 1990s the position of grid-connected renewable energy improved markedly. The
introduction of 'green power' schemes enabled electricity consumers to voluntarily support
renewables through paying a premium on their electricity bills. A n d in the lead up to the
Kyoto climate change conference, the federal government promised to implement a
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renewable energy target. B y then, wind power w a s considered one of the cheapest forms of
renewable energy and thus one of the most promising to introduce under these mechanisms.
Consequently the wind power industry grew rapidly, with m a n y n e w players entering, eager
to capitalise on the n e w business opportunities.

In this chapter, I explore the effect of the greenhouse agenda and electricity industry
restructuring on renewable energy policy. This chapter follows on from chapter 4, covering
the period post-1988, and is organised along similar lines. I analyse the changing structure
of the Australian energy sector as it pertains to decisions about wind power. T h e history of
the treatment of wind power is told in chapter 8.

7.2 Public Enterprises
Before analysing the restructuring of the electricity sector, I place this in context by
reviewing changes to the public sector. These changes m o v e d public enterprises further
from government control and introduced commercial values and objectives into these
organisations. This section continues from 4.3 in chapter 4.

After achieving partial administrative reform of Australia's public enterprises during the
earlier period, state and federal governments sought more extensive changes. The
transformation of public enterprises, or Government Business Enterprises ( G B E s ) as they
were called, was part of a structural change process labelled 'microeconomic reform',
driven mainly by the federal government and its economic agencies, and the

NSW

government.1 Microeconomic reform, announced in 1987, w a s intended to increase
Australia's international competitiveness by removing impediments to productivity growth.2
International influences included the 1987 O E C D

report Structural Adjustment

and

Economic Performance, which had argued that the poor economic performance of O E C D
countries could be attributed to "rigidities and distorted incentives" within the economies,

I 2 1 7 ff
, ^ W government's role see Martin Laffin and Martin Painter "Introduction",
m Martin Laffin and Martin Painter (eds), Reform and Reversal: Lessons from the Coalition
Government in New South Wales 1988-1995, Macmillan, Melbourne, 1995
Louise Dodson-Hawke details Labor's new economic agenda", Australian Financial Review, 7 July
Microecono c
0 Anril 1080 If
'
™
Worms to Date in Labor's Third Term, Media Release
10 April 1989. For an overview of microeconomic reforms see Industry Commission, Microeconomic
Reforms in Australia: A Compendium from the 1970s to 1997, Research Paper, A G P S , C a n b e r r a , ^
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and had recommended greater attention be given to microeconomic policies.3 Australia's
Industries Assistance Commission (IAC), a federal agency, had also been pushing for
structural change, earlier proposing a series of broad inquiries into the removal of general
impediments to international competitiveness including in energy generation and supply.4
Interest in energy w a s undoubtedly prompted by earlier findings from I A C industry-specific
inquiries, particularly those into, the chemicals and plastics industry, and the pulp, paper,
paper products and printing industries, which had raised the adverse effect of electricity
prices on the industries' performance.5 A key component of the microeconomic reform
agenda w a s the achievement of greater efficiency and cost effectiveness in public services.
G B E s could achieve this, the government suggested, through "improved performance
criteria and greater exposure to competition", or in s o m e cases privatisation.6

In 1988, the Treasurer announced that the IAC would undertake a series of inquiries into
general impediments to efficiency, as the I A C had earlier recommended. T h efirstinquiry
would be into state and federal government non-tax charges on industry.7 T h e mention of
state governments w a s significant: the I A C w a s becoming concerned about the slow pace of
microeconomic reform at state level and the inadequacy of intergovernmental mechanisms
which could facilitate a more cooperative approach.8

In September 1989 the I A C released its report Government

(Non-Tax) Charges, a study into

the impact o n industry competitiveness of government-supplied goods and services, mainly
transport, energy supply and communications. T h e report highlighted the need to improve
the performance of the G B E s that supplied these goods and services, and to ensure that

3

4

5

6
7
8

Cited in Peter Carroll and Martin Painter, "The federal politics of microeconomic reform: an
overview and introduction", in Peter Carroll and Martin Painter (eds), Microeconomic Reform and
Federalism, Federalism Research Centre, A N U , Canberra, 1995. The influence of this O E C D report
is noted by Carroll and Painter.
Industries Assistance Commission, Annual Report, A G P S , Canberra, 1985-86. Prior to this the IAC
had conducted inquiries into single industries and had championed tariff reductions.
Industries Assistance Commission, The Chemicals and Plastics Industries, A G P S , Canberra, 1986, p.
196- Industries Assistance Commission, Pulp, Paper, Paper Products and Printing Industries,
A G P S , Canberra, 1987, p. 75,127, Q30-Q34.
Treasury, Budget Statement No. 2, Canberra, 1987-88, pp. 44-45.
Industries Assistance Commission, Annual Report, A G P S , Canberra, 1987-88, pp. 27-28.
Peter Carroll, "Federalism, microeconomic reform and the Industry Commission", in Carroll and
Painter (eds), Microeconomic Reform and Federalism, 1995, op. cit. O n N S W ' s reform agenda see
Simon Domberger, "The role of public enterprises in microeconomic reform", in Peter Forsyth (ed.),
Microeconomic Reform in Australia, Allen & Unwin, St. Leonards, N S W , 1992; Laffin and Painter
(eds), Reform and Reversal, 1995, op. cit.
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prices charged reflected "efficient costs of supply". The following were seen as problems:
government influence on pricing leading to cross-subsidisation;9 lack of competition;
inadequate control and performance monitoring mechanisms; and inadequate intergovernmental coordination, an outcome of Australia's federal system. 10 T h e I A C suggested that
aside from administrative reform, which w a s already in progress, the performance of G B E s
could be improved through the introduction of competition, and privatisation.

The IAC's recommendation that competition be introduced into areas usually regarded as
natural monopolies reflected a growing interest in this mechanism. Proponents of
privatisation had already urged increased competition.11 Furthermore, valuable lessons had
been learned from the U K , where a n u m b e r of public enterprises had been privatised with
insufficient attention given to enhancing competition.12

The microeconomic reform agenda represented a change in approach to the question of how
to increase business profitability. Rather than the traditional approach of reducing the cost
of directly employed labour, microeconomic reform represented a systematic attempt to cut
other costs incurred by business, principally services provided by the public sector. That the
government appealed to the mechanism of microeconomic reform w a s probably a reflection
of the growing influence of neoliberalism on a Labor government for w h o m privatisation
w a s politically difficult. O n the other hand, microeconomic reform could be successfully
implemented because there had been a shift in p o w e r relations; the forces opposed to these
measures, particularly organised labour, had been sufficiently weakened by the Labor
government's Prices and Incomes Accord. 13

10

12

It had been long held that some electricity customer groups, particularly rural customers and very
large industries were being subsidised at the expense of commercial customers
Industries Assistance Commission, Government (Non-Tax) Charges, A G P S , Canberra, 1989, pp. xiii.
Business Council of Australia, "Business Council submission to the Economic Planning Advisory
Council Policy guidelines for statutory authorities and government business enterprises", in Business
Council Bulletin, February 1987, pp. 18-23; Robert Albon, "Privatisation or politicisation of
Australian communication?"; in Peter Abelson, Privatisation: an Australian Perspective, Australian
Professional Publications, Sydney, 1987; Economic Planning Advisory Council, Economic
Infrastructure in Australia, A G P S , Canberra, 1988, Appendix 7.
See for example the discussion in Kerry Schott, "Competitive markets and the provision of public
services", Australian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 49, No. 2, 1990, pp. 113-123.
The Prices and Incomes Accord was negotiated between the Australian Council of Trade Unions and
the Australian Labor Party. It represented a commitment from the union movement to exercise wage
restraint in return for improvements in the 'social wage'. Australian Council of Trade Unions and the
Australian Labor Party, Statement of Accord by The Australian Labor Party and The Australian
Council of Trade Unions Regarding Economic Policy, 1983.
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T h e federal government w a s the key advocate of microeconomic reform; yet m a n y of the
areas targeted for microeconomic reform were the responsibility of state governments. T h e
relationship between the state and federal government w a s often strained due to the states'
financial dependence on the federal government. Inter-state rivalry w a s also a barrier to
national coordination. Thus, to achieve its microeconomic reform agenda, the federal
government needed to reshape federal-state relations. In 1990, the Prime Minister B o b
H a w k e sought to establish a m o r e cooperative federalism in order to "remove the
impediments and the anomalies which stand in the w a y of... [improved] national efficiency
and international competitiveness".14 T h e vehicle for this cooperative federalism would be
the Council of Australian Governments ( C O A G ) . 1 5 C O A G w a s intended as a forum for
resolving national rather than federal issues, particularly the achievement of an integrated
and efficient national economy. 1 6

Were the state governments capable of achieving the desired changes to their GBEs without
federal intervention? T h e 1980s had already seen s o m e state G B E s , including the Victorian
and N S W electricity utilities, becoming more accountable to government, and cutting costs
through significant staff reductions. Yet the main purpose of microeconomic reform w a s not
increased accountability or cost cutting per se; it w a s about reducing costs for business.
Improved financial performance of the electricity utilities and other G B E s saw them
returning a considerable dividend to state governments rather than reducing tariffs for
business. State governments were unwilling to carry out too m u c h cost cutting in the
electricity utilities, fearing an electoral backlash from job losses caused by more extensive
downsizing and the closure of less efficient power stations. Eliminating cross-subsidies in
electricity supply w a s also politically difficult: state governments feared an electoral
backlash from the inevitable rise in electricity tariffs for domestic and rural consumers,
were cross-subsidies to be reduced.

14
15

16

17

Bob Hawke, Toward a Closer Partnership, Speech to the National Press Club, 19 July 1990.
This name was not adopted until 1992. Prior to this, the state-federal meetings intended to facilitate
this cooperative federalism were called Special Premiers' Conferences.
Meredith Edwards and Alan Henderson, "Council of Australian Governments: a vehicle for reform",
in Carroll and Painter (eds), Microeconomic Reform and Federalism, 1995, op. cit. The 'carrot' for
the states was a promise to review funding arrangements. It was this issue, rather than microeconomic
reform, that led to later conflict. See Fred Gruen and Michelle Grattan, Managing Government:
Labor's Achievements and Failures, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1993.
I do not suggest that there is a value-neutral method of determining tariffs for different electricity users.

7.3 Restructuring Of Electricity Supply Industry
7.3.1 Introduction
During the 1990s, the Australian ESI underwent fundamental restructuring. T h e vertically
integrated, state-based, state-owned, monopoly utilities were disaggregated into their
generation, transmission, distribution and supply functions. Competition w a s introduced in
generation and supply. A national electricity market w a s formed in the southern and eastern
states.18 S o m e electricity assets were privatised. T h e ESI restructuring w a s driven by the
federal government; the states were not keen to relinquish control of their utilities and did
not fully cooperate with the federal government's agenda. T h e restructuring process thus
varied in different states. Here I focus in particular on Victoria and N e w South Wales.

Restructuring has produced mixed outcomes for renewable energy. Electricity pool prices
(the wholesale market price for generation set half hourly) dropped significantly at first,
making it difficult for renewables to compete. Prices have recently started to rise. T h e
network advantages of renewable energy technologies' ( R E T s ) and other e m b e d d e d
generators are not well recognised: because they are usually located close to load centres,
they require less transmission and distribution network services, but this is not reflected in
network pricing.19 O n the other hand, niche markets for renewables are opening up:
renewable energy remote area power supplies and green power (described in chapter 6 and
below) are the main examples.

7.3.2 T h e E S I in Transition
During the late 1980s, the N S W and Victorian electricity utilities, which were debt-laden
following their earlier excesses in power station construction, began to shed staff,
encourage private generation, and consider privatisation of s o m e generators.

18

19

At the time of writing, Tasmania's electricity network is not connected to the mainland, but there are
plans to interconnect Tasmania via 'Basslink'. Tasmania will then join the National Electricity
Market. The grids of Western Australia and Northern Territory are too distant for them to join.
Australian Cogeneration Association, Removing Impediments to Cogeneration and Renewable
Generation in the National Electricity Market, Melbourne, June 2000.
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N S W s a w a change of government in early 1988. T h e incoming conservative Coalition
government w a s committed to neoliberal 'reform' of the public sector.20 T o justify intended
cuts to and restructuring of the public sector, the n e w government commissioned an audit
into the state's finances, k n o w n as the Curran Report.21 T h e Report declared that N S W w a s
in a serious financial predicament and that there were "massive operational inefficiencies"
and serious financial problems within the main public enterprises.22 It recommended that
these public enterprises be corporatised.23 This w a s to entail not only changes to management incentive structures, but also competitive neutrality, that is the removal of advantages
and disadvantages that applied by virtue of these enterprises being publicly owned. 24

Targets of the Curran Report included Elcom, the NSW electricity utility. Elcom's major
problems were identified as overcapacity, poor industrial relations, increasing fuel costs,
low plant availability and overstaffing. T h e Report recommended that E l c o m reduce staff
numbers, sell its mines allowing the cheapest coal to be sourced, retire old power stations,
and consider the sale of a power station, allowing it and any other potential private power
stations to compete with Elcom's generators.25 Elcom carried out significant staff reductions
over the following few years,26 and began to encourage the development of private
generators, albeit on a small scale.27 T h e government initially sought to corporatise Elcom,
but did not proceed with this; instead Elcom w a s restructured infernally into separate
business units and renamed Pacific Power.

The State Electricity Commission of Victoria (SECV) also started to downsize from 1989,
slashing its workforce by over 4 0 % over the next four years.28 A s described in section 4.4.6,

20
21

22
23

24
25
26
27

28

Laffin and Painter "Introduction", 1995, op. cit.
C. P. Curran Focus on Reform: Report on the State's Finances by the New South Wales Commission
of Audit, N S W Government Printer, Sydney, 1988, pp. 62-63. A key government advisor later
dubbed the. audit "a marketing exercise", to "create a popular demand for that kind of reform". Gary
Sturgess, Interview, December 1994, cited in Laffin and Painter "Introduction", 1995, op. cit., p. 9.
Curran, 1988, op. cit., pp. 62-63.
See also Steering Committee on Government Trading Enterprises, A Policy Framework for
Improving the Performance of Government Trading Enterprises, N S W Government, Sydney, 1988.
The concept of corporatisation is discussed further in section 7.3.3.
ibid.
Curran, 1988, op. cit., p. 111, Appendix A. 1.
Electricity Commission of N e w South Wales, Annual Reports, various years.
Alicia Larriera, "Govt plan to privatise power plants", Sydney Morning Herald, 11 November 1988,
1 See also Electricity Commission of N e w South Wales, Electricity Development and Fuel
Sourcing Plan - Strategy Options for the Future, 1989.
Electricity Supply Association of Australia, Electricity Australia 1994,1994.
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the S E C V was encouraging private generation, specifically cogeneration and renewable
energy, through an incentives package. That the S E C V , unlike Elcom, w a s specifically
targeting more environmentally benign generation options w a s undoubtedly due to the
greener tendency of the Victorian Labor government. 29 But the S E C V went further than just
the encouragement of small-scale private generation. Faced with a large debt, the
government w a s also considering the privatisation of one of the S E C V ' s existing power
stations. Privatisation w a s politically difficult for a Labor government, and several early
attempts to privatise or raise private capital had failed.30 B y 1990, however, the Victorian
government was facing a financial crisis,31 and concerns were being raised over government
and S E C V debt levels. In 1992, 4 0 % of L o y Y a n g B w a s sold to the U S c o m p a n y Mission
Energy. Soon after, Labor was replaced by a coalition government, w h o s e intention w a s to
break up the S E C V and privatise the industry.

7.3.3 The Federal Government's Restructuring Push
B y this time, the federal government had set in motion the restructuring of the ESI. It
commissioned the Industry Commission (IC)—the renamed I A C — t o undertake an inquiry
into electricity generation, transmission and distribution and to report on the scope for
improving efficiency in the ESI. 32 This report followed on from the 1989 I A C report
Government

(Non-Tax) Charges, which had identified the performance of the electricity

industry as an impediment to increasing the international competitiveness of business.

In its report of 1991 the IC recommended sweeping changes to the ESI including:
• corporatisation of electricity authorities;
•

removal of legislative barriers to entry;

•

disaggregation of generation, transmission and distribution;

• formation of an independent transmission body to operate the grids in the southern and
eastern states;

See section 7.4.3 on the Victorian government's attitude towards environmental issues.
Richard Webb, " V E T undersubscribed by personal investors", Australian Financial Review, 17 M a y
1988, p. 20. Lim Say Boon, Rosemary Mulally and Jeni Cooper, "Private sector in play for power",
The Australian, 2 July 1988, p. 5.
Kenneth Davidson, "The Victorian economy and the policy of the Cain/Kirner Government", in Mark
Considine and Brian Costar (eds), Trials in Power, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1992.
Industry Commission, Energy Generation and Distribution, Vols I, II and III, A G P S , Canberra, 1991.
The Industry Commission was also to investigate the natural gas industry.
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• break-up of generation into several independent generating bodies to enable competition;
• formation of multiple distribution franchises in each state, and termination of exclusive
franchises with the aim of introducing competition into distribution;
• open access to transmission and distribution facilities;
• privatisation of all electricity generation and some distribution assets.33

Corporatisation—a much-used term for which there was no agreed definition apart from
general emulation of the private sector 34 —was defined by the IC as including: adoption of
commercial

objectives; removal of utilities' regulatory functions; abolishment of

community service obligations; introduction of performance monitoring; removal of
legislative barriers to entry; adoption of commercial accounting practices; and liability for
government charges and taxes, as well as dividends payable to the government.35

Thus the IC saw corporatisation as a step in the move towards a competitive electricity
market, rather than just an end in itself or a means of controlling state government debt. The
IC's definition also suggested that the electricity utilities should not be expected to fund
non-commercial projects at the behest of government, as it had done in the past. Such
projects included those justified by social and/or environmental benefits, such as renewable
energy projects. Yet, as described below, some of the electricity utilities—particularly
Elcom (later called Pacific P o w e r ) — w e r e becoming more interested in renewable energy
during this period, in part because of the potential business opportunities offered.

If the federal government were to facilitate the formation of a south-eastern transmission
grid, as proposed by the IC, it needed to achieve more inter-state cooperation. A s noted
above, the Council of Australian Governments ( C O A G ) had been established to achieve a
more cooperative federalism.36 Thefirstof the cooperative state-federal meetings w a s held
in October 1990, and high on the agenda w a s microeconomic reform of state-owned
enterprises. The conference established an Electricity Working Group

comprising

representatives from the electricity authorities and government policy agencies. It w a s to
investigate the formation of an interstate electricity network between N S W , Victoria, S A ,

See for example discussion in Senate Standing Committee on Industry Science and Technology, Gas
and Electricity: Combining Efficiency and Greenhouse, Australian Parliament, Canberra, 1992.
Industry Commission, Energy Generation and Distribution, Vol. Ill, 1991, op. cit.
Earlier meeting were called Special Premiers' Conferences. The term C O A G was adopted in 1992.
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Queensland, Tasmania and the A C T . 3 7 A National Grid M a n a g e m e n t Council ( N G M C ) w a s
subsequently formed to coordinate the planning and activities of the interstate grid, and to
encourage open access to the grid and competition in generation.38 T h e N G M C comprised
representatives from each government and an independent chair, and w a s initially
•i* *

39

dominated by people from the electricity utilities.

From the outset, there was tension between the federal government, which wanted an
independent grid authority, and the states, which did not wish to relinquish control of
transmission assets.40 The structure of N G M C represented a concession to the states, and
thus existing players. In the end, the states agreed to the separation of transmission from
generation for their utilities, the formation of separate transmission corporations and the
establishment of a National Electricity Market ( N E M ) . 4 1 T h e development that secured the
states' cooperation in the ESI restructuring w a s National Competition Policy ( N C P ) . A n
inquiry into N C P w a s established by the federal government with the strong backing of
business. The inquiry's report, released in 1993, recommended that G B E s be subject to
competition.42 It took nearly two years for the states to accept the N C P package, the main
sticking point being financial compensation: dividends and tax equivalents from G B E s
comprised a significant part of state revenue. In 1995 the statesfinallysigned up to N C P in
return for substantial compensation.43

7.3.4 Restructuring of ESI in Victoria
In the w a k e of the Industry Commission report, the Victorian Labor government w a s
intending to corporatise the S E C V . 4 4 But this w a s short-lived. In October 1992 there w a s a
change of government in Victoria. T h e incoming conservative government, headed by Jeff

^

Special Premiers' Conference, Communique, Brisbane, 30-31 October 1990.
ibid. Report O f The Electricity Working Group To The Special Premiers' Conference.
National Electricity Code Administrator, "National Electricity Code, application to the A C C C for
authorisation", 1996, Accessed 7 November 1997, <http://www.accc.gov.au/sched/>; Robert R.
Booth, Warring Tribes: The Story ofPower Development in Australia, Bardak, Perth, 2000.
Department of Primary Industries and Energy, National Electricity Strategy: A Discussion Paper,
A G P S , Canberra, 1992; SSCIST, Gas and Electricity, 1992, op. cit.; Cathy Bolt, "States hedge bets
on national power body", Australian Financial Review, 22 April 1992.
For an overview of this period see Booth, 2000, op. cit.
Independent Committee of Inquiry, National Competition Policy, A G P S , Canberra, 1993.
Council of Australian Governments, Communique, Canberra, 11 April 1995.
Public Bodies Review Committee, Report to the Parliament on the Appropriate Model for
Corporatisation of the State Electricity Commission, Government Printer, Melbourne, 1992.
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Kennett, arguably represented a n e w phase in the transformation of Australia's public
sector. Advised by right-wing think-tanks and business organisations, the Kennett
government instigated a major program of public sector cutbacks.45 T h e changes to
Victoria's E S I were substantial and, although mainly in keeping with the restructuring being
considered at national level, were executed speedily.

The new government soon divided the SECV into its generation, transmission and
distribution functions.46 A n u m b e r of generation and distribution companies were formed,
and

the distribution companies

and three generators were

sold for a price of

A $ 17.9 billion.47 Analysts have suggested that s o m e prices significantly exceeded
expectations with buyers paying a premium over international benchmarks. 48

Victoria was the pacesetter not only in disaggregation and privatisation of electricity assets,
but also in the development of a wholesale market and the expansion of retail competition.
T h e development of the national electricity market w a s proceeding cautiously: the N G M C
had specified an initial threshold for customers participating in the market as 10 M W . 4 9 This
meant that only electricity suppliers and a few very large customers could participate. But
this w a s too slow for Victoria. In 1994, Victoria announced plans for its o w n state
electricity market, which it implemented before the national market. A timetable w a s
announced for the introduction of contestability (i.e. customers choosing their supplier), to
gradually encompass all customers.

It seems likely that Victoria's rapid restructuring was driven by more than just zeal for
privatisation or maximisation of sale price. T o achieve m a x i m u m price it w a s preferable to
sell the utility as a monopoly. But this is incompatible with the other objective of

45

46

47

48

49

See Des Moore and Michael G. Porter, Victoria: An Agenda for Change, Tasman Institute and the
Institute for Public Affairs, Melbourne, 1991; Booth, 2000, op. cit.
Department of the Treasury, Office of State Owned Enterprises, The Electricity Supply Industry in
Victoria: A Competitive Future - Electricity: Summary, Melbourne, 1993; Department of the
Treasury, Office of State Owned Enterprises, Reforming Victoria's Electricity Industry: Stage two: A
Competitive Future - Electricity, Melbourne, 1994.
Department of Treasury and Finance, Energy Projects Division, Victoria's Electricity Supply
Industry: Towards 2000, Melbourne, 1997.
"Power sales in Victoria", Privatisation International, No. 84, September 1995, p. 19; "Intoxicated
by power: is the world's electricity business setting itself up for a profit cut?", The Economist, Vol.
343, No. 8021,14 June 1997, p. 65.
National Grid Management Council, Transition to a National Electricity Market, 1993.
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restructuring—reducing electricity prices for business. That required the utility to be broken
up into a sufficient number of competing generation and supply companies. The model
adopted in the United Kingdom, whose electricity industry restructuring provided the
inspiration for Victoria's, was insufficiently competitive: a duopolistic generation structure
gave the generators considerable market power. Victoria was determined not to repeat this
mistake, setting up a more competitive structure before privatisation.50

7.3.5 Restructuring of ESI in NSW
That N S W should have lagged so far behind Victoria in restructuring its electricity industry
might seem surprising: the conservative government which came to power in 1988 was
considered to be taking the lead in microeconomic reform, particularly with its program of
corporatisation.51 In the electricity sector, however, the government's attempts to
corporatise the electricity councils (which were responsible for distribution) were mostly
unsuccessful. It is likely that the government's stalling on electricity restructuring had
much to do with its precarious parliamentary position and the fear of an electoral backlash if
power station closures were threatened.53 Pacific Power was restructured internally, and its
three generating business units 'competed' in an internal market. But it resisted
disaggregation, arguing that a large, integrated enterprise would have more success
competing with foreign companies.54 The only disaggregation was the separation of
generation and transmission, agreed to at the national level.
In March 1995, a new ALP government was elected in NSW, and it quickly sought to
restructure the ESI. The n e w Treasurer soon released the Electricity Reform Statement,
outlining

changes

including

amalgamation

of existing

electricity

distributors!

corporatisation, the introduction of retail competition, and an investigation into whether and
h o w Pacific Power should be disaggregated.55 Given that Victoria's electricity generating
assets had been disaggregated and privatisation was underway, advocates of competition
50

51
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53
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expressed concern that an intact Pacific Power might exert undue market power. 56
Meanwhile, workers in the electricity industry, and the rank and file of the Labor Party
argued that restructuring in distribution and generation could lead to job losses. The
government finally opted to split Pacific Power into three. The ESI changes also included
two measures—thefirstones taken in the national electricity restructuring process—which
were directly intended to advantage sustainable energy initiatives. These were the
establishment of the Sustainable Energy Fund, and environmental guidelines imposed on
electricity retailers operating in N S W . These are described in section 7.4.4.

In 1997, the NSW Treasury called for the prompt privatisation of NSW's electricity assets
to eliminate state debt, arguing that the value of N S W ' s assets would decline following
Victorian's privatisation and N S W ' s loss of electricity market share to Victoria. Although
privatisation was contrary to the ALP's platform, the proposal was endorsed by key
government members, despite vehement opposition from the Left faction, unions and most
of the public. The proposal was put to the 1997 A L P Conference where it was decisively
defeated. In the following state election, the Opposition campaigned on electricity privatisation and lost the election. Since then, privatisation has been off the N S W political agenda.

7.3.6 Recent Developments in the National Electricity Market
Victoria's wholesale electricity market commenced operation in 1994, and N S W ' s in 1996;
both were subsumed by the National Electricity Market ( N E M ) in 1997, albeit with only
N S W , Victoria and South Australia interconnected. The formation of the N E M saw the pool
price drop significantly, and N S W generators lose some market share to Victoria. Within a
few years, pool prices were starting to rise. Queensland joined the N E M in 2001 after its
grid w a sfinallyinterconnected.

ESI restructuring, it was claimed, would provide opportunities for new technologies, such
as cogeneration, renewable energy and demand side management, to compete with
conventional generation. The use of natural gas-fired combined cycle gas turbines ( C C G T )
w a s expected to increase significantly: their short lead times and modular design, not to

55
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Michael Egan (Treasurer of N S W and Minister for Energy), Electricity Reform Statement, 1995.
Industry Commission, Does Pacific Power have Market Power: A Report on the Implications for the
National Electricity Market ofNSW Generation Options, AGPS, Canberra. 1995.
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mention lower G H G emissions, are considered attractive features. But change has been
slow. Overcapacity in some states and improved availability of existing generators has
curbed the need for n e w plant. Queensland, which is experiencing high growth, has seen
substantial investment in n e w coal-fired power stations. Recently the Queensland
government halted this trend, requiring retailers to source 1 3 % of electricity from gas-fired
plant by 2005.57 Nationally, several natural gas pipeline projects are planned or under
construction. The restructuring of Australia's natural gas industry and the consequent
downward pressure on natural gas prices should enhance the viability of C C G T s . This will
undoubtedly diminish future prospects for renewable energy.

Some states have tried to sweeten controversial changes to their ESI by tying them to
renewable energy initiatives. South Australian's proposal to privatise its E S I

was

accompanied by a promise to institute a Sustainable Energy Authority. T h e privatisation
went ahead in December 1999, but the government then claimed that there w a s insufficient
m o n e y for the Authority. (See section 7.4.5.) Tasmania's ESI has promised to install up to
several hundred megawatts of wind power capacity, conditional on the installation of an
undersea cable, dubbed Basslink, connecting Tasmania to the mainland.58 Basslink is
strongly opposed by environmentalists.

7.3.7 Overview
The restructuring of Australia's ESI has been driven in part by the quest for international
competitiveness through lower energy prices for business, and in part by the dominance of
neoliberalist ideas, which favour competition and privatisation. Although the timing of the
restructuring has coincided with growing concern about climate change from the burning of
fossil fuels, the greenhouse agenda has had very little effect on the restructuring, apart from
in the rhetoric of allowing non-discriminatory access to the grid for less GHG-intensive
energy sources, such as renewables, as the following quotes demonstrate:
The micro-economic reforms currently sweeping through the traditional energy industries
will have implications for renewables. Establishing an open, competitive and fair market
for energy is fundamental to the long term success of new energy technologies. In such an
environment these technologies can compete on their merits, and thus establish themselves

^

Queensland Government, Queensland Energy Policy: A Cleaner Energy Strategy, 2000, Accessed 14
December 2002, <http://www.energy.qld.gov.au/pdfs/qldenergypolicy.pdf>.
Hydro-Electric Corporation, "Hydro announces major wind project", Media Release, 29 July 1999.
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as soundly based economically sustainable industries.59

And:
[MJany of the [electricity reform] measures will have a positive impact on the use of
renewables. Firstly, the reform process will address cross-subsidies and improve the
commercial prospects for renewables in sectors of the market which benefit from large
subsidies (eg. rural areas). A s more evidence becomes available about the relative cost of
grid connected versus stand alone power supplies there will be more incentive for the
electricity industry to realise that it is not only in the 'wires' business ... Secondly, ... the
introduction of a fair and open market will remove institutional barriers to entry into the
market for small-scale producers using renewable energy sources ... Thirdly,... in response
to uncertainties about load growth, the industry will have a greater incentive to examine
power supply options which are more modular in nature than coal-fired power plants.60

Modular plant, which are medium-sized and can be brought on line quickly, are less risky
than traditional large coal-fired or hydro plant, as they reduce the cost of under- or overcapacity.61 Moreover, corporatised electricity authorities or the private sector would n o w be
bearing the risk of overcapacity rather than governments, and thus might be m o r e attracted
to modular plant.62 But natural gas plant is also modular, and it too has reduced G H G
emissions. W i t h its lower capital cost, natural gas plant would m o r e likely be preferred to
renewables. 63 T h e issue of whether network pricing recognises the network advantages of
distributed, modular supply such as natural gas plant and renewables has also not been
resolved to the satisfaction of n e w players; thus this promise has not yet been realised.64

Restructuring has led to significantly lower electricity prices for large consumers, and a
substantial rise in electricity d e m a n d . Existing coal-fired p o w e r stations, particularly in
Victoria, are in the m a i n producing the cheapest electricity, and are thus favoured in the
national electricity market. N e w b r o w n coal plant is under consideration in Victoria, subject

59

60

61

62

63
64

Department of Primary Industries and Energy, The Australian Renewable Energy Industry, A G P S ,
Canberra, 1993, pp. 4-5.
W.L.Fisher, (Department of Primary Industries and Energy), "Commonwealth renewable energy
initiatives", Solar '94, Australian and N e w Zealand Solar Energy Society Conference, Sydney, 30
November - 3 December 1994, pp. 684-693.
Ian J. Walker, "Carbon dioxide from the Australian energy sector: an energy-efficient scenario", in
W.J. Bouma, G.I. Pearman and M.R. Manning (eds), Greenhouse: Coping With Climate Change,
C S I R O Australia, Collingwood (Vic), 1996.
Mark R Stevens "Renewable energy options in Australia and N e w Zealand for the next 25 years: the
technologies and the feasibilities", in W.J. B o u m a et al (eds), 1996, op. cit., p. 499.
ibid.
Australian Cogeneration Association, 2000, op. cit.
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to G H G abatement.65 There is little opportunity for less GHG-intensive forms of generation
such as natural gas-fired plant and renewables to supplant existing coal-fired plant;
however, they have been used to meet part of the rising demand.

7.4 Renewable Energy Policies
7.4.1 Introduction
In this period, the threat of climate change from the burning of fossil fuels s a w
environmentalists promoting renewable energy as an alternative. Decision makers still
maintained that renewable energy sources were a long-term proposition, but in the short
term were not practical or economic, and required further R D & D . Nonetheless, with the
growing 'green' consciousness of the electorate particularly from 1988 to 1990—it
diminished somewhat after the onset of the early 1990s recession—governments responded
with some measures, albeit invariably small, to encourage renewable energy technologies
(RETs). However, m u c h renewable energy policy focused on the use of renewable energy
in remote areas, where it could supplant liquid fossil fuels. This would not change until the
late 1990s, w h e n more substantial measures were introduced.

Although greater use of renewable energy sources could lead to reduced GHG emissions,
they were still supply-side options. Increasingly it became clear that a viable short-term
strategy to reduce G H G emissions was to reduce demand, that is, to pursue energy
conservation.

The scope for increased energy conservation in Australia w a s high, partly

due to past practices of the energy authorities. Unlike during the previous energy crisis,
w h e n the main focus of energy conservation campaigns w a s the transport sector, all energy
end uses and energy production would be targeted.67 Soon the term 'energy efficiency'

65

66

Candy Broad (Minister for Energy), Release of Brown Coal Resources in the Latrobe Valley,
Department of Natural Resources and Environment, Melbourne, 2002.
For example D.J. Swaine (ed.), Greenhouse and Energy, CSIRO Australia, 1989; Ecologically
Sustainable Development Working Group Chairs, Greenhouse Report, A G P S , Canberra, 1992; Alan
Pears and Peter Versluis, "Energy options: scenarios for alternative energy in W A Solar '93,
Australian and N e w Zealand Solar Energy Society Conference, Fremantle, 1-5 December 1993 pp'
335-341.
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For an overview of energy conservation in Australia compared with several other countries, see Gill
Owen, Public Purpose or Private Benefit? The Politics of Energy Conservation, Manchester
University Press, 1999. For a review of energy conservation programs in Australia, see P.J. Walsh
and J.S. Kerby, "Energy management programs in Australia—past experience and future prospects"
in Swaine (ed.), 1989, op. cit.
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replaced 'energy conservation', to change the focus from using less energy to using energy
wisely.68 Renewable energy and energy efficiency c a m e to be seen as associated strategies,
with the term 'sustainable energy' coined to cover both.

Despite the scope for greater energy efficiency, renewable energy still had popular appeal;
thus governments did at times offer support to the renewable energy industry. But until
recently, wind power w a s not a R E T targeted for assistance. A s described earlier, in this
period Australian governments were keen to foster n e w industries, especially exportoriented industries. If R E T s were to be assisted, those which could form the basis of both a
viable local market and a viable export market would be favoured. Mostly, these would be
the technologies in which Australia had both expertise and a local demand: photovoltaics,
R A P S systems (which often used photovoltaics) and solar water heating. A n d indeed an
orientation towards export rather than just local use could be advantageous for the industry:
for example the potential market for R A P S systems in the Asia-Pacific region was
considerably larger than the local Australian market.69 There was a possibility that export
markets in small wind turbines could be developed.70 However, large wind turbines were
another matter, as European manufacturers were already dominant.71

This section follows section 4.5 in chapter 4: I examine policy objectives towards
renewable energy situated within the broader framework of energy policy. I start by
examining this at federal and national level, followed by an analysis of renewable energy
policy objectives in several states.

7.4.2 Federal and National
Throughout m u c h of the 1980s the federal government played only a minor role in the
Australian energy sector. Its main activities were fostering the development of Australia's
energy resources for export or to attract industry, providing funding for energy R D & D , and

68

Because energy conservation is only a secondary issue in this thesis, I use the two terms
interchangeably. For a discussion on the difference see Owen, 1999, op. cit.
69
Department of Primary Industries and Energy, Renewable Energy Industry, 1993, op. cit.
70
See for example Peter Headley (Energy Australia), "Small scale wind turbines in China—a business
experience", Proceedings of the 1999 Australian Wind Energy Conference, Newcastle, 28 - 30 June
1999, pp. 159-166.
71
The company Renewable Energy Asia-Pacific manufactured large wind turbines in Australia under
licence for export. This was only for a short period until the company was taken over. At the time of
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for a time promoting the conservation of liquid fuels. But this changed during the period
examined here.

As described in chapter 4, in the late 1980s the federal Labor government began to take a
more active interest in the energy sector with the aim of increasing exports of Australia's
energy resources and improving the efficiency of the gas and electricity sectors. T h e latter
was intended to reduce the cost of energy, thereby

improving the international

competitiveness of local industry.72 About the same time, the 'greenhouse effect' b e c a m e a
policy issue. With the growing popularity of environmentalism, and a federal Labor
government eager to capture the green vote, n e w policy responses for the energy sector
which acknowledged the objective of reducing G H G emissions would be developed. These
two agendas were undoubtedly at odds. Australia's electricity sector relied very heavily on
coal and the government was aiming to reduce electricity tariffs, which w a s likely to
increase demand. Fuel switching, it was thought, would lead to higher tariffs. Hence,
suggestions that G H G

emissions should be reduced were a significant threat to the

electricity sector. Not surprisingly, policy responses to the greenhouse agenda were weak,
and remained so throughout the 1990s.73

After the election of a conservative government in 1996, the government's attitude to the
greenhouse issue hardened. At the 1997 Kyoto meeting on climate change, where binding
emission targets were negotiated, Australia insisted on and w a s granted an increase in
emissions. The government argued that because of the structure of the economy, in
particular

the

dependence

on

energy-intensive

industries, Australia

would

be

disproportionately affected by the requirement to reduce G H G emissions.

Although the pre-1996 Labor government seemed more favourably disposed than its
successor to reducing G H G emissions and to encouraging sustainable energy initiatives, it
achieved very little. M u c h of its professed commitment m a y well have been aimed at
maintaining the green vote.

writing, other wind turbine manufacturers are planning to establish facilities in Australia.
Department of Primary Industries and Energy, Energy 2000: A National Energy Policy Paper, A G P S ,
Canberra, 1988.
For a critical analysis of Australia's greenhouse policies see Clive Hamilton, Running from the
Storm: The Development of Climate Change Policy in Australia, U N S W Press, Sydney, 2001.
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In the late 1980s, one of the first indications of how the federal Labor government intended
to address concerns about G H G emissions in the energy sector w a s the Prime Minister's
statement on the environment, Our Country Our Future, released in 1989. Although the
statement announced increased research funding for renewables, its main emphasis w a s on
the role of 'clean' coal and greater energy efficiency.74 A notable omission w a s greater use
of natural gas, a greenhouse-superior fuel, deemed scarce in the 1980s. Despite this
commitment, funding levels to support renewable energy and energy efficiency programs
remained

relatively low. However, National Energy

Research, Development

and

Demonstration Program ( N E R D D P ) funding for renewable energy and energy efficiency
w a s boosted with an additional $5 million over five years.75 Following the Prime Minister's
statement, the federal Department of Primary Industries and Energy (DPIE) increased its
commitment to energy efficiency programs (which had been reduced during the previous
few years) to about $4.4 million in 1990-91. 76 Most of DPIE's energy efficiency programs
were confined to the provision of information and education.77 There w a s little action on the
introduction of regulatory measures such as energy efficiency standards, measures that
would have undoubtedly been more effective.78 Indeed, the federal government, whose
commitment to an economic rationalist agenda w a s by then firmly established, indicated
that it w a s most reluctant to use regulatory measures to achieve environmental objectives.79

By 1989, some state governments were talking of adopting the 'Toronto target', a 20%
reduction in 1988 carbon dioxide emissions by 2005 called for by an international
greenhouse conference held in Toronto in June 1988. 80 T h e adoption of such a target could
have been threatening to Australia's energy-intensive industries and the electricity supply
industry. Soon governments were being more cautious. A t a 1990 intergovernmental
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R.J.L. Hawke (Prime Minister of Australia), Our Country Our Future: Statement on the
Environment, A G P S , Canberra, 1989.
This increase had been announced in the Energy 2000 report. See section 4.5.2.
N S W Government Minerals and Energy Committee, Review of Energy Conservation Management
Policies and Programs, Report to the Minister for Minerals and Energy, 1990, p. 27.
Department of Primary Industries and Energy, Annual Report, Canberra, various years.
In 1991 for example, energy efficiency standards for buildings were being 'investigated'. Department
of Primary Industries and Energy, Annual Report, Canberra, 1990-91, pp. 75-76. Regarding the
failure to introduce efficiency standards for domestic appliances see Gavin Gilchrist, The Big Switch:
Clean Energy for the Twenty-first Century, Allen & Unwin, St. Leonards, N S W , 1994, chapter 9.
See for example Department of Primary Industries and Energy, Issues in Energy Policy: An Agenda
for the 1990s, A G P S , Canberra, 1991, pp. 7-9.
Conference Statement, 77K? Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security, Toronto, Canada,
27-30 June 1988. N S W and Victoria's proposals to adopt the Toronto target are discussed below.
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meeting, the state and federal governments adopted a modified Toronto target

as an

interim planning target, subject to the proviso that:
Australia should not implement response measures that would have net adverse economic
impacts nationally or on Australia's trade competitiveness, in the absence of similar action
•

82

by major greenhouse gas producing countries.

To what extent were state and federal governments heeding the message of ecological
modernisation—that efforts to improve environmental outcomes could improve business
profitability through greater resource efficiency and offer n e w business opportunities in the
development of clean technologies? It w a s certainly recognised at the aforementioned
intergovernmental meeting, with the C o m m u n i q u e noting:
[N]ew economic and trade opportunities could open up for Australia through the
development of more environmentally sound processes and products, and all governments
agreed to encourage industry to take up this challenge vigorously.83
Yet, the federal government nearly always portrayed G H G reductions as detrimental to
industry, rather than offering n e w business opportunities. That is, it has sought to protect the
industries which are potential losers from G H G reductions.84 Little attention w a s given to
foster potential winners, such as the sustainable energy industries.85

The advice given to the federal government on this was mixed. In the early 1990s, several
official studies were undertaken into the effect on Australia's energy sector of m o v e s to
curtail G H G emissions.86 M o s t concluded that increased energy efficiency offered the best
short-term hope of reducing emissions, with renewable energy seen as a long-term option.
Support for renewable energy w a s seen as appropriate if it fostered an Australian renewable
energy industry, and in particular, an export-oriented industry. S o m e studies considered that

81

82
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85

86

The Toronto target referred specifically to carbon dioxide emissions, whereas the Australian target
included carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide.
Special Premiers' Conference, Communique, Brisbane, 30-31 October 1990.
ibid.
Clive Hamilton noted that the federal government has been heavily influenced by the fossil fuel and
energy-intensive industries. H e also claimed that some economic instruments encourage
environmentally damaging behaviour by industry. Hamilton, 2001, op. cit.
This has changed recently. See Department of Industry, Science and Resources, New Era New
Energy: Renewable Energy Action Agenda, Canberra, 2000.
Industry Commission, Costs and Benefits of Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Vols 1 and 2,
A G P S , Canberra, 1991; Senate Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, Rescue
the Future: Reducing the Impact of the Greenhouse Effect, A G P S , Canberra, 1991; Ecologically
Sustainable Development Working Groups, Final Report—Energy Use, A G P S , Canberra, 1991;
Ecologically Sustainable Development Working Group Chairs, Greenhouse Report, 1992, op. cit.
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areas where Australia had significant research strength—solar thermal and photovoltaic
technologies—were worthy of support.87 A n

Industry Commission study w a s less

enthusiastic, warning that overseas companies might capture m u c h of the market for
RETs.

Yet, there w a s little analysis of h o w the economy might benefit from

GHG

emissions reduction. Clear exceptions were a series of studies commissioned by the
environment department. These studies, undertaken by renewable energy advocates,
investigated what opportunities G H G emissions reduction offered the Australian renewable
energy industry.89

The government seemed to give little consideration to how the restructuring of the energy
sector would affect attempts to reduce G H G emissions. A s H u g h Saddler noted:
Astonishingly, the two policy debates—on micro-economic reform and on greenhouse—are
being conducted in almost total isolation from each other. Where the two do come together,
it is mainly in the form of inadequately substantiated claims about the positive benefits of
micro-economic reform for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.90
T h e view usually stated w a s that ESI restructuring would assist the fortunes of renewable
energy by removing institutional impediments to the use of renewable energy, thereby
creating a m o r e level playing field.91

In 1992, Australia was represented at the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development held in Rio, and soon ratified the Framework Convention on Climate Change,
seemingly indicating a willingness to take a leading role in tackling the greenhouse issue.
Parties agreed to the non-binding target of stabilising emissions at 1990 levels by 2000, and
agreed to report periodically on measures taken. Following this, the Council of Australian
Governments ( C O A G ) released its National Greenhouse Response Strategy ( N G R S ) . S o m e
critics argued that the N G R S w a s a w e a k document, particularly as it did not commit
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See for example, SSCIST, Rescue the Future, 1991, op. cit.
Industry Commission, Costs and Benefits, 1991, op. cit.
See for example Andrew Blakers, T o m Crawford, Mark Diesendorf, Geoff Hill and Hugh Outhred,
The Role of Wind Energy in Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Opportunities and Benefits for the
Australian Wind Energy Industry. Department of the Arts, Sport, the Environment, Tourism and
Territories, Canberra, 1991.
Hugh Saddler, "Greenhouse policies and the Australian energy-supply industries", in Bouma, et al
(eds), 1996, op. cit., p. 464.
See for example Industry Commission, Costs and Benefits, 1991, op. cit.; SSCIST, Gas and
Electricity, 1992, op. cit. Also see section 7.3.7.
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governments to G H G reduction targets.92 Clive Hamilton, on the other hand, argued that the
measures in the N G R S "if prosecuted with vigour, would have m a d e a significant impact on
emissions growth", but most of the measures were ignored by governments. 93 T h e N G R S
w a s framed as a 'no regrets' strategy, that is, measures to be supported were those with no
net cost or some net benefit. It also included the stipulation: "any undue burden of
adjustment potentially borne by a particular sector or region is recognised and accounted
for".94 In other words, GHG-intensive industries should not suffer an economic burden,
even though these industries could well be replaced by m o r e sustainable industries.95 A s
noted in chapter 6, industries w h o perceive themselves to be losers are likely to oppose
attempts to restructure economies along ecological modernist lines. Australian governments
have continued to ensure that these industries will not be disadvantaged.

The NGRS made mention of the need to encourage renewable energy, but it assumed that
renewables would find their place once a level playingfieldw a s established.
Governments will expand the use of renewable energy sources in generating electricity
wherever there are suitable opportunities ... Governments will encourage wider use of
renewable energy sources, paying particular attention to removing barriers that discriminate
against their use.97
This commitment to renewable energy under the N G R S w a s so w e a k that the states and
Commonwealth, w h e n reporting on their progress on the N G R S , could report almost any
activity related to renewable energy as evidence of their progress: a solar hot water
demonstration program or rebate scheme; installation of renewable electricity plant in
remote areas; energy information and education centres; a competitive electricity sector
where renewables would be considered "on an equal footing".98

In accordance with the 'no regrets' approach of the NGRS, renewables would in the main
be given no special treatment, except through R D & D funding and support for renewable
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See review in Roslyn Taplin, "Greenhouse: an overview of Australian policy and practice",
Australian Journal of Environmental Management, Volume 1, 1994, pp. 142-155.
Hamilton, 2001, op. cit., p. 34.
Council of Australian Governments, National Greenhouse Response Strategy, A G P S , Canberra, 1992.
Taplin, 1994, op. cit.
See also Hamilton, 2001, op. cit.
Council of Australian Governments, National Greenhouse Response Strategy, 1992, op. cit.
Intergovernmental Committee on Ecologically Sustainable Development (ICESD), "Progress in
implementing the National Greenhouse Response Strategy and issues to be considered in the 1996
major review of the N G R S " , 1995, Accessed 3 June 1997, <http://www.environment.gov au/
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R A P S systems. T h e N G R S , however, did acknowledge that institutional impediments to
renewable energy went beyond overt discrimination, particularly in that economic
evaluations of energy options usually ignored the social and environmental costs and
benefits (called externalities). T h e N G R S noted:
[Governments will] promote a pricing regime that better reflects costs of supply (including
economic, environmental and social costs) ... A N Z M E C and A N Z E C C will commission a
national investigation ... of issues affecting the incorporation of externalities in the energy
sector, to better understand the full cost of energy service provision.99
Indeed a study of externalities in the energy sector had been commissioned by the Victorian
government—it reported in 1993. 100 It w a s intended that the A N Z M E C / A N Z E C C study
build on its findings.101 But by 1995, w h e n the N G R S progress report w a s released, m u c h
had changed. T h e Labor government that had commissioned the externalities study had long
gone, and the n e w Coalition government had restructured Victoria's electricity sector.
Inclusion of environmental and social costs in energy pricing w a s not compatible with the
aim of achieving the lowest possible energy prices. In the N G R S progress report it appeared
that inclusion of environmental and social costs had slipped off the agenda. Furthermore the
national investigation into issues affecting the incorporation of externalities w a s not
undertaken because the management committee could not agree on the Terms of Reference
of a pilot study.102 Externalities, it seems, had been put in the 'too hard' basket.

The main federal mechanism for supporting RETs during this period was RD&D funding.
In 1990 the N E R D D P w a s transformed to better meet the needs of industry and to foster
greater commercialisation of energy technologies, a transformation in keeping with the
government's aim of improving international competitiveness of industry.103 T w o n e w
energy R & D corporations were established: one to administer coal research funding (funded
by a coal industry levy); and the other to administer energy research funding for the oil, gas,
electricity, renewable energy and energy efficiency industries. T h e latter w a s established as

portfolio/esd/climate/greenhouse/ngrs95.html>.
99
Council of Australian Governments, National Greenhouse Response Strategy, 1992, op. cit., pp. 16,
19. A N Z M E C and A N Z E C C are Australian and N e w Zealand Minerals and Energy Council, and
Australian and N e w Zealand Environment and Conservation Council, respectively.
100
Department of Manufacturing and Industry Development. Victoria's Energy Efficiency Strategy, Part
I, 1991, p. 16, S R C Australia Pty Ltd, Externalities Policy Development Project: Energy Sector,
Report for Department of Energy and Minerals, Melbourne, 1993.
101
Council of Australian Governments, National Greenhouse Response Strategy, 1992, op. cit.
102
ICESD, "Progress in Implementing the N G R S " , 1995, op. cit.
103
Department of Primary Industries and Energy, "New arrangements for energy R & D " , Australian
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the Energy Research and Development Corporation ( E R D C ) . This n e w system of research
funding represented quite a different arrangement from the previous system of advisory
bodies.104 The role of the n e w R & D corporations w a s to "provide strategic leadership to
industry R & D and act as a catalyst to stimulate R & D interest within industry. T h e y will
take a pro-active role in identifying andfillinggaps in the research effort."105 N E R D D P had
simply provided research grants; E R D C w a s to be an investor in energy R & D . 1 0 6 N E R D D P
had funded m a n y small, independent research projects, rather than developing an overall
industry strategy. In contrast, E R D C w a s to fund larger but fewer projects, which were
more likely to involve a number of organisations, and which were in accord with E R D C ' s
overall strategy.107 N E R D D P , it w a s claimed, w a s predominantly researcher-driven; E R D C
would serve industry and energy end-users.

Renewable energy received a reasonable level of support from ERDC, although RD&D
funding w a s aimed at technologies thought to offer the best commercial prospects. E R D C
believed that Australia's record on commercialisation of R E T s w a s 'patchy', and that
Australia should aim to commercialise those R E T s that were cost competitive.109 In its 1993
draft renewable energy strategy, E R D C ranked R E T s , indicating that it would give funding
priority to technologies that: "have the potential for substantial improvements through
R & D ; high potential for commercialisation; high export potential; [and] score high in the
reduction of pollution and which are on the brink of commercialisation and need funds to
speed up the process".110 Technologies designated by E R D C as high priority were high
temperature solar thermal, photovoltaics, power conditioning and control technology and
biomass. W i n d turbines were considered low priority because they were commercial
overseas; thus further research w a s deemed unnecessary.111

The formation of ERDC was quite compatible with an ecological modernisation approach.

Energy Research, Canberra, No. 9, 1989, p. 5.
Aside from the new energy R & D corporations, there were a large number of new R & D corporations
established across the Primary Industries and Energy portfolio.
Department of Primary Industries and Energy, "New energy R & D arrangements taking shape",
Australian Energy Research, Canberra, No. 10, 1990, p 11
106

"

Energy Research and Development Corporation, Annual Report, Canberra, 1990-91.
ibid.
j°8 Department of Primary Industries and Energy, Australian Energy Research, Canberra, June 1992, p. 6.
i io E R D ( ^ d t e d m " E n e r SyR & D : renewable energy strategy released", Scitech, July 1993, pp. 15-16.
ibid.
111
ibid.
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But it w a s not established on a firm footing. While most of the n e w R & D corporations in
the Primary Industries and Energy portfolio were funded by industry levies, E R D C was
not.112 Perhaps this w a s because some energy industries (particularly the oil industry) were
already paying a number of taxes and believed that energy R D & D should be funded
through these existing taxes;113 perhaps it was because some energy industries (such as
renewables) were too small to fund their o w n R D & D ; or perhaps it was because E R D C funded research w a s intended to benefit all energy end-users, not just a narrowly defined
sector. Indeed, it would be difficult to impose a levy across the diverse range of industries
classified as 'energy industries'. This funding arrangement left E R D C quite vulnerable to
the w h i m s of the incumbent government: w h e n the conservatives came to power in 1996,
E R D C w a s soon abolished.

In 1996, R&D arrangements for renewable energy were strengthened with the establishment
of the Australian Cooperative Research Centre for Renewable Energy ( A C R E ) at Murdoch
University in W A . However, A C R E was the lowest funded of all Cooperative Research
Centres established by the federal government.114

Apart from providing research funding, the federal government instituted or funded a few
other programs to assist R E T s , mostly aimed at promoting R A P S systems and solar water
heating, and assisting the development of a renewable energy industry. This would all
change in 1997 with the promise of a renewable energy target.

In late 1997, the Australian government was represented at the Kyoto climate change
conference, at which targets for reductions of G H G emissions were negotiated. The
government's position was that Australia should be allowed a significant increase in
emissions, a position strongly criticised by environmentalists and m a n y in the international
community. Australia, the government claimed, would be disproportionately disadvantaged
by uniform reductions, as the economy w a s heavily dependent on energy-intensive
industries. A t Kyoto, Australia was granted an 8 % increase in 1990 emissions by 2 0 0 8 -
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2012, while most other developed countries were expected to achieve a decrease. 115

A s part of the bargaining position for Kyoto, the prime minister announced a series of
measures targeted at renewable energy. These included the promise to c o m m i t $65 M to
projects including a renewable energy innovation investment fund, a loans and grants
program to assist with the development and commercialisation of R E T s , and a renewable
energy showcase program. 116 These were, in effect, replacing the previously axed E R D C
funding for renewables, and as with the E R D C funding w a s targetted at the most promising
R E T s which could form the basis of a viable industry. T h e prime minister also promised to
set mandatory targets for renewable power generation:
Targets will be set for the inclusion of renewable energy in electricity generation by the
year 2010. Electricity retailers and other large electricity buyers will be legally required to
source an additional 2 % of their electricity from renewable or specified waste-product
energy sources by 2010 (including through direct investment in alternative renewable
energy sources such as solar water heaters). This will accelerate the uptake of renewable
energy in grid-based power applications, and provide an ongoing base for commercially
competitive renewable energy. The programme will also contribute to the development of
internationally competitive industries which could participate effectively in the burgeoning
Asian energy market.117
The Australian Greenhouse Office ( A G O ) w a s established to coordinate the federal
government renewable energy (and other greenhouse) initiatives.118

Although a specific target was nominated, the eligible sources included were so broad that
the implications for n e w renewable electricity plant were not clear. First, given the
relatively low cost and low penetration of solar water heating, solar water heaters could
absorb a significant proportion of the target.119 Second, "specified waste-product energy
sources" could have included fossil fuel sources which were currently wasted, particularly

2

This period is reviewed (from a critical perspective) in Hamilton, 2001, op cit
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After debate, such fossil fuel wastes were rejected from the measure,

but controversial sources such as native forest waste were d e e m e d eligible, subject to
conditions.121 Third, n e w renewable plant w a s already being installed to meet d e m a n d for
green power. W o u l d this plant be included in the target? It w a s argued that to do so would
have led to green power's d e m i s e — w h y would consumers choose to pay a p r e m i u m for
what retailers were already required to do? After consideration, electricity from green
p o w e r schemes w a s excluded from the measure. Fourth, would additional generation from
existing renewable energy generators (mainly hydro) be eligible? If so, h o w m u c h of the
target would they absorb? A s described below, existing renewable energy generators were
d e e m e d eligible, and have benefited significantly from the measure.

A long consultation period followed before the measure was finally passed into legislation
in late 2000. Sections of business, particularly energy-intensive industries, were opposed to
the measure arguing that it would raise electricity costs and reduce their international
competitiveness. For example, a group representing business associations and individual
large corporations, argued:
Members of the A I G N have data which shows that implementation of this measure in the
way implied in the Issues Paper would not be cost effective in terms of electricity supply or
reduction in greenhouse emissions. Moreover, the measure in the form suggested would
create an economic distortion that would be contrary to the policy of micro-economic
reform ... If additional support for specific renewable sectors or projects is required, then it
should be in the form of direct and transparent assistance from Government.122
Renewable energy advocates, in turn, claimed that any price rise would be insignificant in
comparison with the price reductions that followed restructuring. For example:
International experience in emissions trading and load based licensing all shows one
c o m m o n thread—once implemented, the actual costs to consumers as a result of the
measure is always significantly lower than reasoned estimates tabled before its
introduction. Put simply, the market always finds a cheaper way of meeting targets than
anyone imagines. S E D A has carried out various financial assessments to identify the cost of
compliance of this measure. The cost of this measure, estimated by S E D A at an electricity
price increase of 0.28% (in the face of the recent 1 0 % to 4 0 % reductions), will have no
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See section 7.4.4.
Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Commonwealth); Renewable Energy (Electricity) (Charge)
Act 2000 (Commonwealth); Renewable Energy (Electricity) Regulations 2001 (Commonwealth).
Australian Industry Greenhouse Network, "Submission on the efficiency standards and renewable
energy issues papers", July 1998, Accessed 25 September 1998, <http://www.environment.gov.au/
portfolio/esd/climate/energy/consult/submissions/renewable/renewable.html>.
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significant impact on energy prices for Australian business or industry, and therefore not
• •

123

affect international competitiveness.

The measure, when passed into legislation, became known as the Mandatory Renewable
Energy Target ( M R E T ) . Under M R E T , eligible renewable energy generators produce
renewable energy certificates ( R E C s ) which are traded. It is thus a least-cost measure. T o
appease business, concessions were granted including a penalty cap of $ 4 0 / M W h (which is
not indexed), exemption for self-generators, and the target fixed at 9,500 G W h / y e a r by
2010 (reportedly to create certainty). T h e penalty cap in effect provides renewable energy
with a 4c/kWh price advantage. M R E T has given an enormous boost to the wind power
industry in Australia, with m a n y wind farms currently being planned.

Since implementation of the measure, renewable energy advocates have pointed to several
problems. They claim the target is no longer an additional 2 % . T h e conversion of 2 % to the
9,500 G W h target w a s based on a 1997 forecast of total power generation for 2010. M o r e
recent forecasts from the ESI are significantly higher. According to the Australian
Ecogeneration Association ( A E A ) , the target should be raised to 13,000 G W h to meet the
2 % increased forecast.124 Also controversial has been the inclusion of existing renewable
energy generators, and the method for determining their additional generation. Baselines
have been set for existing generators, determined from the average power generated over a
previous period. The A E A claimed that existing generators, principally hydro power
stations, have been significantly advantaged by the w a y in which these baselines have been
determined and the effect of annual variation of output. T h e inclusion of existing
generators, it w a s claimed, w a s intended to encourage upgrade or refurbishment of these
generators.125 However, the A E A estimated that by 2010, 3 5 % of R E C s could be supplied
from existing hydro, with no n e w investment.126

Despite MRET being introduced as a greenhouse measure, it can do little to reduce GHG

Sustainable Energy Development Authority, Submission: Mandatory Targets for the Uptake of
Renewable Energy in Power Supplies, June 1998, Accessed 24 September 1998, <http://www.
IM environment.gov.au/portfolio/esd/climate/energy/consult/submissions/renewable/renewable.html>.
Australian Ecogeneration Association, "The Government's disappearing 2%", June 2001, Accessed
19 August 2002, <http://www.ecogeneration.com.au>. O f course, given the ESI's past record of
^ overestimating future demand, the figure cited by A E A may also have been too high.
Hydro Tasmania, "Renewable energy: M R E T baselines", 2002, Accessed 14 December 2002,
<http://www.hydro.com.au/renewableenergy/MRET_baselines.html>.
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emissions. In Australia, the electricity sector contributes m o r e G H G emissions than other
sectors, and between 1990 and 2000, emissions from electricity generation increased by
35.6%. 1 2 7 This m a k e s it very difficult for Australia to achieve only an 8 % increase in
emissions from 1990 to 2010. Electricity consumption rose significantly during the 1990s in
part because of price drops to large consumers following ESI restructuring. Greater
emission reductions could probably have been achieved through measures to curb demand.
Yet as noted in the previous chapter, reducing electricity d e m a n d is often deemed politically
too difficult, whereas building n e w power stations—using renewable energy or otherwise—
is in keeping with a pro-development ethic.

At the time of writing, MRET has come under threat. A review of the Australian energy
market conducted for the Council of Australian Governments ( C O A G ) by a Ministerial
Council for Energy recommended that M R E T be scrapped, and measures m o r e directly
targeted at greenhouse gas reduction be introduced. T h e review w a s chaired by Warwick
Parer, a former energy minister in the conservative federal government w h o had interests in
the Australian coal industry. T h e Council noted:
There are some major problems with the current greenhouse measures that impose
significant and unnecessary costs on the Australian community ... [M]any of the schemes
are very poorly targeted in that they favour particular technologies or solutions rather than
focus on greenhouse abatement. For example, the Commonwealth's Mandatory Renewable
Energy Target ( M R E T ) scheme focuses exclusively on renewable energy, not carbon
abatement ... The rationale for a scheme which focuses only on renewable rather than on
greenhouse benefits is the perception of the need for the conservation of non-renewable
resources. This is, however, not an issue for Australia. Consequently, any arbitrary
diversion of investment away from more efficient carbon reducing options and towards
renewables will burden the economy with unnecessary costs.128
Here the Council has invoked an earlier interpretation of renewable energy—as a means of
conserving depleting fossil fuels. Given Australia's vast coal reserves, this interpretation
holds little sway. Renewable energy proponents have been fighting this recommendation,
arguing that M R E T is helping Australia to build a viable renewable energy industry. T h e
federal government has yet to respond to the Council's recommendation.
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Australian Ecogeneration Association, RECs, Baselines, 2002, op. cit.
Australian Greenhouse Office, National Greenhouse Gas Inventory 2000, Canberra, 2002.
Ministerial Council on Energy, Towards a Truly National and Efficiency Energy Market, Report to
Council of Australian Governments, December 2002, Accessed 25 January 2003, <http://www.
energymarketreview.org>.

7.4.3 Victoria
Victoria's renewable energy policy dropped off the agenda after the 1992 election of a
conservative government. T h e conservative government c a m e to p o w e r intending to
restructure the public sector. Environmentalists were not included in the policy-making
process.129 A number of Labor greenhouse initiatives, including measures to foster greater
use of renewables, were w o u n d d o w n or shelved 130 —undoubtedly they would have
interfered with the government's plans for the energy sector. T h e S E C V , which w a s starting
to display a more favourable attitude to renewables, w a s broken up and privatised. T h e
conservative government lasted until 1999.

In contrast, the earlier Labor government frequently proclaimed its commitment to
encouraging renewable energy and energy efficiency, and improving environmental
outcomes. It developed a relatively favourable relationship with the

environment

movement, built up the state's environment institutions, fostered community participation in
decision-making about environmental issues, and attempted to integrate environment policy
with economic development and social justice objectives.131 Its initial policy response to the
greenhouse issue w a s more comprehensive than that of other state and federal governments,
and included measures to foster energy efficiency and renewable energy.132 Yet,
environmental initiatives including sustainable energy largely c a m e second to economic
objectives, such as fostering growth by exploiting the state's fossil fuel resources.
Moreover, the government's rapid policy response to the greenhouse issue during its final
term m a y have been a means of deflecting criticism over its handling of the Victorian
economy: by then, the government w a s embroiled in a major financial crisis culminating in
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Peter Christoff, "Degreening government in the garden state: environmental policy under the Kennett
Government, 1992-1997", Environmental and Planning Law Journal, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1998, pp. 10-32.
Christoff noted that while other environmental strategies developed by the previous government were
mostly allowed to run to completion, greenhouse and energy policy issues were quickly curbed or
abandoned, ibid.
ibid. Nicholas Economou, "Greening the garden state? Labor and environmental policy in Victoria",
in Considine and Costar (eds), 1992, op. cit.
Its measures earned them praise from internationally renowned champion of energy efficiency,
Amory Lovins. Amory B. Lovins, Report to the Minster for Industry and Economic Planning on
Matters Pertaining to Victorian Energy Policy, Rocky Mountain Institute, Colorado, 1990. See also
N S W Government Minerals and Energy Committee, 1990, op. cit., pp. 27-31; Australian Minerals
and Energy Council, Energy and the Greenhouse Effect, A G P S , Canberra, 1990.
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the collapse of several Victorian financial institutions.

In June 1989, the Victorian Labor government released its draft greenhouse strategy,
proposing to aim for the Toronto target "as an interim target for planning purposes, subject
to review in 1991". 134 Yet the government w a s still enticing energy-intensive industries to
Victoria.135 The adoption of the Toronto target would have major implications for the
S E C V , since the main fuel used for power generation w a s brown coal. (Brown coal
produces about 2 0 % more C O 2 emissions per unit of electricity than does black coal.)
Moreover, the N S W utility Elcom had earlier offered to sell the S E C V electricity from its
black coal-fired power stations—the S E C V had refused 136 —and in the late 1980s, the N S W
government began pushing for the establishment of a national grid so that N S W could sell
power generated from black coal to Victoria and other states. This could have achieved an
overall reduction in C O 2 emissions.

By the time that greenhouse became a policy issue, the SECV was already embarking on
strategies to promote energy efficiency and encourage alternative energy sources for power
generation. Following the N R E C inquiry (described in chapter 3), the S E C V ' s traditional
supply orientation began to shift a little. In 1987 the S E C V launched its Cogeneration and
Renewable Energy Incentives Package, 137 and in 1988 the S E C V and the Department of
Industry, Technology and Resources (DITR) began examining the potential for demand
118

management, producing a D e m a n d Management Action Plan.

In July 1989, the SECV released its own discussion paper on the greenhouse effect. It
outlined scenarios for working towards the Toronto goal. These would require an aggressive
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Davidson 1992, op. cit.; Hugo Armstrong, "The Tricontinental affair", in Considine and Costar (eds),
1992, op. cit.
Ministry for Planning and Environment, The Greenhouse Challenge: The Victorian Government's
Response, A Draft Strategy for Public Comment, Melbourne, 1989, p. 27.
During 1988-89, for example, the Energy Intensive Industries Facilitation Unit in the Department of
Industry, Technology and Resources received a funding injection of $1 million. See Department of
Industry! Technology and Resources, Annual Report, Melbourne, 1988-89, p. 43.
Robert Booth noted that Elcom offered to complete its M t Piper power station so the S E C V could
defer construction of Loy Yang B. Booth, Warring Tribes, 2000, op. cit.
See chapter 3.
Department of Industry, Technology & Resources, and State Electricity Commission of Victoria, 3
Year Demand Management Action Plan, Melbourne, 1989. For a critical view see Community
Energy Network, A Clayton's Energy Conservation Strategy: An Appraisal of the SEC-DITR
Demand Management Project, Conservation Council of Victoria, Melbourne, 1990.
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demand management program to increase conservation and cogeneration, n e w combinedcycle gas plant, n e w hydro plant, and between 450 and 650 M W of wind power plant. T h e
S E C V proposed a number of measures, including: promoting end-use energy efficiency;
encouraging use of cogeneration and renewable energy by customers; optimising thermal
efficiency emissions in n e w power stations; investigating fuel substitution (such as natural
gas); increasing efficiency in electricity supply; and ensuring that C 0 2 emissions were
minimised in energy end-use (e.g. ceasing the promotion of off-peak electric water heating
where less GHG-intensive fuels such as natural gas were available).139 Renewable
electricity could therefore play a role in two ways: the S E C V could encourage the
installation of independent renewable power plant; or the S E C V could install its o w n
renewable power plant.

As described in section 4.4.6, the SECV was already encouraging the installation of
independent small-scale renewable power plant through its Cogeneration and Renewable
Energy Incentives Package. Most of the uptake w a s for cogeneration, and hydro power.
The Incentives Package closed in 1990; subsequent projects were considered under the
S E C V ' s Independent Generation Policy.141 Under the Independent Generation Policy the
buyback rates for non-firm capacity returned to their earlier rate of about 2.3 c / k W h (peak),
compared with about 8.9 c/kWh (peak) under the Incentives Package. However, the
Independent Generation Policy did offer some concessions to renewable energy. A
premium of 1 5 % w a s added to the buyback rate for generation from renewable energy.142
For partially firm plant, a sliding scale between non-firm and firm rates w a s used to
determine buyback rates.143 This represented a change of attitude from the earlier view that
intermittent sources be valued for only the fuel saved, but it w a s not appropriate for sources
with a highly variable output, such as wind power.

And what of the SECV installing its own renewable power plant? Here, despite the rhetoric,

140

141
142

143

State Electricity Commission of Victoria, The SEC and the Greenhouse Effect: A Discussion Paper,
1989, Melbourne, pp. 12-13. See also State Electricity Commission of Victoria, The SECV and the
Greenhouse Effect: Discussion Paper Number 2, Melbourne, 1992.
State Electricity Commission of Victoria, Independent Generation Policy, 1990; SECV, The SECV
and The Greenhouse Effect: 1992, op. cit.; Ross Gawler (SECV), "Pricing policies for independent
generation", Workshop on Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Canberra, 16-18 April 1991.
SECV, Independent Generation Policy, 1990, op cit
ibid.
This applied to projects up to 50 M W capacity, ibid., Appendix A2.

Post-

there w a s little action. Its main renewable energy project w a s a 10 M W wind farm. This
project, which w a s discontinued after the change of government, is discussed in chapter 8.
T h e S E C V w a s also conducting investigations into other renewable energy technologies,
including w a v e and solar thermal power. 144

Since the post-1992 conservative state government intended to privatise the SECV, we
cannot k n o w whether these renewable energy proposals would have reached fruition. Yet
one Victorian electricity organisation did install solar and wind power capacity in the post1992 period: the Brunswick Electricity Supply Department ( B E S D ) , the body responsible
for electricity distribution and supply in the Melbourne suburb of Brunswick. 145 B E S D ' s
renewables project w a s tiny; but the innovative mechanism used to pay for part of the solar
power capacity w a s a forerunner of later grid-connected, consumer-funded schemes such as
green power, and rooftop photovoltaic systems.146

BESD was not a typical electricity company: for many years, it had promoted energy
conservation, including retrofitting local community buildings and h o m e s of low-income
residents.147 T h e B E S D initiatives provided m u c h of the impetus for the Victorian H o m e
Energy Advisory Service, a scheme assisting low-income householders to improve energy
efficiency.148 A n d , in conjunction with the Centre for Education and Research in
Environmental Strategies ( C E R E S ) , 1 4 9 B E S D had established an Energy Park containing
examples of renewable energy and energy efficient technologies.150

BESD's renewable energy project, dubbed 'Project Aurora', comprised a grid-connected
wind turbine and photovoltaic panels. It w a s funded by a local capital works grants awarded
in 1992-93 by the federal government for job-creation projects in areas of high unemploy-
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Department of Manufacturing and Industry Development, Victoria's Energy Efficiency Strategy,
II, 1991, pp. 22-23.
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B E S D was one of eleven Municipal Electricity Undertakings in Victoria. The section on the BESD's
renewable energy project draws on Andrea Bunting, "Explaining absent technologies: grid-connected
solar and wind energy in Victoria", M . Sc. Thesis, University of Melbourne, 1996.
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Green Power schemes are described in chapter 6.
147
Helen Penrose, Bright Sparks: The Brunswick Electricity Supply Department 1912-1994, Brunswick
Electricity Supply Department, 1995.
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Owen, 1999, op. cit., p. 151.
149
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Penrose 1995, op. cit.; Peter Zwack, Renewable Energy in Action: A Case Study, Brunswick
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ment. The solar panels were placed on the B E S D building rooftop, and the wind turbine and
ancillary equipment were installed at the adjacent C E R E S site. The wind speeds at the site
were quite low; however, the project w a s primarily an educational and demonstration
project—each year over 20,000 school children and several thousand adults visited the
C E R E S site151—rather than one intended to produce power as cheaply as possible. T h e
second phase of the project, which required electricity consumers to participate, w a s
initiated because there w a s spare capacity on the inverter.152 B E S D launched a scheme
whereby Brunswick residents and others could purchase solar panels and receive payment
for the power generated. The buyback rate was about 15 c/kWh (representing about 8 0 % of
the commercial tariff), greatly exceeding typical buyback rates of the S E C V . Participants
would expect an annual return of about 2 % of the purchase price.153

After the restructuring of the Victorian ESI, BESD was absorbed into Citipower, one of the
n e w electricity distribution companies. Citipower continued the solar panel purchase
scheme for a time. It also extended the B E S D project, launching in 1995 a scheme called
EcoPower

whereby electricity consumers could pay extra on their power bill to fund

renewable energy projects.154 Unlike later green power schemes, the premium w a s not
directly linked to electricity consumption. This w a s because the Office of the RegulatorGeneral ( O R G ) in Victoria had ruled that electricity prices for domestic consumers be
capped.155 Such a ruling arose because of concerns about electricity price rises following
privatisation of the electricity in Victoria. After m u c h lobbying, particularly from green
groups, in M a y 1998 the O R G removed this obstacle to green power schemes in Victoria. A
number of Victorian retailers then announced green power schemes.

The 1990s also saw changes to the agency established to promote renewable energy, the
Victorian Solar Energy Council. The agency that w a s to succeed V S E C would shift its
focus away from renewable energy and towards energy efficiency. Under the post-1996
conservative government, it became almost solely concerned with energy efficiency. In
1989, the government commissioned a review of V S E C . The review recommended that
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V S E C ' s charter be expanded to include energy conservation, and that the Victorian
government update its 1985 renewable energy strategy and formulate a strategy on energy
conservation.156 In July 1990 the functions of V S E C , the Energy Information Centre and the
Energy Education Centre were transferred to a n e w authority, called the Renewable Energy
Authority Victoria ( R E A V ) . 1 5 7 T h e Energy Information Centre and the Energy Education
Centre were previously funded by Energy Victoria, a joint program of the Victorian
Department of Industry, Technology and Resources and the energy authorities. Both
Centres had promoted energy conservation in the residential sector. A s soon as it w a s
instituted, R E A V adopted 'Energy Victoria' as its marketing n a m e , reflecting its n e w
emphasis on energy efficiency rather than renewable energy. In 1998, it took on the n a m e
Energy Efficiency Victoria.

The government also accepted the recommendation of the VSEC review to update its
renewable energy strategy, releasing in 1990 a Green Paper entitled Renewable
Conservation.156

Energy

Energy

and

Its policy objectives were a far cry from those of the early

1980s, 159 reflecting the influence of ecpnomic liberal thinking, and the favouring of energy
efficiency measures over the fostering of renewable energy. T h e Paper stated:
The Government's broad objectives for renewable energy and energy conservation are:
•

to improve the overall efficiency of the Victorian economy by ensuring that renewable
energy and energy conservation resources are developed to satisfy society's need for
energy services at least cost;

•

to reduce demand for fossil fuel resources, thereby conserving resources for the future
and reducing environmental impacts; and

•

to improve the capability of the Victorian community and economy to meet
Government goals for Greenhouse gas emissions.

In the short to medium term energy conservation offers by far the greatest potential. Energy
conservation activities ... should have the highest priority.160
That energy efficiency offered the greatest immediate potential w a s partly a consequence of
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Victorian Solar Energy Council Review Panel, Review of Victorian Solar Energy Council,
Department of Industry, Technology and Resources, Melbourne, 1989.
Victorian Solar Energy Council, Annual Report, 1990, p. 6.
Department of Industry, Technology and Resources, Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation:
Green Paper, Melbourne, 1990. The 'White Paper' was Department of Manufacturing and Industry
Development, Victoria's Energy Efficiency Strategy, Parts I and II, Melbourne, 1991. (Note: a Green
Paper is a discussion paper presented by a Minister to Parliament. A White Paper is a policy
document.)
See section 4.5.3.
Department of Industry, Technology and Resources, Green Paper, 1990, op. cit., p. 3.
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past practices in the energy sector.161 Moreover, since there w a s little growth in d e m a n d and
the S E C V had two large brown coal generating units soon to be commissioned (Loy Y a n g
B ) there was little need for any n e w renewable power plant. W h e n the White Paper w a s
released the following year, the term 'renewable energy' had been dropped from the title: it
was called Victoria's Energy Efficiency Strategy.

Despite this change of emphasis, the Green Paper announced some targets, albeit modest
ones, for the use of renewable energy. These included 10 M W

of wind power by 1995

rising to 80 M W by 2000, a fivefold increase in the use of solar hot water by 2000, and
about 25 M W of geothermal energy by 2000. 163 These formal targets were dropped in the
subsequent White Paper. The White Paper did, however, contain one major n e w policy
decision which might have benefited renewables: a commitment to recognise externalities
when assessing the costs of energy sources.164 A study w a s to be undertaken to assess the
appropriate w a y to apply externalities in Victoria; meanwhile there would be an interim
policy measure to provide a 1 0 % credit for all non-fossil fuel resources and energy
conservation measures w h e n assessing energy projects. Victoria w a s the first state in
Australia to attempt to incorporate externalities.165 However, the measure m a d e no
difference to the fate of renewables.

The Labor government's plans for the energy sector were too small and too weak to bring
about substantial changes in Victoria's energy supply and use patterns, but even this small
effort would bear little fruit. In October 1992, there w a s a change of government in
Victoria. A s described above, the n e w conservative government w a s firmly committed to
the restructuring of Victoria's energy sector. Unlike the N S W

government, whose

restructuring of the ESI included measures to assist renewable energy and energy
efficiency, the n e w Victorian government ignored greenhouse issues in its restructuring. Its
main objective was to establish an industry structure which would deliver cheap electricity
for industry and enable the government to realise a high sale price for the electricity assets.
Greenhouse measures were undoubtedly presumed to be incompatible with these aims.

For an overview, see Owen, 1999, op. cit.
Department of Manufacturing and Industry Development, VEES, 1991, op. cit.
Department of Industry, Technology and Resources, Green Paper, 1990, op. cit., pp. 19-20.
Department of Manufacturing and Industry Development, VEES, Part 1, 1991, op. cit., p. ii.
ibid., p. ii; "Energy externalities: balancing the equation", Energy Forum, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1992.
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The conservative government did pay some lip service to renewable energy and energy
efficiency, initially stating:
The government wishes to address the problems of the potential greenhouse effect and the
need to gain local experience in alternative generation projects ... The government also
wishes to promote energy efficiency, conservation and demand management.166
It would not adopt targets or regulatory measures, but rather would rely on voluntary
measures, information provision and, through competition, the provision of "appropriate
signals" for energy efficiency and renewable energy.167 There were few direct measures to
encourage renewable energy. Even the 10 M W wind farm project was shelved.

One small measure introduced, to assist renewable energy was retained by the new
government for a time: the Remote Area Power Supply Incentives Scheme (RAPSIS)
introduced by the S E C V in 1991. Under this scheme, the S E C V would pay up to $3000
towards the cost of a renewable energy R A P S system.168 After the break up of the S E C V ,
this w a s replaced with the Renewable Energy Assistance Program, administered by Energy
Victoria.169 The conservative government axed the scheme tn late 1996.

One body that survived the conservative government's cuts to greenhouse programs, albeit
with a smaller budget, w a s Energy Victoria. Its primary aim w a s to promote energy
efficiency, with most of its renewable energy activities scrapped. Its n a m e was changed to
Energy Efficiency Victoria ( E E V ) to reflect this emphasis. After the 1999 election of a
Labor government, this agency w a s renamed the Sustainable Energy Authority Victoria
( S E A V ) , and its budget increased.170 S E A V was modelled on N S W ' s Sustainable Energy
Development Authority ( S E D A ) , described below. Although S E A V ' s main focus was
facilitation of increased energy efficiency, its undertook n e w renewable energy activities. A
solar hot water rebate program was introduced, and green power schemes were promoted.
S E A V also administered the federal government's renewable energy initiatives.171 In the
early 2000s S E A V became involved in efforts to encourage wind farms in Victoria,
producing planning guidelines for the state (described in section 6.5.2).
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1AA New South Wales
The year 1988 s a w a change of government in N S W . A conservative government led b y
Nick Greiner c a m e to power with an agenda to restructure and downsize the public sector.
However, its results were not as severe as those seen in Victoria under its post-1992
conservative government, and certainly in the N S W electricity sector not as significant as
those achieved under the subsequent Labor government.

As in Victoria, the NSW government responded to the greenhouse issue by adopting in June
1989 the Toronto target as an "interim target".172 T h e achievement of this target w a s also
hindered by ongoing efforts to attract energy-intensive industries. Furthermore, the
government's intended corporatisation program would give it less control over public
energy bodies, making the Toronto target even m o r e difficult to achieve.173 But perhaps the
government s a w no contradiction: this w a s an opportunity to solve the problem of
overcapacity in the N S W electricity generation system at the expense of Victoria. In its
greenhouse strategy discussion paper of June 1990, it announced:
The Government will press for rationalisation of national electricity production so that
maximum use is made of fuels which produce the least carbon dioxide. This may involve
interstate power grids or strategic location of energy-intensive industries in N S W , which
has vast reserves of black coal. This fuel produces at least 20 per cent less carbon dioxide
than the brown coal ... In cooperation with other States and the Commonwealth, it is
proposed to investigate the potential for reducing carbon dioxide releases in Australia
through greater interconnection of electricity systems in eastern and south-eastern
Australia, including achieving optimum fuel mix and location of generation systems.174
This rationalisation would lead to the electricity industry restructuring, described above.

The NSW government also proposed a number of other GHG emissions reduction
strategies, including a few renewable energy initiatives to be undertaken b y E l c o m
(described below). 175 However, the main effort would be promotion of energy efficiency.176
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Yet, at the same time, critics were reporting that the number of public servants working in
the area of energy conservation had been cut severely.177

Greater use of renewables may not have been an important part of NSW's greenhouse
strategy, but renewables did receive some government R D & D funding. In the late 1980s, a
n e w funding mechanism for energy R D & D was instituted, providing several million dollars
to renewable energy R D & D over the following few years. The State Energy Research and
Development Fund ( S E R D F ) , financed by contributions from the electricity and gas
industries,178 w a s established with the objective of "foster[ing] the development,
demonstration and commercialisation of n e w energy technologies, manufacturing processes
and related expertise and services likely to benefit N S W " . 1 7 9 If w a s considered that funding
should be targeted at areas of particular relevance to N S W or where the state had a
comparative advantage, rather than be spread across a range of energy technologies.180
Photovoltaics w a s particularly targeted. B y the early 1990s, nearly 4 0 % of this renewable
energy R D & D funding w a s directed to photovoltaics research, m u c h of it to researchers at
the Centre for Photovoltaic Devices and Systems, at the University of N e w South Wales. 181

Despite wind energy being considered as a priority area, wind energy research at first
received little S E R D F funding, aside from the Malabar wind/diesel project, which had been
reclassified as a S E R D F project.182 In 1995, however, about $100,000 w a s granted to
Newcastle City Council, the University of Newcastle and electricity distributor Orion
Energy for the development of a small wind turbine at Fort Scratchley in Newcastle.183 The
University of Newcastle w a s a leader in small wind turbine blade design.
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The other main mechanism for assisting renewable energy w a s the N S W

government's

Remote Area Power Assistance S c h e m e ( R A P A S ) , established in 1987. This scheme
provided funds to landowners in remote areas to assist in the purchase of stand-alone
electricity systems or connection to the grid.184 It enabled m a n y domestic renewable energy
systems to be installed, though the majority of these used photovoltaic arrays, with only a
small number employing wind generators (44 installed by 1994) 1 8 5 —not surprising as most
remote areas in N S W have more sunshine than wind. T h e scheme also led to a significant
growth in the N S W remote area power supply industry.

The other main NSW body providing funds and resources for renewable energy RD&D was
Elcom (called Pacific Power after 1992). Prior to the late 1980s, E l c o m had s h o w n very
little interest in renewable energy. But the late 1980s and early 1990s w a s a period of
transition for Elcom. 187 O n e compelling problem w a s a potential shortage of economically
winnable coal; hence Elcom began to encourage private generation and diversification of its
energy sources and generating technologies.188 E l c o m also acknowledged that it might soon
be under pressure to reduce G H G emissions in power generation, noting:
The impetus for [investigating developments in new generation technologies] stems from a
range of factors including the need to meet increasingly stringent environmental
requirements, to further diversify the primary energy mix for power generation with greater
emphasis on renewable energy, and to develop ways in which traditional energy sources,
such as coal, can be used more efficiently.189
Perhaps just as compelling as future environmental requirements w a s the prospect of n e w
business opportunities in renewable energy.190 In other words, Elcom w a s starting to heed
the ecological modernisation message. Elcom perceived that photovoltaics offered the best
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business opportunities. It provided $1.2 million funding for photovoltaics research at the
Centre for Photovoltaic Devices and Systems at the University of N S W ; 1 9 1 and in 1994
announced that it would invest $45 million to commercialise photovoltaic cells being
developed at this Centre.192

As part of this new emphasis, Elcom undertook or sponsored a number of renewable energy
projects. These included a wind resources assessment carried out by the C S I R O Centre for
Environmental Mechanics (see chapter 8), the development of domestic solar thermal
systems, a study into solar cogeneration, provision of funding for photovoltaic research at
the University of N S W , the development of power plant fuelled by waste products, and a
study of the state's w a v e energy potential.193

In the late 1980s, the potential of a new fuel source for NSW was becoming apparent. This
w a s coal seam methane ( C S M ) , the natural gas found in coal deposits. In terms of changing
pressures on the energy sector, natural gas offers similar advantages to renewables: reduced
G H G emissions and other pollutants;flexibilityin construction of generating plant; and the
potential for embedded generation. A n d unlike m a n y forms of renewable energy, natural
gas is not an intermittent source. B y the late 1980s, earlier fears about shortages of natural
gas were waning; indeed natural gas c a m e to be seen as a plentiful fossil fuel that w a s also
relatively environmentally sound. In terms of reducing G H G emissions, natural gas was
seen as a possible transition fuel to a renewable energy future, thus delaying the need to
construct renewable energy plant.

The potential of NSW's CSM resource is very large; it is thought larger than all
conventional natural gas fields in Australia.194 Previously it was assumed that N S W had
little viable natural gas resources, with gas used in N S W piped from South Australia. In
1988, Elcom started to investigate its C S M resource. Drivers included the need to diversify
fuel sources, uncertainties over future interstate gas supplies, C S M ' s potential to be a costcompetitive resource, and C S M ' s superior environmental qualities compared with those of
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coal.195 By the mid 1990s, the restructuring of the natural gas industry was well on the
agenda; and development of n e w gas resources could be a lucrative enterprise. It w a s a
scenario which would not augur well for renewable energy.

Prospects for renewable energy in NSW improved after the 1995 election of a Labor
government. Restructuring of the state's electricity industry began in earnest. Included were
two measures to assist sustainable energy initiatives: environmental licensing conditions for
electricity retailers, and a Sustainable Energy Development Authority.

The first measure was the inclusion in the Electricity Supply Act 1995 of licensing
conditions on electricity retailers. These required that retailers develop strategies to reduce
G H G emissions, the effectiveness of which would be periodically audited. Retailers were
also required to develop one, three and five year plans for such strategies. These conditions,
however, were not an initiative of the A L P government, but the result of an a m e n d m e n t to
the legislation m o v e d by the State Opposition (after lobbying from green groups) and
supported by m e m b e r s of the crossbench holding the balance of power in the N S W Upper
House. 196 The government's commitment to this measure w a s thus questionable. Critics
have argued that the measure w a s w e a k and unclear on the question of implementation.197

The Sustainable Energy Development Authority (SEDA) was established in February 1996
to complement the electricity restructuring by facilitating energy efficiency measures and
renewable energy technologies. S E D A ' s role was:
[T]o bring about a reduction in the levels of greenhouse gas emissions and other adverse
by-products of the production and use of energy in N e w South Wales, through assisting the
development, commercialisation, promotion and use of sustainable energy technologies.198
Unlike renewable energy agencies of the 1980s such as V S E C and S E R I W A , S E D A ' s role
w a s not to undertake or provide funds for renewable energy R & D , but rather to support
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commercial or near-commercial technologies. S E D A ' s aim was "to transform the
marketplace for sustainable energy technologies".199 S E D A ' s activities were divided into
four areas: energy efficiency; cogeneration and fuel substitution; renewable energy; and
core programs (including green power schemes and policy development).

Although SEDA focused most of its efforts on improving energy efficiency, one of its
initiatives helped to increase significantly the amount of grid-connected renewable energy.
This w a s the promotion of 'green power' schemes, under which electricity consumers pay a
premium on their power bills, and the electricity retailer undertakes to purchase an
equivalent amount of electricity from renewable energy sources. Green power, it is claimed,
will increase the amount of renewably generated electricity, and help to reduce the cost.
With the restructuring of the electricity industry, electricity prices for domestic consumers
were capped until these customers could choose their electricity retailer. The

NSW

regulator excluded green power premiums from these revenue caps in 1996, allowing green
power schemes to be established. A s described above, it took another two years for the
same to be done in Victoria, delaying green power in that state.

Green power was launched in NSW by SEDA in 1997 after all of the NSW and ACT
electricity retailers had agreed to offer a green power product. However, the idea w a s being
promoted well before the establishment of S E D A , and a green power scheme had already
been tested in the Hunter region of N S W . The company GreenPower Services Pty Ltd,
established by Colin Crawford-Smith, had earlier been promoting the idea to governments
and electricity utilities, and had worked with the Hunter region electricity distributor Orion
Energy (later part of Energy Australia) on developing a trial green power scheme. 200 The
green power product, 'Pure Energy', w a s offered to 50,000 consumers in 1996. Energy
Australia's market research in the Hunter region found that about 6 5 % of customers
indicated that they would be willing to pay about $5 extra a week for electricity from
renewable energy sources, but only about 1 % signed up.201

Colin Crawford-Smith, "The demand for energy from renewable sources", Outlook 98, Proceedings
of the National Agricultural and Resource Outlook Conference, Australian Bureau of Agricultural
and Resource Economics, Canberra, 3-5 February 1998, Vol. 3, pp. 71-76.
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Following the launch of green power, S E D A actively promoted the electricity retailers'
green power schemes through advertising campaigns—indeed, it w a s argued that S E D A ' s
advertising costs were initially greatly exceeding the revenue accruing from the schemes. 20
S E D A also designed a Green Power Accreditation Program, to ensure that electricity
retailers planned for new renewable power generators, and supplied green power only from
types of renewable energy plant considered acceptable by environmentally conscious
consumers. (See also section 6.4.2.)

That green power schemes emerged during this period was not only due to the growing
community concern about G H G emissions. Green power w a s also compatible with a
competitive market, offering electricity retailers a means of differentiating themselves. It
also was consistent with the government's preference for market solutions rather than
regulatory measures to reduce G H G emissions. Although green power schemes led to a
significant increase in renewable energy generation, albeit from a very small base, green
power is a tiny proportion of total electricity generated. Only about 1 % of electricity
consumers have signed up, although some state government departments and local councils
are increasingly signing up to green power to meet their o w n demand. 203

SEDA also played a substantial role in encouraging wind power developers to set up wind
farms in the state of N S W . This is discussed further in chapter 8.

7.4.5 Other States
Within a short time of the advent of greenhouse politics, most of the other states had also
released greenhouse response strategies and established interdepartmental and/or energy
specific committees to examine aspects of the greenhouse issue.204 T h e states were
considering a variety of response measures to reduce G H G emissions in the energy sector
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including greater energy efficiency, increased use of natural gas, cogeneration, and solar hot
water. Renewable electricity continued to be viewed as appropriate primarily for remote
areas; that is, it w a s seen as a means of reducing dependence on diesel fuel, rather than as a
greenhouse strategy. In thefirsthalf of the 1990s, there were only a few proposals for
developing grid-connected renewable energy systems: W A for example, briefly considered
a grid-connected wind farm. (See chapter 8.) However, the prospects for renewables started
to brighten in the second half of the decade.

Western Australia
In the 1980s, Western Australia ( W A ) had taken a leading role in renewable energy R D & D ,
with several organisations working cooperatively. After the closure of S E R I W A in 1986,
m u c h of the renewable energy research activity m o v e d to the university sector, particularly
to the M u r d o c h University Energy Research Institute ( M U E R I ) . 2 0 5 W A w a s also h o m e to a
significant renewable energy industry.206 The main driver for W A ' s renewables activities
w a s cheaper power supplies in remote areas, as there are m a n y W A communities remote
from the grid. W A w a s not only the leading state in small-scale R A P S systems, but also the
leading state in wind power projects—at least until the mid 1990s. In 1993 Western
Australia became h o m e to the country's second wind farm, again located at Esperance. This
episode is described in chapter 8.

Geographically, Western Australia is well suited to both solar and wind power. It has a vast
coastline, m u c h of which is exposed to high prevailing winds; most of the state experiences
high average solar radiation; and it has m a n y remote communities. Northern parts of the
state are also ideally suited to another form of renewable energy—tidal power. The story of
tidal power in W A is an instructive one as it shows that the forces supporting and opposing
a renewable energy project need not correspond with a presumed environmentalism versus
developmentalism divide. In this regard, tidal power has m u c h in c o m m o n with large-scale
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hydro.207 There are some similarities too with h o w protagonists line up in disputes over
wind power projects, described in section 6.5.

For many decades, the West Kimberley region of WA has been considered a potential site
for a large tidal power station. The region is remote from very large loads, although there
are a number of medium-sized towns and industries in the region. Throughout the 1990s,
investigations were undertaken into the feasibility of tidal power. In the late 1990s, W e s t
Kimberley, which was reliant on diesel power, faced an impending shortage in generating
capacity. T w o options were considered: gas-fired plant and a tidal power station. T h e main
gas proposal, by Energy Equity Corporation and Woodside Ltd, w a s for natural gas
generators in each town, with L N G trucked in from the Pilbara, a distance of over 1000 k m .
The tidal option was put forward by a private company called Tidal Energy Australia.
TEA's proposal was for a 48 M W tidal power station near Derby, which would have been
the second largest tidal power plant in the world, and W A ' s largest renewable energy plant.
It would have supplied power to several W e s t Kimberley towns, but required about 500 Ian
of transmission lines. The tidal plant w a s assessed as more costly than gas-fired plants, and
so required a subsidy. The federal government indicated that it could provide a grant of up
to $60 million for the project.208 This funding would have c o m e from the 'Renewable
Remote Power Generation Program' ( R R P G P ) , a federal scheme providing financial
support for renewable energy projects replacing diesel generation in remote areas.209 The
$60 million represented the bulk of the funds earmarked for W A ; 2 1 0 thus this subsidy would
have greatly reduced the opportunities for small solar and wind systems in remote W A .

The Derby tidal power station proposal was highly controversial: Derby residents supported
it for its tourism potential, while environmentalists from the Green Party and the
Conservation Council of W A
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opposed it arguing that it would d a m a g e the local
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environment.211 The conservative government favoured the gas option over the tidal plant
on economic grounds, while the Labor opposition promised to approve the tidal project if
elected. ' T h e proposal gained considerable support from some pro-development conservative politicians, not k n o w n for their support of 'green' projects.213 Prior to the 2001 W A
election (which Labor w o n ) , the government, facing a split within its o w n ranks, signed a
contract for the natural gas option for other towns in the region, and also agreed to a smaller
10 M W

tidal power station to supply the town of Derby. 214 Soon after, the tidal plant

proponents hinted that the full-scale tidal project might go ahead if they could stitch up a
deal with a resource company w h o wanted to expand its operations.215 If successful, this
would have seen renewable energy projects used to increase the role of energy-intensive
industry—hardly in keeping with the sentiments of traditional renewable energy advocates.
A t the time of writing, the future of the tidal power proposal has not yet been finalised.

South Australia
For a short period in the 1990s, the prospects for renewable energy in South Australia (SA)
looked very favourable. In 1993 the South Australian government announced that it was
investigating the possibility of achieving 2 0 % of non-transport energy from renewable
sources by 2004-05. It had been influenced by lobbying effort of the S A branch of
A N Z S E S . Concerned about the neglect of SA's renewable energy sector, the branch
prepared a policy document, which included recommendations on solar hot water,
electricity generation, building design, biomass, research, education and the removal of
barriers to renewable energy.216 In the main, these were not recommendations for special
treatment for renewables; rather, they were calls for better information provision, and for
renewables and non-renewables to be treated equitably, measures that should have been
more appealing to their target audience. During the state election campaign in late 1993,
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217

A N Z S E S m e m b e r s lobbied election candidates for a better deal for renewable energy.
The Liberal Party (a conservative party, then in opposition) included in its Environment and
Natural Resources Policy the following statements:
.

The Liberal Party believes South Australia should aim at self sufficiency in energy
supplies and be a net exporter of energy.

.

Production, distribution and consumption should be undertaken in the most cost
efficient manner by adopting demand management and least-cost planning.

.

A Liberal Government will pursue alternative energy sources such as solar and wind,
with a long-term aim of reducing our dependence on existing energy sources.

.

Priorities will be given to incentives rather than regulation to achieve energy efficiency

in all sectors.
. A Liberal Government will ensure that within 10 years, 2 0 % of the state's energy will
218

be derived from renewable energy sources.
M u c h of this w a s predictable: the S A long-term preoccupation with energy self-sufficiency
(and in the 1990s S A w a s purchasing a significant proportion of its electricity from
Victoria); the platitudes about pursuing cost efficiency; and the preference for incentives
rather than regulation. But the setting of targets, particularly for renewable energy, w a s
quite another matter; nothing like this had been seen before.

The Liberal Party won the 1993 state election, and shortly after, confirmed its commitment
to the 2 0 % renewables target.219 In 1994, a Renewable Energy W o r k i n g G r o u p w a s
established to address this policy, including the identification of opportunities for
manufacture of renewable energy technologies in SA. 2 2 0 T h e W o r k i n g G r o u p comprised
221

officers from government agencies, the energy utilities, and A N Z S E S representatives.
The Working Group reported in 1995, with a revised report issued in 1996 after public
consultation. In the revised report, the 2 0 % target w a s reinterpreted to include energy
efficiency. (And by applying the reduction to primary energy use, it w a s also including not
only increased efficiency in end uses, but also the benefits of increased efficiency in
electricity generation from fossil fuel sources.) T h e report noted:
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Although 2 0 % of the State's energy demand could be derived from renewable sources, it is
not considered economically feasible to pursue the goal within the required short time
frame. However, it should be noted that if renewable energy is introduced successively as
existing fossil fuel based capacity needs to be replaced, the cost of replacement could be
more readily justified. The Working Group interpreted the target as requiring a 2 0 %
reduction in primary energy use compared with the current forecast for 2004. This takes
into account the effect of energy efficiency measures which are considered to be more
economically feasible than renewables.222

The Working Group's report included the following recommendations: aim to increase
penetration of solar hot water systems from 3 % to 4 0 % ; provide subsidies for Build-OwnOperate renewable electricity systems; encourage expanded use of renewable R A P S
systems; encourage use of w o o d in synergy with other environmental programs; and
maximise implementation of energy efficiency measures. Apart from the subsidy for
renewable energy plant, these measures were thought to incur no additional cost to
government. T h e Group also recommended that a Sustainable Energy Council be appointed,
and that additional funding be provided for renewable energy and energy efficiency R D & D .

The most favourable renewable energy technology for power generation in the short term
w a s thought to be wind energy. The group estimated that to ensure system stability the
m a x i m u m technical limit for wind power within the S A grid was about 300 M W , an amount
which would achieve one quarter of the 2 0 % renewables target. The Working Group
suggested that 30 M W of wind power per year could be introduced over 10 years. Taking
into account fuel saving only (i.e. not including any capacity credit) this w a s estimated to
cost on average $2 million per year.223 The Working Group selected $10 million per year as
the m i n i m u m amount likely to be required to implement its recommendations. Options for
obtaining this amount included: direct funding from consolidated revenue; funding from
E T S A ' s annual dividend; renewable energy levy on electricity accounts; green tariffs; and a
carbon tax (which would need to be a national initiative).224

So what happened to these proposals, and the government's promise? In effect, they were
abandoned. Sandy Pulsford, a m e m b e r of the Working Group stated:
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W e had high hopes—it was government policy and they had been to the election with it...
Nothing was implemented and nothing got through. The report ... was completely sidelined
by mid-1996. The response was 'Forget it, this is off the agenda now'.225
B y the time that the Working Group had reported, the restructuring of the E S I w a s well
underway. T h e resultant price drops in Victoria and N S W led to a significant differential
between electricity tariffs in South Australia and in the eastern states. A n y measures that
would increase the cost of electricity in South Australia, such as a renewable energy levy,
would become increasingly unpalatable to the government.

However, the idea of establishing a Sustainable Energy Council lived on—for a time. In
early 1998, the S A government announced its intention to privatise its electricity industry,
reversing its election promise of 1997. 226 A s a sweetener and to gain support from those
holding the balance of power in the upper house, the government introduced an
environmental package for the industry. O n e measure would be the establishment of a n e w
Sustainable Energy Agency to promote energy efficiency and renewable energy, to assist in
development of a demand management strategy for the E S I and to encourage the private
owners of S A power stations to develop G H G reduction programs. 227 T h e government
stated that it would initially fund the n e w agency, expecting that over time the n e w
electricity industry would support the agency. 228 But government funding w a s not
forthcoming. In 1998 a bill w a s introduced into parliament to establish a Sustainable Energy
Authority,229 and the privatisation of the electricity industry went ahead in D e c e m b e r 1999.
But the bill establishing the Sustainable Energy Authority w a s allowed to lapse, with the
government subsequently claiming that there w a s insufficient m o n e y from the licence fees
of the privatised electricity companies to pay for it.230

7.4.6 Overview
Renewable energy policy w a s in the main driven by the need for governments to be seen to
be responding to public concern about the threat of climate change from G H G emissions.
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Yet, early in the period, m u c h of the concrete activity was in fact directed at increasing the
utilisation of renewable energy in remote areas, where the driver was cost sayings.
Renewable energy technologies, particularly wind power, were becoming significantly
cheaper and more reliable, making them attractive propositions in remote areas if noneconomic barriers could be removed.

It was not until the late 1990s that grid-connected renewable energy received a massive
boost,firstthrough the implementation of green power, and later through the institution of
the M R E T . These two measures helped to partially overcome the economic barriers to
renewable energy, but revealed m a n y other barriers, such as the structure of the National
Electricity Market, and planning practices. The restructuring of the electricity sector
initially drove the generation price down, but in the long-term, prices will probably rise
making it easier for renewables to compete. The Australian government has failed to deal
adequately with the issue of internalising the social and environmental costs associated with
power generation, such as implementing a carbon tax; however, M R E T can be viewed as a
de facto, albeit crude and very limited, short-term mechanism for recognising the
environmental benefits of renewable energy.

Although MRET and green power have been relatively successful measures, we can see
from this history of renewable energy policy that support measures for renewable energy
have been very tenuous. They have been subject to the whims of the governments, rather
than placed on a firmer footing. Even green power, which is a market-based tool, has been
fostered in the main by government agencies, particularly S E D A .

7.5 Other Renewable Energy Actors
7.5.1 Renewable Energy Associations and Industry
A s described in section 4.4.6, the Australasian Wind Energy Association ( A u s W E A ) was
absorbed into the Australian and N e w Zealand Solar Energy Society ( A N Z S E S ) in late
1987. (A n e w A u s W E A formed in 1999.) While the demise of A u s W E A was undoubtedly a
reflection of waning interest in renewables among the general public and policy makers, the
loss of this once active lobby saw the voice speaking on behalf of wind power greatly
diluted. A N Z S E S had a m u c h broader focus than did A u s W E A : its interests included a wide
range of renewable energy and energy efficiency technologies.
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In this period with the growing m o o d of concern about global environmental issues,
renewable energy w a s popularly seen to play an important role in reducing G H G emissions.
Renewable energy lobbies quickly tapped into this n e w m o o d . So while A u s W E A had been
in the first instance a support and information-sharing group for the wind energy
community, later evolving into a lobby group, A N Z S E S in the post-1988 period saw itself
not only as an advocate for renewable energy but also as an advocate for energy-related
environmental and social goals.231 W h e n renewable energy industry associations suffered a
decline in the late 1980s, A N Z S E S also took on the role of promoter, lobbyist and industry
advocate of renewable energy.232 M u c h of this renewable energy industry comprised
manufacturers and installers of R A P S and solar heating systems; there w a s very little wind
power industry.

During the 1990s, the renewable energy and energy efficiency industries increasingly
recognised the need to project a united and thus stronger voice to government. Industry
associations were formed, and over time these began to amalgamate. In 1993, the
Sustainable Energy Industries Council of Australia ( S E I C A ) w a s formed. 231 But the
renewable energy industry w a s still fragmented. There were two other bodies representing
the renewable energy industry: the Solar Energy Industries Association of Australia Ltd
(SEIAA) and the Renewable Energy Industries Association of Australia (REIA). T o achieve
a more effective lobby, these organisations were merged in 1998 into a peak industry body
called the Sustainable Energy Industry Association (Australia) or SEIA. 2 3 4 T h e Australian
Cogeneration Association w a s seeking to represent cogeneration as a more environmentally
benign technology. Expanding its focus to include sustainable energy, it w a s renamed
Australian Ecogeneration Association ( A E A ) . In 2002, SEIA, A E A

and a group

representing the energy efficiency industry were planning to merge. S E I A noted:
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At present there are still at least twelve associations that focus on renewable energy and
energy efficiency ... This disparate structure has failed to produce a united and strong
industry voice, and is causingfragmentationof policy positions, competition for the
attention of policy makers and the media, and an ineffectual counter to reactionary views
from some competing large industry lobbies.235

Meanwhile, existing large hydro companies sought to benefit from policies introduced to
support the renewable energy industry, forming in 1999 a lobby group called Renewable
Energy Generators Australia ( R E G A ) . O n e of its earlier successes w a s achieving an
advantage for existing hydro power stations under the M R E T . R E G A successfully lobbied
to have power generated by existing hydro plant above a specified baseline included in the
target. The predicted ramifications for n e w renewables were described in section 7.4.2.

7.5.2 The Wind Energy Industry
Until the late 1990s, w h e n Australia's wind power capacity started to grow rapidly
following the introduction of green power schemes and the M R E T , Australia's wind energy
industry w a s very small. A s described in chapter 4, during the 1980s Australia had several
wind turbine manufacturers. The main one was the Western Australia-based company
Westwind Turbines, which had worked closely with S E C W A . Westwind survived into the
1990s but shifted its focus to smaller turbines suitable for R A P S systems.236 Other wind
turbine manufacturer operating in Australia in the 1990s also manufactured small
turbines.237 In 1999, a small company called Renewable Energy Australasia Pacific ( R E A P )
started to manufacture Lagerwey turbines under licence for export, but R E A P w a s soon
taken over by Primergy, and wind turbine manufacture w a s not continued. All medium- and
large-sized wind turbines installed in Australia during the 1990s were imported.

As described in chapter 5, wind power advocates had for many years been pushing for the
establishment of a manufacturing industry for large wind turbines in Australia. This, they
argued, would create local jobs and reduce the cost of installing wind turbines in Australia.
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However, established wind turbine manufacturers were not willing to set up manufacturing
facilities unless there w a s a large enough market.

Efforts of wind power advocates to establish a local industry continued in this period. As
described above, the federal environment department commissioned in 1991 a series of
greenhouse studies examining opportunities and benefits of developing or furthering
Australian renewable energy industries. T h e study into wind energy, undertaken by three
former A u s W E A

members and two people from Westwind Turbines, evaluated the

possibility of establishing a larger wind turbine manufacturing industry in Australia and
recommended measures that could be taken to facilitate this.238 T h e study concluded that
there w a s potential for m a n y wind turbine components to be manufactured locally: a
number of local companies were willing and able to manufacture these, but there needed to
be a local demand for wind turbines.239 T h e study noted:
For an industry to be set up in Australia which included component manufacture, the
minimum annual production would be about... 30-40 M W per year. If gearboxes, blades
and other specialist components were imported perhaps ... 3-4 M W would suffice ... The
early establishment of an Australian windgenerator industry is crucially dependent on coordination between the states. Failure to co-operate will probably lead to a situation where a
series of small windgenerators purchases are made from foreign sources, with no one
purchase being large enough to get an Australian manufacturer off the ground.240
O f course, cooperation between the states w a s not easily achieved. T h e promise of any n e w
industry in Australia invariably leads to inter-state rivalry; indeed in the late 1990s, w h e n
the prospect of establishing a local turbine manufacturing industry looked m o r e promising,
several states hoped to lure the industry.

By the late 1990s, the prospects for wind power in Australia were becoming more
favourable, particularly as it looked quite likely that the M R E T would be introduced. B y
then, m a n y overseas wind turbine manufacturers had representatives in Australia, and s o m e
were considering local manufacture of wind turbines. O n c e the M R E T w a s introduced, the
number of wind farm developers increased rapidly, as did companies dealing with project
management and consulting.

238
239

Blakers et al, 1991, op. cit.
ibid, pp. 48-50.
ibid., pp. 72-73. (emphasis removed)

Chapter 7: Australian Energy Sector Post-1988

327

In 1999, a n e w Australian W i n d Energy Association ( A u s W E A ) was formed. Unlike the
earlier association, A u s W E A M a r k II comprised mainly the wind power industry—wind
farm developers, project managers and consultants. Interest in wind power grew rapidly in
the early 2000s following introduction of the M R E T . Increasingly, companies with little if
any previous association with renewable energy were recognising n e w

business

opportunities in wind p o w e r — a s financiers, project managers, equipment suppliers,
contractors and so on. Indeed, the number of attendees at A u s W E A ' s annual conferences
doubled each year between 2000 and 2002.241 B y 2002, A u s W E A was planning to employ a
lobbyist.

7.5.3 Overview
During the post-1988 period, renewable energy advocates clearly associated themselves
with the issue of climate change, rather than with the broader social and environmental
goals of the earlier period. The industry was initially very small, but grew rapidly as
governments introduced measures to assist renewable energy. M u c h growth was due to
companies recognising business opportunities in environmental technologies. Hydro power
companies too reinvented themselves as being in the business of environmental
technologies. The renewable energy industry became a more organised lobby over t i m e —
no doubt helped by the influx of those with broader business interests—and was thus able to
influence the form that renewable energy measures take.

7.6 Conclusion
The 1990s was a period of significant change in Australia's energy sector. The effect on the
fortunes of wind power was initially mixed, but became more favourable from the late
1990s onwards. During m u c h of the 1990s, the restructuring of the electricity supply
industry dominated energy policy agendas. Although the greenhouse effect had become a
public policy issue in the late 1980s, in effect redefining the meaning of wind power, it took
nearly a decade for this to translate into effective policy measures to support grid-connected
i

renewable energy.

Throughout this period, the ability of the energy sector to provide cheap reliable energy
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supply was viewed by government as critical to Australia's economy. Because they were
deemed to increase energy costs, support measures for renewable energy were in the main
portrayed by policy makers as detrimental to the international competitiveness of Australian
industry. However, targeted support measures, those focussing on renewable energy
technologies in which Australia had a competitive advantage and which could form the
basis of a viable export industry, were deemed advantageous. Thus R & D funding for
renewable energy became aligned to these imperatives.

From the late 1990s, the wind power industry grew rapidly, following the introduction of
green power schemes and the M R E T , both providing opportunities for grid-connected wind
power hitherto unseen in Australia. With the entry of both n e w and established business
interests into the wind power industry, the influence of the industry on government policy
was growing. However, while this account concludes at a time w h e n the prospects for wind
power were looking reasonably favourable, the long-term viability of wind power depends
on a myriad of barriers being overcome. This is explored in the next chapter.

In this chapter and chapter 4, I have mapped out the context for efforts to introduce wind
power facilities in Australia, and described the key players. This context is critical for
understanding the history of wind power in Australia. It is important to recognise that the
institutional structures described here provided not only the setting in which proponents of
wind power had to operate but also an arena which they sought to reshape. These two
chapters have demonstrated both the stability of institutions, and the changeability of
institutions. At the same time, it has focussed on what remains stable w h e n institutions are
in flux. Times when institutions are changing appear to provide useful opportunities for
intervention by those promoting wind power. Yet while institutions have changed, so too
have the interests of the key players. In thefinalchapter, I return to reflect on these points.
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Chapter 8: Wind Power in Australia Post 1988
8.1 Introduction
This chapter is a continuation of chapter 5: it gives an account of the history of wind power
in Australia after the greenhouse effect had become a public policy issue. In this period,
wind power was portrayed in the main as a power generation technology that did not
produce greenhouse gas emissions.

Because the cost of wind turbines had fallen significantly since the early 1980s, and their
performance and reliability had improved significantly, wind turbines were no longer
regarded as experimental or suitable only for 'demonstration' as had been the case for m u c h
of the previous period. However, they were regarded as economic only in windy remote
areas, where wind power could supplant diesel fuel. Most of the utilities still displayed a
conservative attitude, even towards remote area wind power, with very few wind turbines
installed before the late 1990s. At that time, several federal government support mechanisms were put in place, making a number of remote area wind facilities quite profitable.

Grid-connected wind power fared poorly, until two support mechanisms were introduced
from the late 1990s. Restructuring of the electricity industry initially led to lower electricity
prices, making it more difficult for wind power to compete. Electricity companies were also
operating along more commercial lines, making it less likely that they would introduce
more expensive generation technologies, even if they were deemed to have greater social
and environmental benefits. Yet there were other positive developments for grid-connected
wind power in some states. For example, in N S W wind power came to be regarded as a n e w
business opportunity, and in Tasmania it was regarded as one of the few energy sources
remaining, after most potential hydro sites had been set aside as conservation areas.

Grid-connected wind power started to look more promising from 1997. Green power
schemes were introduced in N S W and the A C T (and later in other states), and the idea of a
renewable energy target was announced by the federal government prior to the 1997 Kyoto
climate change conference. At the time of writing, a large number of wind projects are
being planned. This 'wind rush' is revealing other obstacles to wind power, including
planning practices, community opposition, insufficient network infrastructure and the

330

Andrea Bunting. The Social Shaping of Wind Power in Australia

obtainment of connection agreements with network owners.

The remainder of this chapter is divided as follows. The next section deals with the history
of wind power in remote areas. I also analyse evolving ideas about what is an appropriate
m a x i m u m level of penetration of wind power on wind-diesel systems. In section 8.3, I
describe the history of grid-connected wind power. T h e period until the mid 1990s s a w
several governments propose wind farms as part of their greenhouse strategies but none of
these proposals came to fruition. Since 1997, a n u m b e r of wind facilities have been built,
which earn their owners extra payment from the sale of green power or the generation of
Renewable Energy Certificates. A number of communities are starting to view wind power
as offering an opportunity to revitalise their local economy. I describe the most developed
of proposals for a community wind farm, that at C r o w s Nest in Queensland. Section 8.4
deals with an issue that is starting to be raised in Australia as a result of the 'wind rush': the
presumed effects of significant wind power penetration on the operation of the electricity
system and networks. I conclude in section 8.5 by drawing out the main themes.

8.2 Wind Power for Remote Areas
8.2.1 Introduction
The improved performance and economics of wind turbines and enabling technologies s a w
m u c h greater use of remote area wind power in this period. A s described in chapters 6 and
7, such developments were more likely to be supported by government and business if they
could help to build n e w industries and export markets. Promising areas for innovation in
Australia were design of small turbines and enabling technologies for isolated systems,
including storage and control technologies. Australian wind energy researcher Peter Freere
argued that Australia should concentrate on development of small wind turbines for export:
Whereas Australia has probably missed the chance to manufacture large wind turbines
greater than 100 k W rated output, it still has two companies making small wind turbines
(up to 10 k W rating) and I believe that there are good opportunities for 50 k W wind
turbines. These would be most useful where there are remote grids or in areas where
maintenance is difficult. This includes most of the Pacific and Asian Islands.2

The term 'wind rush' was originally used to describe the rapid increase in installed wind capacity in
California in the early 1980s.
Peter Freere, "Energy from the wind", Wind Energy Workshop, Asia Pacific Wind Energy Centre,
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Yet, as described in chapter 7, wind power w a s not well funded. M o s t renewable energy
R D & D and commercialisation funding w a s directed towards photovoltaics and associated
remote areas power supply ( R A P S ) technologies, which were considered to have good
export potential. Remote customers w h o used government support schemes to finance
renewable energy R A P S systems also favoured photovoltaics, although this w a s in part
because there were fewer remote locations suitable for wind power. O n e supplier of R A P S
systems commented:
The lack of popularity ofwindpower in R A P S is something we should face. Photovoltaics
are winning hands down ... I might suggest some reasons why this is so. First, F E A R — o f
flying blades and falling towers. Secondly, worry about the number of moving parts and
lifespan. Thirdly, doubt about the output per dollar. Even when a machine earns its keep
customers are often bother by irritating and ominous noises. W e must face that there are
about as many broken or dysfunctional wind machines in the public eye as there are good
ones! ... White elephant, or 'demonstration' machines are rarely seen doing any work,
making them seem impractical.3

To the electricity utilities, however, wind power was looking more promising. Increasingly
it w a s seen as an economically viable w a y of reducing diesel fuel usage in windy remote
areas. Several remote area wind projects were constructed, with most deemed to be
commercial projects. S o m e of these projects were aimed at increasing the penetration of
wind power using innovative storage and power control methods.

To encourage innovation in renewable energy technologies, in the late 1990s the federal
government introduced measures to support renewable energy technologies deemed to have
good prospects for commercialisation. A

one-off scheme called Renewable Energy

Showcase offered a total of $10 million in competitive grants to a few 'leading edge'
renewable energy projects. T h e Renewable Energy Commercialisation Program w a s a fiveyear scheme offering $30 million in competitive grants to innovative renewable energy
technologies with strong commercial potential.4 S o m e grants were awarded to wind-diesel

3

4

Monash University, Clayton (Vic), 18 September 1995.
Kali McGlaughlin, "Doubts about wind turbines", Wind Energy Workshop, Asia Pacific Wind Energy
Centre, Monash University, Clayton (Vic), 4 July 1994.
As described in section 7.4.2, these were introduced in the lead up to the 1997 Kyoto climate change
conference, as part of the government's bargaining position. John Howard (Prime Minister),
Safeguarding the Future: Australia's Response to Climate Change, Appendix: Commonwealth
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projects that enabled a high wind power penetration.

In the early 2000s, another source of federal government funds became available for remote
area renewable energy projects. The four-year scheme, called the Renewable Remote Power
Generation Program ( R R P G P ) , w a s directed towards projects that replaced diesel
generation, and was funded by diesel excise revenues. It was introduced as an outcome of
federal government negotiations with a minor parliamentary party to secure passage of the
Goods and Services Tax legislation. Recipients were eligible for up to 5 0 % of the capital
cost of the renewable energy installation. Funds were directed to the states on the basis of
diesel excise paid by public generators; thus states with a large number of remote
communities dependent on diesel fuel would benefit the most. About half of the funds were
allocated to Western Australia, with Northern Territory and Queensland also allocated
significant amounts.5

After the introduction of the Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (MRET), a new source
of funds became available to owners of recently installed remote area wind plant. Under
M R E T , wind plant (and other renewable energy plant) installed from 1997 onwards could
be registered as eligible renewable energy generators. Eligible generators can create
Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs) and earn around $35 to $ 4 0 / M W h . 6 Thus projects
that were considered commercial merely on the basis of savings in diesel fuel could receive
an additional source of funds.

Later in this section, I describe the main remote area wind power projects of this period. Bu
first I examine evolving ideas about h o w to maximise the penetration of wind power on
wind-diesel systems.

8.2.2 Increasing the Penetration of W i n d P o w e r in Wind-Diesel Systt
tems
A s described in section 5.4.2, integrating a significant level of wind power with diesel plant

Greenhouse Measures 20 November 1997, Accessed 23 September 1998, <http://www.environment.
ReC6ntIy the Renewable E n e r
™!f?H^^
^ Commercialisation
Program was replaced by the Renewable Energy Industry Development Program.
5
f l t n ^ n n w ^ T ° fflCe ' "RCneWable R e m ° t e Power Generation Pro 8 ram "> 2 0 0 1 > Accessed
« T U J^e|2001' <httP://w^-^enhouse.gov.au/renewable/rrpgp/index.html>.
m e trading price of renewable energy certificates at the time of writing was $36/MWh. The price has
remained reasonable stable. The penalty cap is $40/MWh

Chapter 8: Wind Power in Australia Post-1988

333

on isolated grids can have adverse effects on diesel operation, possibly decreasing the
efficiency of diesel plant and causing quality of supply problems (specifically voltage and
frequency variations).7 These adverse effects are due to the unpredictable variability of
wind power, the demand profile on the grid, and the often lack of correlation between wind
power output and electricity demand. Since wind is intermittent, diesels are usually
operated to supply spinning reserve. At part load, diesel engines operate less efficiently than
at full load, and they are limited in the extent to which they can sustain a light load without
risking cylinder bore glazing—a condition requiring costly repairs. Typically, diesel
engines were required to be loaded to at least 4 0 % of capacity. Given the latter constraint,
w h e n times of high wind generation coincided with times of low system demand, excess
wind energy would be dumped.

During the 1980s, the State Energy Commission of Western Australia (SECWA) had the
most experience in operating wind-diesel systems. Its adverse experience with high wind
penetration on Rottnest Island led it to place a limit on the m a x i m u m wind penetration.8 At
S E C W A ' s 360 k W wind farm at Salmon Beach, Esperance, described in section 5.4.2, the
rated capacity w a s less than 2 0 % of the m i n i m u m system load. Since the average output of
the wind farm w a s m u c h lower than the rated capacity, and the average load was m u c h
higher than the m i n i m u m , the Salmon Beach wind farm contributed only about 2 % of the
total energy requirements. However, m u c h more wind power could be economically
introduced. S E C W A then set about determining h o w m u c h wind power was viable, and
what limit should be placed on the m a x i m u m wind penetration. It determined that about
2500 k W could be introduced at Esperance before generation costs started to rise due to
excess dumping of wind energy.9 This was approximately the same level as the m i n i m u m
system demand. S E C W A suggested that the m a x i m u m wind penetration at any instant
should be 4 0 % to avoid system instability (excessive voltage or frequency fluctuations)
should the feeder to the wind farm be lost and to avoid light loading of the diesels.10 This
would lead to some dumping of wind energy at night-time if the wind output was high.

7

8
9

See also I. Stann, "Pushing wind to its limit", Solar '91, Australian and N e w Zealand Solar Energy
Society Conference, Adelaide, 5-7 December 1991, pp. 100-108; Matthew Rosser, " 7 0 % penetration
of wind energy into a rural grid—2.4 M W of wind capacity interconnected with a 14 M W diesel
power station", Wind Energy Workshop, Asia Pacific Wind Energy Centre, Monash University,
Clayton (Vic), 9-11 July 1997.
Stann, 1991, op. cit. The Rottnest Island wind experiments are described in section 5.4.2.
ibid. '
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W h e n S E C W A installed its second wind farm at Esperance, 'Ten Mile Lagoon' (described
in section 8.2.6), it adopted a policy of providing spinning reserve to cover 1 0 0 % of the
wind output, and limiting the wind penetration to 3 0 % . H H o w e v e r , after experience with
operating the second wind farm, S E C W A found that these criteria could be relaxed. Indeed,
in itsfirstfew years of operation, the power station had sometimes operated with a wind
penetration level of 5 0 % , and instantaneous levels of 7 0 % . ! 2 It had been assumed that such
high levels of penetration would lead to unacceptable voltage and frequency fluctuations
due to the rapidly fluctuating power output of the wind farm. In fact, the p o w e r output of
the wind farm w a s found to fluctuate m u c h less than had been predicted and significantly
less than the rapid fluctuations of loads on the system.13 A t high levels of wind penetration,
voltage and frequencyfluctuationsstill remained within the regulated limits.14 H o w e v e r , it
w a s questioned whether system stability could be guaranteed under such high penetration.

The main limiting factor on wind penetration was the need to avoid light loading of the
diesels. Yet, if the diesels were not required to provide 1 0 0 % spinning reserve, fewer (or
smaller) diesels could run during times of high wind output, and the m a x i m u m penetration
of wind power could be increased. Although not the operating policy, this had been tried at
Esperance. Paul Ebert noted:
Interestingly, the amount of penetration and spinning reserve have become dependent on
the individual power station operator. Some operators believe Ten Mile Lagoon's output is
predictable and operate the diesels with a limited spinning reserve and high wind
penetration. Others refer to run with a greater safety margin and maintain the 1 0 0 %
spinning reserve.16
While it w a s c o m m o n utility practice to provide spinning reserve to avoid loss of supply
from a contingent event, providing 1 0 0 % spinning reserve for the whole wind output
increased the cost of power supply. N o t only w a s s o m e wind energy being wasted, but also
the diesels were at times operating inefficiently. T h e optimum level of spinning reserve

n
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Paul Ebert (Western Power), "Making wind energy work: a case study of Western Power's Ten Mile
Lagoon wind farm", South Pacific Forum Wind Energy Workshop, Suva, Fiji, 23-27 June 1997.
ibid.
Rosser, 1997, op. cit.
ibid.
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P.R. Ebert and J. Zimmerman, "Successful high wind penetration into a medium sized diesel grid
without energy storage using variable speed wind turbine technology", Proceedings of 1999
European Wind Energy Conference, Nice, France, 1-5 March 1999, pp. 903-906.
Ebert, "Making wind energy work", 1997, op. cit. p. 1.
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depended o n estimates of the probability of contingent events (such as feeder loss) and the
value placed on continuous supply, and was thus debatable. Ebert noted:
Regardless of operator preference, there is a case for lowering the spinning reserve,
especially when the system load is low and winds are good ... Under these circumstances
the diesels at Esperance are forced to run sub-optimally and, therefore, inefficiently—
diesels run most efficiently when heavily loaded ... Western Power continues to debate the
correct operational criteria for a system such as Ten Mile Lagoon ... [T]he best levels of
penetration and spinning reserve are hard to quantify.17

There are other ways to maximise the usage of wind power on isolated grids, as illustrated
in the Australian cases cited below. Rather than requiring wind to fit in with an existing
diesel generating system, integrated generating and control systems are being designed to
allow maximum wind penetration. Problems caused by light loading of diesel plant can be
reduced by replacing old diesel plant—newer high-speed diesels are better able to cope with
the low load operation that could arise as a result of wind integration. Energy storage
methods can be employed to smooth fluctuations and reduce the need for spinning reserve.
And the use of wind power can be further increased if the minimum demand is increased by
the use of demand management techniques such load shifting,18 or by the installation of
constant or supply-matched loads such as water desalination plant.19

8.2.3 T h u r s d a y Island - Q u e e n s l a n d
Thursday Island, one of the Torres Strait Islands located north of Cape York Peninsula, was
the site of Queensland's first medium-sized wind p o w e r development. 20 T h e project w a s
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ibid. Rosser and Carr calculated that the fuel rate of the diesels (a measure of their efficiency) had
fallen by 2 % since the wind farm had been commissioned. Matthew Rosser and Michael Carr
( S E C W A ) , "Australia'sfirstcommercial wind farm Ten Mile Lagoon", Proceedings of the Electrical
Engineering Congress, Sydney, 24-30 November 1994, pp. 293-298.
Load shifting entails encourage consumers to move some of their electricity use from on-peak times
to off-peak times, such as through the use of off-peak water heaters.
Matthew Rosser, "Potential for wind power integration into an island diesel power grid", Solar '94,
Australian and N e w Zealand Solar Energy Society Conference, Sydney, 30 November - 3 December
1994, pp. 461-469.
This was not thefirstrenewable energy power station on the Torres Strait Islands: a solar-diesel
hybrid power plant had been installed on Coconut Island in 1987, and later a small wind generator
was added. In the late 1980s, the Queensland government was planning to provide a public electricity
supply for fourteen other Torres Strait Islands, and intended to install solar-diesel hybrid power plants
on these islands as well. W h e n the Queensland Electricity Commission took over the project, the
solar-diesel proposal was abandoned and diesel generators were installed. For a scathing criticism of
the failure to proceed with the solar project see Gavin Gilchrist, The Big Switch: Clean Energy for the
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instigated by the Far North Queensland Electricity Board ( F N Q E B ) 2 1 the electricity
distribution body responsible for supplying the Torres Strait Islands. Thursday Island, only
a few square kilometres in area with a population of about 4000, has been electrified since
the 1950s. The island had the largest isolated power station in Far North Queensland with
diesel generators supplying a peak demand of 2.4 M W , which was growing at about 7 % per
annum.22 Since Queensland had uniform tariffs for remote areas, Thursday Island power
consumers were being subsidised to the tune of about $4 million per year. Reducing this
cost was the main aim of the wind power project.23

The Bureau of Meteorology had been monitoring wind speeds at one location on Thursday
Island since 1950, with recorded wind speeds indicating that the site had a good wind
regime. In the early 1980s, fears of rising oil prices led m a n y electricity utilities to
investigate the potential of using wind power in windy remote areas to achieve cost savings.
The F N Q E B was no exception. It commissioned a U S company with expertise in the
modelling of wind flows to identify the most suitable candidate sites for the generation of
wind power using the historical wind speed records and the details of the physical attributes
of the island.24 The findings were reported to the F N Q E B in 1988, and the following year
the F N Q E B commenced its o w n wind monitoring on the island at the sites identified.25

In 1993 Fiona Morrow, an FNQEB engineer with a prior interest in renewable energy and
environmental issues, took on the project and had the data collated and analysed. O n e site
was found to have an annual average wind speed of 7.5 rn/s at a height of 30 m , although
the wind pattern was seasonal, and for five months of the year the average wind speeds
were quite low.26 With such a resource, wind power looked to be a cost saving proposition,
and F N Q E B elected to proceed with the project.

Given the small size of Thursday Island,findinga suitable location for wind turbines
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problem. Residents raised a number of objections about noise, aesthetics and impact on
birds. Because of objections on aesthetic grounds, the local council refused to grant the
F N Q E B permission to erect a wind turbine at the F N Q E B ' s preferred location (a ridge
which they o w n e d ) due to the proximity of the site to residential areas. Instead, the F N Q E B
w a s given permission to erect two turbines at M i l m a n Hill. T h e F N Q E B took the view that
w h e n these turbines were installed, the residents' concerns might be allayed, and
subsequently the F N Q E B might get permission to install further turbines at its preferred
site.27 Nevertheless, M o r r o w thought that this setback had taught F N Q E B a valuable lesson:
"Timely public information is essential to obtain and keep the support of residents".28

In 1996 the Danish company Vestas was awarded the contract to supply and install two
225 k W turbines. These were commissioned in July 1997. 29 The wind project, which cost
about $2.1 million, could supply about 1 0 % of the island's power, saving about $300,000
per year in diesel fuel.30 Later, Ergon Energy (the electricity company that absorbed the
F N Q E B after ESI restructuring) w a s able to m a k e more m o n e y from the project. A s they
were installed after 1 January 1997, the wind turbines were eligible to be registered as n e w
green power generators. Ergon Energy registered them as such,31 enabling it to charge green
power consumers a premium on their electricity bills for the equivalent amount of
electricity. After the introduction of M R E T , the Thursday Island wind turbines were
registered as eligible generators, and thus could create RECs. 3 2 If all of the wind power
generated w a s used to create R E C s , Ergon Energy could earn about $50,000 annually.33

8.2.4 Bass Strait Islands - Tasmania
A s described in section 5.4.3, in the late 1970s the Hydro-Electric Commission of Tasmania
( H E C ) 3 4 undertook wind monitoring studies on the two main Bass Strait Islands: King
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ibid.
Green Power, "Green Power approved generators", July 2002, Accessed 7 December 2002,
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Registry for Renewable Energy Certificates, Accessed 30 January 2003, <http://www.rec-registry.
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This estimate is based on a capacity factor of 3 5 % and a R E C price of $36/MWh.
In 1995, following legislative changes arising from the adoption of National Competition Policy, the

Island (population about 1800) and Flinders Island (population about 850). During the
1980s, there were a number of proposals for wind power developments on King Island, but
little came of them. Flinders Island w a s thefirstto get a medium-sized wind generator
connected to the island's isolated grid. Indeed Flinders Island appeared to have a better
wind resource than King Island; the original wind monitoring study had found very high
average wind speeds at Hayes Hill on Flinders Island.

Flinders Island's wind generator was installed and operated not by the HEC but by two
private individuals. In 1988, Brian Ramsey, the director of a diesel engine importing
company, and K n u d N e x o designed, assembled and installed at Hayes Hill a 55 k W wind
generator using locally m a d e and Danish components. 36 T h e turbine w a s sufficient to
provide about 4 % of the island's demand. 37 In 1996, a wind generator of capacity 25 k W ,
which had previously been operating on a private property in the south of the island, w a s
relocated to Hayes Hill and also started producing power for the Island's isolated grid.
The electricity generated by the wind turbines is purchased by H E C , resulting in an annual
saving of about $40,000 on diesel fuel.39

As described in chapter 5, during the 1980s the HEC seemed reluctant to install wind
facilities, confining its wind power investigations to paper studies, m a n y funded by the
federal government. During the 1990s, its attitude changed. T h e H E C (later called Hydro
Tasmania) increasingly saw wind power as a promising technology, in part because
Tasmania had very few hydro sites available to exploit. In the early 2000s, Hydro Tasmania
was planning for several hundred M W of wind capacity on the Tasmanian mainland. But
before this, the H E C renewed its investigations into wind power for King Island.

King Island had long relied on diesel plant for its electricity, although some remote
householders had purchased their o w n wind turbines. Formerly, the two main towns were
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supplied by separate grids; but by the 1990s, the H E C had extended and connected the grids
to cover most of the island, making larger scale wind power a technical possibility. In 1993,
the H E C carried out a study into options for saving diesel fuel in power supply. The
alternatives considered were wind power, mini-hydro, w a v e power, cogeneration, and
combined mini-hydro and wind power. It concluded that wind power w a s the only
economically viable alternative, and consequently undertook a feasibility study into
building a wind farm on King Island.40 The original wind monitoring on King Island,
conducted in the late 1970s, had investigated three locations, of which M a r y Hill, about 10
k m southwest of the main town Currie, w a s the windiest.41 In the feasibility study, two sites
were considered—Mary Hill and Huxley Hill (the latter not included in the 1970s wind
monitoring study) 42 —with Huxley Hill chosen as the preferred site. The study concluded
that about 700 k W of wind power could be installed on the island without causing problems
with light loading of the diesel engines.43

The H E C elected to install three 250 k W wind turbines, with space for two more turbines
should the power demand on the island increase.44 The wind farm w a s commissioned in
M a r c h 1998. The project, which cost $2.5 million, generated about 1 5 % of the island's
electricity saving the H E C over $400,000 per a n n u m in diesel fuel costs.45 The overall
capacity factor of about 3 3 % w a s significantly lower than the m a x i m u m achievable at this
site (estimated at 4 4 % 4 6 ) because the output of the wind turbines w a s restricted during
periods of low demand. The m a x i m u m instantaneous wind contribution was limited to 4 0 %
of total demand. Given that the overnight demand w a s around 1 M W , the output of the
750 k W wind farm w a s limited to 400 k W during periods of m i n i m u m demand. This
limitation w a s imposed because of the nature of the existing diesel generators. A
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penetration of above 4 0 % could lead to the diesels being lightly loaded, which could
adversely affect their performance and maintenance requirements.47

At the time of writing, the King Island wind system is being upgraded. To reduce the
amount of wind energy being wasted and to increase the penetration of wind power, Hydro
Tasmania (the renamed H E C ) is intending to install an energy storage system in 2003. It
was recently awarded $1 million in funding from the federal government's Renewable
Energy Commercialisation Program to optimise wind generation by installing a large
battery storage system and a p u m p e d hydro facility.48 Hydro Tasmania is intending to install
two 850 k W wind turbines in addition to the current 750 k W capacity, enabling wind to
supply about 5 0 % of King Island's total electricity.49

As it had been installed after 1 January 1997, the Huxley Hill wind farm was also eligible to
generate R E C s towards the M R E T . It subsequently registered as an eligible generator. If the
two additional wind turbines are registered as eligible generators, Hydro Tasmania can earn
about $260,000 per annum from the sale of R E C s from the wind farm.

8.2.5 South Australia
A s described in chapter 5, E T S A and other South Australian energy agencies carried out a
wind monitoring study between 1984 and 1988 at thirty sites both within the E T S A grid
area and in remote areas. This study was in response to concerns about future gas supplies.
The original intention was to build a small wind farm in the grid area following the study.
However, by the 1990s, the grids of South Australia and Victoria were interconnected,
alleviating SA's electricity supply concerns. E T S A ' s focus then shifted to use of wind
power in remote areas.

Of the remote sites monitored, Coober Pedy, a small opal-mining town near the centre of
the state, had the highest electricity demand. Although Coober Pedy had quite a poor wind
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regime—the study found an average wind speed of only 4.0 m/s at 10-m h e i g h t — E T S A
considered that the cost of wind power at this site w a s only slightly higher than the cost of
diesel power. 50 (Later the average wind speed w a s estimated at 4.9 m/s, a significant
difference considering that the power in the wind is proportional to the third power of the
wind speed, increasing the expected output by about 80%. 5 1 ) Despite this low average wind
speed, Coober Pedy w a s chosen as the location for SA'sfirstmedium-sized wind turbine.
Coober Pedy had other advantages too: the town was a tourist destination, and no local
opposition to the project w a s expressed.52

The SA government had initially agreed to fund the project, although funding assistance
w a s also sought from the federal government. In 1990, the project received a $200,000
grant from N E R D D P (later E R D C ) , with E T S A agreeing to provide up to $100,000. The
total cost of the project (including the subsequent monitoring) w a s about $630,000.53 The
Coober Pedy District Council, which o w n e d the Coober Pedy power station, also funded the
installation of an automatic control system for the diesel generators, a project which was
justified by savings in labour, but which would also allow the operation of the wind-diesel
system to be optimised.54

The wind turbine chosen was a Nordex 150, imported from Denmark. It had a two-speed
generator, and hence could cut in at wind speeds as low as 3 m/s, making it more suitable
than other turbines for the low average wind speeds experienced at Coober Pedy.55 The
turbine reached its rated output of 150 k W at 10 m/s, although it could generate about
175 k W at wind speeds over 13 m/s. 56

The Coober Pedy wind turbine was commissioned in March 1991, and its performance was
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monitored for about two years. It produced about 2 0 % m o r e p o w e r than originally expected,
predominantly due to the error in translating the w i n d speed data obtained at 10 m to the 3 0
m hub height.57 If the wind speed is k n o w n at one height it can be estimated at other heights
using the wind shear rule. H o w e v e r , the wind shear coefficient used in this rule is dependent
on other factors such as the local terrain. Coober P e d y w a s found to exhibit significant
variation in the wind shear coefficient diurnally and seasonally, with o n average a higher
eo

value than the typically used value of one-seventh.

Overall, the Coober Pedy experience suggests that the knowledge used to assess wind
resources and calculate the economic value of wind p o w e r in coastal areas did not easily
translate to inland areas. With their variable average annual w i n d speeds and w i n d shear
coefficients, inland areas require both longer term w i n d speed monitoring, and monitoring
conducted at hub height rather than the standard 10 metres.

After the performance of the turbine had been monitored for two years, the agencies
responsible for the project published their economic evaluation. Unlike s o m e of the other
authorities, which quoted only a cost in cents per k W h for wind p o w e r without stating the
assumptions on which the cost w a s based, the Coober Pedy project group published a rather
detailed economic evaluation performed over a range of discount rates. (One of the m o r e
contentious economic parameters used w h e n evaluating renewable energy technologies is
the discount rate: proponents of renewable energy argued that a high discount rate
disadvantages renewables compared with other generation technologies.59) T h e project
group concluded that the project would break even at a real discount rate of about 4 % . 6 0

Though this figure was lower than the figure generally used for public utility investments,
the project group argued:
Since the economics of doing so are dependent on the discount factor employed and there is
a positive nett present value benefit for real discount factors up to nearly four per cent, it
can be argued that the installation of the wind turbine generator has been demonstrated to
be a satisfactory 'no regrets' measure, within the intent of the State's and the National
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Greenhouse Strategy.61
Such thinking m a y have been reasonable for a public utility, but the electricity industry was
at the time undergoing major change. In m a n y states, n e w generation capacity would be
built and o w n e d by the private sector, by companies seeking a m u c h higher rate of return.
The electricity companies would soon be facing fierce competition with the advent of the
national electricity market, and were probably less likely to undertake projects with such
marginal economics, even if they were technically "no regrets".

As with many other wind-diesel systems, the incorporation of a wind turbine has caused
operating difficulties at times of low demand. The Cooper Pedy diesel power station had not
been designed around the characteristics of wind power; thus a high wind power output at
night-time would cause the diesel generators to operate at low load. A s described above,
this can be detrimental to the diesels. Since the power station was automated, this could not
be managed by an operator; hence the wind turbine was switched off at night.62 At the time
of writing, the diesel power station is being refurbished. N e w diesel sets are being installed,
which are better matched to suit the fluctuating characteristics of wind power; thus the wind
turbine will be able to operate for longer periods.63 Given the low wind output at Coober
Pedy and the high capital cost involved, the idea of incorporating storage (as is being done
on other wind-diesel systems at King Island and in Western Australia) is not considered
economically feasible.64

8.2.6 W e s t e r n Australia
Through m u c h of the 1980s Western Australia was the leading state in wind power
developments, the main driver being the desire to reduce the high cost of providing power
in remote areas. M u c h of this activity w a s carried out by S E C W A working with the local
company Westwind Turbines, with some funding from other bodies. Western Australia w a s
also h o m e to Australia's only wind farm: the 360 k W wind farm located at Salmon Beach,
Esperance, commissioned in 1987. During this period, S E C W A (later called Western
Power) built several more wind farms in remote areas, in some cases testing innovative
ways of increasing the penetration of wind on wind-diesel systems.
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S E C W A ' s (and Australia's) second wind farm w a s also built at Esperance, at Ten Mile
Lagoon, taking the total wind generating capacity on the Esperance isolated grid to
2.4 M W . Unlike thefirstwind farm and m a n y of S E C W A ' s other wind facilities, where the
wind turbines were manufactured by the local company Westwind, the Ten Mile Lagoon
wind farm used wind turbines imported from Denmark. 65 Indeed, during the 1990s, local
wind turbine manufacturers stopped developing medium-sized

wind

turbines and

concentrated on small machines. S o m e local companies turned their focus to the innovation
of enabling technologies, such as those allowing greater wind penetration on wind-diesel
systems, as described below. Later attempts to establish a local manufacturing industry of
the larger wind turbines would focus on European-designed turbines built under licence.

In late 1992, Australian Defence Industries was awarded the contract to design and install
the Ten Mile Lagoon wind farm, comprising nine 225 k W turbines.66 The wind farm w a s
considered afinanciallyviable project: it was estimated to have a payback period of about
twelve years, based on diesel fuel savings.67 The wind farm w a s commissioned in 1993.

In 2002, Western Power decommissioned the 360 kW Salmon Beach wind farm because of
urban encroachment.68 At the time of writing, Western Power is installing a n e w wind farm
at Esperance, dubbed Nine Mile Beach, comprising six 600 k W wind turbines. Along with
the Ten Mile Lagoon wind farm, wind power would be supplying over 2 0 % of the town's
electricity. Western Power is expected to receive $5.32 M from the federal government's
RRPGP.

The R R P G P was intended to fund projects that would reduce the use of diesel

fuel in remote area power generation; yet Esperance's days of relying on diesel fuel are
numbered. A natural gas pipeline to Esperance is to be constructed during 2003, and a n e w
gas turbine power station installed.
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Western Power's most innovative experiment in increasing the penetration of wind power
on a wind-diesel system w a s at D e n h a m , a small tourist town about 800 k m north of Perth.
D e n h a m w a s k n o w n to have high wind speeds; indeed, in 1991 a 30 k W wind turbine
supplied by Westwind w a s installed at the Western Australian Water Authority's water
desalination plant at Denham. 7 0

In the late 1990s, Western Power installed three 230 kW variable speed wind turbines at
D e n h a m along with a flywheel storage system. Variable speed wind turbines operate more
efficiently over a range of wind speeds and their output is smoother than that of constantspeed turbines. The flywheels also smooth out short-term power fluctuations from the wind
turbines, reducing the need for spinning reserve. The diesel engines at D e n h a m were also
capable of running at loads of only 2 0 % of capacity, although the usual limit of 4 0 % was
set as the normal limit, to be breached for up to one hour per day.71 It was expected that
wind penetration levels of 6 0 % could be achieved with this system; indeed wind could at
times be supplying 1 0 0 % , with the diesel engines switched off.72

The first Denham wind turbine (without storage) was installed in 1998. It incorporated an
automatic control system, which would optimise the wind-diesel operation. The control
system w a s designed and installed by Powercorp Pty Ltd, a Darwin-based company run by
Alan Langworthy (a founder of the original A u s W E A ) . Western Power claimed:
The use of this Australian designed and built smart control technology, together with the
advanced variable speed wind turbine, made thisfirstDenham system a world leader. The
fully controllable wind turbine has delivered a much higher average amount of energy than
that possible with turbines like those used in Esperance.73
For the second stage of the project, comprising two additional wind turbines and flywheels,
Western Power and Powercorp received a Renewable Energy Showcase Grant of $1 million
from the federal government.74
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Western Power's most recent remote area wind farm w a s built at Exmouth, a town of
population around 2500 on the coast of W A about 1200 k m north of Perth. In 2002,
Western Power commissioned a mini-wind farm at Exmouth comprising three 2 0 k W wind
turbines manufactured by Westwind. 75 The penetration of wind power in Exmouth is very
low, but this wind farm was innovative in another way. The region is prone to cyclones—
indeed in March 1999, the town sustained severe damage w h e n it w a s hit by tropical
cyclone Vance, registering one of the highest wind gusts on record in Australia. Because of
the potential for cyclone damage to conventional wind turbine towers, the Exmouth wind
turbines were installed on towers that can be lowered if cyclonic winds are expected. These
wind facilities were designed in a joint industry-university program supported by the
Australian Cooperative Research Centre for Renewable Energy.76 Because of this
innovation, the project received $225,000 in funding from the federal government's
77

Renewable Energy Commercialisation Program.
Another way to increase the penetration of wind power on an isolated wind-diesel grid is to
flatten the demand profile, by encouraging greater electricity usage at night-time, w h e n the
system demand is a minimum. (Indeed, this is encouraged in most grids through off-peak
tariffs.) Such a solution is soon to be employed at Rottnest Island.

As described in chapter 5, Rottnest Island, a popular tourist destination close to Perth, wa
home to Australia'sfirstmedium-sized wind turbines, installed in 1980. These two turbines
failed soon after, and a third turbine installed in 1983 failed after ten years operation.
Integrating wind into a diesel system at Rottnest had proved difficult because the m i n i m u m
demand was very low. If a high amount of wind power was available during periods of low
demand, the diesels would be forced into low-load operation possibly causing damage, or
wind power would need to be dumped.

In the 1990s, SECWA again investigated the potential for wind power on Rottnest Island.
B y this time, the diesel engines on the island's power station had been replaced with high-
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speed units, better suited to low-load operation.78 S E C W A considered that if the m i n i m u m
load could be increased by finding n e w loads that could operate at night, then a higher
penetration of wind power could be introduced. A suitable load was water desalination.79 A s
there w a s insufficient local rainfall to meet the demand for water, Rottnest Island depended
mainly on aquifers for its water supply. This water was becoming in short supply, and some
of the bores had high salinity levels.80 The Rottnest Island Authority installed a reverse
osmosis water desalination plant in 1995, and upgraded its capacity in 2002. 81 This enabled
n e w wind capacity to be installed. In 2003, the Rottnest Island Authority was awarded up to
$1 million from the federal R R P G P to install a 600 k W wind turbine. The project, expected
to cost around $2 million, is expected to produce about one third of the island's electricity,
saving over $300,000 per year in diesel fuel cost.82 This significant level of wind
penetration was m a d e possible by the integration of water desalination, a load well suited to
the variable output of wind power.

8.2.7 Overview
At the beginning of this period, remote area wind power was regarded as an experimental
technology; but by the late 1990s it was regarded as mature and reliable. While the Western
Australian utility has continued to play a leading role in the usage of remote area wind
power—no

doubt their high number of remote power stations is a major driver—other

utilities have been willing to install wind facilities. The main challenge of recent years has
been h o w to maximise the use of wind power on wind-diesel systems. Interestingly, while
remote area wind power has become an economic proposition for windy sites, subsidies
have become available through the R R P G P and the M R E T . These mechanisms are failing
to differentiate between applications where renewable energy requires a subsidy to be
considered economically viable, and applications where renewable energy is already
considered viable.
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At the time of writing, a number of other remote area wind facilities are being investigated
or constructed. For example, the Sustainable Energy Development Authority of N S W is
currently investigating the installation of wind p o w e r on Lord H o w e Island, a site that w a s
first considered in the late 1970s. T h e most challenging recent project is the installation of
three 300 k W wind turbines along with flywheel storage at Australia's M a w s o n Station on
Antarctica, a site which experiences extremely high winds. This project is expected to be
completed in early 2003.

Because of Australia's extensive electricity grid, opportunities for sizeable remote area
wind facilities are very limited. However, there are significant opportunities for exporting
such systems—hence the Australian government's financial support for innovative
developments. It is in grid areas that the potential for wind capacity is the greatest. T h e
treatment of grid-connected wind power in Australia is examined in the next section.

8.3 Grid-Connected Wind Power
8.3.1 Introduction
The main driver for grid-connected wind power in this period w a s government policy on
reducing greenhouse gas emissions.84 A s described in chapter 7, there w a s m u c h rhetoric on
greenhouse policy, but little real action. Observers repeatedly noted that in the short-term,
increased energy efficiency w a s the most cost-effective m e a n s of reducing emissions.85 But
renewable energy w a s popular with the public, and wind power w a s emerging as one of the
cheapest forms of renewable energy. Apart from small wind turbines, no grid-connected
wind capacity w a s installed until 1996, w h e n thefirstgreen power scheme w a s introduced
in N S W . The spread of green power and the introduction of the M R E T have led to a rapid
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growth in installed and planned capacity (albeit from a very low level). The formation of
the National Electricity Market has allowed the entry of n e w players, thereby increasing the
prospects for wind power, although the early price drops following the introduction of
competition m a d e it more difficult for wind power to compete. Tasmania, for example, is
currently building wind farms, and, following its impending grid-connection to Victoria,
hopes to export wind power to the mainland.86 M a n y consumers can n o w choose their o w n
electricity retailer, and some retailers are trying to differentiate themselves by offering a
'greener' product.

8.3.2 The Period 1988 to 1995
A s described in chapter 7, the greenhouse effect became a public policy issue in 1988. State
and federal governments soon released greenhouse policy statements, some including
promises to investigate use of grid-connected wind power. However, wind power was still
considered more expensive than fossil fuel and hydro plant, and only in Victoria were there
specific mechanisms put in place to subsidise renewable energy. The State Electricity
Commission of Victoria ( S E C V ) had introduced its Cogeneration and Renewable Energy
Incentives Package (later the Independent Generation Policy), and the Victorian
government had agreed to apply a 1 0 % credit w h e n assessing renewable energy projects.87
However, no wind power projects were considered viable under these mechanisms.

This was also a period of change for the electricity supply industry (ESI). As described in
chapter 7, the federal government had initiated a restructuring of the industry, and although
the states were slow to respond (other than in Victoria after a change of government), some
of the electricity utilities were shedding staff and adopting more commercial principles.
This meant that they were less inclined to undertake non-profitable ventures. In the early
1990s, Australia also experienced a recession. With the consequent downturn in electricity
demand growth, and in some states significant overcapacity in supply, the utilities found it
more difficult to justify building n e w power stations.

There were some proposals for grid-connected wind plant, and several states undertook
more assessment of the wind resource. However, no sizeable grid-connected wind facility
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That is it intends to sell green power or Renewable Energy Certificates generated from wind power.
These are described in sections 4.4.6 and 7.4.3.

was installed during this period.88 Both S E C W A and the S E C V called for expressions of
interest in the supply of grid-connected wind farms, but did not proceed with the projects.
This creation of false expectations w a s strongly criticised by Blakers et al:
The past practice of the electricity commissions of calling for expressions of interest and in
some case tenders and then not proceeding to place an order is costing the windgenerator
industry money which it can ill afford. It is understood that one Australian company spent
some $400,000 of their principal's funds in negotiations with overseas manufacturers and in
setting up funding for private wind farms in Victoria and W.A. If none are built, all this
money, mostly in foreign currency will have been wasted.

Western Australia
In the late 1980s, S E C W A and researchers from M u r d o c h University (with funding from
wind farm investor Austwind) started to investigate the prospects for large grid-connected
wind farms in Western Australia.90 It w a s hoped such large facilities could attract local
manufacture of wind turbines.91 Previous surveys of W A ' s wind resources had investigated
areas remote from the grid, so n e w wind-monitoring studies had to be undertaken. Three
locations within the grid area were chosen for detailed investigation: Geraldton, Albany and
M o s e s R o c k (a coastal site near Margaret River). 92 Based on a subjective assessment, the
researchers concentrated most of their effort on Geraldton: not only w a s the land use and
topography suitable, but also the presence of horizontally growing trees suggested that this
w a s a very high wind area. Later it w a s discovered that this horizontal growth w a s caused
by salt-laden air, not high wind speeds, and that in fact Albany's wind speeds were
significantly higher than those at Geraldton.93 (Western Australia's first grid connected
wind farm w a s later established at Albany.) In 1990, S E C W A called for expressions of
interest for a grid-connected wind farm of capacity 4 to 2 0 M W
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Smaller systems were installed. See description of the 10 k W wind turbine installed by Brunswick
Electricity Supply Department in 7.4.3.
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Energy Conference, Nice, France, 1-5 March 1999, pp. 504-507.
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T h e options considered were supply of parts; turnkey ( S E C W A

would o w n and operate the wind farm); or build-own-operate (the wind farm would be
privately o w n e d and operated).95

In the end, SECWA concluded that such a wind farm could not be economically justified.
According to journalist Gavin Gilchrist, the decision to abandon this project had m u c h to do
with Western Australian politics and the desire of s o m e politicians (and S E C W A ) to
proceed with the electorally strategic coal-fired Collie power station.96 W A w a s thought to
need significant n e w generating capacity as, unlike Victoria and N S W , it had experienced
very high d e m a n d growth rates in the 1980s,97 a situation that did not continue into the
1990s.98 A n inquiry into future power options conducted in 1989-90 had recommended that
combined-cycle gas turbines be built. S E C W A , on the other hand, had recommended that a
private coal-fired power station be built, allegedly to gain concessions from coal companies
and unions.99 M a r k Diesendorf claimed that not only w a s there no need for a large power
station such as Collie—indeed its size w a s later reduced from 600 to 300 M W — b u t also the
unit cost of electricity from Collie w a s about the same as that from a wind farm.100

Victoria
In the late 1980s, the prospects for wind power in Victoria looked quite bright. T h e S E C V
had produced a greenhouse discussion paper outlining scenarios whereby several
hundred M W

of wind power might be needed to help Victoria meet the Toronto target.101

A n d in the early 1990s, Victoria c a m e close to having the largest wind farm in Australia,
indeed thefirstgrid-connected wind farm. A 10 M W wind farm w a s planned for Toora on
Victoria's southern coast near Wilsons Promontory; but the project w a s shelved following
the restructuring of Victoria's electricity sector.
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A s discussed in section 5.5.4, in the mid 1980s the S E C V and V S E C had undertaken a wind
monitoring study at ten sites along the Victorian coast, and in 1987 had installed a m e d i u m sized wind turbine at Breamlea near Geelong. Breamlea w a s not one of the monitored sites;
indeed the Breamlea wind turbine project had its origins in a N E R D D P - f u n d e d project,
which was abandoned by the recipient private company. Later, the results of the wind
monitoring study were used to produce a Victorian Coastal W i n d Atlas, which could be
used to identify the potential for large-scale wind farm developments in Victoria.102 T h e
S E C V ' s decision to proceed with a wind power facility at one of the monitored sites w a s at
the behest of the state government: in mid 1989, the government announced in its draft
greenhouse strategy a proposal to provide financial support for a 10 M W wind farm.

103

The government's push for a wind farm w a s in part a response to the growing m o o d of
environmentalism: the Labor government w a s keen to co-opt the environmental m o v e m e n t
and win the 'green' vote. There were also other factors at play. Following the 1988 election,
the first rumbles were being felt of a financial scandal that would soon embroil the
Victorian government. Support for green projects might help to deflect s o m e of the
criticism levelled at the government over its management of the Victorian economy.
Furthermore, the wind farm project w a s announced at about the same time as the
government's decision to postpone indefinitely the L o y Y a n g B 3 and B 4 brown coal power
station project, a decision that w a s unpopular in the Latrobe Valley.104

The wind farm project did not proceed as quickly as the government was urging; and
initially the S E C V seemed less enthusiastic about the project than did the government. 105 In
1990 the government had announced:
The S E C V will invite proposals in early 1990 for the construction on the south coast of
Victoria of a nominal 10 M W 'wind farm', to be operational in 1992.106
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But it w a s not until late 1991 that the S E C V called for expressions of interest for private
companies to build, o w n and operate the wind farm.107

Of the ten wind-monitored sites, the SECV chose two as possible locations for the wind
farm, both in south Gippsland: Toora and Kilcunda North. These sites were a m o n g the four
windiest of those monitored; the other two, Apollo B a y and Bridgewater, were rejected
because the first w a s nearly inaccessible and had insufficient land for a 10 M W wind farm,
and the second w a s considered too distant from Melbourne for a demonstration project.108
Toora and Kilcunda North were considered suitable for a wind farm as they had very high
wind speeds (averaging about 8 m/s at 10m), relatively low grid connection costs, and
reasonably close proximity to Melbourne. 109 Both sites were agricultural areas mainly used
for grazing, and could accommodate a wind farm with little disruption to agricultural
production.110

Before expressions of interests were called, a Kilcunda North anti-wind farm group was
gathering m o m e n t u m , declaring that a wind farm would ruin m u c h of the area's natural
beauty. T h e S E C V w a s roundly criticised by the group's spokesperson for pursuing a
"public relations exercise", for wanting to appear "ecologically sound" by building the wind
farm in a location that w a s highly visible from a popular tourist road.111 A m o n g those
opposing the development at Kilcunda North were the landowners of some of the best sites
for a wind farm, w h o refused to grant the necessary leases. Toora seemed to be a better
choice, as there w a s greater community support. There were several other factors in Toora's
favour: it had more potential sites for locating the wind turbines, there would be less visual
impact, and there w a s no requirement to upgrade the grid.

Although the wind farm was to be a Build-Own-Operate plant, with the SECV guaranteeing
to buy the electrical power at an agreed price, m u c h of the initial planning work, including
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site selection and design, and obtainment of necessary planning and environmental
in

approvals, w a s actually carried out by the S E C V .

After a protracted tendering process the winning bidder was announced in June 1993. The
selected company w a s the arms manufacturer A D I Engineering (formerly Australian
Defence Industries),m the same company that had w o n the contract for the 2 M W

wind

farm at Esperance.

By this time, however, there had been a change of government. Although the project had
been an initiative of the Victorian Labor government, the n e w Coalition government
initially agreed to the project. In M a r c h 1993, the Minister for Energy and Minerals
announced:
Although the government is concerned about the addition of 10 megawatts of generation, it
considers it desirable that the station should proceed. I accept that the project is much more
than just another power station and that it will provide benefits to the local community. I
am happy to advise ... that the project will proceed. The emphasis, however, will be on
research and development and not on production. There will be maximum flexibility in the
construction and management of the station to ensure that Victoria stays at the cutting edge
of research and development in Australia into that alternative energy source."5
Hence in 1993, the government gave approval for the S E C V to enter into a p o w e r purchase
contract with ADI. 1 1 6

But nearly twelve months later, by which time the restructuring of the Victorian electricity
industry was well underway and the S E C V had been broken up, the Victorian government
changed its mind. Because the state's electricity industry w a s being broken up and
competition w a s being introduced, wind power would need a subsidy; the cost could no
longer be absorbed within the S E C V . Initially the state government had agreed to provide
this subsidy, calculated by the government to be $1.3 million per y e a r — A D I disputed this
figure117—but
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later the government reneged on this agreement. 118 It w a s perhaps not a
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surprising decision for a government with few if any 'green' credentials, and with an eye to
slashing public expenditure. According to a spokesperson of the Energy Minister:
The Government initially supported the project but, after establishing the Electricity Supply
Industry Reform Unit [in October 1993], received strong advice the arrangement was
uncommercial and not in the state's interest.... The Government accepted its environmental
responsibilities, and would spend up to $145 million subsidising about 15 projects,
including hospital cogeneration and landfill gas-powered stations.119
Thus, the government would honour contracts signed under the S E C V ' s Cogeneration and
Renewable Energy Incentives Package (projects which the government claimed would
require, w h e n fully operational, an annual subsidy of about $14.5 million120) and claim
credit for the environmental benefit of these projects, but would not agree to n e w projects.

Undoubtedly the break up of the SECV signalled the death knell of the Toora wind farm
project. But what of the Breamlea wind turbine, the S E C V ' s only existing wind turbine? In
1994, it w a s sold by tender and bought by the Alternative Technology Association ( A T A ) , a
non-profit community group with a long-term interest in renewable energy. T h e purchase
price w a s a mere $18,000, about one tenth of its original cost. After a complete overhaul,
the A T A

operated the generator, selling electrical power to one of Victoria's n e w

distribution companies, Citipower.

New South Wales
N S W ' s only medium-sized wind turbine, the Malabar turbine described in section 5.4.4,
w a s not operational for five years. In April 1989 a lightning strike knocked out the
transformer and the following year the overhead lines were removed leaving the turbine
isolated.122 It appears that the N S W Department of Minerals and Energy m a d e no attempt to
repair it. Journalist Gavin Gilchrist noted: "the N S W Government then happily let its
$438,000 investment stand idle for five years".123 But Elcom (later Pacific Power) had its
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eye on the Malabar turbine, and was investigating its reconnection.124 Elcom reported that it
was negotiating with the Department of Minerals and Energy to acquire the wind turbine
and use it "to gain experience in wind generation and as a public demonstration of this
technology in N S W " . 1 2 5 In 1993 Pacific Power purchased the turbine and repaired it.126 The
wind turbine was recommissioned in 1994.

In 1990, Elcom commissioned the CSIRO Centre for Environmental Mechanics to
undertake a survey of N S W ' s wind resources and to identify prime wind farm sites in
N S W . 1 2 7 Six areas were selected for detailed wind monitoring. These included the coastal
sites of Bermagui, Kiama and Forster, and inland sites of the Great Dividing Range, near
Cooma, Tumut and Crookwell.128 If an appropriate site was found, Pacific Power w a s
intending to set up a 5 M W wind farm.129

By this time, methods for identifying suitable locations for wind turbines were becoming
quite sophisticated. A team at C S I R O led by D r Peter Coppin had developed a n e w
modelling technique to help identify locations with good wind resources. Whereas it w a s
previously assumed that the best wind resources were to be found along the southern coast
of Australia, the C S I R O team demonstrated that windy sites could also be found inland.
Dr Coppin's technique is demonstrating there are plenty ofrichenergy sources inland too,
mainly mountain ridges and peaks, where the moving air is squeezed through a smaller area
of atmosphere when it is blocked by the higher topography. In the case of Crookwell, there
is a large expanse offlatopen country which allows the wind strength to build up; a series
of ridges follow and these act like huge aircraft wings, kicking the wind upwards and
increasing its energy as it slips over the top.130
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Coppin's work established that the wind power potential, particularly in the grid areas, w a s
significantly higher than previously supposed.

Of the monitored sites, Crookwell (in the Southern Tablelands near Goulburn) was found to
have the highest average wind speed. Over a twelve month period, the average wind speed
w a s determined to be 6.7 m/s 1 3 1 —not as high as those found along parts of the Tasmanian
coast and the southern coast of the mainland, but still quite respectable. A s described below,
Crookwell would become the h o m e of N S W ' sfirstwind farm.

8.3.3 T h e I m p a c t of G r e e n P o w e r a n d the Promise of a M a n d a t o r y Target
While Western Australia w a s the leading state in remote area wind power developments, in
the latter half of the 1990s N S W became the leading state in grid-connected wind power.
This w a s despite N S W having a relatively poor wind regime. O n the other hand, N S W has
extensive transmission infrastructure, meaning that windy sites are more likely to be close
to suitable networks.132

NSW's wind power initiatives were to meet the demand for green power, which was being
promoted by the newly established Sustainable Energy Development Authority ( S E D A ) .
(As described in chapter 7, all of N S W ' s electricity retailers introduced green power
schemes in 1997.) T h efirstlarge grid-connected wind turbine from this period w a s installed
at Newcastle, and Australia'sfirstgrid-connected wind farm w a s installed at Crookwell.
Another grid-connected wind farm w a s planned for Blayney, although delays by the local
electricity retailer in committing to a decision on this meant that it w a s not built until 2000.

Newcastle, a NSW city strongly associated with the coal industry and steel production, was
becoming k n o w n as a centre for sustainable energy initiatives, with a synergistic
relationship evident between the local council, electricity retailer and university.133
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power investigations. Robert Marlin (Pacific Power), Interview, 29 May, 2000.
Peter Dormand, Andrew Feehely, Paul Ebert and David Wood, "Sustainable energy initiatives in
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Newcastle City Council had introduced a sustainable energy program, with the aim of
reducing energy consumption and making greater use of renewable energy technologies.134
The electricity retailer Energy Australia had tested Australia'sfirstgreen p o w e r scheme in
the Hunter region, surrounding Newcastle. 135 T h e University of Newcastle w a s h o m e to a
group of researchers specialising in design of small wind turbines. This group had installed
a small demonstration wind turbine in Newcastle.

In late 1997, a 600 kW Vestas wind turbine was installed at Kooragang Island, an industrial
centre of Newcastle, with the intention of providing green power for EnergyAustralia.
Newcastle is on the eastern coast of N S W , and Bureau of Meteorological data had
suggested that it w a s one of the windiest locations in N S W . 1 3 7 EnergyAustralia noted:
The Kooragang site was chosen for the turbine because it was one of the few sites available
in EnergyAustralia'sfranchisearea, with a wind regime capable of supporting a wind
138

generator.
Later EnergyAustralia also installed Australia's largest photovoltaic power station (rated at
200 k W ) at Singleton in N S W .

Another group also working together on wind power developments was Pacific Power
(previously called Elcom) and C S I R O . A s described above, they had been conducting wind
monitoring at several sites in N S W . This wind monitoring w a s later extended to m a n y more
sites across the state. In 1996, Pacific Power elected to proceed with a wind farm at
Crookwell. The 5 M W wind farm w a s commissioned in 1998.

Pacific Power had recognised that a gradual shift to more sustainable energy options was
inevitable, given concerns over climate change from greenhouse gas emissions. Renewable
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energy offered n e w business opportunities, and Pacific Power intended to be the leader in
the market. 139 Its general manager of operations and marketing, D r Robert Lang, w a s
particularly supportive of wind power, and played a key role in convincing Pacific Power
m a n a g e m e n t to build wind plant.140 L a n g described Pacific Power's position thus:
[W]e ... are currently Australia's leading renewable energy developer, and w e wish to
expand that even further .... W e are certainly see[ing] ourselves as a company that is
positioning itself for a future that is carbon constrained. In that, w e are looking at the range
of options, from renewables right through to looking at emissions reductions through
emissions trading and other policy options.141

Pacific Power was a generating company, and thus considered that it needed to find a
market for the renewable energy if it w a s going to proceed with a wind farm. Green power
offered a w a y of making renewable energy attractive to a retailer, and Pacific Power w a s
keen to support such a concept.142 A s described in section 7.4.4, the N S W government had
also introduced licensing conditions on retailers requiring them to develop strategies to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Pacific Power also presented the purchase of renewable
energy as a w a y in which electricity retailers could differentiate themselves w h e n full retail
contestability w a s introduced. Before proceeding with the Crookwell wind farm, Pacific
P o w e r successfully convinced the local retailer Great Southern Energy to agree to a longterm contract for power from wind plant.143

As the intended developer of Australia's first grid-connected wind farm, Pacific Power had
to break n e w ground in gaining local community support. It w a s fortunate in finding a very
supportive landowner. T h e wind farm is located in an agricultural area comprising large
farms, so there were few locals w h o would be affected by the wind farm. This m a d e gaining
local support an easier proposition that it would be in coastal areas, which tend to have a
higher population density. Obtaining approval from the local council, however, proved
m o r e difficult, particularly since the council had no prior experience in assessing such
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developments and needed to source external expertise.

Once the Crookwell wind farm w a s built, it became an important asset for Pacific P o w e r in
convincing other groups to support wind farms. This w a s particularly important w h e n
planning for its next wind project, a 10 M W wind farm at Blayney, near the inland N S W
city of Orange. This project, however, did not proceed as quickly as planned. Pacific Power
was intending to build the wind farm and to sell green power to the local retailer, Advance
Energy. While Advance Energy w a s initially enthusiastic about the project, it soon started
to have doubts. Robert Marlin from Pacific Hydro believed that Advance Energy became
more risk-adverse after an internal restructure. Since there were no penalties associated with
not reducing greenhouse gas emissions, Advance Energy saw that taking a risk by entering
into a long-term power purchase agreement for wind power w a s unnecessary. However,
since Advance Energy had already received m u c h publicity for the proposed wind farm, it
later agreed to the proposal. The Blayney wind farm w a s thus not commissioned until 2000.

More recently, the state with the best wind resource, Tasmania, has indicated that it intends
to be a leading player in the renewables business. In the late 1990s, the H E C (later called
Hydro Tasmania) was again examining the potential for wind power on the Tasmanian
mainland.145 This interest w a s prompted by the restructuring of the electricity industry,
concerns over Tasmania's future electricity supply options, and emerging markets for gridconnected renewable energy. Following the agreement of the states and C o m m o n w e a l t h
over National Competition Policy in 1995, Tasmania w a s required to change the legislative
framework governing the operation of its electricity industry, removing the H E C ' s
monopoly powers and requiring it to act in a commercial manner. 146 Thus if it had
demonstrated a preference for hydro power in the past, it could no longer do so; n e w
generating plant had to be assessed using standard commercial criteria.147 Furthermore,
Tasmania, which had traditionally relied on its cheap electricity to attract industry, w a s
running out of options for n e w power stations. There w a s little scope for n e w hydro plant
since the best sites were in protected areas, and fossil fuel options were of inadequate
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quality or had insufficient proven reserves.148 W i n d power w a s thus considered a possible
economic alternative; indeed it w a s expected to be cheaper than m a n y other alternatives
including coal-fired plant.149

But another option was available, one that would not require Tasmania to build new
generating plant. This w a s Basslink, a proposed undersea cable joining the Tasmanian and
Victorian electricity grids. Such a project had long been proposed and w a s being
investigated as part of the national electricity industry restructuring. Apart from being a
supply option, Basslink had a further advantage, one with a significant economic benefit: it
would allow Tasmania to participate in the National Electricity Market. Since Tasmania's
electricity supply w a s nearly all hydro-based and included significant storage capability
while the mainland's electricity supply w a s predominantly coal-based, the interconnection
of Tasmania with the mainland would have significant operational advantages: Tasmania
could export to the mainland during peak periods (when electricity w a s expensive) and
could import during off-peak periods (when electricity w a s cheap). Participation in the
National Electricity Market would also help to increase the value of Tasmania's power
generating assets.150 Critics argued that this would m a k e privatisation of the H E C a more
attractive option.151 (Privatisation of the H E C w a s a significant issue in the Tasmanian
election of August 1998, with the Liberal government seeking a mandate to sell.152 The
Liberals lost the election.)

Basslink was quite a controversial project; indeed the Tasmanian Greens had campaigned
resolutely against the proposal, advocating an energy efficiency program and wind power in
its stead.153 (There have also been protests in Victoria, particularly over the siting of the
transmission line.) T h e H E C , on the other hand, saw Basslink and wind power as
complementary: it w a s envisaging developing wind power so it could sell 'green power' to
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the mainland.154 Indeed, the H E C claimed that were a sizeable amount of wind power to be
installed, the ability to export energy through Basslink would actually allow more effective
usage of wind and hydro resources by reducing spill.155 Basslink w a s finally approved by
the relevant governments in 2002, and is expected to be operational by 2005.

In July 1999 the HEC announced that a wind farm would be built at Woolnorth on the
northwest coast. The initial development w a s to be about 76 M W by 2004. If a mechanism
«

was introduced to give an advantage to renewable energy sources, up to 4 0 0 M W could be
built.156 At the time of writing, the H E C (now called Hydro Tasmania) has developed a
10.5 M W

wind farm at Woolnorth, and has announced plans for over 600 M W

of wind

farms in Tasmania.157 The H E C has also negotiated with the Danish c o m p a n y Vestas to
establish a manufacturing facility for nacelles.158

In most other states, sizeable wind farms were also being planned. As described in section
6.5.2, in 1997 Energy Equity Corporation announced plans to build a large wind farm near
Portland in Victoria with the aim of selling the power generated as green power. This
development was stopped because of local protests. However, in 2001, an 18 M W

wind

farm was installed in nearby Codrington by Pacific Hydro. Stanwell Corporation, a
Queensland government-owned generating company, built a 12 M W

wind farm near

Ravenshoe in the Atherton Tablelands region. This region of Far North Queensland had
long been recognised as a windy location in a state usually considered to have a poor wind
resource. Stanwell is also investigating wind farm developments in other states, and
recently commissioned a 21 M W wind farm at Toora, the site originally investigated by the
S E C V (described above). The Toora wind farm generated significant local controversy,
with protesters n o w attempting to stop other wind farm developments currently being
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Western Power, the W A government-owned electricity company

has also recently commissioned itsfirstgrid-connected wind farm at Albany on the south
coast of W A . 1 6 0

While the introduction of green power and the promise of a renewable energy target led to a
rapid increase in the amount of grid-connected wind power (albeit from a very small base),
this appears to be minor compared with the amount of grid-connected wind power
envisaged for the near future.

8.3.4 The MRET Wind Rush
The introduction of the Mandatory Renewable Energy Target led to a 'wind rush' as n e w
and existing players planned for m a n y large wind farms, particularly in the southern states
of Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia and Western Australia. B y early 2003, projects
totaling nearly 3000 M W of wind power capacity had been publicly announced, and m a n y
other sites were being investigated.161

Many of these wind farm proposals were for coastal areas. As described in chapter 6, such
proposals can generate opposition particularly a m o n g locals keen to preserve coastal
landscapes. In Victoria, for example, a group calling themselves P r o m Coast Guardians was
established to stop wind farms being developed in the South Gippsland region near the
Wilsons Promontory National Park.162 Such groups are drawing on the strategies and
experiences of overseas anti-wind farm groups, particularly in the United K i n g d o m where
m a n y wind farms proposals have been denied planning permission because of protests.

Successful protest actions may not only stop a particular wind farm development, but also
adversely affect the prospects for future wind power developments, since bad publicity can
erode popular support for wind power. 163 W i n d power advocates hope to maintain this
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support, and believe that the quality of wind farm developments and the approach taken by
developers in dealing with stakeholders will influence public opinion. T o encourage wind
farm developers to adopt practices that would avoid or minimise damage to the industry, the
Australian W i n d Energy Association ( A u s W E A ) sought and received funding from the
Renewable Energy Commercialisation Program to produce Best Practice Guidelines. These
were released in March 2002. The guidelines drew on similar guidelines adopted by the
British and European W i n d Energy Associations, and consultation with a wide range of
stakeholders in Australia. It covered in detail recommendations for developers through all
stages of a wind farm project from site selection through to operation and eventual
decommissioning, emphasising the need for continual dialogue with stakeholders, including
landowners, state and federal governments, local authorities, network service providers,
electricity retailers, community groups, the general public and the media.

The MRET has led to a rapid growth in the Australian wind industry. New players have
recognised that they can n o w enter the electricity industry for only a few tens of millions of
dollars and that future moves to reduce greenhouse gas emissions will probably m a k e wind
power a lucrative venture in the long term.'65 A range of n e w players have entered the
industry, including local entrepreneurs with no prior experience with wind power, and
overseas wind power companies with little or no experience with Australian conditions.
S o m e long-term Australian wind power advocates have expressed concern about s o m e of
the actions of n e w players, suggesting that they m a y not be following best practices. For
example, Geoff Collins, whose involvement with the renewable energy industry began in
the mid 1980s, claimed that poor consultation with stakeholders has contributed to the
growth of the opposition groups, and in particular an increase in the number of wellinformed opponents.166

While many developers were investigating wind farms for the southern states, other states
with a poorer wind resource were also keen to attract wind farm developments. In N S W , the
Sustainable Energy Development Authority ( S E D A ) established a commercial venture
called WindBusiness to facilitate the development of private wind farms in the state by
providing a number of services. This venture w a s intended to reduce the cost and risk borne
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S E D A worked closely with C S I R O wind researchers,

w h o had developed a computer-modelling tool that used topographic and atmospheric data
to estimate wind speeds within a region, enabling probable high wind speed sites to be
identified.168 S E D A also undertook extensive wind monitoring at sites across N S W that had
been identified with C S I R O ' s assistance. Using C S I R O modeling along with data from
S E D A ' s monitoring stations and overlays (including electricity and transport infrastructure,
vegetation, property ownership, local government boundaries and protected areas) S E D A
produced regional wind reports.169 These were offered for sale to potential wind farm
developers, as w a s the data from its wind monitoring stations (the latter on a non-exclusive
basis). S E D A also offered a wind monitoring service at sites identified by clients: S E D A
would bear the capital cost of wind monitoring, and licence the data on an exclusive basis
for an annual fee.170 A t the time of writing, there are still few planned wind farms for N S W
compared with the southern states; hence the outcome of S E D A ' s venture is not clear.

8.3.5 Community-Led Wind Developments
Because local opposition to proposed wind power developments m a y m a k e it difficult for
developers to obtain planning permission, some advocates of wind power have suggested
that community ownership and control offers a w a y of winning local support and ensuring
that the financial benefits associated with wind development are shared more widely in the
local community. 171

Since such projects would require communities to access substantial financial resources and
wind power expertise, it is not surprising that there have been few such projects in
Australia. T h e project that has advanced the furthest at the time of writing is a proposal for
a wind farm of up to 30 M W rated capacity at Crows Nest (Queensland), a small town in
the Great Dividing Range about 45 k m north of T o o w o o m b a . The project w a s initiated in
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2000 by a small group of locals, including university academic Adrian Allen. 172 T h e C r o w s
Nest W i n d Working Group, as they called themselves, were interested in exploring
development of wind p o w e r facilities as a w a y of revitalising the local community, since the
main industry in the region, dairy farming, w a s becoming less economically viable. C r o w s
Nest w a s considered a promising site for a wind farm as the region is elevated and exposed
to high winds, and is close to the major load centre of T o o w o o m b a and the electricity
transmission network. 173 Aesthetic concerns were not thought to be an issue, since the area
selected w a s agricultural.

The Wind Working Group hoped that along with the wind farm it could develop a
renewable energy centre to attract visitors and students, particularly from T o o w o o m b a ,
which is a large regional city and h o m e to the University of Southern Queensland. It noted:
Planning is underway to develop a state-of-art visitor and interpretive centre to be located at
the wind farm, once the project is given the 'green light'. The interpretive centre will have a
strong education component; aiming to promote sustainable and environmentally sensitive
energy practice. It is envisaged that good linkages will be created with schools and tertiary
institutions in south-east Queensland with regular visits to the centre integrated into
curricula. As well as this specific education focus, the wind farm interpretive centre has the
potential draw an estimated 400,000 to 500,000 tourists to the area overfiveyears. It is also
estimated that these tourist will spend over $15 million in the Shire during the five-year
period. Such visitor and subsequent spending pattern predictions highlight the significance
this project has for the regional economy.174
The group also enlisted the help of Trevor Berrill, a renewable energy educator from the
Brisbane Institute of T A F E with long-term expertise in renewable energy systems, and
Peter Fries, environment journalist and developer of a solar-powered house. 175

The group initially signed a memorandum of understanding with Stanwell Corporation,
which at the time w a s developing Queensland'sfirstwind farm at R a v e n s h o e — s e e section
8.3.3. Stanwell undertook wind monitoring at C r o w s Nest for t w o years, but concluded that
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the wind resource was not sufficient for them to proceed with developing a wind farm that
would have an acceptable rate of return. However, the Crows Nest Wind Working Group
considered that a wind farm would still be a profitable venture. It has elected to continue the
project without Stanwell. At the time of writing it is attempting to establish a market for the
wind power by signing up businesses in the region to 'green power', and to raise finance
from within the region. It envisages that for stage one of the project they will install
between three and five 1.8 M W wind turbines, and later up to 30 M W capacity.

While the Wind Working Group's attempts to raise finance are still in the early stages and
thus the future of this wind farm is unknown, this example suggests that the types of wind
farm developments that proceed can be dependent on financing arrangements. Rates of
return expected by outside developers might well be significantly higher than those
expected by other groups, particularly local groups that recognise other benefits in
developing a wind farm. Groups expecting a lower rate of return are also more likely to be
able to accommodate some of the concerns of local residents in their developments.

8.3.6 Overview
At the time of writing, the prospects for large-scale grid-connected wind power are looking
very favourable, although the high growth rates predicted are contingent upon the
continuation of M R E T or a similar support mechanism and resolution of planning and
connection issues. However, the introduction of a significant level of wind power into the
electricity grid, as envisaged under M R E T , will have an impact on the operation of the
electricity system and networks. This is discussed in the next section.

8.4 The Value of Wind Power to the Grid
8.4.1 The Effect of Wind Generation on Supply-Demand Balance
The issue of h o w an intermittent energy source such as wind power would affect the
reliability of an electricity system had featured in the 1980s debate over whether wind
generation should be assigned capacity credit. In the 1980s, utilities typically classified
wind power as non-firm with zero capacity credit. They argued that the installation of wind
capacity did not avert the need for an equivalent amount of firm capacity; thus the value of
wind power amounted to only the value of fuel saved. W i n d power advocates countered this
by developing computer models of electrical systems incorporating wind power to
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demonstrate that wind power had s o m e capacity credit.

Much of the capacity credit debate centred over the long-term reliability of the electricity
system—the need for sufficient capacity on the system to meet m a x i m u m

demand.

However, the intermittency of wind power can also affect short-term system security, in
particular the need to continually balance supply (i.e. generation) and demand. This
becomes more of an issue as the level of wind penetration increases.

To ensure system security under high wind penetration, there needs to be sufficient flexible
generation capacity available on the system for the system operator to maintain the supplydemand balance. Under the former monopoly utility model, the system operator o w n e d
nearly all the generators, and thus could directly control the flexible generators. Following
the introduction of the National Electricity Market ( N E M ) , in which generators compete to
supply, the system operator became organisationally separate from the generators; thus
market mechanisms are used to maintain the balance. The body that is n o w the market and
system operator for the N E M is the National Electricity Market M a n a g e m e n t C o m p a n y
( N E M M C O ) . 1 7 7 Generators bid into the market, and N E M M C O determines the order in
which generators will be dispatched.

In the NEM, generators rated above 5 MW are required to register with NEMMCO as either
scheduled (hence dispatchable), or unscheduled generators. Unscheduled generators are
typically those rated less than 30 M W , or intermittent generators. T h e definition of an
intermittent generator is one:
[W]hose output is not readily predictable, including, without limitation, solar generators,
wave turbine generators, wind turbine generators and hydro-generators without any
material storage capability.178
Since they are intermittent, wind generators register as unscheduled generators, and their
output is not controlled by the system operator.

While there was still a very low penetration of wind power, the intermittency of wind
generators w a s of little consequence: fluctuations in total output of all wind generators
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connected to the grid represented barely a ripple compared with the variability of total
system demand. H o w e v e r , this would change if the penetration of wind power were to
increase to significant levels, as wind power fluctuations would necessitate greater use of
m o r e flexible plant. Following the introduction of M R E T and the consequent 'wind rush',
this w a s starting to b e c o m e a possibility. W h a t is d e e m e d significant penetration depends on
a range of factors, in particular the flexibility of other generators on the system, the ratio of
m a x i m u m to m i n i m u m d e m a n d , the nature of the wind resource, and the dispersal of wind
generators. O n the interconnected system served by the N E M , a few thousand megawatts
could represent significant penetration.179

In the early 2000s, the question of h o w intermittent generation would impact on system
security requirements started to be raised, particularly by N E M M C O . 1 8 0 Unlike in the
earlier period w h e n most electricity utilities were dismissive of wind power, N E M M C O
accepted that rapid growth in wind capacity w a s likely, given the introduction of M R E T . It
acknowledged that the National Electricity Code, which governed the N E M operation, had
been established to suit the characteristics of the existing electricity system and w a s
possibly not compatible with wind power. It indicated that the rules of the market might
need to change to accommodate increased penetration of wind power:
N E M M C O will be developing a discussion paper to more fully address the issues within
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the National Electricity Market framework and to explore ways of resolving them in a way
that meets the expectations of both the National Electricity Market and the wind generation
industry. It is expected that this process will, over the next 12 months, lead to changes to
N E M M C O ' s central dispatch facilities and procedures and changes to some Code
provisions, particularly where they might be impeding the development of wind generation
in the National Electricity Market.181
At the time of writing, this discussion paper w a s not available.

The effect of intermittent energy sources such as wind power on the supply-demand
balance is generally formulated in terms of frequency control. W h e n either supply or
demand changes, the power system frequency changes: an increase in supply or decrease in
demand causes frequency to rise; while a decrease in supply or increase in d e m a n d causes
frequency to fall. The nominal system frequency is 50 Hertz, and the system operator is
charged with keeping this frequency within defined limits. T h e value of these limits
depends on the type of event that caused the change in supply or demand: serious but rare
events such as multiple generator loss are allowed a m u c h wider limit than m o r e c o m m o n ,
non-critical events. Fluctuations in system frequency are controlled to ensure integrity of
both generators and customers' equipment, with m a n y generators designed to disconnect to
avoid damage should abnormal frequencies be experienced. The defined limits are very
stringent: for example, the normal frequency band permitted in the N E M

w a s (until

recently) ±0.1 H z , i.e. 49.9 H z to 50.1 H z . The most extreme limit imposed for multiple
contingencies is 47 H z to 52 H z , these being the frequencies at which generators and other
equipment m a y disconnect, possibly leading to a system collapse. T h e reason that the
frequency band for normal operation w a s so stringent w a s not because of possible adverse
effects on generators and equipment (see below); rather, it w a s to minimise the risk that a
contingent event (such as loss of a large generator) would lead to system instability or
collapse. That is, should a contingent event occur w h e n the frequency w a s too far from
50 H z , the adverse effect of a contingent event on system stability could be exacerbated.182

Prior to the formation of the NEM, the system operator would change the output of

^^ long-term advocate of renewable energy, and a founding member of the original A u s W E A .
National Electricity Market Management Company, "Australian Wind Energy Association
^ Conference", 2002, Accessed 3 October 2002, <http://www.nemmco.com.au/events/000-0121 .htm>.
National Electricity Market Management Company, Consultation Paper: Implementation of Causer
Pays for Small Deviation FCAS, Version No. 1, Consultation Draft, February 2001, Accessed
10 October 2002, <http://www.nemmco.com.au>.
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generators to keep the system frequency within range. In the N E M , electricity generation is
treated separately from the frequency control requirement. Generators bid to deliver a set
power output, while frequency control is deemed an 'ancillary service' and procured
separately. N E M M C O n o w maintains the balance between generation and demand in two
ways. D e m a n d is forecast in five-minute intervals, and N E M M C O dispatches scheduled
generation to meet this demand. T o meet other deviations—errors in forecast demand; nonlinear changes in demand or generation within the five-minute intervals; scheduled
generators not meeting their dispatch targets; or unexpected loss of load, network element
or g e n e r a t i o n — N E M M C O dispatches 'frequency control ancillary services' ( F C A S ) . F C A S
are supplied by generators willing to change their generation (often within the same region
to maintain interconnector flows within limits) thereby keeping the system frequency within
the defined limits. F C A S are divided into two groups: regulation, used continually to correct
minor changes in generation and demand; and contingency, used infrequently to correct
major changes in generation or demand such as through an unexpected significant load
change, loss of generator or loss of network element. In the early period of the N E M , F C A S
were purchased through contract; later a spot market w a s introduced. Prior to the
introduction of a spot market in 2001, the annual cost of F C A S w a s about $ 1 5 0 M to
$200M. 1 8 3

Generators whose output fluctuated in an uncontrolled manner, such as wind turbines, could
exacerbate the requirement for regulation F C A S . Under the 'causer pays' principle recently
introduced by N E M M C O , intermittent generators might be asked to bear this cost.184 This
would require that dynamic data on the intermittent generator's output be m a d e available to
the system operator, at an increased cost. Currently this data is not provided.

What then determined the cost of FCAS? Clearly the nature of the generators and loads on
the system, and the operating rules of the N E M affected the cost. Within a given system and
market, an important determinant was the electricity operating standards, in particular the
defined limits for system frequency fluctuations. These operating standards had long been
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National Electricity Code Administrator, Reliability Panel, Frequency Operating Standards:
Determination, September 2001, pp. 4-5, Accessed 4 October 2002, <http://www.neca.com.au>. The
costs under the spot market are not directly comparable with the former costs, as standards were also
changed. See below.
This was raised by N E M M C O . Arnott, "The participation of wind energy", 2002, op. cit. (The
'causer pays' principle is intended to allocate costs on the basis of how much generators and loads
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established, though they differed for different electricity networks depending on the system
size and types of generators. Thus the amount of any F C A S cost imposed on wind
generation depended not only on the operating characteristics of existing generators, but
also on the operating standards designed around the characteristics of those generators.

While operating standards are in the main 'black boxes', they are occasionally opened up
for review. For example, w h e n electricity grids are interconnected, their frequency
operating standards must be brought into alignment (since frequency is the same throughout
the whole interconnected system), usually with the more stringent standards prevailing.
Might such standards be opened up in the future as a result of their likely adverse effect on
the economics of intermittent generators such as wind turbines?

Indeed, frequency operating standards in the NEM did come under review by the National
Electricity Code Administrator ( N E C A ) in the late 1990s, calling into question the basis for
the stringency of these standards. The review was prompted not because of the effect on
intermittent generators, but because once frequency control w a s unbundled from generation,
the high cost of frequency control became an issue for the electricity market. T h e review
investigated whether these standards could be relaxed to reduce the cost of F C A S .

Given that frequency control for contingencies was required to ensure the integrity of
generators and customers' equipment, what fluctuations in frequency could this equipment
tolerate? The N E C A review found that little was k n o w n about the effect of frequency
fluctuations on customers' equipment, as little research had been done in this area. Most
equipment, it appeared, could tolerate a relatively wide frequency band of several H z ,
though some high technology equipment required frequencies to remain within ±0.5 H z for
satisfactory performance.185 Generators, it was thought, could withstand a frequency band
±1 H z without threat to their integrity.186

The NECA review noted that regulation frequency control—keeping the frequency within
normal range—was incurring the highest cost, and that the normal band in the N E M (±0.1
Hz) was internationally one of the most conservative. The U K , Ireland and N e w Zealand,

contribute to frequency deviations.)
' National Electricity Code Administrator, Reliability Panel Frequency Standards Consultation Paper
March 1999, Accessed 3 October 2002, <http://www.neca.com.au>.
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for example, used ±0.2 H z . 1 8 7 Furthermore, rigorous application of these standards w a s
incurring extra costs under the N E M , because it allowed no discretion for the system
operator:
If there is insufficient F C A S offered or only at very high prices a realistic technical option
is to accept that, within limits, it will take longer to restorefrequencyto normal or a greater
excursion should be allowed should a contingency occur while there is a shortfall of that
F C A S . The current standards for frequency are technically very similar to the standards
used prior to introduction of a market. The manner in which they are applied to scheduling
and dispatch is, however, more rigorous. Discretion previously given to system operators to
vary the F C A S requirement is currently not available in the N E M ... [This] means that the
standards are subtly more onerous than prior to the market.188

The review determined that frequency operating standards could in some cases be eased to
reduced the cost of F C A S . T h e normal band w a s relaxed to ± 0.15 H z , and a probabilistic
tolerance for the normal band of 99 percent of time w a s applied. Frequency standards for
the loss of a single generator (±0.5 H z ) were m o r e stringent than frequency standards for
another credible contingency (± 1 H z ) , but the review elected not to relax these. This is
because, while the National Electricity C o d e required generators to be capable of
continuous uninterrupted operation within the frequency limits specified in the standards
(up to 4 7 to 52 H z for a short period), derogations applied to m a n y Victorian generators.189
In the case of single generator loss, these generators were required to remain operating only
as long as system frequency remained above 49.5 H z . Thus, relaxation of the contingency
band for single generator loss could possibly lead to system collapse if Victorian generators
disconnected.190

The relaxed frequency standards were introduced in late 2001, at the same time as the spot
market for F C A S w a s introduced. After showing s o m e early volatility, the average cost of
191

F C A S dropped to a significantly lower value.
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ibid.
N E C A Reliability Panel, Frequency Operating Standards: Determination, 2001, op. cit.
National Electricity Code Administrator, Reliability Panel, Power System Frequency Standards: an
Economic and Technical Review, December 2000, Accessed 3 October 2002, <http://www.
neca.com.au>.
National Electricity Code Administrator, National Electricity Code, Schedule 5.2, S5.2.5.3.
N E C A Reliability Panel, Frequency Operating Standards: Determination, 2001, op. cit. The
derogations are found in Schedule 9A3 of the National Electricity Code, and are considered
transitional arrangements for Victoria.
In thefirst38 weeks of 2002, the average was about one third of the prior cost. Data available from
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Thus costs that could be ascribed to wind power were dependent on operating standards,
which in turn had been shown to be adjustable once a cost had been placed on them. Given
that some of the changes implemented in N E C A ' s frequency standards review were still
conservative in comparison with frequency standards in other jurisdictions, in part because
some existing generators were given special treatment under the Code, it is possible that
frequency standards could be further relaxed in the future.

Also impacting on the cost of FCAS was that frequency control was implemented mainly
from the supply side, That is, while interruptible loads were sometimes used during periods
w h e n supply was insufficient, typically generators rather than loads were used to manage
the supply-demand balance. H u g h Outhred noted that greater demand-side participation in
the provision of ancillary services would be required if there w a s significant penetration of
intermittent generation.192 Given the structure of the market, demand-side participation
would probably be implemented through price signals. For example, if there were
insufficient generation, the price of electricity would rise and s o m e users might choose to
disconnect. However, under the N E M , the pool price is set half-hourly. This interval is
m u c h too wide to accommodate the matching of wind variation with demand. T h e
traditional use of interruptible loads could also be inappropriate in compensating for the
variability of wind generation, as it could necessitate frequent stopping and starting of the
load.193 Loads that could be stopped and started more frequently, such as storage hot water
systems, would be more appropriate.

How would increased penetration of wind power affect the need for FCAS? Little was
known about this. The output of wind turbines within a small region should be correlated, as
they would most likely face a similar wind regime. Yet the number of wind turbines within
a small region would be limited, so the total effect would be relatively minor in relation to
the whole system. (They could, however, have significant locational effects in w e a k g r i d s see below.) But what of widely dispersed wind turbines? If their output also exhibited s o m e
194
correlation that was not predictable, it could exacerbate the need for frequency control.

N E M M C O website, <http://www.nemmco.com.au>
™ Outhred, "Power system operation and network issues for wind farms", 2002, op. cit.
Western Power, Information Paper: Technical and Commercial Issues, 2002, op. cit.
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N E M M C O suggested that for an individual wind farm, there w a s a probability of 1 % that
the output could vary by more that 3 0 % of the wind farm rating within a five-minute period
(the dispatch interval).195 Thus the amount of regulation F C A S required would have to be
increased to provide for these fluctuations. If wind farms were widely dispersed, each
would face a different wind regime; hence some of these fluctuations would be smoothed.196
N E M M C O estimated that for this situation the additional F C A S would represent about 5 %
to 1 0 % of the total wind generation capacity.197 Thus if there were 3000 M W of wind power
in the interconnected grid of the N E M , an additional 150 to 300 M W of F C A S might be
needed. (For comparison, in 2002 the amount of regulation F C A S dispatched by N E M M C O
w a s 250 M W generation increase and decrease at a cost of about $300,000 per week. 198 )

And what of contingent events such as single generator loss? While the loss of a single
wind generator would cause an insignificant change in supply, the loss of a large wind farm
is another matter. Such an event could occur through the loss of a network element or
through all or most wind turbines in a wind farm cutting out due to excessive wind
speeds.199 M o s t wind turbines are designed to cut out at a particular wind speed, say 25 m/s,
to avoid damage. Given that all wind turbines in a wind farm should face a relatively similar
wind speed regime, simultaneous cutting out is a possible event. A w a y to avoid such an
event would be to redesign wind turbines to ramp d o w n their output instead of cutting out.
S o m e newer wind turbines are able to do this.

It could be problematic to accommodate the fluctuating output of wind turbines within the
F C A S categories of regulation, which has a very tight frequency band and hence relatively
high costs, and contingency, which is designed for unexpected and infrequent events.
NEMMCO

acknowledged that the F C A S market w a s not well designed around the

characteristics of intermittent generators, noting:
[T]he Reliability Panel could be asked to review thefrequencystandards with regard to
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Hugh Outhred, pers. comm.
The 1 % probability is in keeping with the 1 % probabilistic tolerance applied to the normal frequency
band, as described above.
Michael Grubb, 'The integration of renewable electricity sources', Energy Policy, Vol. 19, No. 7,
1991, pp. 670-688.
Arnott, "Intermittent generation in the N E M " , 2002, op. cit. This estimate was based on European
experience.
ibid.
Here I a m drawing on matters raised by a number of delegates in a plenary discussion at the
Australian Wind Energy Conference, Adelaide, 24-26 July 2002.
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intermittent generation, and perhaps create a standard to apply to variation of intermittent
generation, logically sitting between regulating and contingency standards.200

The Australian National Electricity Code also includes what is known as the principle of
technological neutrality, viz.:
[A] particular energy source or technology should not be treated more favourably or less
favourably than another energy source or technology.
Given that generators had different operating characteristics, h o w would this principle be
applied? Ian Arnott from N E M M C O noted:
In recognition of this market objective, N E C A ' s review of technical requirements is
moving to make requirements based more on power system performance objectives and
less on traditional technologies.202
In other words, 'technological neutrality' combined with the 'causer pays' principle w a s to
be interpreted as penalising those technologies that have an adverse effect o n system
performance, including the supply-demand balance. N E M M C O

noted that one of the

reasons for the introduction of the causer pays principle for F C A S w a s to encourage "each
market participant to act to reduce the requirement for the service", but which "to the extent
practicable, is perceived to be fair".203 Yet the principle of 'causer pays' for F C A S could
disadvantage wind generation and other intermittent generators, since it is m u c h m o r e
difficult for intermittent generators to reduce the need for this requirement compared with
generators with a predictable output.

In effect, technological neutrality combined with the structure of the electricity market (with
generation and load-following treated as separate functions with separate costs) privileges
technologies whose output is predictable. It treats generators o n an individual (or group)
basis, rather than fitting together a system designed around generators with differing
operating characteristics. (Wind generators could, of course combine with complementary
generators or loads, which could match the variations in output;204 but this is seen as the
generators' responsibility rather than the system operator's.) Yet the penalty applied to
generators whose output is not predictable is dependent o n the operating characteristics of
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Arnott, "Intermittent generation in the N E M " , 2002, op. cit.,
National Electricity Code Administrator, The National Electricity Market, Accessed 6 October 2002,
<http://www.neca.com.au/NEM/>.
Arnott, "The participation of wind energy", 2002, op. cit, pp. 5-6.
N E M M C O , Consultation Paper: Implementation of Causer Pays, 2001, op. cit., p. 9.
Western Power, Information Paper: Technical and Commercial Issues, 2002, op. cit.
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other generators, and is exacerbated if there is m u c h inflexible generation on the s y s t e m —
such as b r o w n

coal generators, w h o s e output is nearly constant. This has been

acknowledged by s o m e system operators. For example Western P o w e r noted that to reduce
costs of ancillary services: "it would be important for the market to provide incentives for
flexibility of base load generators".205 T h e inflexibility of other plant m a y also require wind
p o w e r to be spilled if there w a s high output from wind generators during periods of
m i n i m u m demand. This would decrease the revenue of wind generators unless they were
compensated. Western P o w e r noted:
It is envisaged that developments to the W A electricity market would provide a mechanism
for financial compensation to wind generators for curtailment.206

At the time of writing, the Australian electricity industry is in the early stages of developing
market rules for dealing with the potential need for additional F C A S arising from the
incorporation of intermittent generators. T h e Australian wind energy industry is only just
starting to deal with this; hence their response cannot be analysed here. Indeed, the wind
industry has been m o r e proactive in calling for measures that would increase the value of
wind p o w e r (such as being compensated for reduced network losses—see below), than they
have been in acknowledging future changes which could decrease the value of wind power.
Yet, overseas experience shows that wind generation can be severely penalised by market
rules for ancillary services.207 For example, the N e w Electricity Trading Arrangements
( N E T A ) introduced in the U K in 2001 penalised generators that did not meet contracted
generation. After thefirstw e e k of N E T A , G r a e m e Bathurst and Goran Strbac noted:
As Intermittent Renewable Sources are intrinsically difficult to forecast, the effect of these
penalty costs in thefirstweek of N E T A has made renewable energy worthless ... Over the
last seven days the most profitable way of operating wind farms was to switch them off.208

Since electricity markets have 'unbundled' ancillary services from generation, there will be
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ibid.
ibid., p. 10.
For an overview see Christian A. Nabe, "Approaches to the valuation of the use of ancillary services
by wind generators—the example of Germany", World Wind Energy Conference and Exhibition,
Berlin, 2-6 July 2002.
Graeme Bathurst and Goran Strbac, "The value of Intermittent Renewable Sources m thefirstweek
of N E T A " Tyndall Briefing Note No. 2, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, April 2001,
Accessed 23 February 2003, <http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/publications/briefing_notes/note02.shtml>.
The circumstances for renewable energy have since improved with the introduction of the
Renewables Obligation.
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more pressure to improve the predictability of wind power. T h e development of techniques
for forecasting wind speeds and thus power output is emerging as a significant challenge for
wind power R & D . 2 0 9 It also makes the search for low-cost storage options more pressing.

8.4.2 Wind Generation and Electricity Network
The above section w a s concerned with the impacts of wind power on the operation of the
whole interconnected electricity system, and vice versa. In this section I discuss the impacts
on local networks.

Australia has extensive electricity networks, into which grid-connected wind power must
largelyfit.These networks have been designed around the needs of conventional generators
and existing demand profiles. In m a n y rural areas, these networks comprise long, mediumvoltage power lines carrying relatively low levels of power. These are often described as
'weak grids'. Under the N E M , the cost associated with existing networks is regulated and
borne by all electricity consumers. There are possibilities for modifying these networks to
better suit wind power; however, the question arises as to w h o will bear the capital cost.

There can be significant advantages in embedding small-scale generation into distribution
networks. If such 'embedded generators' are located close to load centres, they can
significantly reduce network power losses. S o m e embedded generators can also reduce the
need for network augmentation. If the electricity demand in an area serviced by a w e a k grid
increases beyond the rating of the local network, the network is usually augmented. A n
alternative means of meeting the increased electricity demand is to install local embedded
generation, as long as the generation is available during times of peak local demand. Since
peak demand in m a n y parts of Australia is typically associated with hot sunny weather (that
is, it is caused by air-conditioning load), solar electricity plant including photovoltaics can
be ideal for this purpose. Cogeneration plant can also serve a similar function, if its output
is available during peak times. W i n d power, however, is intermittent and cannot be
guaranteed during times of peak demand. It is thus of little use as an alternative to network
augmentation, unless it can be combined with appropriate demand-side management to
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International Energy Agency, Implementing Agreement for Co-operation in the Research and
Development of Wind Turbine Systems, Long-term Research and Development Needs for Wind
Energy for the Time Frame 2000-2020, October 2001.
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reduce peak d e m a n d if w i n d is unavailable, or with partial storage.

In Australia, the National Electricity Code specifies non-discriminatory access to the grid,
and thus the electricity market, viz.:
[A]ny person wishing to do so should be able to gain access to the interconnected
transmission and distribution network;
a person wishing to enter the market should not be treated more favourably or less
favourably than if that person were already participating in the market.210
Intending e m b e d d e d generators frequently argued that they were not being treated fairly in
the NEM. They claimed that network owners, typically distribution network service
providers (DNSP), were making it difficult to negotiate a connection agreement, and did not
provide sufficient information for potential e m b e d d e d generation projects that could
provide an alternative to network augmentation.211 The Australian Ecogeneration
Association (AEA), which represented the interests of embedded generators, argued:
There are significant information and negotiation asymmetries, particularly where small
scale generators are concerned. There is no compelling reason w h y a D N S P needs to
proactively connect the embedded generator, particularly where the generator is competing
with the service provided by the network and/or retailer. The connecting party is the one
that is most keen to conclude a connection agreement as it is incurring significant
development costs. The N S P is certainly not in any hurry and its commercial position is
normally enhanced by delay.212
Allegations of a range of difficulties faced by e m b e d d e d generators have been examined in
a number of reviews. A report for the Council of Australian Governments' Energy Market
Review of 2002 claimed that these allegations were symptomatic of:
[L]imitations in the still evolving regulatory arrangements ... [and] inexperience, lack of
expertise and resource limitations of both network service providers (NSPs) and embedded
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N E C A , The National Electricity Market, op. cit.
A n example where a wind farm proponent was found to have been treated unfairly by a D N S P was
the dispute between Stanwell Corporation and T X U (the D N S P ) over connection of the Toora Wind
Farm in Victoria. The regulator found that TXU's price offered to Stanwell for connecting the wind
farm was excessive "in that it seeks to recover the costs of the shared distribution network, when
T X U is already remunerated for these costs". Office of the Regulator-General, Victoria, "Dispute
between Stanwell Corporation Ltd and T X U Networks Ltd: R e offer to connect an embedded
generator", Draft Decision, June 2001, Accessed 25 January 2003, <http://www.reggen.vic.gov.au/
PDF/2001/Draft Decision_Stanwell.pdfi>. This case was referred to in Australian Ecogeneration
Association, Submission: C O A G Energy Market Review, 19 April 2002, Accessed 6 August 2002,
<http://www.energymarketreview.org>.
Australian Ecogeneration Association, Submission: C O A G Energy Market Review, 2002, op. cit. See
also Australian Cogeneration Association, Removing Impediments to Cogeneration and Renewable
Generation in the National Electricity Market, Melbourne, June 2000.
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generation proponents in dealing with the range of commercial, technical and regulatory
provisions.213

As described above, some of the benefits claimed by embedded generation proponents were
problematic if applied to wind. T h e main benefit that wind power proponents did claim w a s
reduced network losses. If small-scale generators are connected to the distribution network,
the electrical flows through the transmission network and perhaps part of the distribution
network would be reduced, as long as local d e m a n d exceeded local generation. Reduced
electrical flows lead to reduced network losses and hence save m o n e y . W i n d power
proponents argued that they should benefit from these savings, particularly all of the
savings in Transmission Use of System ( T U O S ) costs.

This issue of network pricing has long been a contentious one for the restructured electricity
industry. It has been the subject of a number of reviews, and changes have been m a d e to
require D N S P s to pass on savings.215 T h e issue, however, has yet to be resolved to the
satisfaction of embedded generators—they continue to argue that the dominant position of
the network owners means that the principle of non-discriminatory access is not being fully
applied.216

Many of the embedded generators whose proponents were represented by the AEA have
operating characteristics similar to most conventional generators; that is, their output is
predictable and controllable. Yet the characteristics of wind generators are quite different to
those of conventional generators, making the principle of non-discriminatory access m o r e
problematic.

From the Network Service Provider's perspective, Keith Frearson argued:
•

Many windfarm proponents assume that wind farms will provide network benefits to

Charles River Associates, Distribution Network Barriers to Embedded Generation, Final Report
submitted to C O A G Energy Market Review, October 2002, p. 3, Accessed 26 January 2003,
<http://www.energymarketreview.org>.
Australian Wind Energy Association, Submission to C O A G Energy Market Review, April 2002,
Accessed 6 August 2002, <http://www.energymarketreview.org>.
For an overview of the history of this dispute, see Charles River Associates 2002, op. cit. See also
Colin Crawford-Smith, Mark Ellis, and Hugh Outhred, "Review of the Environmental Implications of
the National Electricity Market (NEM)", Report to the Department of the Environment, Sport and
Territories, May 1996.
Australian Ecogeneration Association, Submission: C O A G Energy Market Review, 2002, op. cit.
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Network Service Providers (NSPs) and that NSPs should contribute to Wind Farm
connection costs as a consequence of these benefits.
•

From a network engineering perspective, wind farms create numerous difficulties.

•

Need to develop a mutual understanding of the issues facing each of the parties.217

What then are the difficulties caused by wind power? Network issues associated with wind
p o w e r arise through a combination of its intermittency and its dependence on site-specific
conditions. M a n y sites with a significant wind resource are located in rural areas with w e a k
grids. Such grids cannot handle m u c h penetration of wind power. The penetration is limited
not only because the m a x i m u m ratings of the power lines and transformers restrict h o w
m u c h wind p o w e r can be connected, but also because the introduction of wind power can
adversely affect the p o w e r quality. In w e a k grids, changes in power flows can cause
significant changes in voltage levels in nearby locations on the network. T h e allowable
voltage changes in a network are specified in quality of supply standards: in Australia,
voltage levels are required to remain within ± 1 0 % of the nominal value, and voltage
fluctuations (or flicker) to be maintained within limits specified in Australian Standard
2279. 218

From the perspective of a network operator, the introduction of wind power into weak grids
can cause a n u m b e r of difficulties.219 Because the power output of wind turbines fluctuates
in response to variations in wind speed, wind turbines can cause changes in the steady-state
voltage level as well as flicker, possibly impacting on quality of supply.220 S o m e wind
farms have poor fault ride-through ability: that is, a short-lived large drop in voltage m a y
cause the wind farm to disconnect.221 This is considered very undesirable, as the loss of
wind generation can exacerbate the voltage problem. T h e National Electricity C o d e
specifies that generators must be capable of uninterrupted operation during faults of up to
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Keith Frearson, "Electrical interconnection issues for wind farms in Victoria", Presentation t
Electric Energy Society of Australia (Vic), 16 October 2002. Frearson works on power systems
analysis for Sinclair Knight Merz, a consultancy group.
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National Electricity Code Administrator, National Electricity Code, <http://www.neca.com.au>. Note
that the Australia Standard 2279, "Disturbances in mains supply networks - limitation of voltage
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219
A number of these issues were raised by Frearson, 2002, op. cit.
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0.175 seconds.222 This requirement is more easily met by synchronous generators (as used
in conventional generation) than by induction generators typically used in wind turbines.

Electricity networks were also designed for radial power flows—from generators to the
high voltage system, to medium voltages and d o w n to consumers at low voltage. The input
of wind power near the ends of networks could result in reverse power flows on the
networks. A s these networks were not designed for this, the voltage on parts of the network
m a y at times go beyond the specified limits.

Some of the problems associated with the use of wind turbines in weak grids can be
mitigated by the use of variable-speed wind turbines. Until recently, most grid-connected
wind turbines were constant-speed or two-speed.223 From the late 1990s, usage of variablespeed wind turbines increased. The latter incorporate power electronic converters to convert
variable A C power from the generator to grid-synchronous A C power. Variable-speed wind
turbines are more expensive, and incur additional losses in the converter. The power
electronic converters m a y produce harmonic distortions on the voltage waveform, possibly
requiring more expensive filtering. Variable-speed wind turbines, however, have
operational advantages. They operate more efficiently over a range of wind speeds, and part
of the energy from gusts can be stored as rotational kinetic energy. Their variations in
output are not as large as those for fixed speed wind turbines. They offer improved power
quality, particularly the reduction of flicker, and the control of power factor.

A different type of problem may arise if very large wind capacity is envisaged. Some
regions of Australia have an immense wind resource, far in excess of the local demand or
the capacity of the local electricity network. W i n d farm developers seeking to exploit these
resources and sell wind power into the electricity market must then ensure that n e w
electricity networks are built. The question then arises as to w h o is to pay for this n e w
infrastructure.

Following the MRET-inspired 'wind rush', many wind farm developers were seeking
resolution of this question. For example, several developers were planning wind farms for
the Eyre Peninsula in South Australia, a region with an excellent wind resource but one that

National Electricity Code Schedule 5.2.
The two-speed wind turbine uses a pole-changing generator.
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required several hundred kilometres of transmission line. These developers were expected
to pay the cost of transmission capacity themselves, since the generator access provisions in
the National Electricity Code required n e w generators to pay the long run marginal cost of
network augmentation. W i n d power proponents argued that this expectation meant that they
were not been treated equitably with existing coal-fired generators. For example, the
Australian Ecogeneration Association ( A E A ) noted that a proposed 250 M W transmission
line between South Australia and N S W (dubbed SNI) was to be given regulated status,
since it was deemed to have 'net market benefit'. This meant that S A electricity customers
would pay for it. N S W coal generators would therefore gain access to a n e w market without
incurring any cost for that access, while wind power generators seeking access to the same
market would have to pay the network costs.224

8.4.3 Overview
At the time of writing, debates over the technical capability and thus the value of wind
power to the electricity system are only just re-emerging in Australia, although m a n y
lessons are being drawn from experience in Europe, where there are already m u c h higher
local wind power penetrations in some regions. Not all European experiences can be
transferred to Australia, however, as Australia has a much sparser, more weakly-connected
electricity network.

It is not clear at this stage how the issues under debate will be resolved. However, the
groups n o w supporting wind power c o m m a n d significantly more resources than in the
previous period, and are better placed to influence the outcome.

8.5 Conclusion
This period saw substantial shifts in the context for wind power deployment: the greenhouse
effect became a public policy issue; and the electricity industry was restructured. These
shaped the type of mechanisms that were introduced to support wind power. Furthermore,
wind power technology had matured, with its cost and performance improving significantly.

The introduction of the MRET and to a lesser extent green power has led to a rapid
224

Australian Ecogeneration Association, Submission: COAG Energy Market Review, 2002, op. cit

improvement in the fortunes of wind power. M a n y n e w players have entered the industry,
some commanding significant resources. Most governments are n o w backing wind power
developments. Yet there are some similarities with the previous period. In particular, the
network service providers are able to specify the terms of connection, although their
decisions can be overturned by a regulatory authority. Debates over the technical capability
of wind power are still unresolved, although these debates are being conducted from a
position of greater experience with operating wind power facilities. Such experience should
contribute towards settling some of the debates; however, this will not resolve contentious
issues over w h o pays for network augmentation and ancillary services, and what are
appropriate operating standards for the electricity system. H o w such debates are resolved
will depend on the strategies of the various players involved. Because they are a m o n g the
range of n e w players entering the electricity industry, today's wind power proponents are
much better placed to influence these developments than were those of the earlier period.

This chapter has shown how a contextual analysis can be combined with an analysis of the
interpretative flexibility of wind power. In particular, I have shown h o w assumptions about
appropriate levels of wind power penetration, and the value placed upon wind power are
contingent upon operating standards and practices. Such standards and practices are still in
flux, and subject to debate. Thus while significant changes to the context have improved the
fortunes of wind power, h o w wind power is deployed and what levels are integrated into the
existing system will depend on h o w these debates over the technical capability of wind
power are resolved.
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Chapter 9: Discussion and Conclusions
9.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I ask h o w well the social shaping of technology (SST) approaches reviewed
in chapter 2 enables us to explain this history of wind power in Australia. M y aim is not to
seek a single S S T approach to explain this history; rather I acknowledge that all approaches
reviewed have their strengths and seek to integrate them into a consistent framework.

In section 9.2, I explore requirements for an explanation of the treatment of wind power.
Section 9.3 comprises an analysis of h o w compatible wind power has been with the
electricity system. In section 9.4 I analyse the institutional interests built into the Australian
electricity sector, and ask h o w the introduction of wind power would affect these interests.
In section 9.5, I explore the strategies that actors have employed to further the uptake of
wind power. Section 9.6 deals with the meaning of wind power, in particular the two
themes raised in this thesis: what it means for wind power to be regarded as an
environmental technology; and the question of the efficacy of wind power. W h a t have I
added to this history by making these themes explicit? In section 9.7 I ask whether it was
inevitable that wind power was, and still remains, a marginal technology. I conclude in
section 9.8 by asking briefly what lessons can wind power advocates learn from this study.

9.2 Requirements for an Explanation of the Treatment of Wind Power
In this account of the history of wind power in Australia, I have sought to demonstrate that
no simple explanatory framework can deal with the complexity of this history. The
treatment of wind power cannot be explained merely by recourse to a technological and
economic logic, nor is it a simple outcome of the organisational structure and the sociopolitical context of the electricity industry. It cannot be explained merely as an outcome of
strategies by wind power proponents and other players. Nor is it sufficient merely to invoke
the changing agenda on environment policy. All of these themes are important, and I have
drawn on all, while also incorporating the observation that various groups interpret wind
power differently. W i n d power technology has long been considered an environmental
technology. In this thesis I have explored what this has meant for different groups, h o w
such interpretations have changed over time, and implications for the adoption of wind
power technology. Groups have also differed in their assessments or expectations of the
technical capability of wind power. I have sought to account for these differing evaluations,
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and to evaluate the implications for the adoption of wind p o w e r technology.

In section 2.3,1 explored the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) approach, which
has been used to explain the innovation of n e w technologies. S C O T emphasises the
interpretative flexibility of technologies, and negotiations a m o n g relevant social groups in
reconciling differing meanings, problems and solutions. I suggested that this could be useful
in studying h o w negotiations over different meanings affect usage patterns of a n e w
technology, such as wind power. I find S C O T useful in dealing with the complexities of
change

including

contingencies

and

constraints, and

in

incorporating

differing

interpretations of the attributes of socio-technologies. Yet, as described in section 2.3,
S C O T has s o m e shortcomings and omissions. In particular, as Stewart Russell and I argued
in a recent paper, approaches such as S C O T , which d r a w primarily o n agency as an
explanatory principle, fail to deal adequately with structural constraints:
[We aim] to show the limitations of an overemphasis on strategies, design and purposive
action, rather than routine practices; on groups actively mobilising resources rather than
benefiting from the normal operation of social systems; on exercises of power rather than
the effects of structures of domination; on individual motivation rather than ideologies or
shared beliefs or patterns of thinking. For those committed to a contextual approach, action
frameworks leave key questions unanswered: they cannot explain observed patterns and
continuities in sociotechnical practice and outcomes; they tend to overstate the malleability
of sociotechnical arrangements and see the possibilities available to system builders as
unrestricted; they produce accounts which are ultimately limited to complex descriptions;
and they see outcomes as products solely of interactions among groups, or relations within
a network—that is, they cannot show how patterns in technologies reflect broader social
structures, contribute to their maintenance, or may lead to their transformation.1

In recent work, Wiebe Bijker outlined a framework in which he acknowledged the need to
incorporate action- and structure-oriented explanatory principles. Bijker proposed that a
theory of sociotechnical change should:
•

allow for both stability and changes in organisations and technologies;

•

explain the success and failure of technologies symmetrically, without recourse to
categorising them as working or not working—these should be the explanandum

not the

explanans;

Stewart Russell and Andrea Bunting, "Privatisation, electricity markets and renewable energy
technologies", m Andrew Jamison and Harald Rohracher (eds), Technology Studies and Sustainable
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allow for strategies of actors and contingency of outcomes, as well as structural
constraints;

•

not assume a priori distinctions about what factors should be regarded as, for example,
social, technical or political.2

My intention is to use Bijker's framework to build on a more structural account, rather than
using his proposed theory as the starting point. I argue that, because this account of wind
power does not deal primarily with the micro level (as Bijker's case studies did), an
emphasis on structures is more appropriate. It is certainly possible to construct an
explanation that places m o r e emphasis on structures, while recognising that structures are
the product of previously successful strategies, need to be maintained, and can be changed
as a result of actors' strategies. A n d , of course, the interests of actors m a y change over time,
partly as a result of events implicated in sociotechnical change.3 It is important both to
incorporate such changes, and to recognise stable patterns.

Thus, while I have traced institutional changes to the electricity supply industry (ESI), and
m o v e s towards system hybridisation, I find that continuities and patterns in these
institutions need emphasising. Indeed, by analysing a period of change, one m a y be better
able to identify what it is that remains stable. For example, some commentators were
critical of the electricity utilities' commitment to large centralised coal or hydro power
stations.4 However, it seems likely that the utilities were more committed to maintaining
control over electricity supply. Similarly, enduring aspects of the ESI's sociopolitical role
can be identified by observing whose interests it continues to serve throughout a period of
change. O n the other hand, long-term shifts can also be identified. For example, the utilities
traditionally treated reliability as its foremost priority; but with the gradual shift from a
technological to a commercial focus, a price c a m e to be placed on reliability.

I also find it useful to heed Bijker's requirement that the working (or efficacy) of a

2

3

4

Development, Profil, Munich, 2002.
Wiebe E. Bijker, Of Bicycles, Bakelites, and Bulbs: Towards a Theory of Sociotechnical Change,
M I T Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1995.
John L a w and Wiebe E. Bijker, "Postscript: technology, stability and social theory", in Wiebe E.
Bijker and John L a w (eds), Shaping Technology / Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical
Change, M I T Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1992.
See for example Gavin Gilchrist, The Big Switch: Clean Energy for the Twenty-first Century, Allen &
Unwin, St. Leonards, N S W , 1994.

technology, along with other measures of its performance, be treated as an achievement
rather than an intrinsic property, since this prompts us to explore contested knowledge
claims. In this study, m a n y such claims relate to the significance of wind power's technical
characteristics, such as intermittency and diffuseness. H o w different groups interpret the
efficacy of wind power can then be related to the structural location, interests and belief
patterns of these groups. The aim then is not to determine w h o w a s right: for example,
whether the electricity utilities of the 1980s were justified in dismissing wind power as
unsuitable because of its technical characteristics, or whether alternative interpretations of
wind power's efficacy presented by wind power advocates were more reasonable. Indeed,
both groups had m u c h to learn about the operation of wind systems. W e can, however,
recognise that the characteristics of conventional technologies—those entrenched within an
existing system—have come to be regarded as the norm because the system has evolved
around these characteristics. This can place n e w technologies with different characteristics
at a disadvantage. But such handicaps are notfixed.A s systems change or encounter n e w
constraints, or as more becomes k n o w n about the n e w technology following greater
operating experience, the significance of these characteristics can be reassessed, casting the
efficacy of a n e w technology in a n e w light. Periods of upheaval, in particular, can open up
opportunities for n e w technologies. For example, difficulties encountered in building n e w
power lines such as securing finance and obtaining planning approval, along with the entry
of n e w players into the electricity industry, have led to decentralised generators increasingly
being regarded as an alternative to network augmentation.5

Incorporating the idea of contested knowledge claims certainly adds to the richness of this
account. Yet, to understand h o w the structural location of wind power advocates and other
groups affects whether and h o w their knowledge claims influence decision-making (at the
same time acknowledging that their location, influence and knowledge claims m a y change
over time) requires a more structural approach. The focus then turns to the question of what
resources these groups can deploy to influence change.6

Does this then mean that the 'true' technical characteristics of, say, a wind turbine cannot b
known, and that w e can have no recourse to such characteristics w h e n explaining the

This argument is more often applied to non-intermittent forms of decentralised generation.
Hans K. Klein and Daniel Lee Kleinman, "The social construction of technology: structural
considerations", Science, Technology and Human Values, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2002, pp. 28-52.
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fortunes of wind power? A s discussed in chapter 2, I do not take such an epistemological
relativist position. M y concern is with contested knowledge claims. For example, the groups
that I studied7 do not dispute that wind is an intermittent power source; it is the significance
of this characteristic for the operation of the electricity system, in particular the value and
appropriate role of wind power, that is disputed.

Referring to Bijker's third point, I find than an emphasis on the strategies of actors and
contingency of outcomes is problematic if w e do not acknowledge that structural constraints
place limitations on what is likely, and that structures can be both constraining and
enabling. O n the other hand, analyses of periods w h e n systems are in flux illustrate
problems associated with using only a structural framework. It is likely that during such
times w e can see most clearly h o w strategies of actors shape outcomes, while at the same
time w e can recognise that structural constraints limit what change is possible. O f course,
apparent constraints can be overcome as a result of actors' successful strategies, including
during times w h e n systems are seemingly stable.8

We cannot fully understand in advance the nature of structures and how they enable or
constrain except in a very general sense—actors learn about constraints and possibilities as
they challenge structures. A s noted in section 2.3.3, there are limits to the value of an
unengaged analysis. That is, to understand h o w established systems maintain their
dominance requires that they not only be observed, but also be provoked through challenge
by alternatives. A n example is h o w capitalist society might achieve amelioration of
environmental problems. A s described in section 6.3.2, ecological modernisation theory
suggests h o w economic growth and environmental protection might be regarded as
compatible, recasting the traditional view that they were mutually exclusive. Yet,
capitalism's requirement for economic growth is seen as constraining the ways in which
amelioration of environmental problems can be achieved. This constraint can be better
understood by testing the limits of 'green capitalism'.

Instead of merely analysing actors' strategies, we need to analyse strategies in terms of
actors' ability to access and mobilise resources, while recognising that their strategies can

7

8

See section 2.3.5 for discussion about how analysts' preconceptions influence how they decide who
are the appropriate groups to study.
See discussion in section 2.2.4 about whether system stability should be presumed as the norm.
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have varying degrees of success. H a n s Klein and Daniel Kleinman described four types of
resource: economic, political, cultural, and those deriving from technological legacy.9 I
illustrate these with reference to the case study.

The ability to access and mobilise economic resources may be regarded as necessary but
insufficient as an explanation. For example, early wind power advocates comprised
individuals, environment associations, small companies and small agencies, all of w h o
could mobilise few economic resources. After mechanisms to promote wind power were
introduced, the group of wind power advocates changed composition significantly. Entering
the industry were large companies and financiers, w h o could mobilise significant economic
resources. But this does not explain the shift in wind power policy that led to these larger
players entering the field.

Political resources refer to the capacity to shape policy outcomes. These may arise from
organisational arrangements within the state.10 For example, as described in chapter 5 and 8,
wind power developers wishing to connect to the grid were required to gain permission
from the electricity utilities; hence the utilities had the power to prevent the development. In
some states, organisational arrangements saw responsibility for renewable energy placed in
the hands of agencies other than the electricity utilities, such as the Victorian Solar Energy
Council ( V S E C ) and the Energy Authority of N S W . This probably led to a better outcome
for renewable energy. Yet the ability to harness political resources is also an outcome of
past successful strategies. The establishment of agencies dedicated to renewable energy,
such as V S E C , was one such outcome. Over time, the renewable energy industry has sought
more effective forms of representation to improve its political resources. T h e recent
establishment of the Business Council for Sustainable Energy is the latest in this process.
Even in the 1980s, w h e n the prospects for wind power were not favourable, the research
and lobbying strategies of the Australasian W i n d Energy Association ( A u s W E A M a r k I)
were partly instrumental in putting wind power on the policy agenda.

Cultural resources refer to what is taken for granted as legitimate, normal or correct:
Actors who are in a position to draw on such cultural resources in their effort to promote a
particular meaning of an artifact often have an advantage over those who wish to challenge

9
10

Klein and Kleinman, 2002, op. cit.
ibid.
ibid.
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what is widely taken for granted.11
W e can see this clearly in recent disputes over the development of wind farms in scenic
locations: wind farm developers have been successful in promoting wind turbines as
environmentally benign power generators, while discrediting an alternative view of wind
turbines as visually intrusive industrial plants. Their success has been in part because they
have latched onto and reinforced a long-standing, popular interpretation of wind power, one
that has also been in accord with the view promulgated by governments wishing to appear
both green and pro-development. A n earlier example is where the electricity utilities were
seen as the legitimate bodies to undertake assessment of power generation options,
including wind power, making it difficult for alternative assessments presented by wind
power advocates to gain a hearing.

Resources described as technological legacies refer to how proponents of a new technology
can be more successful in promoting a particular meaning of a technology if they link it to a
popular existing technology.12 Here w e can see h o w wind power proponents have linked
large-scale wind facilities to small-scale renewable energy options such as photovoltaic
systems and solar water heaters. In a converse fashion, opponents of wind farms sited in
rural locations have sought to discredit wind power by linking wind turbines to unpopular
technologies, such as large-scale industrial facilities and power transmission lines.

Finally, how useful is Bijker's 'seamless web' requirement—the avoidance of assuming a
priori distinctions between the social, the technical, etc? It is certainly important to
recognise, for example, that electricity systems comprise not only generators, wires and
electrical equipment, but also organisations, markets, regulations, consumers, values,
meanings and ideologies. Judgments about the efficacy of wind power depend on these
socio-cultural factors as well as the hardware. Inter-organisational relationships and
ownership arrangements; the establishment of a green electricity market; mechanisms by
which electricity supply and demand are balanced; quality of supply standards; the value
placed on lost load; the view of electricity as a social necessity; the dominance of technical
and/or economic imperatives; the legitimacy conferred to arrangements in the ESI: all
influenced h o w wind power was assessed. Because such socio-cultural factors influence
h o w electricity systems are operated, they influence the effect of wind power on the

12

b d.' vv 45^16 I suggest that technological legacies can be considered a subset of cultural resources.
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operating parameters of electricity systems.

Another example is how I have treated the descriptor 'environmental technology' as both
sociopolitical and technical, not only because environmental knowledge can be subjected to
a social constructivist analysis, but also because the portrayal of an artefact as an
environmental technology embodies normative ideas of what sociopolitical role the artefact
plays. For example, wind power is n o w associated with 'green capitalism' rather than with
ideas of social change associated with the alternative technology movement.

The idea of a seamless web cautions one against seeking simple social, political, economic,
legal or technical explanations for the assessment and treatment of a n e w technology. It
emphasises that what are traditionally taken to be technical characteristics are in part
socially constructed and contingent. It also avoids the assumption that social structures are
fixed and unaffected by technical change. T o that extent, the idea of a seamless w e b is
useful. But I concur with the argument m a d e by Klein and Kleinman that this metaphor
should not be taken to the extent where it precludes analysis:
At any given point in time ... it is analytically possible to stop the process and ascertain, at
least tentatively, what is affecting what.13
Thus, I argue, w e need to draw on social and technical categories in constructing an
explanation, while also recognising their contingency.

9.3 The Compatibility of Wind Power with the Electricity System
B y employing a contextual analysis of the treatment of wind power, I have emphasised h o w
the sociotechnical characteristics of the existing electricity system influence h o w a n e w
technology such as wind power is assessed, and whether and h o w it is deployed. I have
shown h o w those responsible for the operation of electricity systems (including networks)
have typically viewed wind power as a nuisance because of the effect of wind's
intermittency and diffuseness on the operation of other system components.

In section 2.2.5, I described the four elements of a framework, proposed by Thomas
Baumgartner and T o m B u m s , for analysing h o w compatible a n e w technology m a y be with
an existing sociotechnical system. Using this framework, w e can identify ways in which
13

ibid, 2002, p. 35.
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wind power m a y be incompatible with Australia's electricity system.

Technology and material infrastructure
Australia has an advanced technological base; hence the development of facilities to manufacture, install, repair and maintain wind turbines should not present a problem (particularly
given that the design of the technology is likely to be imported). However, m a n y potential
wind farm sites are remote from industrial centres, and local facilities m a y be inadequate.
Because of the large size of wind turbines, installation is particularly problematic: for
example, very large cranes are required. Manufacture of wind turbine blades requires
specialised facilities, and because they are very long they are difficult to transport. Towers
can be manufactured using the existing technological base, but they too are cumbersome to
transport. Although Australia has large areas with high winds, m a n y are remote from
population centres. Hence, m a n y of these areas are serviced by weak grids, which without
grid augmentation are limited in h o w m u c h wind power they can absorb without
contravening quality of supply standards. A n extensive grid network is a disadvantage to
the use of stand-alone wind power systems, a form of the technology advocated by some
early environmentalists and wind power advocates, as described in chapters 3 and 5.

Cultural infrastructure
W i n d power m a y violate electricity industry norms, particularly power engineers'
assumptions about what constitutes a power plant, and the consequent ways in which
electricity networks are designed and operated. Australian power plants are typically very
large and centralised. The average output of a wind farm is a small fraction of that of a
typical coal-fired generator. The nature of the resource means that wind power plants are
physically decentralised, and thus m a y be embedded in the distribution network. Electricity
grids were designed for radial electricity flows from centralised generators, with equipment
designed to deal with the associated voltage drops. Reverse electricity flows from an
embedded generator introduce n e w operating requirements.

Power system operators expect to control power output to meet demand; rarely do they
control demand to match available supply. (Electricity utilities in the main have done little
to implement demand side management. Since ESI restructuring there have been
opportunities to control demand indirectly through price signals, as the pool price is set
half-hourly. However, as described in chapter 8, half-hour intervals are too wide to match
wind variation with demand.) Power engineers distinguish between base-load, intermediate
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and peaking plant, with base-load running continuously at nearly constant load and the
others for shorter periods to meet d e m a n d variation. Yet wind is a highly variable energy
source: a wind power plant is not controllable in the usual sense, and its output is quite
unpredictable. From the perspective of the operation of other plant, the inclusion of wind
power is equivalent to an additional, and relatively unpredictable, variation in demand.
S o m e base load plant such as Victoria's brown coal-fired power stations is very inflexible;
thus wind power on the system increases the load-following demands on peaking plant. All
in all, these characteristics of wind power are at odds with traditional assumptions about
h o w a power station should function.

With the restructuring of the ESI, the introduction of an electricity market, the partial
hybridisation of the electricity system, and the entry of n e w players, m a n y of these industry
norms have been (and are still being) reviewed. Whether n e w norms are established that are
more favourable for wind power depends, I suggest, on the strategies of wind p o w e r
proponents during this time of review. O n the other hand, other actors will be seeking m o r e
favourable terms for other n e w and conventional technologies.14

Organisational and social infrastructure
A s described in chapters 4 and 7, decision making about electricity supply w a s until the mid
1990s in the hands of publicly owned, vertically integrated electricity utilities. Private
generation w a s discouraged through stringent requirements for grid connection and low
buyback prices set by the electricity utilities. Private generators were financially
disadvantaged compared with public utilities since they incurred higher interest rates, faced
greater investment risk, needed to m a k e a profit, and had m o r e difficulty obtaining long
term financing.15 Mostly, the electricity utilities showed little interest in using wind power
other than for a few applications in remote areas. T h e principal energy research funding
bodies were dominated by those with an interest in conventional energy sources. Advocates
of wind power were typically outsiders, w h o had little influence on the existing ESI.

14

15

For a British example see Mark Winskel, "When systems are overthrown: the 'dash for gas' in the
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A s described in chapter 7, the greenhouse agenda gave n e w impetus to wind power;
however, existing players dependent on fossil fuels had success in ensuring that the federal
government's response to demands for reductions in greenhouse gas emissions remained
weak. T h e restructuring of the ESI has altered organisational infrastructure, providing some
opportunities for wind power proponents. But while the restructuring of the ESI was
promoted as offering opportunities for n e w players and small-scale generation, the process
w a s dominated by existing players, whose interests were well represented in the n e w
structure and market operating rules. H o w this has affected wind power was described in
chapter 8. For example, since wind power plants are typically embedded generators, they
need to be connected to the distribution network, which is controlled by existing players.
Another example is the separation of system operation and generation, with the variability
of wind dealt with through purchase of ancillary services at prices determined by market
forces. At the time of writing, n e w players are trying to influence the market operating
rules. The outcome remains to be seen.

External support structures and institutions
External institutions have been of little assistance to wind power. For example, engineering
curricula have long covered conventional generating technologies; but rarely were
engineers schooled in the design and operation of renewable energy technologies. Local
councils were rarely familiar with the technology and until recently did not have in place
planning and regulatory guidelines; hence potential developers of wind power often face
problems gaining planning permission. (See section 6.5.) Each installation was treated on an
ad hoc basis, although this started to change in the early 2000s as wind farm developers put
pressure on governments to develop consistent guidelines. Writing in the mid 1980s based
on her experience in planning for the installation of N S W ' s first medium-sized wind
generator at Malabar (described in section 5.4.4), Muriel Watt described some of the legal,
regulatory and economic issues hindering the development of wind power:
•

wind users had no guaranteed access to the wind;

•

wind turbines were classified as 'electricity generating stations' and thus could be
installed only in land zoned for industrial use;

•

lack of regulations specifically dealing with the installation of wind turbines led to
individual interpretations of planning regulations;

•

council planners often applied the most stringent regulations to n e w technologies;

•

environmental impact assessments had been required for every proposed wind turbine
installation, adding to the cost and time required;
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the electricity utility required parallel generators to connect at high voltage adding
greatly to the cost of a wind turbine.

Australia's recent 'wind rush', which has arisen following the establishment of green p o w e r
schemes and the Mandatory Renewable Energy Target, has seen wind p o w e r proponents
and governments apply pressure to these external support structures and institutions.
Change is n o w underway to improve external support for wind power.

In section 2.2.5,1 also introduced Mikael Hard and Andrew Jamison's analysis of symbolic,
organisational and behavioural reinforcing structures of existing technologies, which
alternative technologies must overcome. 17 H o w did these reinforcing structures appear from
the perspective of the Australian electricity utilities, the bodies that usually m a d e the
decisions about the deployment of wind power? A s described in chapters 4 and 5, in the
1980s they were mainly negative. W i n d power symbolised environmental values, which the
utilities viewed as a constraint on their operations; smallness at a time w h e n utilities were
favouring increasingly larger generating units to achieve economies of scale and forecasting
high growth rates to serve n e w applications and expected industrial expansion; and
uncontrollability and unpredictability w h e n utilities were treating control of supply-side as
essential. In most cases, wind power advocates failed to secure support from the electricity
utilities: only in Western Australia did the utility w o r k closely with a wind turbine
manufacturer—Westwind.

Following the restructuring of the industry, there were significant changes to organisational
structures. S o m e electricity companies, both old and n e w players, are trying to develop a
'greener' image to differentiate themselves in the n e w market. For example, generating
companies such as Pacific Hydro Ltd and Hydro Tasmania portray themselves as renewable
energy companies; 18 while s o m e electricity retailers are seeking a greener image through
promotion of green power and other forms of renewable energy.19 T h e strong symbolic

16

18

19

Muriel Watt, "Planning for the installation of a wind generator", International Solar Energy Society
(Australian and New Zealand Section) Annual Conference, Sydney, 14-15 November 1985, pp. 114-123.
Mikael Hard and Andrew Jamison, "Alternative cars: the contrasting stories of steam and diesel
automotive engines", Technology in Society, Vol. 19, No. 2,1997, pp. 145-160.
Hydro Tasmania—formerly part of the Hydro-Electric Corporation—uses the logo is "the renewable
energy business". Pacific Hydro's wind power activities were described in chapters 6 and 8.
For example, the electricity retailer Origin Energy commissioned a report that recommended
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association of wind power and other forms of renewable energy with environmental values
has n o w b e c o m e a positive reinforcing feature. T h e ESI restructuring also means that the
behavioural changes associated with use of wind power, particularly those arising from its
uncontrollability and unpredictability, are not such an issue: the companies generating or
retailing wind power are organisationally quite separate from those responsible for system
operation.20 These changes m a k e it easier for wind power to overcome the symbolic,
organisational and behavioural reinforcing structures of existing technologies.

9.4 Institutional Interests
9.4.1 Introduction
A s described in section 2.2.1, Stewart Russell proposed an analysis of the institutional
interests built into the electricity sector. In this section I ask: W h o have been the dominant
interests in the electricity sector and h o w have these interests changed over time? In what
w a y s has the deployment of wind power been threatening or beneficial to these dominant
interests?

A useful starting point is J.K. Benson's analysis of public policy sectors. Benson argued
that a public policy sector is a multileveled social structure. A t the surface level are the
policy paradigm, administrative arrangements and resource dependencies

between

organisations within the sector. These surface level arrangements are constrained by 'rules'
at a deeper level: the interests and power structures embedded in the sector, and the rules of
structure formation. Changes at the surface level occur w h e n a contradiction develops
between it and the constraints of the deeper level. Surface level changes seldom threaten the
interests and power structures, nor m o v e beyond the boundaries set at the deeper level or
they will soon be brought into line.21 In analysing deeper rules, Benson argued thatfirstthe
structured interests embedded in the sector need identifying:
The structured interests are those groups whose interests are built into the sector, either
negatively or positively, in the sense that the operation of the sector serves or conflicts with

20
21
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See chapter 8 regarding the effect of intermittent generation such as w m d power on system operation.
J K Benson, "A framework for policy analysis", in D. L. Rogers and D. A. Whetten (eds),
Interorganizational Coordination: Theory, Research and Implementation, Iowa State University
Press, Iowa, 1982.
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their interests.
Benson pointed to the following interest groups: d e m a n d

groups, support groups,

administrative groups, provider groups and coordinating groups.

Such interest groups can be identified for the Australian electricity sector.
•

D e m a n d groups are the various groups of electricity customers. These should not be
treated as unified, for these groups' interests are built into the sector quite differently. It
is possible to differentiate between industrial, commercial, domestic or farm customers;
large, medium-sized or small customers; and urban, rural or remote customers. O n e can
also differentiate between lucrative customers and those the utilities d e e m a burden.

•

Support groups provide financial and political resources for the sector. These include
state governments, state energy departments, and electricity customers, particularly
large industrial users. Here too are found groups that benefit from the E S I and thus
provide support for it: communities and workers dependent on the industry, and their
political representatives; the fossil fuel industry; equipment suppliers; and the electrical
appliance industry.

•

Administrative groups include the managers of electricity utilities and other energy
agencies, such as state and federal energy departments, including agencies responsible
for renewable energy. Benson noted that administrative groups "have a structured
interest in maintaining and/or extending their spheres of control".25

•

Provider groups engage in the delivery of services or the conduct of programs. Benson
cited occupational groups w h o have an interest in maintaining and extending their
control over certain jobs and organisations. Groups of interest here include builders and
operators of conventional power stations, and utility engineers, w h o s e technocratic
ideology permeated the utilities.

•

Coordinating groups are "groups engaged in the rationalization of programs within and
between sectors".26 A s described in chapters 4 and 7, such groups c a m e to the fore
during the 1990s restructuring of the ESI, although s o m e also played a role during the
1980s. They included some state governments and energy departments, particularly in

ibid., p. 154.
Stephen Graham and Simon Marvin, "Cherry picking and social dumping", Utilities Policy, Vol. 34
No. 2, 1994, pp. 113-119.
Benson, 1982, op. cit.
ibid., p. 157.
ibid., p. 158.
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Victoria and N S W , and from the late 1980s the federal energy department. Neoliberal
economists and their supporters also urged the rationalisation of the sector; they were
particularly influential in the 1990s.

The arrangement of these structured interests constitutes the power structure underlying the
sector:
The operation of the sector tends to serve some interests and subordinate others. Changes in
administrative arrangements and policy paradigm that threaten established interests in some
fundamental way are generally stifled, contained, or modified. Changes in administrative
arrangements and policy paradigms, as a general rule, preserve the structure of dominance.27
A n analysis of the p o w e r structure requires an understanding of the limits on the policy
sector operation, or as B e n s o n termed it, the "rules of structure formation". O n e then
examines w h a t role the sector plays within the larger social formation.
In the case of advanced capitalist societies [the requirements of the larger social formation]
stem in part from the changing demands of capital accumulation and legitimation ... These
limits would vary between sectors and would depend upon the location of the sector
relative to the core problems of accumulation and legitimation.28

9.4.2 Institutional Interests Built into the Australian Electricity Sector
Applying Benson's framework to the analysis of the Australian ESI, I ask what were the
dominant interests served by the industry and what w a s the industry's broader sociopolitical
and economic role.29 1 then ask h o w the dominant interests and the broader role of the
industry might have been challenged by the introduction of wind power, and conversely
w h o s e interests were served by greater use of wind power. H o w have all of the above
shifted over time, and what has been driving this shift?

The proclaimed role of the electricity utilities was to provide a reliable, secure, safe and
cheap supply of electricity to business and the public, and promote growth in electricity use.
O v e r time the expected role has changed only slightly with cost becoming an overriding

27
28

29

ibid., p. 159.
.
bid p 161 Marxists refer to the accumulation and legitimation functions of the state. The
accumulation function is about providing the conditions for capitalist enterprises to grow and be
profitable. The legitimation function is about providing the conditions (welfare, services, etc.) such
that the population accepts the capitalist system as legitimate.
See also Stewart Russell, "Writing energy history: explaining the neglect of C H P / D H m Britain",
British Journal of the History ofScience, Vol. 26, 1993, pp. 33-54.
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criterion. For example, since ESI restructuring, it has been acknowledged that ensuring a
highly reliable supply imposes an additional cost, which s o m e customers m a y not wish to
pay. Electricity companies have also been questioning the cost of maintenance required for
a safe, reliable supply—or, one could argue, putting short-term profitsfirst.30T h e other
significant change is that environmental demands have slightly tempered h o w the
requirement for growth is portrayed, leading to acknowledgment being given, albeit often
only lip service, to curtailing electricity demand.

As described in section 4.4, the ESI was traditionally an instrument of state government
policy: it was used to attract and support industry thereby underpinning economic growth,
and to further the government's social objectives. Thus it contributed to both the
accumulation and legitimation functions of the state. H o w these two functions shape state
policy has been studied by James O'Connor, a neo-Marxist analyst of the state. In his
analysis of the U S A , O'Connor divided expenditures required to support accumulation into
'social investment' and 'social consumption'. Social investment comprises expenditures
that increase productivity and thus industry's rate of profit; while social consumption
comprises expenditures that reduce the reproduction cost of labour. O'Connor termed
expenditures that support legitimation 'social expenses': these are the non-productive
expenditures that maintain social cohesion and harmony. 31 State provision of electricity
supply served all of these purposes. It was a form of social investment: the provision of
cheap plentiful supplies of electricity supported the growth of industry. Indeed the state had
taken over the function of electricity supply as the private sector had proved unable to fulfill
this function adequately. It was a form of social consumption: near-universal provision of
electricity supply to the populace reduced the cost of the reproduction of labour, eventually
becoming virtually a social necessity. It was also a form of social expense, as the state used
the ESI to meet various social objectives: uniform tariffs and rural electrification secured
support in non-urban areas; subsidised electricity aided welfare recipients; and high
employment in the electricity industry particularly in regional areas helped to stabilise
employment levels.

How have these functions changed over time, particularly with the ESI restructuring?
30

ntators claimed that some equipment failures were due to inadequate maintenance performed
•-cutting' electricity utilities. For example, David Humphries and Andrew Clennell, "Putting
before efficient service' gets the blame", Sydney Morning Herald, 24 February 1998 p 5
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In the early 1980s, neoliberal critics of public ownership of the E S I argued in effect that the
p e n d u l u m had s w u n g too far towards the legitimation function: the state w a s using the
utilities to favour non-business interest groups at the expense of providing cheap electricity
to business. Australian advocate of privatisation, Michael G. Porter argued:
The evidence suggests that the main reason for state ownership of electricity utilities, such
as the State Electricity Commission of Victoria (SECV), is to facilitate non-market price
and distributional objectives which enable the regulators, and, behind them, the political
decision makers, to achieve outcomes which would cost them more under private ownership. Public utilities have no (explicit) claimants on their residual income, and so there is no
obvious incentive for managers to maximise profits or minimise costs. The absence of these
constraints appeals to many in the political-bureaucratic process, since it facilitates diversion of benefits to particular interest groups without obvious reporting of the procedure.32
Neoliberal commentators cited several problems with the structure of the ESI: e m p l o y m e n t
in the industry w a s too high, and the additional cost w a s being borne by customers through
high electricity tariffs; industrial unrest w a s rife resulting in too frequent electricity outages;
investment decision-making w a s being influenced by political pressures leading to high
tariffs; and cross-subsidies were disadvantaging m a n y business customers. Indeed, concerns
about cross-subsidies between different customer groups had been raised by commentators
for m a n y years. T h e m a i n beneficiaries of cross-subsidies, it w a s claimed, were domestic
customers, particularly those in rural areas and social security recipients. Large industrial
electricity customers were also able to secure low tariffs. T h e m a i n losers were commercial
customers and smaller industrial customers, w h o incurred the highest tariffs.33

Other critics claimed that the electricity utilities had become self-serving, expansionist
bureaucracies, which in turn suited their political masters. Aynsley Kellow argued:
Public electrical utilities became monuments to expansionist electricity planning, supported
by prodevelopment politics, which militated against searching political scrutiny because
politicians wanted to be able to deliver the benefits the construction and operation of an
expanded electricity system would bring to their constituents ... The strategic location of
utilities ... allowed them to push for expansion long after it ceased to be necessary or
desirable ... M a n y utilities yielded to the temptation to forecast ever-expanding demand

31
32

33

James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State, St. Martin's Press, N e w York, 1973.
Michael G. Porter, Private Resource Development and Public Electricity Supply, Centre of Policy
Studies, Monash University, 1983, pp. 13-14.
For an overview see Stephen Rosenthal and Peter Russ, The Politics of Power: Inside Australia's
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because it served the goals of organisational maintenance or expansion. It was not just that
demand forecasts were self-fulfilling prophesies; it was also often the case that utilities'
expansion plans represented self-prophesying fulfillments of bureaucratic ambition.34

As described in section 7.3, the 1990s restructuring of the ESI saw the electricity utilities
broken up, corporatised and in s o m e states privatised. N e w players were granted access as
generators, retailers, and network owners and operators; but the overall system operation
and regulation of the ESI remained a function of the state. Restructuring led to a massive
reduction of employment in the ESI, and significant price drops for large customers in the
short term—the long-term outcome is not clear. Thus, restructuring has furthered the
accumulation function of the ESI. However, because electricity supply remains a politically
sensitive issue, governments have continued to use the industry to meet certain social
objectives: for example, it has intervened to delay adverse impacts on the public by
regulating domestic tariffs.

Which groups then were the dominant interests served by arrangements in the ESI, both
before and after restructuring? Before restructuring, the industry's relative autonomy from
state control, notwithstanding the increasing push for accountability during the 1980s, and
its commitment to growth benefited administrative and provider groups. Other dominant
interests included large industrial electricity customers, and the coal and natural gas
industry. Arrangements in the industry also supported rural customers, w h o benefited from
rural electrification and uniform tariffs, and workers and communities dependent o n the
ESI, such as in Victoria's Latrobe Valley. Likewise, communities and businesses that
benefited from the establishment of n e w energy-intensive industries, such as aluminium
smelters, were served by these arrangements.35 T h e industry also furthered the interests of
the political representatives of all of these groups.

ESI restructuring furthered the interests of some demand groups, mainly large businesses
and industries, by enabling large tariff reductions. Workers and communities dependent on
the industry were in effect disenfranchised. With privatisation, liberalisation and the
beginning of hybridisation of the ESI, a range of n e w commercial interests entered the

Electric Utilities, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1988, chapter 7.
Aynsley Kellow, Transforming Power: the Politics of Electricity Planning, Cambridge
Press, Cambridge, 1996, pp. 3-4.
Don Siemon, "Energy policy without power", Chain Reaction, No. 33, 1983, pp. 26-28.
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industry, including financiers and Australian and international energy companies. Measures
introduced to foster renewable energy generation—green power and the Mandatory
Renewable Energy Target ( M R E T ) — h a v e seen m a n y of these n e w players, as well as s o m e
existing players, m o v e into the business of renewable power generation.

9.4.3 The Effect of Usage of Wind Power on Institutional Interests.
In this section I examine h o w the introduction of wind power has challenged or furthered
the interests built into the electricity sector.

Those with a direct interest in conventional generating plant—the coal industry, equipment
suppliers, and builders, owners and operators of coal-fired and large hydro power stations—
were threatened by the environmental demands associated with calls for wind power: an end
to flooding hydro, and reduced emissions of greenhouse gases and other pollutants from
fossil fuel plant. However, w h e n the greenhouse effect became a critical environmental
issue for the electricity sector, these conventional interests began to differentiate between
themselves. For example, the natural gas industry has recently embraced environmental
demands for greenhouse gas reduction, and portrayed natural gas as a greenhouse friendly
fuel.36 In early 2000, the Australian Gas Association, which represented the natural gas
industry, resigned from the Australian Industry Greenhouse Network, an industry group
representing high emitters of greenhouse gases,37 and sought to align itself with the
renewable energy camp, stating:
[The former] paradigm about energy security ... saw fossil fuels in one camp and non-fossil
fuels in another camp. In a greenhouse conscious world, the paradigm should shift and w e
should consider ... a package of those low emissions fuels—that can be renewables and
natural gas together and other fuels elsewhere.38

Fossil fuel interests have not been too concerned that wind power might displace
conventional plant, at least under the current renewables support mechanisms. Electricity

36
37

38

Emissions from natural gas per unit energy output are typically much less than thosefromcoal.
John Eyles (Executive Director, Australian Industry Greenhouse Network), Submission to Senate
Environment, Communications, Information Technology And The Arts References Committee,
Inquiry into Global Warming, Hansard, Australian Parliament, 20 March 2000, p. 143.
William Nagel (Chief Executive Officer, Australian Gas Association), Submission to Senate
Environment, Communications, Information Technology And The Arts References Committee,
Inauirv into Global Warming, Hansard, Australian Parliament, 23 March 2000, p. 390.
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demand has grown strongly, and the small growth in penetration of wind power and other
renewables from green power schemes and M R E T represents only a small proportion of this
growth. Indeed, following the introduction of green power schemes and M R E T , s o m e
companies with an interest in conventional plant or fuels m o v e d into the wind energy
industry. For these companies, wind power represented an additional business interest, one
that also enhanced their green image.

The ecological modernisation thesis, discussed in section 6.3.2, suggests that the outlook of
the mainstream environment m o v e m e n t and industries associated with environmental
technologies has started to converge, although there are still substantial differences. (It
should also be acknowledged that m u c h of Australian industry has not embraced the
ecological modernisation message.) Environmentalists and environmental technology
industries both view wind power in terms of the climate change agenda. However, to
industry, wind power and other environmental technologies represent an expanding
business opportunity, whereas to environmentalists, greater use of these technologies
represents part of a broader strategy to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases and other
pollutants. Environmentalists are also likely to be far more sensitive to the wider ecological
and social impacts of wind power and other environmental technologies. This is illustrated
by the ambivalence or opposition that some environmentalists have demonstrated towards
some renewable energy projects, such as biomass generators, controversial wind farms and
the proposed Derby tidal power plant.39

Given that large electricity customers have been the main group benefiting from ESI
restructuring, would the introduction of wind power challenge their interests? Large
customers were principally concerned with the cost of electricity supply and saw wind
power as a threat to this. A s described in section 7.4.2, representatives of these interests did
not object to voluntary schemes, (that is, green power) but argued against mandatory
schemes (that is, M R E T ) claiming that these would increase the price of electricity. Large
electricity customers could also be adversely affected if the cost of ancillary services
increases. A s described in chapter 8, this has been predicted for significant wind power
penetration. These interests were also opposed to environmental demands m a d e by
renewable energy advocates that would have increased the cost of electricity, in particular

See chapter 6, and section 7.4.5.
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the d e m a n d that environmental costs of energy supply be internalised through measures
such as carbon taxes.40 B y the late 1990s, however, sections of Australian business were
starting to heed the ecological modernisation message and looking to gain from business
opportunities arising from ratification of the Kyoto Protocol.41

The issue of how increased wind power usage would affect electricity prices was frequently
disputed. Electricity tariffs incurred by m u c h of Australian industry were a m o n g the
cheapest in the world, and electricity restructuring w a s intended to reduce these further.
W i n d power advocates argued that a substantial increase in wind generation would have
negligible effect on these tariffs.42 S o m e wind power advocates argued that conventional
economic assessments of energy options did not take into account the economic benefits of
installing modular, flexible plant. For example, as described in section 5.5.5, A u s W E A
challenged the H E C ' s economic assessments of wind power and hydro, arguing that if the
H E C were to opt for wind power they would reduce the risk of overcapacity and the
consequent large debt. However, reduced risk w a s not necessarily in the interests of large
electricity customers: as A n d r e w Blakers noted, overcapacity in generation gave large
industrial customers a clear advantage w h e n negotiating electricity prices, since they could
threaten to close d o w n or relocate thereby exacerbating the overcapacity and the utilities'
financial woes. 43

The main groups that lost out from the restructuring of the ESI were workers and
communities reliant on conventional generating plant in regional areas. W i n d power
advocates frequently argued that increased usage of wind power would benefit regional
areas through creation of jobs.44 W i n d power, they proclaimed, w a s more labour-intensive

40
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The federal government dropped the idea of a carbon tax in 1995 because of such concerns: "Canb
dumps carbon tax", Australian Financial Review, 14 February 1995, p. 3.
At the time of writing, the Australian government is not willing to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.
See for example McLennan Magasanik Associates, 2002, op. cit. M M A claimed that if the M R E T
was 5 % instead of 2 % , with the majority of the increase coming from wind power, the effect on
wholesale electricity prices would be about 0.1 c/kWh: "lower than many of the regular wholesale
price movements within the National Electricity Market".
Andrew Blakers, "Dam debt in Tasmania", Solar '94, Australian and N e w Zealand Solar Energy
Society Conference, Sydney, 30 November- 1 December 1994, pp. 18-23.
See for example the proposal by a group, including trade unionists, to establish major wind power
projects in Victoria, to provide thousands of jobs in the depressed Latrobe Valley region. Andrea
Carson, "Wind to' power Gippsland jobs", The Age, 15 November 1999; Fraser Brindley
(Earthworker Inc ) "The Earthworker industry plan", Australian Wind Energy Forum 00, Australian
Wind Energy Association, Churchill (Vic), 27-28 April 2000.
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than other energy sources: "Compared to conventional generation options, wind
development creates more jobs per dollar invested and per k W h generated".

A s described

in section 3.3, the criterion that environmental technologies should create jobs w a s an
important one for the early A T movement, and remained important long after the erosion of
AT's socio-political ideals. This w a s undoubtedly because structural unemployment
remained high in m a n y first world countries. Moreover, and particularly in Australia,
resource-based industries have often proclaimed that environmentalists' demands destroy
jobs. Environmentalists hope that if environmental technology industries create jobs this
perception can be countered.

On the other hand, jobs in the wind industry may displace other jobs, such as in the coal
industry, perhaps in different locations and requiring different types and levels of skill.46
Coal industry jobs m a y be a sensitive issue for governments, particularly as coal mining
jobs are often located in economically depressed areas. Decisions about electricity plant
m a y be based on the desire to protect these jobs. (In Australia, however, coal is a major
export; thus government decisions about coal are mostly premised on retaining export
markets.) O n the other hand, coal miners have often been amongst the most militant of
workers—this has historically been the case in Australia. Governments could base their
decisions about energy on the desire to crush coal-mining unions, as did the 1980s Thatcher
government in the U K . The promise of jobs in wind power will not necessarily sway
workers and communities dependent on conventional generating systems. These groups are
already allied, and thus can act as an effective lobby for conventional sources; those w h o
would gain from a future wind power industry are not.47

In Australia, following the MRET-inspired wind rush, the wind industry made much of its
ability to create local jobs in an attempt to gain local support for proposed wind farms. Yet
m a n y of the jobs created by wind power projects are in the manufacturing and construction

National Wind Coordinating Committee (USA), The Effect of Wind Energy Development on State
and Local Economies, Issue Brief No. 5, January 1997, Accessed 2 October 1999, <http://www.
nationalwind.org>. The source for this claim is a study conducted by the N e w York State Energy
Office, which compared the labour intensity of wind plant compared to coal- and gas-fired generating
plant. See also Paul Gipe, Wind Energy Comes ofAge, Wiley, N e w York, 1995, pp. 437-439.
Michael Grubb, Renewable Energy Strategies for Europe, Vol. 1: Foundations and Context, Royal
Institute of International Affairs and Earthscan, London, 1995.
Thomas Baumgartner and T o m R. Burns, Transitions to Alternative Energy Systems: Entrepreneurs,
New Technologies and Social Change, Westview Press, Boulder,, 1984.
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phase, while operation and maintenance requirements tend to be few. A n d although the
establishment of wind facilities m a y create local jobs in construction, most of the jobcreation benefits accrue only if there is a local manufacturing facility of wind system
components. A s described in section 6.5, Pacific Hydro used the promise of a local
manufacturing industry to win local support for the Portland W i n d Energy Project. Yet,
there can only be a few such facilities established in Australia.

I now turn to the question of whose interests were served by the greater use of wind power.
Prior to the introduction of green power and M R E T , groups with a direct interest in greater
use of wind power were few. The Australian wind power industry was tiny: there were
several companies manufacturing and/or installing small wind turbines, two manufacturers
of medium-sized wind turbines (which shifted to manufacturing small turbines after the mid
1980s), and a few representatives of overseas manufacturers. A u s W E A M a r k I represented
m u c h of this industry as well as those with a social and political interest in the greater use of
wind power: wind energy researchers; environmentalists committed to more sustainable
forms of electricity generation; and those wishing to build or use small-scale wind systems.
The economic interests of electricity utilities m a y have been served by the use of wind
power in some remote areas if it proved cheaper than diesel supply; however, the one utility
which tried this, S E C W A , did not find it a profitable venture until the 1990s. There are
windy remote areas in states other than W A where wind power would be economic; yet the
utilities have been very slow to install wind turbines at these sites. Only a few have been
installed, mainly during the late 1990s. Residents of these remote areas m a y have benefited
from the installation of wind turbines, since they are usually a tourist attraction and their
construction, operation and maintenance should provide some local employment. Yet some
of these residents did have want such a visible change to their electricity supply, since it
drew attention to the fact that their electricity was being heavily subsidised.

And what of the state agencies responsible for renewable energy, such as the Victorian
Solar Energy Council ( V S E C ) and the Solar Energy Research Institute of Western Australia
( S E R I W A ) ? Such agencies, of course, had a direct interest in supporting renewable energy,
and those w h o worked for such agencies were often advocates of renewable energy. Yet,
the main focus of V S E C and S E R I W A was solar energy. (That both their names included
the term 'solar energy' reflects that in the 1970s this was the umbrella term for renewable
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energy.) S E R I W A undertook research in the use of solar power in remote areas, though it
also provided funding for some of Western Australia's wind energy research.48 V S E C had
been directed to foster the commercialisation of solar heating technologies; however, it also
provided funding for some wind energy projects, and undertook a joint wind energy study
with the S E C V . Both of these agencies were very small with limited resources, and both
existed to further state government policy. However, they could in turn influence this,
particularly in Victoria, where V S E C was given a role in energy planning. A s agents of
state government policy responsible for a very specific area, these renewable energy
agencies were very vulnerable: for example, S E R I W A was closed d o w n in 1986.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, some electricity utilities began to recognise that
renewable energy could offer increased business opportunities. The greenhouse effect was
also becoming a policy issue, particularly as m u c h of the ESI relied on coal. S o m e utilities
began to consider ways in which wind power could be used for grid-connected electricity
supply. The ESI restructuring curtailed m u c h of this activity. The prospects for wind power
changed significantly in the late 1990s following the introduction of green power and the
promise of a renewable energy target. Recognising the n e w business opportunities in wind
power, a range of Australian businesses, financiers'and electricity companies m o v e d into
the wind industry and m a n y overseas wind companies began to set up in Australia.

I now turn to examine whether the Australian electricity utilities' stance towards wind
power was compatible with the expectation that they provide a reliable, secure and cheap
supply of electricity.

The utilities were of the view that wind power could be detrimental to system reliability
since it was intermittent and thus could not be relied upon during times of peak load and
could worsen the load-following demands imposed on other generators. Their initial
position was to allocate wind power no capacity credit, valuing it only as a fuel saver,
though as described in chapter 5, this view changed over the 1980s. W i n d power advocates
of the 1980s argued differently. W i n d turbines in large numbers were reliable, they argued,
since turbines typically had an availability better than 9 5 % , and the loss of a few turbines at
any given time had a negligible effect on output. However, the loss of a large fossil fuel-
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fired unit—these broke d o w n more often than individual wind turbines—posed a greater
threat to system reliability. That wind turbines were unreliable because the wind was
intermittent was seen as a more tractable problem if the utilities were willing and able to
implement demand-side measures. If, during times of peak demand, little wind power was
available, demand could be reduced through spot pricing or interruptible loads. But given
the electricity industry's neglect of demand-side management and the utilities' presumption
that demand must always be met, such arguments carried little weight. In Tasmania, where
nearly all electricity was generated from hydro power, wind power proponents argued that
wind power could enhance system reliability. The power available from hydro plants varies
with rainfall; hence, supplementing the system with wind power meant that the utility was
not putting all its eggs in the one basket. Yet, Tasmania already had an oil-fired power
station at Bell Bay, which was expensive to operate but fulfilled this purpose. A s discussed
in chapter 8, the issue of h o w wind power could affect system reliability was raised again in
the early 2000s, following the introduction of M R E T and the rapid growth in wind power
capacity. At the time of writing, there has been little debate on this issue.

The question of whether wind power could enhance long-term security of supply was
irrelevant for m a n y Australian utilities. The 1970s oil shocks had led several other
countries, particularly in Europe and North America, to investigate wind power as a means
of enhancing security of supply. Australia, with its large fossil fuel resources, did not
experience the same sense of urgency. The eastern mainland states had plentiful supplies of
cheap coal, and Western Australia's dependence on oil was alleviated once natural gas
became available. However, in the 1980s, wind power could have enhanced security of
supply in two states: Tasmania, which was running out of hydro sites to exploit; and South
Australia, which was negotiating a n e w natural gas contract with a private producer. In both
of these states, the electricity utilities investigated grid-connected wind power, though
neither state carried their wind programs through to the installation of grid-connected wind
turbines. B y the mid to late 1980s, circumstances in both states had changed: S A was
proceeding with an interconnection with Victoria; and Tasmania's electricity demand
growth had stalled, leaving it with substantial overcapacity.

In the 1990s, increased availability of natural gas saw this fuel come to be regarded as
viable option for power generation, and several gas pipelines were built to facilitate greater
use in power generation and heating. Natural gas also has m a n y of the advantages of wind
power—modularity, flexibility and reduced greenhouse gas emissions—without the
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disadvantage of intermittency. Indeed, natural gas is often regarded as a transition fuel in
the shift towards a future based on low greenhouse gas-intensive fuels. However, Australian
natural gas reserves are limited—reserves to production ratio has averaged about 9 0 years
for the last decade—and given the rapid growth in natural gas usage, this could reduce
significantly.49

And what of the utilities' role in providing electricity as cheaply as possible? Certainly cost
was frequently cited by the utilities as their reason for dismissing grid-connected wind
power. A n d cost w a s the main motivation for investigations of wind power in remote areas.
M a n y of the electricity utilities were seeking cheaper alternatives to diesel fuel in remote
areas, and saw wind power as a possible alternative in s o m e locations. However, until very
recently, the only electricity utility that pursued this option seriously w a s the State Energy
Commission of Western Australia ( S E C W A ) ; the other utilities took a m o r e conservative
approach. For example, in spite of numerous investigations, the Hydro-Electric Commission
of Tasmania took until 1998 to install wind turbines on King Island, one of the windiest
remote areas in Australia.

Aside from the general conservatism of the utilities, there are a number of problems with
the assumption that the utilities' wind power activities can be explained merely by the
relative cost of generating technologies. T h e utilities used deterministic electricity planning
methodologies;50 and the choice of planning methodologies affects the economics of
different options. (For example, wind power should be judged more favourably under
alternative planning methodologies such as least cost or integrated resource planning, since
it reduces risk.51) The economics of various options depended on the utilities' forecast of
demand growth, particularly w h e n deterministic planning w a s used; and m a n y of the
utilities' forecasts of the 1970s and 1980s proved to be wildly incorrect. T h e economics of
different options depended on the discount rate used—capital-intensive plant such as wind
turbines are m u c h more expensive at high discount rates compared with fuel-intensive
plant—and the choice of discount rate differed a m o n g the Australian utilities.52 Private
wind farm developers would have applied m u c h higher discount rates than the utilities. A s

Australian Gas Association, Australia's Natural Gas Supply, 2002, Accessed 1 January 2003,
<http:www.gas.asn.au>.
For criticism of this, see for example Kellow, 1996, op. cit.
See section 5.5.5 for AusWEA's arguments about this in Tasmania.
See section 2.2.5 and chapter 5.
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s o m e critics argued, the utilities' economic assessments might have been biased in favour of
the generating technology preferred by the utility, and against renewable energy options.53
A n d , as s h o w n in chapter 4, decisions in the electricity industry were m a d e on a number of
grounds: prior to the ESI restructuring, security of supply w a s a far more critical issue than
narrow economic criteria, and the industry w a s often used to meet various government
objectives, such as employment in regional areas

Overall, I have shown that an analysis of institutional interests is a key part of a
comprehensive explanation for the marginal status of wind power. However, investigations
into or deployment of wind power has been a result of successful strategies by wind power
advocates. This is the topic of the next section.

9.5 Change Agents
In their study of transitions to alternative energy systems, T h o m a s Baumgartner and T o m
B u m s emphasised the role played by change agents:
[T]he establishment and development of alternative energy system will require actors with
social power, knowledge and motivation to bring about the necessary changes in material,
cultural, and social organizational conditions.54
In this section I ask if any of the groups supporting wind powerfittedthe role of change
agent.

Many groups advocating wind power, including state renewable energy agencies, renewable
energy industry groups, renewable energy researchers and parts of the environment
m o v e m e n t , were also pushing other forms of renewable energy, and often energy efficiency
technologies including cogeneration. (The term 'sustainable energy' has been adopted to
cover all.55) A s described in chapter 4 and 7, these groups focused mainly on the promotion
of other technologies, particularly solar heating, photovoltaics, cogeneration and remote
area power supplies. T h e relative success of these technologies did little to help the fortunes

53

54

Some critics have made such arguments. For example, John Street discusses this for nuclear power in
the U K . John Street, Politics and Technology, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1992. Critics of the H E C
made this point during the Gordon-below-Franklin controversy. See for example, South West
Tasmania Committee ( N S W ) , Submission to Senate Select Committee on South West Tasmania,
Hansard, April 1, 1982. Blakers et al suggested that the utilities' negative attitude formed one of the
main institutional'barriers to greater use of wind power. Blakers et al, 1991, op. cit.
Baumgartner and Bums, 1984, op. cit., p. 15.
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of wind power. Associations representing the sustainable energy industry tended to reflect
the relative size of each sector, and until recently the wind power sector in Australia w a s
very

small. Over time, associations representing the sustainable energy

industry

amalgamated to lobby more effectively for more favourable conditions for the technologies
that they represented. Yet, while there were m a n y c o m m o n barriers facing sustainable
energy technologies, wind power also faced a number of unique barriers, particularly those
relating to its intermittency and its critical dependence on site-specific wind conditions. For
example, following the restructuring of the ESI, the Australian Ecogeneration Association
lobbied for fair network access and pricing arrangements for embedded generators.

This

was a significant barrier for forms of embedded generators with predictable output such as
cogenerators and waste-to-energy generators; but for wind power it w a s only one of m a n y
barriers.

In response to the relative neglect of wind power compared with other renewable energy
technologies, wind power advocates twice set up a wind energy association. These were
very different associations in keeping with circumstances of wind power at the time:
A u s W E A M a r k I (1980-87) represented the wind industry (typically those concerned with
small-scale, stand-alone systems), wind researchers, alternative technology advocates and
other wind energy enthusiasts; and A u s W E A M a r k II (1999 onwards) represented the wind
industry (particularly those concerned with large-scale grid-connected systems) including
the electricity utilities. M e m b e r s of A u s W E A M a r k I were in the main outside the arena
where decision-making about electricity supply occurred, but through various lobbying
efforts played a role in putting wind power on the policy agenda, notably in Tasmania. A s
described in section 5.5.5, they also attempted to start a wind turbine manufacturing
industry, without success. S o m e also worked on research projects aimed at overcoming lack
of knowledge about the viability of wind systems, on occasions in conjunction with the
electricity utilities.57 W h e n A u s W E A M a r k II w a s established, a renewable energy target

In section 6.4,1 described how this term is contested. Here I refer to the common usage of the term.
Australian Cogeneration Association, Removing Impediments to Cogeneration and Renewable
Energy in the National Electricity Market, Melbourne, June 2000; Australian Ecogeneration
Association, Submission: C O A G Energy Market Review, 19 April 2002, Accessed 6 August 2002,
<http://www.energymarketreview.org>. In 2001, A C A became the Australian Ecogeneration
Association, expanding its focus from cogeneration to include renewable energy and energy
efficiency. It later joined with the Sustainable Energy Industry Association to become the Australian
Business Council for Sustainable Energy.
Hugh Outhred, for example, did consulting work for the ESI. Mark Diesendorf s work is described in
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w a s in the offing. A s the prospects for wind power were looking increasingly favourable,
established energy companies m o v e d into the wind power industry. Such companies not
only worked through A u s W E A

and other lobby groups to achieve more favourable

conditions for wind power. They

could also influence conditions for the energy

technologies in which they had an interest, through their established links with other
electricity industry bodies. Indeed, as noted in section 2.2.6, H u g o Verheul and Philip
Vergragt observed that n e w environmental technologies m a y achieve success once
established players m o v e in.58

Could any groups within the electricity industry be regarded as change agents? Prior to the
restructuring of the ESI, the electricity utilities had a virtual monopoly on electricity supply,
and m a n y wind power advocates depicted the utilities as a major barrier to greater use of
wind power. 59 O f course, individuals within the electricity utilities initiated and worked on a
number of wind power projects, particularly for remote areas. Those in S E C W A and its
successor Western Power were instrumental in furthering knowledge of the operation of
wind-diesel systems, thereby enabling greater penetration of wind power in remote areas.
They formed effective links with manufacturers of wind turbines and designers of ancillary
equipment to facilitate this.

As described in chapter 8, the electricity utility that did the most to further the fortunes
grid-connected wind power in the era before M R E T w a s Pacific Power, and its precursor
Elcom, in N S W . In the late 1980s, Elcom recognised that renewable energy offered n e w
business opportunities, and was particularly supportive of photovoltaics. It also worked with
C S I R O to identify areas of N S W suitable for wind power. Previously it had been assumed
that the winds in N S W were poor, as N S W was far from the 'roaring forties' and did not
have coastlines facing the prevailing westerly winds. Pacific Power and C S I R O found that
inland areas in the Great Dividing Range experienced relatively high winds. Subsequently
they developed Australia'sfirstgrid-connected wind farm. Later, S E D A ' s WindBusiness
took on the role in facilitating greater use of wind power in N S W . 6 0 It recognised that N S W

i^i l a p it i ->.
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Hugo Verheul and Philip J. Vergragt, "Social experiments in the development of environmental
technology: a bottom-up perspective", Technology Analysis and Strategic Management, Vol. 27, No.
3,1995, pp. 315-326.
See for example Blakers et al, 1991, op. cit.
Sustainable Energy Development Authority, "WindBusiness", 2002, Accessed 5 January 2003,
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was relatively disadvantaged compared with states with southern and western coastlines. T o
attract wind farm developers, it gathered information on suitable locations for wind farms.

What role was played by the environment movement and renewable energy advocacy
groups? Their ability to influence renewable energy policy was greatly dependent on
external circumstances. In the period after the 1970s oil shocks, governments were
interested in developing renewable energy insofar as it could replace oil; however, this w a s
much narrower than environmentalists' aspirations for renewable energy. It w a s in Victoria
that environmentalists had the most success, albeit short-lived. A s described in section
4.5.3, the incoming Labor government of 1982 was favourably disposed to renewable
energy—at least in its rhetoric since little was achieved—and involved the renewable
energy community and others in energy planning. Leigh Glover noted that this was due to
the influence of the Socialist Left faction and environmentalists in the Labor Party.61 In
practice, the Labor Party's interest in renewable energy was driven by the commercial
opportunities, rather than the quest for environmental sustainability: its main aim w a s to
foster a local manufacturing industry of solar equipment. Yet even this commercial
direction was influenced by environmentalists: a group called Environmentalists for Full
Employment, Victoria had previously undertaken a study showing h o w a solar industry
could create jobs.62 O n e of the Labor Party's strategies has been to co-opt and integrate key
sections of social movements. It is no surprise that it would express support for one of the
symbols of the early environment movement: renewable energy.

As described in chapter 4, the attitude of Victorian Labor Party members towards the SECV
had also been shaped by the 1970s Newport power station dispute. After coming to power,
the Labor government sought to bring the S E C V under greater government control. It
changed the S E C V Act to require the S E C V to consider alternative energy options
including renewable energy, and established a Victorian Energy Plan, which enabled the
renewable energy community to participate in energy planning. Victoria also had a
dedicated renewable energy agency, the Victorian Solar Energy Council, which was
established in the late 1970s w h e n solar energy became popular. V S E C ' s policy objectives
included the study of Victoria's wind resources, and V S E C was a joint participant in

<http://www.seda.nsw.gov.au>
Leigh Glover, The Victorian Energy Plan, M. Env. Sc. Thesis, University of Melbourne, 1984.
John Andrews, Solar Jobs in Victoria: The Economic Impact of the Solar Industry, September 1982.
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Victoria's wind energy program, described in section 5.5.4.

The Victorian government's support for the environmentalists' agenda, however, was short
lived. In keeping with the general ideological shift of this period, the government soon
abandoned its interest in renewable energy and community energy planning to focus on
economic development, particularly through the exploitation of the state's fossil fuel
resources. (See section 4.5.3.) Writing in 1983 D o n Siemon noted:
[Although some business media have portrayed the government as heavily influenced by
the environment movement, the reality is very different. Deafened by their own election
rhetoric about 'soundfinancialmanagement', the ears of key decision-makers ... remain
closed to all but the melody of rapid brown coal exploitation.63

By the mid 1980s, popular interest in renewable energy was waning. So too was the resolve
of the environment m o v e m e n t and renewable energy advocacy groups to influence
renewable energy policy. For example, in submissions to the Victorian Natural Resources
and Environment Committee ( N R E C ) inquiry of 1986-88 into electricity planning
(described in chapter 4), most seemed to accept that renewables would continue to play a
very small role. V S E C , for example, focused on demand-side opportunities and recognition
of the environmental costs of fpssil fuel use, but accepted that little would be done to
promote m u c h greater use of renewables:
The Solar Council agrees with the Electricity Commission's conclusions in the light of
current marketing and promotional practice that the overall impact of renewable energy,
conservation and co-generation will be small by the mid 1990's and that these programs are
not a critical issue in determining the choice and sequencing of new generating plant.64

In the 1990s, the resurgence of popular concern over environmental problems, particularly
global environmental problems such as the threat of climate change from greenhouse gas
emissions, s a w environment and renewable energy advocacy groups grow in influence.
They had been influenced by the ideas of ecological modernisation, and they promoted
renewable energy as a growth industry for Australia. Such groups lobbied for and
influenced the forms of measures introduced to support renewable energy. These are
described in chapter 7.

Siemon, w>s,op. -u.,v.±»Victorian Solar Energy Council, Submission to the Natural Resources and Environment Committee,
Inquiry into Electricity Supply and Demand Beyond the Mid-1990s, July 1987.
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9.6 The Meaning of Wind Power
I n o w turn to ask what has been added to this history of wind power by making explicit two
themes: what it means for wind power to be regarded as an environmental technology; and
the significance of debates over the efficacy of wind power.

Clearly wind power's representation as an environmental technology has motivated popular
support for it, even though the environmental issues with which wind power is associated
have shifted over time. Since the late 1980s, wind power has become firmly linked with the
issue of climate change from greenhouse gas emissions; indeed, this association has been a
critical factor in the recent history of grid-connected wind power. Given the popular
association of wind power (and other forms of renewable energy) with concerns about
climate change along with the tangibility of renewable energy plant, government energy
policy has tended to favour measures to increase usage of renewable energy rather than
other measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions that might be more cost-effective but
less tangible, such as greater energy efficiency. Support for building n e w renewable energy
plant rather than for numerous small measures to enhance energy efficiency is also in
keeping with the pro-development ethic of m a n y governments.

In this thesis I have also traced the changing sociopolitical visions associated with wind
power over the past three decades.65 This has been key to understanding what has driven
advocacy of wind power. The 1970s and 1980s visions of sociopolitical change embraced
the desire for more democratic, participatory forms of social organisation, however this w a s
conceived. For some it meant building alternative communities; for others it meant greater
community control over technological practices, such as in the electricity industry. These
visions were important not merely because they encouraged a few advocates of alternative
technology to experiment with building and installing wind turbines, but principally
because they inspired a range of people to develop alternative expertise in energy planning,
policy and technologies. S o m e of these alternative experts played an important role in

Ulrik Jorgensen and Peter Karnoe, "The Danish wind-turbine story: technical solutions to political
visions?", in Arie Rip, Thomas, J. Misa and Johan Schot (eds), Managing Technology in Society: The
Approach of Constructive Technology Assessment, Pinter, London, 1995; Andrew Jamison, "On the
dialectics of sustainable technology", Conference on Cultural Politics of Sustainable Technology,
Amsterdam, 3 December 1998.
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putting wind power on the energy policy agenda in Australia.

The view which came to dominate in the 1990s, in business and energy policy circles as
well as in parts of the environment movement, was that involvement in wind power
represented a business opportunity, particularly since measures to curtail greenhouse gas
emissions were likely to become a permanent feature of energy policy. This view led a
number of energy companies to m o v e into the wind power business and to lobby for greater
government support for wind power. W h e n faced with opposition, they have linked wind
power to industrial growth and job creation in order to gain community support, rather than
seeking more democratic, participatory outcomes. A movement opposed to wind farm
development in scenic (particularly coastal) locations has emerged, and is portraying an
alternative picture: that of wind turbines as industrial technologies intruding into
environmentally sensitive landscapes; and that of wind farm developers as pushing their
o w n commercial interests ahead of community concerns. They are also advocating
increased energy efficiency as a less environmentally damaging w a y of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, at the time of writing, the environmental meaning of wind
power remains contentious.

Second, how useful is it to examine debates over wind power's technical capability?

Wind power advocates have argued for different institutional arrangements and different
planning and operational practices that would be more suited to greater use of wind power.
They have demonstrated h o w the characteristics of an existing system shape h o w the
efficacy of wind power is judged. Assessments of wind power can then be seen as
changeable in the face of broader changes in the economy, energy policy, the environment
agenda, the structure of the energy sector, operating and infrastructure development rules
for electricity markets, and the configuration of the electricity network including the nature
of other generators and loads.

This is not to deny that wind power has characteristics that may adversely affect other
system generators and users, given the existing configuration of the electricity system. In
particular, its diffuseness means that good wind sites m a y be serviced by weak grids, which
cannot handle too m u c h wind power without adverse effects on power quality. Thus they
m a y require additional network infrastructure to carry the electricity generated from a
substantial wind farm development to load centres. Yet the cost associated with this is a
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function of the existing configuration of the network, with established generators benefiting
from the existing infrastructure.

The intermittency of wind power can, at high levels of penetration, place more onerous
demands on other system generators. However, the problems caused by wind are in part due
to the inflexibility of other generators, and the traditional supply-side focus of the electricity
industry. The cost of operating more flexible plant to compensate for the variability in wind
power output also depends on the structure and operating rules of the electricity system.
Costs imposed on wind power for its intermittency will thus be dependent on h o w different
groups are able to influence operating rules and apportioning of costs.

9.7 Contingency and Inevitability
I n o w return to a question raised in chapter 1. Theorists of the social shaping of technology
(SST) have long rejected technologically determinist models, which depict technological
development as deriving from an inherent logic and being the principal determinant of
social change. They have emphasised that social forces shape the design and usage patterns
of technology.66 S o m e have also rejected socially determinist models, which depict stable
social interests as directing technological change.67 S S T

theorists thus emphasise

contingency, that our technologies could have been different.

Why then is one path chosen and not another? To what extent has the marginal status of
wind power in Australia been inevitable? W h a t would have had to be different in order for
wind power to have been more widely adopted? Is the marginal status of wind power an
outcome of a form of systemic exclusion connected to the structure and features of the
energy sector?68

I am not seeking here a broad explanation of the kind that could be gained from a

Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman (eds), The Social Shaping of Technology, Open University
Press, Milton Keynes, 1985.
Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes and Trevor Pinch (eds), The Social Construction of
Technological Systems, M I T Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1987; Wiebe. E. Bijker and John L a w (eds),
Shaping Technology / Building Society, M I T Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1992.
Claus Offe, "Structural problems of the capitalist state", in K. von Beyme (ed.), German Political
Studies 1, Sage, London, 1974; Russell, 1993, op. cit.; Donald MacKenzie, Knowing Machines:
Essays on Technical Change, M I T Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1996.
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comparative study of the fortunes of wind power in m a n y countries, an explanation that
appeals to factors such as energy resources distribution, political and administrative
arrangements, engineering traditions, or geography. I a m also not undertaking a micro
analysis of a single wind power episode in order to identify critical points, instances where
things could have turned out differently for a given project. Rather, I ask, given Australia's
plentiful fossil fuel and hydro resources, widespread electricity network, general geographic
and climatic conditions, and political structure, what would it have taken for the overall
trends in the uptake of wind power in Australia to have turned out differently?

The use of wind power in windy remote areas—islands and some coastal and elevated
regions—was widely portrayed as the most appropriate and likely application for wind
power in the short-term. Most remote communities relied on diesel as the energy source for
power generation, and since the 1970s oil shocks, m u c h attention has been given to finding
cheaper energy sources for these communities. Renewable energy has often been
considered a possible alternative. While the high cost of diesel would make the economics
of remote area wind power more favourable than in grid areas, installation of wind turbines
in remote areas is likely to be more difficult and costly than in grid areas. For example,
there is a high cost associated with transporting cranes to islands. Furthermore, uniform
tariff policies meant that there was little economic incentive for local residents to support
wind power, but good reasons for them to oppose, such as wind turbines degrading visual
amenity and drawing attention to their subsidisation.

Despite investigations being carried out by electricity utilities, energy agencies and resear
groups in all states during the 1980s, the only utility installing wind power capacity in
remote areas during the 1980s was S E C W A . O n the other hand, little was k n o w n about the
wind resource, in particular whether suitable locations could be found inland and in the
north. Given its seasonal variability, it took a long period (perhaps two years) of wind speed
monitoring to gauge the extent of the resource. Given its local variability, it m a y also have
been necessary to set up a number of monitoring stations within a small region. The utilities
other than S E C W A were intent on determining the economic viability and technical
performance of wind power prior to installation of wind turbines. A n d in the 1980s, there
w a s only a short period of time w h e n remote area wind power looked promising—from
about 1983, w h e n reliable medium-sized wind turbines became commercially available, to
1986, w h e n oil prices plummeted.
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In the 1990s, lower costs, increased size and improved performance of medium-sized wind
turbines saw several states install wind power capacity in remote areas. S E C W A (Western
Power) again took the lead. A s in the 1980s, it demonstrated a willingness to experiment
with wind power, increasing wind penetration on isolated grids, using flywheels as storage,
and installing wind turbines that could be lowered in cyclone areas. In other states, the
utilities demonstrated a more conservative attitude towards use of wind power in remote
areas even in locations where the wind resource was excellent. A s described in chapter 8,
from the late 1990s, the federal government introduced various mechanisms to subsidise the
cost of remote area wind power, some favouring projects with innovative components.
These mechanisms have made some remote area wind projects financially attractive.

SECWA / Western Power had a clear economic incentive to investigate alternative energy
sources since Western Australia has a substantial number of remote communities for which
grid extension was not a feasible solution, and the utility provided uniform tariffs. S o m e
other states chose to pursue significant grid extension, leaving fewer suitable remote areas.
Furthermore, m a n y remaining remote areas were inland, where the wind resource w a s
thought to be poor.

Thus we can easily imagine a scenario where there was greater use of wind power in remote
areas that had a reasonable wind resource: the utilities could have pursued options other
than grid extension; electricity tariffs for remote area communities could have been less
subsidised, giving locals an economic reason to support wind power; the utilities in
different states could have been more willing to share the wind power expertise developed
in Western Australia; the utilities could have been less conservative in their approach to
new technologies. But even if the utilities had installed wind power capacity in all of the
suitable remote areas, the total amount of wind power capacity would still be very small.

Remote households were another possible market for wind power. Governments did not
providefinancialsupport for renewable energy remote area power supplies ( R A P S ) until
the late 1980s; indeed as noted in section 4.5.2, they had earlier discriminated against R A P S
systems. Although photovoltaic systems are m u c h more expensive than wind systems, wind
has some other disadvantages, as described in section 5.4.1. Photovoltaics have become the
favoured option for R A P S systems, and recently governments have provided greater
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subsidies for photovoltaic systems. Australia also has a strong history in photovoltaics and
R A P S research, with researchers and industry working closely together over m a n y years.

Given a stronger local wind industry, including installers, it is possible that many more
remote householders could have opted for wind power; yet a stronger local industry would
probably have required greater government and utility support for remote area wind power
and perhaps a stronger history in wind power research and development. But again the total
wind power capacity contributed by this market would be negligible.

It was in grid areas where greater use of wind power could have made a significant
difference. Indeed, since M R E T was introduced in 2001, several wind farms have been
constructed and a large amount of wind power capacity, perhaps thousands of megawatts, is
being planned. The current beginning of a 'wind rush' suggests that, given the right
incentive structures, wind power need not remain a marginal technology. Before I consider
the M R E T period, I ask what could have been different in the previous period, when there
was nofinancialincentive applying to wind power.

SA and Tasmania, the states that were uncertain about future energy supplies, probably
offered wind power the best prospects, since wind power could enhance security of supply.
Both states also have an excellent wind resource. In Tasmania, which relied almost solely
on hydro, wind could have complemented hydro, and enhanced system reliability. In
Tasmania, the H E C ' s commitment to hydro development probably hindered consideration
of wind power in the 1980s. But given that the H E C became enthusiastic supporters of wind
power in the 1990s, their earlier attitude could have been different. A s noted above, the
utilities seem to have been more intent on maintaining control over electricity supply than
committed to a particular energy source. Utilities have also been m u c h more focussed on
supply-side rather than demand-side options. In Tasmania, wind power has represented a
n e w supply-side option once the possibilities for hydro development diminished.

The utilities repeatedly maintained that wind power was not economic compared with
conventional energy sources. Yet the utilities' economic assessments of wind power were
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The federal government's photovoltaic rebate program introduced in 2000 substantially reduces the
cost of P V systems. Robert Hill (Federal Minister for the Environment), "Major boost for clean,
green and solar energy", Media release, 15 December 1999.
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shaped by their values. For example, debates about the capacity credit of intermittent
sources such as wind power reflected the utilities' supply-side orientation, their belief that
demand always had to be met. T h e high-growth mentality meant that modular, flexible
sources were not valued as m u c h as they m a y have been if low growth w a s expected. Lack
of inter-state cooperation and lack of grid interconnection—apart from, in a limited form,
N S W and Victoria and later South Australia—also affected economic assessments of wind
power. Strongly interconnected grids that operate as a single system can share reserve
capacity and enable highly dispersed wind systems, both of which should increase the value
of wind to the electricity grid.

The electricity utilities also had jurisdiction over the economic assessment of renewables.
Assessments m a y well have turned out differently if renewable energy agencies had
undertaken these. For example, V S E C m a d e the following remark about the S E C V during
the N R E C inquiry, described in section 4.4.4:
It is important that the economic parameters used in assessing viability of renewable energy
or other supply options are unbiased ... Such studies should not be undertaken by the utility
but by some independent authority with input from interested organisations. A rational
economic assessment method should be established. Further, the cost of conventional
energy including electrical energy, should reflect true resource depletion, social and
environmental costs.70

Differences in institutional structure of the energy sector, in particular whether there was an
agency directly responsible for renewable energy such as V S E C , could have affected the
fortunes of wind power. A s described in chapter 4, V S E C played a key role in Victoria's
wind power activities of the 1980s. H a d more resources been devoted to V S E C , and its
priorities shifted from solar heating to wind power, the fortunes of wind power could have
been quite different.

The timing of support for wind power also affected the fortunes of wind power. Had the
Australian government supported the development of a local wind power industry in the
early to mid 1980s by fostering a market for wind turbines, wind power m a y have had
greater success in this earlier period. The presence of a local wind industry would m a k e it
more likely that support mechanisms would target wind power.
70

Victorian Solar Energy Council, Comments on Inquiry into Electricity Supply and Demand Beyond
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Since the establishment of M R E T , the rapid growth in wind facilities being planned is
revealing various institutional obstacles. These include the absence of planning guidelines,
insufficient transmission facilities and inadequate mechanisms for funding these, and
provisions in the National Electricity Code not conducive to wind power. But the
introduction of M R E T (and, to a lesser extent, green power) has led to a rapid growth in the
support base for wind power. W i n d power advocates n o w include governments, mediumsized and large players in the electricity industry, and m a n y newcomers including large
financial institutions. These players c o m m a n d significant economic and political resources,
and are currently expending m u c h effort to overcome the institutional obstacles to wind
power. O f course, if these obstacles prove more intractable than originally envisaged, these
players m a y well m o v e out of the wind industry. A s a relative latecomer, Australia is also in
a position to learn from the obstacles inadequately addressed in other countries, such as the
ad hoc planning approach in the U K , which for a time saw the majority of wind farm
proposals denied planning permission.

The incentive structure that has led to the current 'wind rush' is one that enables private
operators and s o m e existing electricity utilities to turn wind into a profitable venture. This
situation is consistent with the point m a d e above: that the success of environmental
technology initiatives is often due to them being taken over by existing corporate interests.71
Such interests m a y also be well placed to lobby for removal of institutional obstacles to
wind power. This suggests that the introduction of corporate values into the electricity
industry as a result of liberalisation and corporatisation along with the introduction of
financial incentives by governments have led to a favourable outcome for wind power.

But could wind power have succeeded without restructuring of the ESI and without the
introduction of the M R E T ? Quite possibly. B y the 1990s, some of the electricity utilities
were becoming more accountable to governments, more willing to embrace alternative,
small-scale

generation

options

including private generation, and

more

open

to

environmental demands including greenhouse gas reduction. However, the history of the
S E C V ' s wind activities from the late 1980s until restructuring suggests that the uptake of
wind power would have proceeded slowly without strong government intervention.

71

the Mid-1990s Preliminary Report and Draft Recommendations,
Verheul and Vergragt, 1995, op. cit.
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Overall, this posing of a counterfactual, along with the rapid change in wind power's
fortunes following the introduction of M R E T , suggest that the fortunes of wind power are
strongly shaped by the structural location of wind power advocates and their ability to
access and mobilise resources. Hence an analysis of institutional interests is key to an
explanation of this history of wind power.

9.8 Lessons for Wind Power Advocates
In this chapter I have argued for and demonstrated the value of explaining the history of
wind power by using a variety of approaches, in particular by integrating contextual and
interpretive approaches. This has allowed us to better understand the complexities of factors
influencing the treatment of wind power. It has also allowed us to ask what changes would
have been required to enable greater use of wind power. The framework developed here
could, I believe, be applied to explaining the history of other environmental technologies.

At the time of writing, the fortunes of wind power are looking quite favourable in Australia,
but are very m u c h contingent upon the continuation of the Mandatory Renewable Energy
Target or another support scheme and, to a lesser extent, rising community support for
green power. Although this thesis does not specifically address policy questions such as
what is required for the long-term success of wind power, I wish to conclude by briefly
asking what lessons wind power advocates can draw from this study.72

An obvious conclusion is that support mechanisms aimed at renewable energy have been
crucial in increasing the deployment of wind power. Recently introduced support
mechanisms include M R E T , green power, the Renewable Energy Commercialisation
Program, the Renewable Energy Showcase, and the Renewable Remote Power Generation
Program. Because of the success of these mechanisms, wind power advocates have been
lobbying governments to provide more funding, to promote greater uptake of green power
and to increase the target for M R E T .

72

For an analysis of how the Social Shaping of Technology can be applied to renewable energy policy,
see Harald Rohracher, Technology Policy - Would Social Studies of Technology Make a Difference,
Inter-University Research Centre for Technology Work and Culture, University of Graz, 1998.

Chapter 9: Discussions and Conclusions

425

This study has shown h o w the fortunes of wind power have been shaped by the institutional
context. It has also shown h o w periods w h e n systems are changing m a y offer useful
opportunities for intervention. This suggests that advocates of wind power need to focus on
more than just lobbying for extension of support mechanisms. Indeed, short-term support
mechanisms m a y not necessarily further the long-term fortunes of wind power in Australia
unless institutional change can also be achieved. Government support for renewable energy
can be readily withdrawn—indeed, as noted in section 7.4.2, a recent review of Australia's
energy markets recommended that M R E T be scrapped. Thus, I argue, advocates of wind
power need to focus on achieving institutional change, and should regard support
mechanisms as a means of achieving this, rather than as ends in themselves. Periods when
conditions for wind power are comparatively favourable, such as under the current M R E T ,
and periods w h e n electricity systems are undergoing change probably offer the best
opportunity for achieving such institutional change.

This study has also shown that the meaning of wind power, including its efficacy, is still
contested. Still evident are debates about whether wind power developments are appropriate
in scenic areas, about whether wind power is the most effective w a y to achieve reduction in
greenhouse gas emissions, about whether targeting wind power for special assistance is an
appropriate w a y of providing employment opportunities, about whether and h o w benefits to
local communities should be incorporated into wind power developments. Current support
mechanisms for grid-connected wind power were introduced because of popular support for
renewable energy. Yet this popular support m a y be premised on relatively uninformed ideas
about energy supply and use, and m a y well be contingent upon whether future wind power
developments are considered appropriate. Also still evident are debates about the effect of
decentralised and intermittent generators on the electricity grid and h o w such effects should
be costed and managed. These debates will undoubtedly continue as the nature of the
electricity system evolves, particularly with increased hybridisation and changes to the
National Electricity Code. Indeed, some characteristics of wind power are quite different to
those of other decentralised and intermittent sources, and at present are regarded by the
electricity system operators and network operators as unfavourable. Thus wind power
advocates should participate in these debates, rather than allowing other interests to speak
for them. Although entrenchment of existing electricity supply and usage practices m a k e it
difficult to impose alternative interpretations of the efficacy of wind power, periods of
system change m a y offer an opportunity.
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In section 2.2.6, I examined the idea that successful management of niches for n e w
technologies can eventually lead to socio-technical change. Applications for wind power
such as remote area power supplies, and support mechanisms such as green power and
M R E T can all be regarded as niches. That is, they offer a protected space for the n e w
technology where it is shielded for a time from market forces.

Kemp et al have suggested how niches should be managed to increase the likelihood of
successful diffusion of the n e w technology, emphasising the need to foster learning and
network-building. They compared wind power policies introduced in D e n m a r k

and

California in the period following the 1970s oil shocks. California offered substantial
economic incentives for wind power, leading to a wind power b o o m . This w a s followed by
a bust after the incentives were withdrawn. California's policies did not lead to a successful
wind power industry—indeed they caused m u c h damage to wind power's reputation,
particularly since owners had little incentive to keep the wind turbines operating. In
contrast, Denmark introduced a range of policies including support for R D & D , the setting
of standards for wind turbines, regulations on siting, and investment subsidies. They
adapted these over time with experience and changing circumstances.
Unlike the Califomian policy that merely created a market for wind power through tax
credits and buy-back regulation, the Danish policy toward wind power was much more
oriented to learning, fostering collaboration and institutional adaptation, and correcting
undesirable outcomes.73

My final suggestion to wind power advocates is that MRET (and to a lesser extent green
power) should be viewed as such a niche, where wind power is relatively shielded from
market forces. This provides an opportunity for learning, for network-building and for
furthering institutional adaptation. Making the most of this opportunity should assist the
long-term fortunes of wind power.

Rene Kemp, Arie Rip and Johan Schot, "Constructing transition paths through the management of
niches", in Raghu Garud and Peter Karnoe (eds), Path Dependence and Creation, Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates, Mahwah (New Jersey), 2000, p. 287.
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